







zu 507/2



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2014

<https://archive.org/details/donjohnofaustria02stir>

DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA

DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA

OR

PASSAGES FROM THE HISTORY OF THE
SIXTEENTH CENTURY 1547-1578

Illustrated with numerous Wood Engravings



BY THE LATE

SIR WILLIAM STIRLING-MAXWELL, BART.

AUTHOR OF 'THE CLOISTER LIFE OF CHARLES V.' ETC.

IN TWO VOLS.—VOL. II.

LONDON: LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

MDCCCLXXXIII.



Printed by R. & R. CLARK, Edinburgh.



CHAPTER I.

	PAGE
EXPEDITION TO TUNIS AND CAPTURE OF THE CITY; FROM MARCH 1573 TO FEBRUARY 1574	1

CHAPTER II.

ACCOUNT OF THE TROUBLES AT GENOA, 1573-1576; AND THE VISIT OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA TO VIGEVANO, MILAN, PIACENZA, AND OTHER PLACES IN THE NORTH OF ITALY, IN MAY, JUNE, AND JULY, 1574	25
---	----

CHAPTER III.

THE LOSS OF TUNIS AND GOLETTA; DON JOHN'S VISIT TO SPAIN IN 1575; HIS RETURN TO ITALY AS VICAR-GENERAL FOR THE KING; HIS APPOINTMENT AS VICEROY OF THE NETHERLANDS; AND HIS SECOND VISIT TO SPAIN; FROM AUGUST 1574 TO OCTOBER 1576	64
--	----

CHAPTER IV.

SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE NETHERLANDS, ESPECIALLY OF THE TROUBLES SINCE THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP II. (1555-1576)	129
---	-----

CHAPTER V.

THE NETHERLANDS; JOURNEY THITHER OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA, AND EVENTS THERE FROM THE END OF OCTOBER 1575 TO THE 1ST OF MAY 1577	184
---	-----

CHAPTER VI.

	PAGE
AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS ; FROM THE BEGINNING OF MAY TO THE END OF JULY 1577	222

CHAPTER VII.

AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS ; FROM THE END OF JULY TO THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER 1577	244
--	-----

CHAPTER VIII.

AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS ; FROM THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER 1577 TO THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY 1578	261
---	-----

CHAPTER IX.

AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS ; FROM THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY TO THE END OF APRIL 1578	284
---	-----

CHAPTER X.


AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS ; FROM THE END OF APRIL TO THE DEATH OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA ON THE 1ST OF OCTOBER 1578	312
---	-----

CHAPTER XI.

FINAL NOTICES OF MATTERS CONNECTED WITH DON JOHN	340
--	-----

APPENDIX.

	PAGE
I. Despatch from Don John of Austria to Philip II. 16th February 1570, describing the taking of Galera	364
II. Fragment of a Letter from Don John of Austria to Doña Magdalena de Ulloa, August or September 1570	372
II*. Letters from Don John of Austria to the Prince of Eboli and Philip II., Barcelona, 8th and 10th July 1571, representing the grief which an order issued by the King had caused him	376
III. Notice of, and Extracts from, the Report presented to the Doge and Senate of Venice, by Sebastian Veniero, Captain-General of the Fleet of the Republic at Lepanto, on his return from service, 29th December 1572	384
IV. Report presented to the Doge and Senate of Venice, by Giacomo Foscari, on his return from service as Captain-General of the Fleet of the Republic, in the years 1572-3	414
V. Six Letters of Don John of Austria to Don Rodrigo de Mendoza, written in the Netherlands between 5th November 1576 and 20th July 1578	436
V*. Letter from Don John of Austria to Philip II., Beaumont, 20th April 1578, on the death of his Secretary, Juan de Escovedo	464
<i>Of the above Papers the originals, Spanish or Italian, are accompanied by an English translation.</i>	
VI. Bibliography of the History of Don John of Austria	468
INDEX	505



ARMS OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA.




DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA. Head (full size) from the print in J. Schrenckius; <i>Aug. Imp. Regum, etc., Imagines</i> . Cēniponti, 1601. Fol.; within a wreath from Heinrich Vogther's <i>Kunstbüchlein</i> ; Strasburg, 1538. 4°	Title-page
ORNAMENTAL SCUTCHEON. Designed by Jean de Laune and engraved by Etienne de Laune, 1578 and 1579. The arms of Stirling-Maxwell inserted instead of the artists' names . . .	PAGE iv
HEAD-PIECE. Contents. From <i>Spits-Boeck der Gout en Silversmeden</i> . [Amst.], 1617. 4°	v
ARMS OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA. From <i>Equile Joannis Austriaci, declin.</i> a J. Stradano. (circa 1580). Obl. fol.	viii
HEAD-PIECE. Illustrations. From <i>Spits-Boeck der Gout en Silversmeden</i> . [Amst.], 1617. 4°	ix
SWORD OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA; <i>Armeria Real</i> at Madrid, 1762	xiii
DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA. From a German print of the 16th century	xiv
LABEL. From <i>Vita di Carlo Quinto Imp. descritta da</i> M. Lodovico Dolce. In Vinegia, appresso Gab. Giolito de' Ferrarii, 1567. 4°	i
INITIAL LETTER S. From Homeri <i>Ilias</i> per Laur. Vallen. in <i>Latinum sermonem traducta</i> . Venetiis (Joan. Tacuinus), 1507. Fol. . .	i
DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA. Half length, with a lion. From a Picture (life size) in the possession of Don Valentin Carderera at Madrid	5
DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA. Medal struck in honour of the taking of Tunis, 1573	15
MARY, QUEEN OF SCOTLAND. From a print by Jean Rabel . . .	23
ANDREA DORIA. From the print in Lor. Capelloni; <i>Vita del principe Andrea Doria</i> . Vinezia (G. Giolita), 1565 . . .	25

INITIAL LETTER I. From F. M. Grapaldus; <i>De Partibus Ædium</i> ; Parmæ (O. Saladus et T. Ugoletus), 1516. 4°	25
GRAND-DUCAL CROWN OF TUSCANY, presented to Cosimo I. by Pius V. From Ald. Mannucci; <i>Vita de Cosimo de' Medici Primo Gran-duca della Toscana</i> . Bologna, 1589. Fol. Catena, <i>Vita di Pio V.</i> Roma, 1587, sm. 8° p. 132, says the crown was designed by Pius with his own hand, and he gives the inscription (which was also dictated by the Pope) thus:—PIVS . V . PONT . MAX . OB . EXIMIAM . DILECTIONEM . AC . CATHOLICÆ . RELIGIONIS . ZELVM . PRÆCIPVVM . Q . IVSTITIÆ . STVDIVM . DONAVIT	26
COSIMO I. GRAND DUKE OF TUSCANY. Reduced from the print sometimes found in the <i>Vita di Cosimo de' Medici, primo Gran Duca di Toscana, descritta da</i> Aldo Mannucci, Bologna, 1586. Fol.	27
ANTOINE DE PERRENOT, Bishop of Arras, afterwards Cardinal Granvelle. From a print by Martin Rota	35
GIOVANNI ANDREA DORIA. Medal. Date, 1600	37
CESARE NEGRI, Dancing Master of Don John of Austria. From the portrait by Leone Pallavicino, prefixed to <i>Nuove Inventioni di Ballare, Opera . . . di C. Negri</i> . Milano, 1604. 4°	54
OTTAVIO FARNESE, PRINCE OF PARMA. From a print by N. Nelli	59
KNIGHTS TILTING. Jobst Amman	61
KNIGHTS IN A MÊLÉE. Jobst Amman. From <i>Thurnierbuch</i> . Frank- furt, 1566. Fol.	63
FRIEZE. From <i>Novum Testamentum [Græcum]</i> Lutetiæ, ex. off. Roberti Stephani, 1550. Fol.	64
INITIAL LETTER D. From <i>Xenophon's Commentarien . . . durch Hieronym. Boner auss dem Latein inns Theutsch gebracht . . . Getruckt zu Augspurg durch Heinrich Stainer</i> , 1540. Fol.	64
DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA. Bust from the Statue at Messina	65
GABRIEL SERBELLONE, General of Artillery. From J. Schrenckius; <i>Imperatorum Regum, etc., Imagines</i> . Cœniponti, 1601. Fol.	83
MARY, QUEEN OF SCOTLAND. Medal	127
BURGONET OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA. In the <i>Armeria Real</i> at Madrid, No. 401	128
FERNANDO DE TOLEDO, Duke of Alba, Governor-General of the Netherlands, etc. From a contemporary print	129

INITIAL LETTER P. From Isidori; <i>Etymologiarum opus, Idem de Summo bono</i> . Without date and name of place or printer; but probably printed in Germany, early in the 16th century . . .	129
PHILIPPE MARNIX DE ST ^E . ALDEGONDE. From <i>Præstantium aliquot Theologorum qui Rom. Antichristum præcipue oppugnarunt Effigies</i> . . . <i>Opera</i> Jac. Verheiden. Hagæ Comitis, 1602. Sm. fol. . .	145
BORDER. From <i>De Insulis nuper inventis F. Cortesii narrationes</i> . Colon. 1532	145
PHILIP II. Medal of the Beggars—Les Gueux, in the Netherlands, 1567	150
ARMS OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA. From <i>La Austriada</i> da Juan Rufo. En Alcalá por Iuan Gracian, 1586. In 8°. . .	178
ARMS OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA. On the title-page of <i>Véritable Récit des choses passées és Pays-Bas</i> . Louvain, 1578. 8°. . .	178
ROYAL ARMS OF SPAIN. Temp. Philip II. From the title-page of Chr. Acosta; <i>Tratado en loor de los Mugerres</i> . In Venetia, presso Giac. Cornetti, 1592. <i>Franco</i> . f. 4°.	183
FRIEZE	184
INITIAL LETTER H, with Crown and Crescent, from <i>Henrici II. Gallie Regis Elogium</i> . Lutet. Par. apud Mich. Vascasanum, 1560. 4°.	184
DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA. Reduced from a contemporary print, probably executed at Venice	187
ELIZABETH, QUEEN OF ENGLAND. From the print by A. Wiercx . . .	209
DEVICE. From Cl. Paradin; <i>Devises Heroïques</i> . Lion (Jean de Tournes), 1557. Sm. 8°.	221
FRIEZE. From <i>Novum Testamentum [Græcum]</i> Lutetiæ, ex. off. Roberti Stephani, 1550. Fol.	222
INITIAL LETTER O. From Isidori; <i>Etymologiarum opus, Idem de Summo bono</i> . Without date and name of place or printer; but probably printed in Germany, early in the 16th century . . .	222
HENRY IV., KING OF NAVARRE, AND MARGARET OF VALOIS, QUEEN OF NAVARRE. From woodcuts in <i>Promptuarii Iconum</i> . Lugduni; apud Gul. Rovillium, 1581. 4° Pars ii.	234
MARGARET OF VALOIS, QUEEN OF NAVARRE. From a drawing by Janet	236
MARGARET OF VALOIS, QUEEN OF NAVARRE	239

	PAGE
BORDER. From <i>De Insulis nuper inventis F. Cortesii narrationes</i> . Colon. 1532	239
DEVICE OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA. An olive cutting, with motto, <i>Etiā Majora</i> . From his portrait in F. Tertius; <i>Imagines</i> <i>Austriacæ Gentis</i> . (Eniponti, 1572	243
WILLIAM THE SILENT, PRINCE OF ORANGE. From a print by H. Wiercx	244
INITIAL LETTER T. From <i>Destructorium Vitiorum</i> . (Genevæ, ap. Joan Belot? 1500.) 4º	244
SOLDIERS PLAYING AT BACKGAMMON. From Jobst Amman; <i>Charta</i> <i>Lusoria</i> . Nürnberg, 1588	260
FRIEZE. Æneas Vicus	261
INITIAL LETTER U. From <i>Verschung Leib Seel Ehr und Gut</i> . 1489. Without name of place or printer. 4º	261
ARCHDUKE MATTHIAS. From a print in Ad. van Meerbeeck; <i>Chroniecke</i> . Antwerpen, 1620. Fol.	268
KNIGHT ON HORSEBACK, with the Arms and Device of Don John of Austria on the Horse-Furniture. Copied, with the excep- tion of the Arms and Device, from a print in <i>Patriciarum</i> <i>Stirpium urbe Augustæ Vindelicorum Insignia, cælo</i> Raph. Custodis <i>expressa</i> . Augsburg, 1613	283
FRIEZE. Æneas Vicus	284
INITIAL LETTER A. From Isidori; <i>Etymologiarum opus, Idem de</i> <i>Summo bono</i> . Without date and name of place or printer; but probably printed in Germany, early in the 16th century	284
JOHN CASIMIR, Count Palatine, etc. Medal struck on occasion of his expedition into Belgium, 1578. From J. J. Luckius; <i>Sylloge Numismatum</i> . Argent. 1600. Fol.	302
ARMS OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA. From a print, 5¼ inches high by 4½ wide, on the title-page of <i>Reglas de la Cavalleria . . .</i> <i>compuestas por</i> Fed. Grison, <i>y traduzidas por</i> Antonio Florez de Benavides. [En Baeça, en casa de Iuan Bautista de Montoya, 1568.] 4º	311
FRIEZE. From <i>Novum Testamentum [Græcum]</i> Lutetiæ, ex. off. Roberti Stephani, 1550. Fol.	312
INITIAL LETTER W. From <i>Xenophon's Commentarien . . . durch</i> <i>Hieronym. Boner auss dem Latein inns Theutsch gebracht . . .</i> Getruckt zu Augspurg durch Heinrich Stainer, 1540. Fol.	312


DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA. From a picture, supposed to be by a Flemish artist, now in the Royal Museum at Madrid. (<i>Catalogo</i> , No. 1737.) On canvas, 8 ft. high by 4 ft. 2 in. 6 lines wide .	317
DEVICE ON THE BANNER OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA in the Netherlands, as described by L. Vanderhammen; <i>Don Juan de Austria, Historia</i> . Madrid, 1627. 4 ^o fol. 320 .	339
DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA. Head from the Statue at Messina, within a border, copied from the portrait of Fran. Sansovino in his <i>Simolacro di Carlo V.</i> Venetia app. Fran. Franceschini, 1567. 8 ^o	340
INITIAL LETTER D. From Homeri <i>Ilias</i> per Laur. Vallen. in <i>Latinum sermonem traducta</i> . Venetiis (Joan. Tacuinus), 1507. Fol.	340
DEVICE. From Cl. Paradin; <i>Devises Heroiques</i> . Lion (Jean de Tournes), 1557. Sm. 8 ^o	362
ORNAMENT. From <i>Spits-Boeck der Gout en Silversmeden</i> . [Amst.], 1617. 4 ^o	363
TAIL-PIECE. Frieze. From Cornelii Nepotis <i>Vitæ . . . imperatorum</i> . Basileæ (H. Petri) 1863. Fol.	504
HEAD-PIECE. Index. From H. Natalis <i>Adnot. et Medit. in Evangelia Antverpiæ</i> , 1595. Fol.	505



SWORD OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA.



DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA.



EXPEDITION TO TUNIS AND CAPTURE OF THE CITY; FROM
MARCH 1573 TO FEBRUARY 1574.



SOON after the withdrawal of Venice from the Holy League, Don John of Austria performed an act of graceful generosity which obtained the general applause of Europe. It will be remembered that at the battle of Lepanto the two sons of Ali Pasha, Commander-in-chief of the Turkish fleet, with their tutor Mahomet, fell into the hands of the conqueror. Mahomet, the elder of the lads, died during the following winter (1571-72)

at Naples. The younger, Said, was, by order of the King of Spain, sent to Rome and placed under priestly care, with a view to his conversion, which, however, was not effected. The tutor, having been set at liberty by Don John at Corfu immediately after the battle,¹ returned to Constantinople; and between this man and an agent of Don John, who accompanied him, negotiations were there carried on for the ransom of the youths. Towards the end of March 1573 a fine Turkish vessel appeared at Naples, having on board the tutor Mahomet, who was the bearer of a letter to Don John, together with a rich present from Fatima, the sister of the captive. The present consisted of Persian furs and tapestry, Damascus swords and daggers magnificently mounted with jewels,

¹ Vol. I. p. 438.

a silver bow, quiver, and belt, which had belonged to Sultan Solymán, embroidery and perfumes, and various other specimens of Oriental taste and skill.¹ The letter was as follows:—

“GREAT LORD—After kissing the ground upon which your Highness treads, that which the poor and miserable orphan desires to make known to your Highness her lord is how grateful I am for the favour which you have done us all, not only in giving freedom to our servant Mahomet, but also in sending him to bring us tidings how, after the death of my father and the rout of our fleet, my poor orphan brothers remained alive in your Highness’s power, for which I still pray God to grant your Highness many years of life. That which now remains, my lord, for me and all our family to do, is to entreat your Highness by the soul of Jesus Christ, by the life of your Highness, by the head of your mother, by the soul of your father the Emperor, by the life of His Majesty the King your brother, to do us the grace and charity of granting liberty to these poor orphans.

¹ They are thus enumerated by H. de Torres y Aguilera (*Chronica*, f. 92):—

4 robes of sable.

2 robes of lynx-skins.

1 robe of ermine.

1 robe of lynx-skins and crimson satin, with a border of brocade worked with Persian histories, which belonged to the King of Persia.

6 pieces of very fine brocade, each $3\frac{1}{2}$ canas, or somewhat less than 7 yards long.

2 boxes of fine porcelain of the Levant.

1 box of Turkish handkerchiefs and napkins of silk, silver, and gold.

1 coverlet of silk patchwork (*cortaduras*) embroidered with gold.

1 coverlet of quilted brocade.

A quantity of leather table-covers.

A Damascus sword, mounted with gold, set with fine turquoises, which belonged to the Sultan.

5 gilt bows, with 500 arrows, richly wrought with gold and enamel, with their perfumed quivers and belts, which belonged to the Sultan.

A quantity of feathers of all colours.

A little box of buttons of fine musk (*botones de almizque fino*).

Several turban-pieces of fine linen.

2 Alexandria carpets of fine silk.

6 very large carpets.

6 large felt housings for horses (*fieltros grandes a modo de reposteros*).

A bow, quiver, and belt, all of gold and blue enamel, which belonged to the Sultan.

A quantity of water-flasks of wrought leather.

4 bottles of fine mastic from Scio.

24 Damascus daggers, mounted with gold, silver, turquoises, and rubies.

M. E. Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, iii. pp. 248-9, note, has printed, from the *MSS. de l’Arsenal*, tom. i. de la *Collection des pièces sur la Turquie*, a letter from the Sultan, said to have accompanied these presents, and Don John’s reply. Selim, in bombastic Oriental style, tells Don John that he has been induced to write to him because “he, Don John, has been destined to be the sole beginning of the harm “which the Ottoman has received at the hands of the Christians,” and that by these present gifts he, the Sultan, greatest of men, makes Don John almost his equal, by rendering him worthy of his recognition. Don John’s answer is even more haughty. He thanks Selim, and sends him back a Turk whom the Sultan had sent to see his warlike preparations, whom he (Don John) might have put to death, but whom, on the contrary, he had permitted to see all his warlike resources and designs, “which,” he adds, “are to make perpetual war upon thee.” He concludes by desiring Selim to consider, as one of the highest of his honours, that John of Austria has accepted his gifts and answered his letter. These letters are, in my opinion, evidently fictions, though M. Charrière thinks that the details furnished by the despatches of the Bishop of Acqs gave them some appearance of authenticity. The Bishop says that the presents came from the Sultan, but the Spanish historian Torres and the other Spanish authorities say they were sent by Fatima. As the Bishop wrote not from Constantinople but Ragusa, and as Torres was a soldier at Naples at the time the gifts arrived, I prefer the authority of the latter.

“ They have no mother, and their father died in battle with your
“ Highness. They depend solely upon the protection and pity
“ of your Highness. As a courteous gentleman, as all men
“ bespeak you, as a pious and generous Prince, take pity on the
“ tears which I shed by the hour together, on the affliction of my
“ brothers, and grant me this grace. Of what I have been able
“ to collect of the products of this country (*de las cosas que por*
“ *acá ai*), I send your Highness a present which I entreat you to
“ accept. It is far from being worthy of the greatness of your
“ Highness, but my means are small; and may your Highness
“ not regard the slenderness of the offering, but generously accept
“ it in consideration of the good-will with which it is offered.
“ Again, my lord, I beseech your Highness, by the spirit of Jesus
“ Christ, do us this charity to set my brothers free, because in
“ doing this good deed, even to those who are enemies, you will
“ be esteemed liberal and compassionate; and since, beholding
“ their tears, you were pleased to send Mahomet to inform us of
“ their being alive, and of your honourable treatment of them
“ (which the whole of this Court considers a great favour, and for
“ which it is ever praising the goodness and magnanimity of your
“ Highness), nothing is wanting to complete your renown but that
“ your Highness should do us this grace and grant them their
“ liberty.

“ The slave of your Highness and the poor sister of the sons
“ of Ali Pasha kisses the feet of your Highness.

“ FATIMA CADEM.”

Don John had some time before obtained leave from the King of Spain to deal in his own way with the captive son of the Turkish admiral. He had likewise asked and obtained a similar permission from the Doge and the Pope. He now recalled his young prisoner from Rome, and at Naples restored him to liberty without ransom, presenting him at the same time with a gold chain worth six hundred crowns, some fine horses, and various stores for the voyage. Declining to accept the gifts which had been sent to him by Fatima, and returning them to Said, he, in turn, sent her an elaborate piece of embroidery, and explained his reasons for not accepting her offering in the following letter:—

“ NOBLE AND VIRTUOUS LADY—When Mahomet Bey and
“ Said Bey, your brothers, were brought to my galley after the
“ defeat of the Turkish fleet in battle, considering the misery to
“ which human weakness is exposed, and the mutability of man’s

“ estate, and that these noble youths were in the fleet rather for
“ the pleasure and companionship of their father than from any
“ purpose of offence against us, I resolved not only to order that
“ they should be treated as befitted their rank, but to give them
“ their liberty when I should find an opportunity. This my
“ intention was greatly strengthened when I received your letter
“ so full of sorrow and sisterly affection, and showing so great a
“ desire for the liberty of your brothers. When I was yet in
“ hopes of being able to liberate both of them, to my great grief
“ there happened to Mahomet Bey the final end of sorrows, which
“ is death. I now restore Said Bey to liberty as well as the
“ other prisoners for whom he has asked it, as I would also have
“ set free him who is dead, were he still living. And believe me,
“ Madam, that it is to me a peculiar pleasure to have it in my
“ power to fulfil and satisfy, in part at least, your desire, holding,
“ as I do, in high esteem the noble character which you bear.
“ The present which you have sent me I have not accepted, but
“ have left it in the hands of Said Bey; not, by any means,
“ because I do not value that which has come from your hands,
“ but because it has been the custom of my great ancestors not
“ to receive gifts from those who apply to them for aid, but to
“ confer favours, and as such, I hope, your brother and those who
“ accompany him may be received. You may also be assured
“ that, if in any other battle he or any other of those belonging
“ to you should become my prisoner, I will, with equal cheerful-
“ ness as now, give them their liberty, and do whatever may be
“ agreeable to you. From Naples the 15th of May 1573.

“DON JOHN.”¹

We have no means of knowing how far the Turkish lady was satisfied with the somewhat Oriental reasons for the rejection of her gifts, or whether she informed her uncle the Sultan of the coolness with which Don John contemplated the possibility of another Lepanto. Said Bey and his tutor left Naples in the middle of May, and, sailing to Ragusa, hastened overland to Constantinople. They were accompanied by Antonio Abellan, an agent of Don John, who had long been a slave in Turkey, and was well versed in the Turkish language and the ways of the Turkish Court. The account which the released prisoners gave of the kindness and courtesy of Don John gained for that Prince

¹ Both letters are printed by Torres (*Chronica*, ff. 92-3) and by Vanderhammen (*D. Juan de Austria*, ff. 165-168).

golden opinions at Constantinople. Even the French Ambassador, the Bishop of Acqs, in his despatches, bore testimony to the generosity of the conqueror in freely liberating a captive who would gladly have paid fifty thousand crowns for his ransom.



DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA.

But in the Prelate's opinion this generosity was the fruit of deep calculation, and a mere excuse for sending a clever secretary to forward the intrigues already set on foot for the establishment of a strong Spanish party and the counteraction of French influence at the Porte.¹

¹ *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, iii. 415.

Soon after the announcement of peace between Venice and the Turk, Juan de Soto, the private secretary of Don John of Austria, was promoted by the King to the post of Commissary-General of the royal fleet. From the time when Don John was appointed to the command at Granada, Soto had followed his fortunes. His skill and industry in business rendered him very useful to his master, for whom he appears soon to have conceived a romantic admiration and an ardent affection. Don John returned his regard; he treated him with the utmost confidence, and frequently recommended him to the King as a fitting object for royal favour. In the summer of 1572 he provided him with an opportunity of attending to his own interests by sending him on a mission to Court;¹ and later in the same year he was said to have helped the favourite secretary to the hand of a Sicilian heiress.² But Soto's present promotion was ascribed, by those who knew, or pretended to know, the secrets of the royal closet, less to the value set upon his services than to dread entertained of his influence. A slow and niggard giver, Philip was supposed to be more desirous to remove the secretary from his brother's side than to reward him with a better post.³ Soto was known to be the most trusted of Don John's advisers, and he was suspected of fostering the young adventurer's hopes of one day obtaining a crown. The new private secretary, who was sent from Madrid, was Juan de Escovedo, a creature of Ruy Gomez de Silva, and no doubt recommended by that minister to the King and Don John. There is no reason, however, for believing that he was imposed upon Don John against his will or without his consent. The courtiers at Madrid reckoned Don John amongst the adherents of Ruy Gomez, and it was therefore natural that he should select or accept as his private secretary a person belonging to the same political connexion. But, whatever were the circumstances of his appointment, Escovedo soon became imbued, as Soto had been, with enthusiasm for his new master. If his commission had been that of a spy, his spirit soon became that of a partisan; but his attachment to Don John, instead of leading him, like Soto, to promotion, brought him, as we shall see, to a very tragical end.

The withdrawal of Venice from the League, and the consequent uncertainty of the policy of the King of Spain, kept Don

¹ Vol. I. p. 481.

² *Ibid.* p. 485.

³ Soto was, however, by no means pleased with it, and made great complaints about his removal from the secretaryship, which he seems to have preferred.

John inactive for the greater part of the summer of 1573. His own counsellors were much divided in opinion. Some advised that the Spanish, Papal, and Maltese squadrons should sail against Aluch Ali, who, at the head of a considerable force, was hovering in the Ionian waters, and occasionally showing himself on the shores of Calabria. They thought it highly important to prove to Europe that Spain, even when left almost single-handed, was still a match for the Turk. Doria objected to this policy, maintaining that its fruits would be chiefly reaped by Venice, and that the King would be merely doing for the Republic what she had declined to aid in doing for herself. Santa Cruz advocated an attack upon Algiers, undeterred by the ill fortune which had attended similar attempts when made by Cardinal Ximenes de Cisneros and by Charles V. The blunders of the one and the misfortunes of the other, he argued, need hardly be again apprehended, while the conquest of Algiers would have the important effects of striking a heavy blow against the power of the Turk; and of paralysing the piracy which so severely harassed the shores of the Spanish dominion. Don John himself, and others, inclined to a less formidable expedition against Tunis, the capture of which dependency was more within the power of their present resources, and to which the possession of the fortress of Goletta gave them easy access. The question was referred to Madrid, and Don John meanwhile busied himself in maintaining the efficiency of his fleet and troops, and in obtaining the co-operation of Granvelle and the Duke of Terranova for a regular supply of provisions from their respective viceroyalties of Naples and Sicily.

The King resolved upon the expedition against Tunis. His orders, it has been supposed, were that the town, if taken, was to be dismantled, and that the fortifications of Goletta also were to be destroyed.¹ But the expedition was not to sail until trust-

¹ This is perhaps a mistake. By a letter from Don John to Don Garcia de Toledo, May 15, 1574, it appears that on 27th *April* (*sic*) the King had written to him stating the arguments *pro* and *con* about keeping up the fortress of Tunis and desiring him to decide the question as he thought most advisable. Don John in August of same year seems to have been for demolishing them.—Mignet: *Ant. Perez et Ph. II.*, 68-9, quoting *Documentos Ineditos*, t. iii. pp. 137-9, 43-50-57. But Mignet is clearly wrong as to dates, for Philip's letter of 27th April could not have reached Don John by 18th May. De Thou (*Histoire*, vii. 112) says Don John *promised* Philip II. to raze the fortifications of Tunis.

Antonio Perez (*Memorial, Obras*, Geneva, 1654, 8vo, p. 296) says that Don John was ordered, after a long debate in council of state, to dismantle Tunis. He adds that Juan de Soto tried to induce Don Miguel de Moncada, who had been Viceroy of Mallorca, to vote for keeping it up; and that Don Miguel said he should then have to change his patent of Councillor of the King for one of Councillor to Don John, and vote as Don John pleased, and not as his own conscience dictated.

worthy information had been obtained that it needed to fear no molestation from Aluch Ali and the Turkish fleet.

Early in August, therefore, Don John embarked his Spanish and Italian troops. He set sail from Naples on the 5th, and on the morning of the 8th arrived at Messina. A month was spent in that harbour, chiefly in loading the great ships with stores. On the 5th of September he steered for Palermo, reaching that city on the 7th. A few hours afterwards he was joined by the Marquess of Santa Cruz and the rest of the fleet from Naples. For several days Don John remained on board his flagship without going ashore, watching his store-ships receive their cargoes or manœuvring his vessels of war. Subsequent bad weather detained him at Palermo longer than he had intended. News of disturbances at Genoa induced him to leave in harbour Doria with forty-eight galleys, to be in readiness to move northwards if required. The Duke of Sesa, again laid up with gout, was also compelled to remain behind. Sailing on the 24th of September, Don John touched the same day at Apartinico, and took in a supply of wine. A gale obliged him to put into the roads of Bonanza; and although he proceeded on his course the next day, the wind was still so contrary that only his own vessel and the flagship of Florence succeeded in making Cape St. Vito. Under the lee of that headland he waited for his squadron, which he again distanced in the short voyage to Trapani, where he arrived on the 27th. The authorities of that town had already waited upon him at Cape St. Vito with a present of fruit and fresh provisions; and he was now received within their jurisdiction with the usual salutes from the shipping and the shore. When the rest of the fleet came up he sent Santa Cruz with a part of it to the isle of Favignana to take in wood and water, while he himself superintended the embarkation of stores which had been previously collected at Trapani. On the 30th he landed, and went in military state to the convent of the Annunziata, an old Dominican house of great fame a mile and a half from the town, where he and his officers and many of the soldiers confessed and received the sacrament. Next day he stood across to Favignana, leaving orders for Doria and Sesa, if they should touch at Trapani, to follow him to Goletta. Bad weather, however, rendering the anchorage of Favignana insecure, he returned to the Sicilian shore, and put into a secluded bay near Marsala. Its entrance, facing the south, was somewhat narrow, and was rendered difficult by shallows; but the basin within was so large and well protected that two hundred galleys

could ride there in perfect safety. This commodious haven Don John named, after himself, the port of Austria ; and he proceeded to make within its waters a final review of his forces. He found his naval armament to consist of one hundred and four galleys, forty-four large ships, twelve barges (*barcones*) of from one hundred to two hundred tons (*salmas*) burden, twenty-five frigates, and twenty-two feluccas (*faluas*). The troops in the galleys were 6345 Spaniards, 5015 Italians, and 788 Germans—in the ships, 5342 Italians and 1300 Germans ; making in all an infantry force of 19,280. There were also 744 pioneers, under Onofrio Forchela of Gaeta, and 400 light cavalry, of which Don Cæsar Davalos commanded one half, and Don Luis de Ayala and Don Pedro Zapata de Cardenas one hundred each. The park of artillery was ample and well appointed ; and it was accompanied by a hundred draught oxen. After the review Don John returned to the isle of Favignana, and despatched thence his courier Angulo in a light vessel to Spain, to inform the King that he was on the point of sailing for Africa. The fleet put to sea during the evening of the 7th of October, the day rendered so auspicious by the victory of Lepanto. The voyage was prosperous. Not a stranger sail was descried, except a French merchantman from Barbary, from which Don Juan de Cardona learned that there was not a single vessel of the enemy upon the coast. Towards evening of the 8th the fleet passed Cape Bona, the north-west headland of Africa, the white cliffs of Cape Blanco, and the tall rock of the Pillars. On the evening of the 8th October it was abreast of the site of Carthage, and at sunset anchored off the Goletta.

Goletta, the fortress which commands the sea approach to Tunis, partially expresses, in its Italian appellation, the sense of its Arabic name *Halk-al-Wad*, or the Throat of the River. It is seated, as that name implies, on the channel, about a mile long and a gunshot broad, which connects the Gulf of Tunis with the shallow lake on whose western side the city is built. When Hayreddin Barbarossa, intervening in the interest of the Turkish Sultan in the dissensions of the native reigning house, took possession of Goletta in 1534, he found the river's throat defended by a single square tower near the sea. He built a second tower near the lake, and connected the two structures by means of considerable walls, so as to form a place of strength from which Tunis might be afterwards overawed by a Turkish garrison. In 1535, when the Turks were driven out by the Emperor Charles V. in person, the Holy Roman Emperor adopted the policy of the

Algerine pirate. Although he replaced on the throne of Tunis the Prince who had been dispossessed by Barbarossa, he retained Goletta for himself, and added materially to the fortifications, which had ever since been garrisoned by Spanish troops with more detriment to the finances of Spain than advantage to the interests of Christendom.

Along the shore, to the north of the Goletta, rose the three low hills, partially clothed with olives, upon which Carthage once sat enthroned, and upon which the range of noble vaulted water-tanks still attests her size and civilization. On the highest of these hills, three centuries before, St. Louis had died, plague-stricken amongst his plague-stricken crusaders.¹ Between the hills and the sea lie the mounds and hollows which once formed the haven of Carthage, and a narrow plain, in which marble shafts and capitals peep at every step through the fragrant undergrowth of rosemary and myrtle. To the west of Carthage lies the Lake of Tunis, an oval sheet of shallow water eight or nine miles long by six miles wide, peopled with mullet fattening on the filth of the city, and haunted by flocks of bright-plumaged flamingoes. Through this lake runs a central channel seven or eight feet deep, kept open by dredging, by which small craft can pass from the Goletta to Tunis. To the north of this channel, and near the northern shore, between two and three miles from the city, a small low island breaks the expanse of turbid water.² At the lake's extreme western margin the walls of Tunis rise from the water's edge, its white buildings rising tier above tier on a gentle slope, and crowned with the massive balconies of the Alcazaba, and the domes of the great mosque, from amongst which soared the tall tower glittering with the golden balls placed on its pinnacles in honour of the daughter of Almanzor.³ The city is girdled by a broad green belt of orange

¹ A tawdry French chapel, built by King Louis Philippe, bearing the inscription, "Louis Philippe Roi des Français à St. Louis IX. Roi de France," marks the spot where the King's tent was pitched, and the site of the supposed citadel of Carthage. The vast plot of ground enclosed with a lofty wall seems to point to some ulterior designs of military occupation.

² The island (Schickli or Chekli) is about two and a half miles from the Marina or landing-place, rather nearer the north shore of the latter than the south, and is about three hundred and thirty paces by two hundred and seventy-five, the greatest length lying nearly north and south. The present ruinous battlemented building with a tower was formerly a lazaretto. Its exterior size is about seventy paces from north to south and fifty east and west, and there is within a courtyard of eighty feet by sixty. The tower is perhaps from thirty-five to forty feet high. Along the north side of the court are a few stones of small vaulted chambers. No part of the building seems to be Christian. The surface of the island is covered with low brushwood and innumerable small shells.

³ Luis del Marmol Carvajal: *Descripcion general de Africa*, 3 vols. fol., Granada, 1573; Malaga, 1599, ii. fol. 241r.

and almond groves and gardens, and the gentle slopes and hills beyond are covered, as far as the eye can reach, with the gray foliage of the olive.

The people of Tunis had long enjoyed the reputation of being the most highly civilized of the inhabitants of Barbary. More addicted than their neighbours to agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, they preferred peaceful traffic to piratical cruising. Indeed the occupation of Goletta by a Christian power had long rendered the business of the corsair incompatible with residence in the city of Tunis. Christians were encouraged to settle in the city, and many Genoese, Venetians, and Frenchmen had established themselves there, and inhabited a quarter allotted to them. The Tunisian territories, two hundred and twenty miles from north to south, and one hundred and seventy from east to west, had been governed for many generations by the race of Benihaffs, claiming descent from Melchior, the dusky monarch who, with his fellow-kings, following the star in the East, knelt before the manger at Bethlehem.¹

It was against a Prince of that House that St. Louis, Charles of Sicily, and Edward, Prince of Wales, directed their fruitless and ill-fated crusade. As the power of the Ottoman Sultans grew and their dominions widened, they cast longing eyes on the fair heritage of the Benihaffs. Selim I. having added Egypt to his realm, the annexation of Tunis became one of the schemes of Solyman. Hayreddin Barbarossa, the famous corsair, was sent by him in 1532 to effect the conquest. Dissensions in the royal house afforded an excuse for interference in the affairs of a State which was too strong to be openly invaded with success. Muley Hassan, a dissolute and unwarlike Prince, inspired with the usual Oriental jealousy of his kindred, had disgusted his subjects by an unusual manifestation of the feeling, in the slaughter of forty-four of his brothers. The forty-fifth, Raschid, escaped to Constantinople, and in his name Barbarossa appeared before Tunis, and was at first hailed by the people as their deliverer from a tyrant. When they found, however, that Raschid had been left behind in the Levant, and that the Turk was less occupied in furthering the cause of the native pretender than in consolidating his own military possession of the country, many of them returned to their allegiance to Muley Hassan, and took up arms against the ally in whom, when too late, they had discovered an invader. Barbarossa,

¹ Luis del Marmol Carvajal: *Descripcion general de Africa*, 3 vols. fol., Granada, 1573; Malaga, 1599, ii. fol. 241.

nevertheless, succeeded in establishing the nominal authority of Raschid as a vassal of the Sultan. Muley Hassan, from his lurking-place amongst the tents of the Arab mountaineers, despatched a Genoese renegade to implore the assistance of Charles V. Prompted by the alarming progress of the arms and influence of Barbarossa along the African shore, and favoured by a lull in the political storms in Germany and Italy, the Emperor complied with his request. In the summer of 1535 he sailed from Barcelona at the head of a gallant fleet and army, which were augmented by auxiliaries from the Pope, Portugal, and Malta. Fortune filled his sails and smiled on his arms. He drove Barbarossa from Tunis, seized his shipping, restored Muley Hassan with an obligation to pay him tribute, and obtained, as a further price of his good offices, Goletta, Biserta, and Afrikye. The Moorish Prince maintained intimate relations with his benefactor, and was more than once beholden to Andrea Doria, the Imperial admiral, for aid in overawing his rebellious subjects. In 1544 he even embarked in Doria's flagship, and sailed with him to Sicily and Naples, in order personally to urge Charles V. to undertake a new expedition for the complete expulsion of the Turks from Barbary. During his absence his son, Muley Hamida, seized the reins of power on the plea that his father had turned Christian. Muley Hassan hurried back with some troops lent to him by the Viceroy of Naples; but the issue of his attempt to regain his throne was unhappy. He was captured by his son and deprived of his eyes. The power of the usurper, however, was so slightly established that the Governor of Goletta soon afterwards took advantage of his temporary absence to set up one of his uncles in his room. Muley Hassan, though not replaced on the throne, was at the same time restored to liberty. The new sovereign reigned only thirty-six days, at the end of which he died. The Governor appointed his son Mahomet as his successor; but after a reign of four months this young Prince was driven out by his cousin, Muley Hamida, assisted by the Arab mountaineers, and compelled to take refuge at Goletta, whence he was sent to live as a pensioner at Palermo. Muley Hassan, blind and in poverty, made his way once more to Europe, and presented himself at the Imperial Court at Augsburg as a suppliant to Charles V., from whom he obtained only promises and an eleemosynary pittance. Muley Hamida retained possession of Tunis until 1570, when Aluch Ali, having bribed some of his trusted officers, led a force from Algiers against him, and, with-

out meeting with any hindrance from the Spaniards, occupied his territories in the name of Sultan Selim. The ejected sovereign took refuge at the Goletta, and there earnestly implored and impatiently awaited the interference of the Catholic King. In the arrival of the Christian fleet he foresaw his speedy return to his throne.

At sunset on Thursday, the 8th of October, Don John of Austria entered the bay of Tunis, and anchored off the Goletta. He immediately sent for the governor, Don Pedro Portocarrero, who next morning accompanied him ashore, where he landed amid the usual roar of congratulatory artillery. Three Moors from Tunis were soon after brought into his presence as bearers of the welcome news that the Turkish garrison was evacuating the city. Accompanied by the Counts of Landriano and Sarno, his secretary Escovedo, the commissary Soto, Don Diego Enriquez, Don Andres de Salazar, and other officers, Don John then rode out to inspect the ground upon which it was proposed to land the troops, the shore to the north-east of the ruins of Carthage. The disembarkation was forthwith commenced, and ere nightfall was nearly completed, when a fresh westerly breeze caused the work to be suspended. Early next morning the laggard vessels of the fleet came in, and the rest of the army was put ashore at the small mole of the Goletta, with the loss of a few boats. The further proceedings of the expedition may be related in the words of the despatch which the Commander-in-Chief addressed on the following day, 11th of October, to the King, from the Alcazaba or citadel of Tunis:—"At the Goletta I found the King, Muley Hamida, who told me how greatly he had suffered in the service of your Majesty. I replied that your Majesty was a most just Prince, and would take care that he should be rewarded according to his deserts. Yesterday morning, Saturday, the 10th October, news was still coming in that the Turks were in great alarm, and retiring from the city. Thinking that success depended on despatch, I therefore set forward with the army, leaving orders that the troops who were still in the act of disembarking should muster at the Goletta, and come on from thence by the lake, so that the Moors should not be able to molest them. I also directed the fleet to be posted near the Goletta, so that if the enemy were to come he should not be able to attack it; and I entrusted the command of it to Don Juan de Cardona, thinking that Antonio Doria and the Marquess of Santa Cruz might be of use to me, as indeed they have been, in my expedition. I marched until the hour of vespers, and as night fell pitched my

“camp near the village of Diana, four miles from Tunis. From
“thence I sent on the Marquess of Santa Cruz, Major Don Diego
“Enriquez, and the warden Andres de Salazar, with two thousand
“five hundred foot, taken from the garrison of the Goletta, in
“order that, if there were no difficulties in the way, they might
“take possession of the Alcazaba or fortress and secure the town,
“and advise me of the state of affairs therein. They arrived
“with their troops before it was dark, and found the place
“deserted, except by old men and old women too old to fly,
“and in this Alcazaba about two Moors with an alcajde, who
“said he was keeping the place for the King, Muley Hamida, but
“caused the gates to be opened for the Marquess and his people,
“who entered without hindrance. Very early this morning,
“having put the troops in order, I marched to the city gate,
“where I left them, with orders that not a man was to enter it
“until the word of command was given. I myself then went
“in with such persons as I thought fit to take with me, and
“immediately inspected the ground with a view to the erection
“of fortifications which should form a connexion with the Goletta.
“I also directed that quarters should be prepared in the city for
“the troops. Having come into this Alcazaba, I gave orders for
“the troops to take possession of their quarters. Being advised
“that the Duke of Sesa had this morning come in with four
“galleys from Palermo, I sent word to him to come on here by
“the lake without loss of time. The Turkish governor and his
“soldiers who held this fortress have gone, I understand, to
“Kerouan, Biserta, and other places adjacent. Such has been
“the issue of the expedition to Tunis, in accordance with the
“Christian zeal and good fortune of your Majesty, an issue
“achieved in little more than two days, for which infinite thanks
“to Our Lord, and for which I myself can never be sufficiently
“thankful. I shall continue to advise your Majesty of whatever
“may happen. May Our Lord endow your sacred, Catholic, and
“royal person with such increase of kingdoms and lordships as I
“desire.” The despatch closed with the following postscript in
Don John’s own hand:—“These Turks have behaved like very
“sorry soldiers, seeing that not a man of them has stopped to
“look at us, as they well might have done, and perhaps might
“have defended themselves for more days than some of us
“imagine. However, I am well pleased that they have done as
“they have done: and your Majesty may be of the same mind,
“giving, as I on my part do, many thanks to Our Lord for what

" we have gained, which is of far greater importance and value than, without seeing it, can be estimated. I will report to your Majesty whatever steps it may be needful to take for your royal service ; and I may now remind you that I am in sore need of money, and how necessary it is that so great a want should be supplied. May God keep your Majesty and make you victorious."¹

The Turkish force which, under Haidar Pasha, the late governor of the Alcazaba, and Radaman Pasha, had retired to the Holy City of Kerouan and other towns in the interior, was estimated at six thousand men ; and they were also said to have been followed by forty thousand of the Moorish militia of the country. In their Moorish auxiliaries the Turks can have had



DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA. MEDAL STRUCK IN HONOUR OF THE TAKING OF TUNIS

little confidence, or they would hardly have made so precipitate a retreat before the inferior force of the Christians. The troops which Don John withdrew from the Goletta were replaced by an equivalent proportion of recruits from his army.

The Christian troops employed in the occupation of Tunis were quartered, at first at least, chiefly in the mosques. Mass was celebrated at the Alcazaba, and attended by Don John and his officers. There also Don John received a deputation of

¹ Como muy ruynes soldados han procedido estos Turcos, pues no esperan a siquiera vernos, y pudieran cierto hazerlo, y defenderse algunos mas dias de los que nos ymaginauamos. Yo estoy en efeto muy contento de que lo ayan hecho asi, y v. magestad deue estimar dando como yo por mi parte do a Nuestro Señor muchas gracias por lo ganado que es de harto mayor importancia y consideracion que sin verse puede figurarse. Dare quento a v. magestad de lo demas que fuere pareciendo aca que conviene a su Real servicio, y acuerdo que estoy muy sin dinero, y quanto conviene suplir a tanta necesidad que ay del. Guarde Dios a v. mg^d. y dele las victorias que puede. D. v. m^d. hechura y mas humilde servidor que sus reales manos besa, Don Juan de Austria. Don John of Austria to Philip II. ; Del Alcaçaba de Tunis, 11 de Octubre 1573. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 487.

citizens, and promised that their lives should be spared. The town itself, however, was subjected to considerable and, as it would seem, very unjustifiable and impolitic pillage, which lasted for several days. Many of the finest mosques and some of the most sumptuous private dwellings were destroyed.

The citizens, who had retired at the approach of the Christians, had carried off with them much valuable property ; but much valuable, though less portable, spoil rewarded the researches of the plunderers. Forty pieces of ordnance, and a large supply of gunpowder and biscuit, were applied to the use of the invaders. Great quantities of wheat, barley, and spices, cotton, linen, and silk, many bales of cloth and carpets, and a vast store of hides, likewise fell into their hands, and were transferred from the warehouses of Moorish merchants to the holds of the Christian galleys. Many columns and other precious marbles, which had once adorned the palaces and temples of Carthage, were now, by the orders of Don John, taken from the mosques and transported into Spain.

The construction of a fortress which should at once bridle Tunis and supply a safe and easy communication with Goletta was, as we have seen, the first subject to which Don John of Austria turned his attention on entering the city. The question was amply discussed in his council of war, and the construction was resolved on. Don John's first idea was to place it within Tunis, by utilizing, strengthening, and enlarging the Alcazaba, which crowned a height on the south-east side of the town, and within the circuit of its wall. That idea was, however, abandoned, because it was found that the Alcazaba was commanded by some higher ground, and because it lay at too great a distance from the lake to join hands with the Goletta.

The site eventually chosen was on the western margin of the lake, between the water and the city wall, so that the guns of the fortress might command the narrow channel leading from the city to the Goletta and the sea. If any remains of the construction exist, they must be looked for in some rubbish heaps to the south of the present Marina or landing-place. The spot was selected by Don John, his staff, and his engineers, after a careful examination of the ground. Some of the engineers having pointed out that it was commanded by the Alcazaba and a hill called the Morabitillo, experiments were made with artillery from both these points, from whence, however, it was found that little harm could be done. The work was entrusted to Gabriel Serbellone,¹ and the building

¹ The portrait and biography of this celebrated engineer will be found in Jac.

was to accommodate eight thousand men, and to be capable of being held by fifteen hundred men, and to be fully garrisoned by four thousand. Serbellone was appointed Governor and Captain-General of Tunis, with supreme civil and military power. He was directed to raze a portion of the city wall facing the new castle, and also to dismantle the Alcazaba on the heights on the other side of the town.¹ Four thousand Spanish and an equal number of Italian² infantry were placed under his orders, as well as a hundred mounted musketeers, and all the sappers and miners attached to the expedition.

It was thought desirable, for the welfare of the province and the stability of the new order of things, likewise to appoint a native Prince or chieftain, in hopes of luring back the Moors, who still held aloof from their homes. Muley Hamida, the late possessor of the throne, was deemed unfit for the post; partly because there was a strong party opposed to his violent seizure of power, and partly because his disposition to severity was more likely to exasperate friends than to conciliate foes. Don John therefore determined to transport him to Italy, and to send in his stead for his elder brother, Muley Mahomet, who had been driven, some years before, by the cruelties of Hamida to take refuge at Palermo. Although completely in the power of the Christian invaders, it was not without much difficulty that the perplexed Moor was persuaded to consent to his own dethronement, and to go peaceably on board the galley appointed to convey him into exile. The advice and entreaties of a son who was to accompany him at last prevailed, and he was safely landed at Palermo. Favourable winds brought Muley Mahomet from Palermo in a remarkably brief space of time. Thus unexpectedly restored to Africa and power, the exiled Prince was invested by Don John with his new dignities, which were accompanied by exhortations to rule with justice and moderation. A proclamation was soon afterwards put forth, in the name both of the Moorish chief and the Christian leader, inviting all the absent inhabitants to return to the city.

In order to secure the conquest thus easily won, Don John

Schrenck's *Imperatorum, etc., Imagines in Ambrasiana arcis armamentario*, Cēniponti, 1601, fol. By Spanish writers his name is usually written Gabrio Cerbellon, and in the despatches and papers of the time he commonly figures as Gabrio.

¹ *Relación que a dado el Secretario Juan de Soto sobre las fortalezas y reyno de Tunes*, Madrid, 20 Junii 1574. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 1142.

² Sereno (*Commentarii*, p. 341) says that these troops numbered only six thousand effective men.

was considering the expediency of marching against Biserta, a place of importance sixty miles to the westward. Before he had taken any step towards the execution of this project, the party in favour of Christian rule rose against the Turkish garrison and put it to the sword; and, liberating the Christian slaves of a war-galley in the port, replaced them with Turks. Four-and-twenty Moors, with Horrux the alcaide at their head, soon afterwards appeared at Tunis, and in the name of the inhabitants made over Biserta to Don John as representative of the King of Spain. Don John appointed Horrux native governor of the place, and sent Don Francisco de Avila with three hundred soldiers to take possession of the castle. They were cautioned to rule with moderation, and the Christians were threatened with severe punishment if they outraged or molested the Moslems who had submitted themselves in so frank a manner to the sceptre of the King.

During their stay at Tunis Don John and his staff found time for the chase. In one of their hunting expeditions a lion, attacking a mounted Moor, tore both man and horse to pieces. When the Spaniards occupied the Alcazaba they found there a lion cub, which Don John brought away with him to Europe. "It was so tame," said a writer on sport, who was also a courtier of Philip II., "that it lived and slept in his room, and was well known by us all."¹ This animal has been more than once introduced as an accessory in the portraits of Don John.²

On the 17th of October the affairs of the new African province appeared to be sufficiently settled to permit of Don John returning to Europe. He marched on that day with his cavalry to the Goletta, where he arrived at noon on the 18th, and he remained there for three days superintending the embarkation of some of the troops. From the Goletta, on the 18th, he announced his arrival there to the King, and gave the reasons, already stated, which had led to the resolution of erecting a fortress at Tunis, and to the choice of site. As the galliot which had carried the bearer of his last despatch (of the 11th) had been driven back from Sardinia by stress of weather, the present one was added to his packet, and the courier was instructed to make the best of his way to Spain. The only subjects on which Don John was now anxious were to get the fleet back to Sicily in

¹ *Discurso de la Monteria*, by G. Argote de Molina, fol. 10, prefixed to his edition of the *Libro de Monteria que mando escribir el Rey D. Alonso*, Sevilla, 1582, sm. fol.

² As in the portrait now or lately in the possession of D. Valentin Carderera at Madrid, and engraved in his *Iconografia Española*, Madrid, 1858, fol. cap. xvii.

safety, and to find a remittance of money at Palermo or Naples.¹ On the 20th he returned to Tunis to give his last instructions to Serbellone and Muley Mahomet. In a day or two afterwards he sailed from Goletta, leaving as commander of the garrison in that fortress Don Pedro Portocarrero, an officer who proved himself very unequal to the duties of his post.

The weather was stormy, and the fleet was in considerable jeopardy in crossing over to Sicily. Santa Cruz and his squadron took refuge from the violence of the south-easterly gales under the rocky islands of Favignana and Maretimo, where the galleys arrived with their rowing-gangs almost dead with the fatigue of contending for many hours together against the winds and waves. The *Lucera* of Naples went ashore and was lost, the crew however being saved. Don John himself had steered a westerly course, intending to visit Biserta on his way. But the violence of the tempest forcing him to seek refuge in the harbour of Porto Farino, thirty miles distant, he despatched a messenger by land to Horrux the governor, requesting him to come and meet him. The Moor mounted his horse and obeyed his summons; and after a courteous reception and long conference with the Commander-in-Chief returned to his post, confirmed, as the Spaniards believed in his allegiance to their King. When the storm was assuaged Don John resumed his voyage, and arrived at Favignana on the 1st of November. There he found Marcello Doria with three galleys and a couple of Turkish corsairs whom he had captured near Cape St. Victor. The prizes were brigantines, carrying seventy men. The prisoners informed Don John that the Sultan's fleet was not expected in the western waters during the winter, but that great preparations were being made at Constantinople for the next year's naval campaign.

At Favignana Don John likewise was met by a courier from Madrid, bringing the news that his sister the Infanta Juana, Princess of the Brazils, had died on the 8th of September at the Escorial. Tenderly attached to this friend of his youth, he received the tidings with a sorrow which cast a gloom over his recent success. The yards, masts, and oars, and bulwarks of the squadron were, by his orders, painted black or covered with black stuff, and in this mourning fashion the galleys moved along the Sicilian shore, receiving, as they went by, the salutes of the castles of Trapani and other places. At sundown on the 2d of

¹ Don John of Austria to Philip II.; La Goletta, 18th October 1573. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 487.

November they cast anchor in the harbour of Palermo. For some days Don John remained on board writing his despatches and paying off the hired galleys. On the 8th of November he stepped ashore at a landing-place splendidly decorated for the occasion, and received the customary homage and congratulations of the authorities. Gil de Andrade, who had been sent to convey the Spanish garrison to Biserta, soon afterwards arrived, bringing with him the Turkish galley which had been surprised in that harbour, a hundred and fifty Turkish prisoners, and two hundred Christians, of various nations, who had been liberated by the friendly Moors. The vessel, which was a very fine one, was added to the squadron of Naples, and replaced that which had been lately wrecked at Favignana. After despatching fourteen galleys under Don Bernardino de Velasco to Malta, to bring home to their winter quarters some Spanish troops sent to the assistance of the knights, Don John sailed for Naples. On the 14th of November he disembarked there with the usual honours and rejoicings. Muley Hamida, the Moorish chief who had accompanied him, was placed in honourable captivity in the castle of St. Elmo.

The despatches from Court which met Don John at Favignana brought him the King's leave to visit Spain. He did not, however, take immediate steps to use this permission. The delightful shore of Campania appeared to exert over him the fascination which it had often exercised upon older conquerors, and he continued to linger at Naples. "The charms of the city and of the "ladies," says one of his biographers,¹ "were well suited to his "gallant time of life." Of the lady or ladies who enjoyed his affections and influenced his movements little is known. His amours were conducted with discretion and decorum, and do not appear to have provoked the jealousy or the enmity of fathers and husbands amongst the Neapolitan nobility, although one of the reasons assigned for the coolness between him and the Viceroy Granvelle was that the Cardinal was envious of the successes of the young soldier "in the fields of Venus and Mars."² The name of one only of his female favourites has been preserved—that of Diana di Falanga, a girl of Sorrento, by whom he had a natural daughter.

More serious occupations, however, had a share in prolonging his stay at Naples. During the winter of 1573-4 he was much occupied in collecting and despatching supplies of all kinds for

¹ Vanderhammen : *D. Juan de Austria*, fol. 177.

² *Ibid.* f. 184.

the use of his engineers and troops at Tunis, and in obtaining, in aid of his works there, the co-operation of the chief officials of government in the viceroyalties of the Two Sicilies. His favourite scheme for the acquisition of an independent sovereignty was also kept steadily in view. His new secretary, Escovedo, had become a warm partisan of plans, for espousing and encouraging which it was supposed that Soto had been removed from that position. Soon after their return from Tunis, Escovedo was despatched to Rome on a secret mission to Gregory XIII. to entreat that Pontiff to renew his intercession with the King of Spain, to permit his brother to assume the crown of the newly-conquered province. Flattered by the request, the Pope promised to use his influence at Madrid. But these negotiations did not escape the notice of the Spanish agents at Rome. An account of them—possibly a very inaccurate one—was sent to Madrid, and they produced in the mind of the suspicious despot a feeling of uneasiness by no means favourable to the interests of Don John.

The Papal Nuncio at the Court of Spain, Nicolas Ormanetti, Bishop of Padua, formally addressed the King on the subject in writing on 16th January 1574. The paper embodied the views of Gregory XIII. on a number of topics, on some of which at least it is probable that his advice was neither desired nor relished. His Holiness had heard with great concern, so wrote the Nuncio, that the King was about to reduce his fleet and recall Don John from the command, and, looking at the menacing attitude of the Turk, he doubted the prudence of either step. The fleet ought rather to be increased than diminished; Don John should be employed in other naval enterprises; and “it might be well to consider whether it would not add to his power and authority were he invested with the title of King of Tunis, so that your Majesty might evince your gratitude to God for the conquest, after the manner of your ancestors, by founding a new Christian realm.” An attempt to renew the Christian League was also suggested, the Venetians being very ill satisfied with their treatment by the Turk since the late peace. Touching on the unhappy state of the Netherlands, the Pope, following the example of his predecessor, urged the King to go and show himself there, or as an alternative to send Don John thither to put an end to the troubles, and “undertake the enterprise of England, it being much desired, as has been already shown, by the English Catholics that he should become their King by marriage with the Queen of Scots.” In that case, the King of Spain

might gratify Naples and Sicily by a visit, which would facilitate the renewal of the Christian League and preparations against the Turk, and which would also enable His Majesty to come to a perfect understanding, by means of personal converse, with the Italian Princes, to confer somewhere on the frontier with the Emperor, and, above all, to meet the Pope, a meeting which could not fail to benefit all Christendom.¹

Philip II. had been long inured to patience under lectures from the Vatican. The advice of Gregory XIII. was on this occasion met by one of those decorous and respectful rebuffs which practice had rendered the first temporal Prince in Italy very expert in giving to his spiritual father and jealous neighbour. With regard to the creation of a Christian kingdom at Tunis, the Pontiff was assured that he need not concern himself lest Don John's services should go unrewarded, his aggrandizement lying very near the King's heart ; that the reward proposed was neither adequate to these services nor as yet sufficiently in the power of the King ; and, lastly, that the matter should, at the fitting season, receive the careful consideration which it deserved.

One result of the battle of Lepanto seems to have been to place the name of Don John of Austria on the list of Princes eligible for the hand of Mary Queen of Scots, who had been since 1566 the prisoner of Queen Elizabeth. The paper of the Nuncio above cited asserted that the English Catholics desired that such a marriage should make Don John their King, in a way which seemed to imply that the Pope himself was in favour of the match.

Advices from London in the winter of 1573-4 informed Philip II. that the French King had been pressing Queen Elizabeth to enter into a closer alliance with him, on the plea that the conquest of Tunis, strengthening the hands of Spain in the Mediterranean, would enable Don John to proceed to the Netherlands and prosecute his plan of marrying her captive rival.² The marriage of the young King of Scots, James VI., to the Infanta Isabella was part of the scheme ; and the Spanish ambassador in England was of opinion that it might be brought about through

¹ Nicolas, Bishop of Padua, Papal Nuncio at Madrid, to Philip II.; Madrid, 16th January 1574. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 924, fol. 4. Nic. Ormanetti, a man of learning and virtue, was made Bishop of Padua by Pius V. in 1570, and after filling various legations died in 1577.

² *Relacion de lo que contienen los papeles en Portugues scriptos en Londres a 25 de Diciembre y 22 de Enero 1573* (the year at that time began on 1st March). Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 828, fol. 2.

the Earl of Argyle, who might be bribed to deliver the boy to Philip II.¹ Queen Mary herself was well disposed to this double alliance. The Jesuit, Nicholas Sanders, assured the King of Spain that he had the authority of her most confidential advisers, Sir Francis Englefield and the Countess of Northumberland, for



saying that she was extremely well affected towards Don John of Austria, and that so far as subjects could pledge their sovereign, they would engage that she would marry him if he would reinstate her in her dominions.² The Spanish ambassador in London

¹ Antonio de Guaras to Don Luis de Requesens, Governor of the Netherlands; London, 13th February 1574; Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 828, fol. 29.

² Sciunt præterea dictam Scotiæ Reginam nominatim erga amplissimum principem Dominum Joannem de Austria unice affectam esse, eundemque Catholicis Anglis mirum non modum placere, eo quod extra Angliam regna maiora non habeat, in quibus peregre ab illis profectus debeat. Ob arctam vero custodiam in qua Scotiæ Regina detinetur, fit ut suum ipsa consensum tuto significare non possit. Quantum subditis ullis nomine sui principis et Reginæ pollicere ac promittere fas est et conceditur: tantum Dominus Franciscus Englefield et clarissima Northumbriæ Comitissa pollicentur et promittunt tuamque Catholicam maiestatem quo modo securam reddunt, videlicet, si amplissimus Dominus Joannes Reginam Scotiæ in libertatem vindicaverit, et in regnorum suorum possessionem reposuerit quod illa vicissim cuicunque iustæ postulationi amplissimi Domini Joannis assentietur, etiam si nuptias eius et matrimonium petierit, aut quodcum-

from time to time reported to his master that Mary desired to marry Don John, and to see her son in the custody of the King of Spain, that his marriage with the Infanta might be insured.¹

On the 22d of February 1574 a large portion of the great hospital of the Annunziata, one of the finest edifices in Naples, was destroyed by fire. Don John was amongst the first persons who made his appearance at the conflagration, and one of the most active in arresting its progress. He caused the crews of his galleys to be landed, and to them, working under his superintendence, was attributed the preservation of a part of the structure.

Military exercises and spectacles occupied a good deal of Don John's time during the winter. He also had the satisfaction of assisting at the ceremony of christianizing the son of his Moslem captive, the former Prince of Tunis. Muley Hamida and his son were lodged at Naples in apartments fitted up by Don John for himself in the Carthusian convent of St. Martin. This noble structure, seated on the hill-top of St. Elmo, and commanding a wide prospect of the magnificent bay, its bold islands, and its diversified shores, occupies one of the finest situations in Naples and the world. Hither Don John would come, in hours when he was under the influence of the devotional melancholy which seemed to belong to his Austrian blood, and indulge in the seclusion and the self-communing which he had learnt to practise at Villagarcia or Abrojo. Here the young African prisoner listened to the exhortations of the white-robed sons of St. Bruno, and resolved to abjure the faith of the Arabian prophet and accept that of the Italian Pontiff. In the baptistery of the church of the fortress of Castel-Novo the youth received the name of Don Carlos of Austria, to which was afterwards added a royal pension of twelve hundred crowns a year. Don John appeared at the font as his godfather, the godmother being Doña Violante de Moscoso. The real father, Muley Hamida, proof against the Carthusians and Christianity, was greatly afflicted at the apostasy of his son. That he might be released from the lad's society, he petitioned that the place of his own captivity might be changed to Palermo; and he died a few months after his arrival in that city.

que aliud. Dr. Nicholas Sanders to Philip II. [no place], 27th April 1574; Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 828, fol. 50.

¹ *Abstract of despatches of Antonio de Guaras, 7th, 14th, 21st, and 28th November, and 5th December 1574.* Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 828, fol. 79.



ANDREA DORIA.

CHAPTER II.

ACCOUNT OF THE TROUBLES AT GENOA, 1573-1576; AND THE
VISIT OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA TO VIGEVANO, MILAN,
PIACENZA, AND OTHER PLACES IN THE NORTH OF ITALY,
IN MAY, JUNE, AND JULY, 1574.



IN the spring of 1574 Don John of Austria determined to avail himself of the leave granted him by the King to visit Spain. He was desirous of prosecuting in person his suit for promotion to the title and rank of Infant of Castille, and of urging upon Philip the claims of his troops for pay, and the pressing necessity of supplying the garrisons of Goletta and Tunis with provisions and munitions of war.

His last days at Naples were spent in effecting such settlements as he could with the creditors of his fleet and army, and

in providing for the vigorous prosecution of the works which Serbellone was constructing at Tunis. He directed the Duke of Terranova to despatch from Sicily four vessels laden with supplies to the Goletta; and he ordered Don Juan de Cardona to hold himself in readiness with fifteen galleys to ply between Sicily and the African shore during the summer, for the purpose of conveying such provisions, materials, and workmen as might be required for the new fortress. The Marquess of Santa Cruz was also ordered to get the greatest part of his naval force ready for the conveyance of such stores as Cardinal Granvelle might be able to furnish to the army in Africa.¹

Sailing from Naples on the 16th of April, Don John of Austria the same day cast anchor at Gaeta. Here he was met



GRAND-DUCAL CROWN OF TUSCANY, PRESENTED TO COSIMO I. BY PIUS V.

by the courier, Andres de Perales, bearing despatches from the King which altered his plans. Disturbances had broken out at Genoa between the rival factions of the Old and the New Nobles, which were supposed to be secretly fomented by French agents, and which seriously compromised the interests of the King of Spain as protector of the Republic. Don John was therefore ordered to repair to Vigevano, a small town on the frontier between Lombardy and the Genoese territory, for the purpose of watching the proceedings of the contending parties and of countermining the plots of the French Court. He was also met at Gaeta by Giacomo Buoncompagno, the Pope's nephew, his old colleague Marc Antonio Colonna, and Don Juan de Zuñiga, the Spanish ambassador at Rome, who conferred with him on the politics of Genoa and informed him of the views of the sovereign Pontiff. Thus advised, he sailed on the 21st. For two days he lay in the port of St. Stephano. Off Leghorn he received news

¹. *Relacion que á dado el Secretario Juan de Soto sobre las cosas tocantes á las fortalezas y reyno de Tunes*. Madrid, à 20 Junio 1574. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 1142.

of the death of Cosimo I., Grand Duke of Tuscany. In the harbour of Spezia he found fourteen Spanish galleys under



COSIMO I. GRAND DUKE OF TUSCANY.

Marcello Doria, with whom he had long conferences on the state of Genoa; and thence on the 28th he sailed for that capital. Landing there on the 29th, he was received with the usual

distinctions, and remained in the city until the 7th of May. A journey of two days brought him on the 8th to Vigevano.

Don John was more or less engaged in watching the affairs of Genoa, and in reporting and advising upon them, from the end of April 1574 to the early spring of 1576, when a brief civil war, waged in the autumn of 1575, was followed by a settlement, in which both parties seemed to be sincerely desirous of saving their country from the evils of further foreign interference. He remained in the north of Italy from the end of April to the beginning of August 1574. During those three months his headquarters were at Vigevano; but he made visits, as we shall see, to Milan, to Piacenza, to Albenga, and to Spezia.

Vigevano was a small town clustering round a crag on which stood an old castle of the Visconti and the Sforzas, much enlarged and embellished by Lodovico Sforza il Moro in the previous century. To the original feudal fortress that Prince had added various sumptuous halls and chambers, a staircase rich with marble columns and sculpture, and a great range of stabling; he had adorned the rock with a terraced garden and open galleries, from which he used to fly his hawks; and he had crowned the chief portal with a tower designed by Bramante. To the north the plain, watered by the Ticino, was covered with an extensive forest abounding in game, and affording a variety of sport which had obtained the praise of Charles V. in one of his visits to the Milanese. Of this pleasant abode Don John took possession on the 8th of May 1574, and remained there till the 11th of July. He entered the town escorted by three hundred soldiers, and was visited at various times by envoys from Venice, the Duke of Savoy, and other Italian potentates. With the people of Vigevano he ingratiated himself by his urbanity, and by joining in their matches at the *palla*.¹

Meanwhile, as the contest between the political parties at Genoa will hardly be intelligible without a sketch of previous events, more full, perhaps, than the part played in it by Don John may seem to justify, the transactions which led to it and which arose out of it shall be related without interruption.² To other

¹ P. G. Biffignandi Buccella: *Memorie storiche della città e contado di Vigevano*, Vigevano, 1870, 8vo, pp. 225-6 and 304.

² For the following sketch of Genoese affairs I have chiefly consulted Herrera: *Historia General del Mundo del tiempo del R. D. Felipe II.*, tom. ii., Valladolid 1606, Madrid 1612, 3 vols. fol.; Filippo Casoni: *Annali della Repubblica di Genova del secolo decimo-sesto*; Genoa, 1708, fol.; and Carlo Varèse: *Storia della Repubblica di Genova*, Genova, 1834-6, 7 vols. 8vo, vols. v. and vi. There is a good account of this also in Botta: *Storia d' Italia*, Parigi, 1832, 10 vols. 8vo, iii. pp. 287-308.

passages in the biography of Don John which likewise belong to the years 1574 and 1575 we shall afterwards return.

The Republic of Genoa owed her long political existence rather to the mutual jealousy of the great powers, her intermediate neighbours, than to the happy constitution of her Government, or the virtue and wisdom of her citizens. Her continental dominions consisted of a narrow territory lying along the Gulf of Genoa, and extending from Monaco to Sarzana, a distance of about one hundred and fifty miles. There had been a time when this territory was an insignificant part of her possessions; when her sway was acknowledged in many of the chief seaports of Italy and the Italian islands; when her flag was unfurled on a line of fortresses studding the shores of the three Mediterranean continents; and when she seemed as if about to grasp the maritime sceptre of the world. Faction at home, however, soon paralysed her progress, and often endangered her existence; her foreign settlements fell away or were wrested from her; and, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, of all her ancient dependencies Corsica and Scio alone remained under the banner of St. George. For three centuries a people, peculiarly impatient of foreign dictation, had found itself compelled habitually to endure it, and even to submit to be governed by Vicars or Viceroy of the Pope or the Duke of Milan, of the Emperor or of the King of France. To this condition Genoa had been reduced by the interminable feuds, first of the Rampini and Mascherati, and then of the Guelphs and Ghibelines, which had finally subsided into a perpetual struggle for power between the noble and popular factions.

In the earlier times of the Republic, and in the theory of its constitution, the class of nobility had no existence. The term noble, at first applied as a tribute of respect to those citizens who had filled important magistracies and embassies, gradually extended itself to their descendants, who, when wealthy and powerful, were often decorated with titles and endowed with fiefs by neighbouring Princes. Some of them acquired from the State, by purchase or usurpation, or a mixture of both, important places on the Ligurian shore, which were easily converted into maritime strongholds. From the small harbours protected by the white towers of Buzalla and Oneglia, the Spinolas and Dorias carried on a lucrative predatory warfare, nominally directed against Turks, Venetians, and other enemies of Genoa, but not always distinguishing with accuracy their flags from that of St.

George. A powerful aristocracy was thus created, which gradually and for a while monopolized all the chief offices of the State, but without acquiring that compactness of organization and unity of purpose which are so necessary to the few who aspire to rule the many. The populace repeatedly rose against its masters, protesting by many a sanguinary revolt against their assumptions and usurpations. In 1340 the plebeian order succeeded in reasserting the rights of which it had been denuded, and the greater part of the nobles were driven from Genoa to their castles amongst the Ligurian hills. A popular vote declared them incapable of serving the State except in naval commands. But as the people had been led to political victory by several powerful and discontented members of the proscribed order, this absurd decree soon became a dead letter. Not only was the return of the nobles winked at, but they were formally empowered to hold first one third, and afterwards one half of all the posts in the State. From the Dogeship or Chief Magistracy alone, an office held for two years, they continued to be by law excluded. In course of time they succeeded, however, in evading the law and reaching the Ducal chair by enrolling themselves in the ranks of the plebeians. Eventually the two factions of the nobles and the people differed from each other in little but in name. Both were led by chiefs of powerful families. Each consisting of many nobles and many plebeians, the majority perhaps of each class being on the side which bore its own name. If the noble faction was thus numerically weaker within the walls of the city, it contrived to redress the balance by means of its greater wealth, and the aid of armed retainers from the country.

The strife of the two factions encouraged foreign interference and produced national decay. Between 1498 and 1528 the Republic underwent no less than twelve revolutions, violent changes of domestic tyrants or foreign masters. To the last of these revolutions, effected under the guidance of the great Andrea Doria, Genoa in a great measure owed her political existence.

During the thirty years which preceded that revolution, Genoa had been for the most part under the protection and dictation, endured with her usual surly impatience, of the House of Sforza or its ally the House of Valois. In the war between Francis I. and Charles V., Ottaviano Fregoso, Vicar-General of Francis, was at the head of the Government; Adorno, chief of the opposite faction, being an exile in the camp of the Emperor. Genoa shared in the disasters of the French. After their defeat at

Biccocca, which drove them from Lombardy, Genoa was cruelly sacked in 1522 by the Imperialists under Pescara. With Adorno for Doge, and his friends in place, she remained some time in impatient and turbulent servitude to the Emperor, for whom his ambassador Lopez de Soria exercised a despotic control over the Government. The people seized every occasion to testify their hatred of 'the Spaniards, evincing at the same time an impartial aversion for the French. When Francis I., a prisoner from Pavia in 1525, rode into their city guarded by long files of chosen Spanish veterans, the pity which generally waits upon humiliated grandeur did not silence the jeers of the rabble. Deeply mortified, the King would never again appear there in public; and he is supposed to have conceived against Genoa an animosity which seemed to inspire his subsequent policy, and was of considerable advantage to his cool and crafty rival. But the mob which hooted the captive French King soon began to waylay and stab the marauding Spanish soldiers, who were saved from a general massacre only by the promise of the Doge and the Spanish ambassador to reimburse those whom the troops had pillaged.

On the sack of Genoa by the Imperialists, Andrea Doria entered the service of the French King. Born of a house which had given an unusual proportion of heroes to the heroic times of the Republic, he had early distinguished himself in arms. He had served the Pope and other Italian Princes, and he had likewise acquired great fame and wealth by his private enterprises at sea against the Turk. His vigorous and successful reprisals upon the pirates of Africa had rendered him one of the greatest shipowners as well as one of the greatest seamen of the Mediterranean. The French fleet being now placed under his command, he became a thorn in the side of the Emperor and his Spanish navy. In the second war between Charles and Francis, Doria contributed greatly to the successes achieved by the French monarch, and to the resumption of his protectorate and authority in Genoa, whence the Imperialists were driven after an obstinate siege. Francis, however, began to abuse his authority before the Genoese had learnt to obey it. Finding them hopelessly hostile, he proposed to remove the seat of Government to Savona, which he had given to the Constable de Montmorency. Against this measure Doria warmly but ineffectually protested. He had another difference with the King on the subject of the Marquess of Vasto and other prisoners of rank, whom a great naval victory off Salerno had placed in his power. By these Imperialists the discontented

admiral was invited to enter the service of the Emperor, who, in addition to the post of Imperial admiral with splendid appointments, promised to make him sovereign of Genoa under the protection of the Spanish Crown. Doria accepted the invitation for the benefit, and not for the betrayal of his country. On the expiry of his engagement with Francis, and after skilfully baffling the schemes of his uneasy master for his arrest, he entered the service of Charles, and with Spanish aid expelled the French from the dominions of the Republic, and extinguished French influence in her councils. He then proceeded to carry out for his country a policy which he had long meditated, and which long survived as his monument. Taught by experience that the perfect independence of a small State hemmed in by powerful neighbours is impossible, he was prepared to sacrifice the free action of Genoa in foreign affairs for the security of liberty at home. Declining the Emperor's offer to raise him to such sovereign rank as was enjoyed by the Medici and Farnese, he undertook that his country should adhere to the Austrian alliance so long as she was protected from all foreign interference in her internal concerns. Charles was sagacious enough to close a bargain by which he secured the friendship of a maritime power without incurring the expense of maintaining a new Duke on a precarious throne.

The constitution of Genoa was then remodelled on a plan framed by a body of twelve principal citizens, chosen for that purpose some years before, under the name of "Reformers." The authority of these Reformers and their plan were universally accepted when it was known that both had received the sanction of Doria, whose splendid services and signal disinterestedness had obtained for him the respect of all good citizens and the name of father of his country. In order to destroy the factions whose dissensions had been so disastrous, the nobles of both parties were formed into a new body of nobility, registered in twenty-eight *alberghi*, or inns, each bearing the name of one of the greater families of the Republic,¹ which name each member of the inn added to his own patronymic. In this body the Senate had the right of annually enrolling ten new names of principal citizens—seven to be chosen from the city, and three from the country. From the nobility all the officers of the Republic were to be selected by a somewhat intricate process of lot and ballot. Three hundred persons, annually elected by lot, chose by ballot

¹ Each family that numbered six distinct branches, each maintaining a house (*sei case aperte*), was considered entitled, on this occasion, to give its name to an *albergo*.

one hundred more, thus constituting the Great Council of four hundred. From the Great Council were taken by lot the Minor Council of one hundred, and by ballot a Senate of eight, who chose the Doge. The Doge and his eight Senators, to whom was intrusted the power of making laws, were elected for two years, on the expiry of which they served for two years more as Procurators or Commissioners of the Public Treasury. A body of five persons, called Censors, likewise selected by ballot from the Great Council, exercised a general supervision over the affairs of the Republic. The first election of the whole magistracy was made by the Reformers themselves, who marked their sense of the great merits of Andrea Doria by appointing him for life Prior or President of the Censors. Although under this constitution the direct privileges of the people were greatly curtailed, it might reasonably be hoped that all would be benefited by the annihilation of the old factions, and that the governing class would be sufficiently imbued with popular sympathies by means of the members annually drafted into it from below. Experience had taught the Reformers that if there was to be a Government worthy of the name, it must be carried on not by the many, but by the few; and in instituting a ruling oligarchy, which was every year to be recruited from the front ranks of the people, they evinced a wise appreciation of the spirit of their age. The ends which they seem to have proposed to themselves were not wholly attained. The ennobled plebeians were found to retain few of those popular sympathies which they had perhaps begun to shake off ere they arrived at the Golden Book. Their care was rather to establish their own equality with the class to which they had risen, than to protect the class whence they had sprung; and under the names of the Old Nobles and the New, or the Portico of St. Peter and the Portico of St. Luke, the ancient feuds and factions began to reappear. Such as it was, however, this constitution of 1528, in its main features, lasted for two centuries and a half, until the Republic was destroyed in 1797 by the French Republicans, the destroyers of Republics.

The patriotism and sagacity of Doria rendered Charles V.—the creator or the supporter of the petty despotisms of Italy—the protector of freedom in Genoa. The Emperor found his advantage in the comparative popularity which he and his Spaniards enjoyed in the Republic, so long at least as the insolence and the encroachments of the French remained fresh in the memory of the citizens. Doria obtained no small degree of influence with his cautious


master, who was intent upon increasing his maritime power, and whose naval supremacy amongst the Christian States in the Mediterranean his able admiral firmly established. The Imperial favour and protection were highly advantageous to the material prosperity of Genoa, and they were, on the whole, cheaply purchased. On one side, the Republic renounced, in foreign affairs, an independence which she could very seldom have maintained ; and she permitted Spanish grandees to draw their coaches through certain streets of the proud city which were forbidden to the wheels of the vulgar.¹ On the other side, in all the dominions of the Emperor, all Genoese not being in the service of an enemy were admitted to the privileges of natural-born subjects, and were thus enabled greatly to extend and improve their commerce. The Bank of St. George,² that great trading company which controlled the finances of the Republic and exercised sovereign rule in Corsica and some other portions of her territory, became, in virtue of its large advances to Charles, and its immense transactions with the usually empty treasuries of his various crowns, the chief creditor and receiver of the revenues of Milan and the Two Sicilies, the Spains, and the Indies.

The constitution of 1528 did not preserve the internal peace of Genoa from being broken by several attempts towards the restoration of French influence. So early as the winter of 1528-9 two thousand French troops, lying idle in garrison in Lombardy, endeavoured by a swift and stealthy march to surprise the city. They were repulsed with loss after burning Doria's house, then without the walls ; and the home of the Dorias soon rose from its ruins in its present beautiful form. In all their attempts, whether from within or without, to disturb the peace of the Republic, the life of the noble veteran was always aimed at as the keystone of the existing order of things ; and it was therefore for no vain show that his bodyguard paced the deck of his galley or the terrace of his palace. The conspiracy of Fieschi in 1547 was, in its origin and in its principal objects, a blow directed in the dark by Henry II. and Paul III. against the influence at Genoa of their enemy Charles V. The change of popular feeling towards the Dorias, which rendered the attempt, so far as that family was concerned, so alarming and so nearly successful, was mainly attributed to the arrogance of Giannettino Doria, the admiral's nephew and heir, who

¹ *Mémoires de M. de la Rochefoucauld, Duc de Dondeaurville*, vols. i.-vi., Paris, 1862, 8vo, vol. i. *Saturday Review*, Nov. 8, 1862, p. 569.

² A good notice of the Bank of St. George will be found in Botta : *Storia d'Italia*, Parigi, 1832, 8vo, 10 vols., i. pp. 31-33.

fell in the affray. The panic which this conspiracy occasioned was improved by Charles V. to propose the erection of a new fortress at Genoa, to be garrisoned by Spanish troops. The delicate task of making this proposal to the Doge and Senate was intrusted to Anthony de Perrenot, afterwards Cardinal Granvelle, who came to Genoa accompanied by several engineers. The envoy's first care was to endeavour to secure the assistance of Doria, whom he assured that the plan had been suggested to the Emperor by



ANTOINE DE PERRENOT, BISHOP OF ARRAS.

many of the Genoese nobles, who feared a revolution. Perrenot further sought to bribe him into approving it by promising him the command of the new castle. Doria rejected both the plan and the bribe with scorn and indignation. He threatened to resign the command of the Emperor's fleet; he appealed directly to those whom he suspected of countenancing the design, and shamed them into a return to more patriotic sentiments; and he animated the Senate to demand the recall of the Imperial envoy and his engineers, whose mysterious surveys of the heights had begun to excite popular suspicion and the mutterings of a popular storm. The Emperor, finding Doria incorruptible and the Genoese jealous of their independence, wisely refrained from pursuing his insidious scheme.

Though determined to permit no foreign interference in the domestic affairs of the Republic, Doria thought it necessary to modify the constitution of 1528. He therefore obtained the appointment of a new body of eight reformers, four from the Old Portico and four from the New, who revised the laws of election, and in certain cases substituted direct voting for the chances of the lot, and in others considerably increased the powers of the magistracy. The result, which was not at first apparent, but gradually developed itself, was to throw a larger influence into the hands of the old and wealthy families of the Portico of St. Luke. The law of 1547, by which these changes were made, was popularly called the law of *Garibo* or *Gariberto*, from a Genoese word signifying order, often used by Doria when expressing his desire to give, by means of these alterations, order and stability to the commonwealth.

The proposal of Charles V. to garrison Genoa with Spanish troops sowed in the popular mind the seeds of a great mistrust of Spanish policy, which bore fruit in the following year. In November 1548 Philip, Prince of Spain, visiting the city on his way to the Netherlands, was, like his father, the guest of Doria. The splendid hospitality of the Doria palace, with its tapestries, velvet hangings, and vast stores of plate, astonished the Spanish courtiers; and the orderly silence of the service, not less than its magnificence, reminded them of the enchanted castles of their favourite books of romance.¹ The honours paid to the Prince within doors were, however, counterbalanced by less agreeable incidents without. His guards were hooted, maltreated, and besieged in their taverns by the surly populace; and he himself, in his own opinion at least, received an affront even from the Senate, inasmuch as they omitted to offer him their palace as his residence. The Genoese, on their side, suspected, and not without some colourable pretext, the Spanish Prince and his people of a plot to seize the city. One Arce, a Spaniard accused of homicide, was arrested by some of the royal attendants, and, by leave of the Senate, lodged in the tower of the public palace. Six soldiers, armed only with their swords, had been thought a sufficient escort to conduct him thither; but when the time came for embarking him for Spain, a number of alguazils and eighty arquebusiers with their firelocks and lighted matches presented themselves at the prison to convey him to the ship. The guard at the public

¹ J. C. Calvete de Estrella: *El felicissimo Viaje del principe D. Philippe*, Anvers, 1552, fol. f. 13.

palace refused to admit so large a body ; the Spaniards endeavoured to force their way in ; and a conflict ensued, in which the foreigners were repulsed with a loss of six or seven men. Shutting their shops and warehouses, the citizens immediately flew to arms, and it required all the personal influence of Doria to quell the disturbance. Philip, by the advice of the Duke of Alba, dissembled his indignation, and accepted the excuses offered by the Senate ; but in the two progresses which he afterwards made through the city, beneath triumphal arches and palace balconies decked with arras, he found his path hedged with pikes and scowling faces.

Doria died in 1560 at the age of ninety-three, leaving behind him a name which on the roll of Genoese worthies stands second



GIOVANNI ANDREA DORIA. MEDAL.

only to that of Columbus. The greater part of his vast wealth, his galleys, and the command of the Sicilian portion of the royal fleet of Spain, devolved on his nephew, Giovanni Andrea Doria, who inherited likewise much of his influence, both at home and at Madrid.

For nearly ten years a revolt in Corsica, actively assisted by the French during their late war with Spain, and secretly fostered by them after peace had been proclaimed, so occupied the thoughts and energies of the Genoese, that the Republic enjoyed something like tranquillity at home. Headed by Sampiero, a chief of great vigour and ability, the savage islanders obstinately maintained a contest, of which the main events were some desperate conflicts for the possession of mountain strongholds, and many treacherous murders barbarously avenged. The Genoese commander having contrived the assassination of Sampiero, the war came to an end in

1569, on terms in which Genoa showed herself merciful and even magnanimous.

Relieved from war abroad, she was soon engaged in the contests of faction at home. The great houses which led the Portico of St. Luke or the party of the Old Nobles—the Dorias, the Lomellini, the Sauli, and Pallavicini—had been gradually becoming greater and more potent. In their ties of kindred with foreign aristocracy, in their monetary relations with foreign Courts, and in the vastness of their ever-growing wealth, the heads of these houses had acquired interests and conceived ideas which their fellow-citizens, having little or no share in either, regarded with dislike and mistrust. The sumptuous palaces of the great nobles, their villas on the shore of San Pietro d'Arena, their castles in the mountain-valleys, their plate, furniture, and equipages, and their princely and exclusive habits of life, were much more suited to monarchical forms of government than to the simplicity of a trading Republic. The New Nobles found themselves not only eclipsed, but treated as belonging to a different caste by these proud and gilded patricians. The Portico of St. Luke had secured the greater part of the offices of the State, and it lost no opportunity of extending the powers of the posts which it had monopolised, and of widening the privileges of its individual members. Out of such causes of strife there arose between the Porticos perpetual quarrels, each more bitter than the one before it. The Doge, Gianotto Lomellino, had a dispute with the secretary of the Republic, Matteo Senarego, an able and sagacious man, about the signature of letters to sovereign Princes. It had hitherto been the custom for these letters to be signed only by the Secretary of State. The Doge now insisted that they should be signed by himself and one or more members of the Senate. Senarego, resisting what he considered an encroachment on his dignity, resigned his post, and became a leading agitator in the Portico of St. Peter. By the constitution of 1528 the nobility had been classed in twenty-eight *alberghi* or inns, each bearing the name of one of the greater houses, which name was also added to his own by every person of another family who joined the inn. The members, by actual descent, of the family whose name was thus assumed soon, however, began to show that they considered their ancient blood thicker than the water of this political baptism, and that they by no means intended to confound themselves, or to be confounded, with the families who had been "aggregated" to their fold. They drew up elaborate pedigrees, and hung upon their

walls family-trees in which no account was taken of the engrafted branches. Nor were these measures dictated by motives of family pride alone. Some of the older families had large funds invested in the Bank of St. George for the benefit of such of their members as might fall into poverty ; but it does not appear to have been clearly defined in 1528, as in equity it ought to have been, that the new recruits were to have no claim upon these family funds. When the question was raised, it was natural that the descendants of those who had established these funds should demur to sharing the benefits of them with strangers, whose connexion with their family was of a political and arbitrary kind, and not contemplated in the deed out of which the benefit arose. The original Lomellini family, taking this view of the case, applied to the Senate for a decree, which should restrict to themselves and their children the ancestral bounty thus devised to their use. The application was opposed by the aggregated members of the Lomellini inn, who insisted on their rights as adopted Lomellini, and represented themselves as victims of the aristocratic exclusiveness of the Portico of St. Luke. A still more difficult case arose in the courts of law at home and abroad. One Rottolo, an "aggregated" Pallavicino, being incarcerated in Spain for debt, desired to take the benefit of a usage which obtained in Castille and forbade the imprisonment of a noble. He therefore applied to the Senate for a certificate that he was a noble of Genoa, and might therefore lawfully claim his release. But as it happened that some of his detaining creditors were Genoese and nobles of the Portico of St. Luke, his application was strongly opposed, on the ground that although he was entitled to enjoy at Genoa the political rights and privileges of a Pallavicino, yet in the eye of the Castillian law he was not a noble at all ; and it was urged that the Senate, instead of the desired certificate, should grant a statement of the facts of the case, leaving the question of Rottolo's nobility to be decided by the Spanish tribunal which had committed him to gaol.

In both these cases of the Lomellini and of Rottolo the Senate temporized and postponed judgment. When elections occurred, popular feeling proclaimed itself unfavourable to the Portico of St. Luke. When detachments of Spanish troops on the way to Milan or to Spain landed or embarked at Savona, the soldiers were received with hooting and curses. In Genoa itself the attitude of the populace became so menacing that the Senate at last suffered itself to be intimidated into deciding the

case of the Lomellini trust money in favour of the aggregated members of the inn. Incensed at this injustice, the nobles of the Old Portico began to echo in their own interest a cry which had been long used by their rivals of St. Peter, for a new commission to reform the constitution. Each party made proposals to this effect, but each contrived to obtain the rejection of those approved by the other. A new Ducal election was keenly contested. The Lesser Council, by whom, subject to certain intricate forms of balloting, the selection of four candidates was to be made, could not complete its choice; and the whole body was, according to law, locked up in the public palace for eight-and-forty hours. Four names of partisans of St. Luke were adopted by a majority; but it was found impossible to obtain for them, or any others, the amount of consent legally required. The Senate stepped in, and announced that if the decision were not made in two hours, it would take upon itself the responsibility of submitting the four names to the Grand Council. The electoral body being still unable to agree, the Senate sent to the Grand Council the four names which had received most support in the lesser one. The result was the elevation of Giacomo Durazzo, a man generally approved, to the Ducal chair. The Old Nobility acquiesced, the New complained and protested. At this point Philip II. offered his mediation between the contending factions, and sent Juan de Idiaquez to represent him at Genoa. That able minister made his proposals with plausible moderation, and gained the ear of the leaders of St. Luke, most of whom urged on their Government the acceptance of the King's offer. It was, however, declined by the Doge and Senate, and Idiaquez remained in Genoa to watch the course of affairs.

These latter events took place in 1571, in the summer preceding the battle of Lepanto. During part of the time Giovanni Andrea Doria was at Genoa with his own galleys and a squadron of the Sicilian fleet, of which he was admiral, lying in the harbour, while he acted as the avowed leader of the nobles of St. Luke. Jealous of his influence and of his power, the nobles of St. Peter entertained a hatred to his person which was at least equal to their distrust of his loyalty to their common country. There is no reason to believe that Doria, in any degree, swerved from the honourable policy of his great kinsman, whose rule it had been to cultivate the good-will of the Republic's most powerful neighbour for the sake, not of destroying, but of preserving her liberties. But as faction ever delights in extreme opinions, it is

not surprising that after Lepanto the partisans of St. Peter adopted to the full, with regard to their countryman, the views of Venice and the Pope. Before the Genoese populace they denounced Doria as the betrayer of Christ and the slave of Spain, who would willingly subvert the liberties of Genoa. During the two following years the Portico of St. Peter increased its influence and strengthened its hold on popular sympathies. Under the auspices of some of its members a popular party, or association of persons wholly of the plebeian class, was formed, who in 1573 addressed the Senate in a petition, somewhat menacing in tone, and demanding the aggregation of leading citizens of that class to the inns of the nobility according to law. The right of popular petition not being known to the constitution, the principal Senators of both parties agreed in condemning this step, and in rejecting the petition with a sharp reproof to its authors.

Notwithstanding this temporary concurrence of policy, when the annual time for making ascriptions to the Golden Book came at the beginning of the following year (1574), the two Porticos were again arrayed against each other. Each tampered with the populace, and by promises of proposing ascriptions endeavoured to obtain its support. The popular leaders, after some negotiations with St. Luke, declared themselves on the side of St. Peter. Every piece of public business became a party question; every public festival an occasion for displaying party spirit. During the carnival some of the nobles of St. Luke appeared on horseback dressed as paladins of chivalry in the aristocratic piazza of San Siro. Those of St. Peter immediately held a tournament in the piazza of Ponticello, a region inhabited by the lowest of the people. Fifty cavaliers rode at night through the streets by torchlight to affix the challenges to the lists, challenges which were full of sarcasms against the rival Portico. The adherents of St. Luke retorted by a petition to the Senate. Alleging that barrels of gunpowder had been placed in convenient cellars, and that the real object of the tournament was to conceal a plot for blowing up the city, they prayed the Senate to forbid it. The city was not blown up, and the tournament took place without any noticeable incident except unbounded popular applause. A countercharge, launched by St. Peter against St. Luke, accused the leaders of the latter of secretly enlisting foreign mercenaries to act against their country. The populace met and uttered a tumultuous protest against this enlistment, and the Senate issued a decree against foreigners or citizens appearing armed in the streets.

Dispute thus followed dispute in rapid succession, until men's minds became ripe for violent revolutionary change, and for actual hostile collision. To keep up their favour with the populace the nobles of St. Peter, being unable to fulfil, were obliged to enlarge, their promises. From ascriptions to the Golden Book they rose to augmentation of wages to the Government workmen, and to a reduction in the duty on provisions. The Portico of St. Luke not unnaturally took the alarm. Its members, though wealthy and powerful, were numerically a small minority in the city. The party therefore elected some representatives to act with Doria, and empowered them to raise an armed force among the peasantry for its protection. These bands, which were levied with the consent of Idiaquez on the part of the King of Spain, came into the city under pretext of serving on board Doria's galleys. They were immediately denounced by the adherents of St. Peter, who advised the citizens to arm themselves and close their shops. The advice was followed, and in spite of various decrees fulminated by the Senate, some collisions took place between the armed retainers of the two factions. Doria himself, leading a body of men (as he said) to protect his galleys, was attacked and routed. This success gave great encouragement to St. Peter and the populace. Assembling in force, they barricaded the streets, occupied the squares and the mole, and strengthened their positions with a few cannon. Guards placed at the doors of the chiefs of St. Luke cut off their communication with each other. The public couriers were stopped and despoiled of their letter-bags; and the insurgents carried their boldness so far as to waylay and seize some boxes of arms belonging to the King of Spain which were passing from his city of Milan to his island of Sardinia.

The two parties, thus standing face to face in armed hostility, were eager to gain the ear of the Princes most interested in the affairs of Genoa. Each sought to justify its own conduct, and to expose the practices of its rival, by means of deputations to Madrid, Rome, and Vienna. The Portico of St. Peter also entered into communications with Paris.

The foreign potentates who were thus appealed to, if they felt any concern in the welfare of Genoa, felt a still deeper concern in the policy which might be pursued by each other; and each was bent on frustrating the aims of the rest.

Philip II., as the sovereign of the greater part of Italy, assumed to himself the prerogative of interfering at pleasure in the concerns

of all the Italian States, and pretended that no one had a right to draw the sword on Italian soil without his permission. To the assistance of his minister Idiaquez he now proposed to send from Spain the Duke of Gandia ; and he ordered Don John of Austria to pay his brief visit to Genoa and thence to repair to Vigevano.

Gregory XIII., who viewed the King of Spain's pretensions with the disfavour natural to a Pope, was especially jealous of Philip's policy in Genoa. The Pontiff was himself suspected of a design to make himself master of the Republic ; but if he ever entertained such an intention, he soon moderated his views to the humbler ambition of foiling the schemes of more powerful competitors. He sent to Genoa first the Bishop Odescalchi, and afterwards Cardinal Morone, a churchman of great ability, who speedily acquired the position of umpire between the contending Porticos.

The Emperor Maximilian sent the Count Daremberg and Pietro Fanno Castaciario, Bishop of Acqui, to watch over his interests.

Francesco I., Grand Duke of Tuscany, had two schemes for benefiting himself at the expense of the Republic. One was to revive certain old pretensions of Florence to the frontier towns of Sarzana and Sarzanella ; the other was to divide the whole dominions of Genoa with the King of Spain. So long as he saw any hopes of attaining the latter object, he was ready to second the designs of Philip II. whatever they might be ; but failing in that, he agreed with the other Italian Princes in deprecating any further aggrandizement of their great neighbour.

Henry III. of France, although his Huguenot subjects kept his hands full and his coffers low, would not lose the chance of recovering the ancient influence of France in Genoa. He sent thither as his agents Mateo Birago, a Milanese, and Galeazzo Fregoso, a Genoese exile, who was now in command of his galleys. They were instructed to offer to the Doge and Senate the King's mediation towards bringing about a settlement of the disturbances in the State ; and, in case the liberties of the Republic should be attacked, aid in men, money, and munitions. These envoys were received at Genoa with great demonstrations of popular joy. They allied themselves closely with the nobles of St. Peter and the leaders of the populace, and did not seek to conceal their hostility to the party of St. Luke and to Spain. The Senate, however, after hearing their message, respectfully

declined their proposals, and desired them to retire from the city.¹

To watch and to frustrate the designs and policy of France and the French party was one of the chief objects of the mission of Don John of Austria. Philip II. was too much engrossed with the revolt in the Netherlands to desire to interfere actively in the concerns of Genoa. He was, however, especially jealous of French intrigues, which at this time were rife at all points where they could thwart Spanish interests, and ready to suspect them where perhaps they did not exist. His own schemes and machinations were equally exaggerated at the French Court. At Paris it was believed that Don John had fifteen thousand men in the Milanese ready to march upon Genoa. At Madrid it was believed that French agents at Constantinople were urging the Sultan to send a fleet to the Italian shores for the sake of providing work for the navy of Spain.

At Genoa Don John had conversed freely with the leaders of both parties. At Vigevano he was waited upon by deputations from both ; and he was in frequent communication with Idiaquez. He was himself in favour of a neutral policy if other foreign influence could be excluded. The nobles of the Portico of St. Luke, he wrote to the King, were firm adherents of Spain, and if permitted to direct the home government they would support Spanish interests in the foreign policy of the Republic. Even in the Portico of St. Peter there were many good friends to Spain. Openly to aid St. Luke would at once arouse the jealousy of the Italian Princes and the hatred of the Genoese populace. To aid St. Peter in any way would be to alienate firm and powerful friends and to set up a democratic government, upon the stability or the policy of which no dependence could be placed. In the event of St. Luke gaining the upper hand the objects of the King were secured ; while if St. Peter gained the day Don John foresaw the possibility of a rupture—which did actually occur—arising out of jealousy between the noble leaders of the Portico and their plebeian supporters.

By the leaders of St. Luke a proposal was made to those of St. Peter that the subjects of dispute between them should be left to the arbitration of the representatives of the Pope and the King of Spain. Idiaquez was greatly in favour of this arrangement, believing that if the Legate were to be made the sole arbiter, as

¹ Herrera (*Historia General del Mundo*, lib. v. cap. vi. p. 179) says they were only allowed to remain there eight days.

it seemed possible he might be made, the terms of settlement would be less agreeable to the interests of the Spanish Crown. The Duke of Gandia was on his way to Genoa to assist Idiaquez : but being delayed on the road by gout, the two parties would not agree to anything until his arrival.

Affairs in the city falling every day into still greater confusion, Don John was directed to order the enrolment of several companies of soldiers in the Milanese, and that two German regiments quartered there should be moved towards the Genoese frontier. It was to be given out that these troops were required for the protection of Tunis and Goletta, those African possessions of Spain being now seriously menaced by the Turk. At the request of some of the party chiefs Don John himself came down to Albenga, a small seaport within the territory of the Republic. Here he conferred with Idiaquez, with Doria, and other influential persons of both parties. The Doge and Senate, who in all their difficulties appear to have been patriotically anxious to avoid any armed interference either by Spain or by France, immediately sent a deputation to wait upon him, and to request that if he came to Genoa he would bring with him no more than three or four galleys, for the sake of avoiding giving offence or alarm to the excited city. The courtesy of this message was somewhat diminished by the fact that while it was on the way the mole and harbour of the city were armed with additional cannon, and other preparations were made for resisting an attack.

Don John, although informed of these precautions, took no notice of them to the deputies. Receiving them politely, he reminded them of the favour with which his father the Emperor had always regarded the Republic, and the services he had rendered her ; and he disclaimed all desire or intention of interfering in her domestic quarrels. As to his going or not going to Genoa, it was a matter of no importance, and besides, the preparations of the Sultan compelled his speedy return to Naples. The desire of his master the King was for the peace of Italy ; it troubled him to see it broken, and he could and would compel those who disturbed it to be quiet. He therefore trusted that the Genoese would, by the aid of the Spanish ministers, find some way of healing their domestic differences, and continue to deserve the friendship and protection of the King of Spain. When Idiaquez returned to Genoa he was accompanied by Luis de Cordoba, Don John's master of the horse, to offer Don John's compliments to the Doge and Senate. This civility was acknow-

ledged by four more envoys bringing a present of provisions. Departing for Spezia, Don John sailed from that port on the 7th of August, and on the 24th he landed at Naples.

Meanwhile, helpless and bewildered in the presence of an armed mob and armed aristocracy whom it had no adequate military means of controlling, the Senate, after issuing various futile decrees against the disturbers of the peace, was reduced to parley with the democratic ringleaders. Certain reforms were demanded, and in particular the immediate abrogation of the obnoxious *Gariberto*, or constitution of 1547. The Senate was much divided in opinion. In heart adverse to the movement, the majority was nevertheless inclined to yield to it. A few, chiefly partisans of the Old Nobles, were for handing over the Government to the people, believing that they would thus rally into one party the bulk of both Porticos. The popular chiefs out of doors, as if foreseeing the effects of this manœuvre, insisted on a formal vote repealing the obnoxious laws. They finally carried their point by surrounding the public palace with armed men. The panic-stricken Senate conceded all that was demanded of them. Four Senators only, nobles of St. Luke, had the courage to set their faces against legislation on compulsion, and to protest that all proceedings taken under such circumstances of intimidation must be held null and void. Reform, nevertheless, took its lawless course. The law of 1547 was abrogated; an aggregation of three hundred new names to the Golden Book was ordered; the wine-tax was repealed; and to the daily wages of the Government workmen three halfpence were added. Great popular rejoicings followed the popular victory, and the nobles of St. Luke seized the opportunity of relaxed vigilance to withdraw from the city.

The retirement of the Old Nobles from Genoa proved very advantageous to their cause. As long as they remained in the city the New Nobles and the popular leaders maintained a good understanding, and presented a united front to those whom they regarded as a common enemy. When, however, the Portico of St. Peter was left alone with the populace, it found itself nearly in the invidious position formerly occupied by its rival. The New Nobles were in fact the sole aristocracy, and were left to deal as they could with the unreasonable demands of a democracy disappointed in the results of the recent victory. The vague and wild hopes which excite and are excited by democratic revolution could no more be fulfilled at Genoa in 1575 than at other places or in other times. To the disappointed populace it was clear

that the benefits to which they had looked forward had been withdrawn from their grasp by the treacherous and selfish patricians. They rushed to the Senate which had so rapidly repealed laws and taxes, and demanded the repeal of all taxes on food. To a Senate who had to face a possible war with its richest citizens, backed by all the power of Spain, the demand was embarrassing. It temporized, as usual, and made some minor concessions. But within the Portico of St. Peter there arose a party secretly desiring and endeavouring to negotiate the return of the Portico of St. Luke.

The headquarters of Doria and the exiled party were at Finale, a small town, which was also an Imperial fief, within the dominions of the Republic on the western shore of the gulf. Here on this neutral ground the Old Nobility assembled in great numbers, concerted their measures, assessed themselves by a voluntary taxation for the expenses of the struggle, and appointed representatives to state their case at foreign Courts. Doria was in constant communication with the Viceroy of the Spanish dominions in Italy, and with Don John of Austria at Milan, at Vigevano, or at Naples.

The first burst of revolution being over, the government at Genoa was carried on by a kind of compromise between the Senate and the leaders of the populace. These leaders were Tommaso Carbone, Bartolomeo Coronato, and Stefano Morea. Carbone, a recent noble of the Portico of St. Peter, was a bold rude man, honest of purpose, and gifted with great popular eloquence. Coronato belonged by birth to the party of St. Luke, which he hated with the hatred of a renegade. He was a proud, arbitrary, and ambitious demagogue, unscrupulous in his objects and his means of attaining them, and careless of everything but his own aggrandizement. Morea was a man of less natural ability, of a savage and relentless disposition, and the satellite of the other two. This triumvirate was generally able to impose its policy on the Senate, which by yielding nevertheless continued to retain some power in its hands. When they could not agree reference was made to the Papal Nuncio, who decided the point in dispute with a due regard to justice and existing engagements. Thus, when the time came for the election of governors of certain districts, the question arose whether they were to be elected according to the forms of 1528 or of 1547. Many of the Senators, knowing that the repeal of the constitution of 1547 had been obtained by force, were for silently adhering to the repealed system. The populace, of course, upheld the validity

of the revolution. The Nuncio, wisely as it appears, decided that the recent change must be respected, and that the elections should be made according to the forms of 1528.

Both the Porticos sent envoys to the various Princes of Europe—St. Peter to justify its acts and explain its policy; St. Luke to complain of its wrongs and of the violation of the constitution, and to entreat for aid in redressing its grievances and restoring order. Philip II. was the only sovereign powerful enough to be able, or interested enough to be willing, to intervene actively in the quarrel. But the war which he was carrying on with his subjects in the Netherlands and his apprehensions on the side of France were of themselves sufficient reasons for yielding to his natural impulse to doubt and delay. Besides, the Pope was strongly averse to any mode of settling the Genoese question which should enable the King of Spain to assume before Europe the place of arbiter in the affairs of Italy. It was long, therefore, before Doria's urgent entreaties for such aid in ships and soldiers as would insure the triumphant return of his party produced any effect either at Madrid or at Naples. The King would not give any decided reply; and Don John of Austria, who now made no secret of his desire to take part with Doria and St. Luke, could not act without orders. The rumour of French emissaries being again at work in Genoa probably first reminded Philip that procrastination might be carried too far. Don John at last received permission to afford assistance from the royal fleet to the Portico of St. Luke; but as to the mode of rendering this aid a difficulty arose between him and Doria. The Genoese admiral desired that an immediate entrance should be effected by force, to be followed by the seizure of the city; but he stipulated that the attack should be made, not under the flag of Spain, but under that of St. Luke, in order to avoid, as far as possible, wounding the national pride and awakening the jealousy of other States. Don John replied that the dignity of the King of Spain did not permit his troops to fight under the flag of a foreign faction. The Cardinal-Legate was appealed to. He, of course, was against armed intervention, in whatever form, on the part of Spain. He assured Don John that his master would resent any attack upon the liberties of Genoa. Under this double protest, Don John had no other alternative but inaction. He permitted Doria to recall from Naples to Spezia his own galleys which were serving in the royal fleet. He also sent his secretary, Escovedo, to Madrid

to explain the posture of affairs and take the pleasure of the King.

Meanwhile, the Pope intimated to Philip II. that he would not tolerate any Spanish interference at Genoa ; that he believed the Genoese, aided by friendly mediation, could settle their own affairs ; and that, if the King was bent upon armed interference, he must count also upon the withdrawal of certain concessions in the matter of ecclesiastical revenues lately made to him by the Holy See.

Idiaquez, on the other hand, wrote that if his master desired to maintain his influence at Genoa and put an end to the revolution there, he must act without further delay, because the French envoys were gaining ground in the city, and the French King might yet step in and give infinite trouble.

In the dilemma, thus offered, of a quarrel with the Pope or a fresh embroilment with Henry III., Philip sent secret orders to Don John to give all the aid he could afford to the party of St. Luke without compromising either himself or the Crown.

The aid was given in a manner highly characteristic of the faithless policy of Philip II. Idiaquez made application to the Senate, in the usual form, for leave for a body of three thousand foot, under Sigismondo Gonzaga, to pass through the dominions of the Republic from Milan, for the purpose of relieving certain garrisons in Sardinia. Leave was granted, but not without considerable examination and discussion of the alternative dangers of admitting into the Genoese territory the troops of a Prince who was known to sympathise with the exiled party of St. Luke and of offending a powerful neighbour.¹ Meanwhile, leave of absence from the Spanish fleet had been given to Doria and the other Genoese captains and their galleys ; and five galleys belonging to the King were likewise permitted to sail with them. License to obtain supplies from Sicily had also been accorded. When the troops arrived at the place of embarkation, probably Spezia, the officers were informed, by despatches from the Marquess of Ayamonte and the Spanish minister at Genoa, that they were thenceforth in the pay of the nobles of St. Luke, and were to act under the orders of Doria, their Commander-in-Chief by sea and land.

¹ The story is told by Herrera (*Historia General del Mundo*, lib. v. cap. viii. pp. 183-185) with apparent unconsciousness that there was anything disgraceful or blamable in the transaction. "Leave was granted," he says, "por los buenos modos con que D. Juan de Idiaquez lo negociava." After narrating the manner in which the troops were transferred to the service of St. Luke, he merely notes that the party of St. Peter was much displeased, "pareciendo que se les avia hecho tiro."

The wealthy magnates of Genoa were willing to make great sacrifices for the recovery of their birthrights; one of them had contributed to the treasury of the exiled party fifteen thousand ducats in a single sum;¹ and there was every reason to believe that they would be more punctual paymasters than the bankrupt Princes whom German mercenaries had been accustomed to serve. The prospect of pay and plunder was equally pleasing to the troops and their leaders. Doria, hoisting the flag of St. George, commenced active operations by seizing and garrisoning Porto Venere.

The Government of Genoa had little means of opposing his progress beyond the shifting enthusiasm of the populace. The troops at the orders of the Senate amounted to only fourteen hundred, of whom six hundred were Germans. A council of war was established, and a levy of four thousand men was decreed. But recruits came in slowly. The plebeians of the city would shout, but they would not fight; the peasantry of the hills were in arms for the exiles; the neighbouring Princes of Savoy, Mantua, and Parma were adherents of Spain and St. Luke; and the Grand Duke of Tuscany would sell assistance only at an exorbitant price. His negotiations with Philip II. for a partition of the Genoese territory having been broken off, he now offered the Senate a thousand men and a loan of money on condition of the cession of Sarzana and Sarzanella. To the credit of their patriotism the Senate at once rejected the offer.

To trace the progress of the brief campaign carried on along the Ligurian shore and amongst its mountains during September and October 1575 is beyond the scope of this narrative. Doria was generally successful. He took Chiavari and Sestri, and obtained possession of Spezia and other seaports by the influence of friends within their walls. Novi, Gavi, Valtaggio, and other inland strongholds opened their gates, and the greater part of the ultramontane territory submitted to the authority of St. Luke.

The commencement of actual war threw increased power into the hands of the popular leaders. Coronato, as president of the council of war, monopolized the conduct of military operations, and his partisans clamoured for his appointment as dictator. Alarmed at this movement, the Senate began to arm those adherents on whom it could depend. The prospect of a disastrous war carried on under democratic chiefs cooled the ardour of all those citizens upon whom any portion of the expense was likely to fall. The Cardinal-Legate, watchful of popular feeling,

¹ Herrera : *Hist. Gen.*, lib. v. cap. viii. p. 183.

informed Doria that the party of St. Peter was becoming reasonable, and would probably agree to a fair peace, and he strongly urged a cessation of hostilities. To this proposal Doria demurred, unless a pledge was given by the Senate for its good faith; and the pledge which he demanded was the port of Savona. The Senate indignantly refused, and Doria took Noli and La Pietra.

His successes gave great anxiety to all the neighbours of Genoa. The interests of the Pope and the Emperor were in favour of peace. The interest of the French King, failing the now hopeless restoration of his influence in the Republic, was to mitigate as far as possible the defeat of the democratic party and to bring the war to an end. The interest of the King of Spain, although it lay on the side of the party of St. Luke, forbade the utter prostration of the party of St. Peter. The Pope wrote to Don John protesting against the Spanish policy of which "his dearly beloved son" was the instrument, and threatening that he would not only excommunicate all concerned, but that he had a million of gold ready to spend in war, and he would raise up all Italy against the King of Spain. The Italian Dukes, especially he of Tuscany, seeing that the war was carried on with Spanish troops, began to be seriously alarmed by the probability that it would end in giving them the Spanish monarch for an inconveniently near neighbour at a new point. Francis II. of Tuscany, hitherto a submissive vassal of Spain, not only allowed the Portico of St. Peter to enlist men and officers in his dominions, but, offering to sell to its chiefs four of his own galleys, he strengthened his garrisons, and assembled a large force of militia on the Genoese frontier. To Doria he sent a message that if he intended to pursue his conquests, he would have to reckon with thirty thousand Tuscans.¹ As the adherents of St. Peter, dispirited by their defeats, began to conceive fresh hopes, the nobles of St. Luke became weary of bearing the expense of signal victories.

With these dispositions in the various parties concerned, no great difficulty was experienced in effecting a compromise. Towards the end of October, Doria, with four other deputies from St. Luke, came in a galley to San Pietro d'Arena, met the Imperial, Spanish, and Papal ministers, and stated the conditions on which he would lay down his arms. To these conditions the Senate agreed with some modifications, and a truce was concluded.

It was also agreed that the final adjustment of the disputes between St. Peter and St. Luke and the terms of peace were to

¹ H. E. Napier's *Florentine History*, London, 1847, 6 vols. sm. 8vo, v. pp. 281-2.

be referred to the Cardinal-Legate and the representatives of the Emperor and the King of Spain. These ministers at first stipulated that during their deliberations on those matters they should be invested with the whole powers of the Republic, civil and military. * This proposal, which was afterwards attributed to Idiaquez, gave great offence to the Senate, and so exasperated the populace that they rushed to the house of the Cardinal and threatened to burn it down. It was at last determined that the ministers should receive twenty hostages from each Portico in pledge of their willingness to accept the plan of reform which, within three months, should be prepared by the ministers. During two years thereafter their sovereigns were to exercise a joint protectorate over the new constitution of Genoa.

The hostages having been given and sent to various cities beyond the dominions of the Republic, the Cardinal and his colleagues retired to Casale de Montferrato, a town belonging to the Duke of Mantua, to mature their scheme of reform. They were assisted by six deputies from either Portico. Their deliberations extended over nearly five months instead of three. The new constitution did not materially differ from that of 1547, except in the abolition of the inns of nobility, and a provision that all those families who had laid aside their original names on joining these corporations should resume them. Inscription on the Golden Book was rendered somewhat more attainable by the mass of the people, and the modes of balloting and casting lots at elections were somewhat modified and altered. Party names were expressly abolished; and the breaking down of party distinctions was the chief end aimed at in the other changes.

The constitution was accepted by both parties without difficulty or delay. Each was exceedingly eager to get the country as soon as possible out of the hands of the three sovereigns who had appointed themselves its trustees. It was questionable whether St. Luke emerged from the confusion of the revolution and restoration with feelings more friendly to the House of Austria than those entertained by St. Peter. There was much reason for suspicion that the King and Emperor, having failed to derive any personal advantage from the internecine strife, desired to punish both parties with unsparing impartiality. St. Peter had suffered in war, and St. Luke was made to suffer in peace. When Doria disbanded his troops, a large body of Germans mutinied for arrears of pay and refused to give up the town of Novi until their claim of forty thousand crowns was satisfied.

An appeal to the three ministers produced nothing but an order to levy a rate of two and a half per cent on the property of the adherents of St. Luke, a fine which had to be paid. The King of Spain stopped the payment of certain dividends on the debt of Flanders, chiefly held by nobles of St. Luke. This measure was for many years a subject of diplomatic warfare between Genoa and Madrid, and the debt was eventually compromised, to the impoverishment of some of the leading families of the Republic. The democratic leader Coronato fared no better at the hands of the Catholic King. At the close of the struggle with St. Luke he had sold himself to Idiaquez for a pension of three thousand crowns. The pension was never paid, and the pensioner, plotting a new revolution, was beheaded.

Doria and his party were received in Genoa with general satisfaction. The Senate decreed that his statue, inscribed to the preserver of the liberty of his country, should be erected in the public palace; and there for two centuries it remained as the companion to that of the great admiral, until both were pulled down by the rabble who sold Genoa to the yoke of revolutionary France.¹ Envoys, with letters of thanks and compliments more courtly than sincere, were despatched to the Pope, the Emperor, the King of Spain, and Don John of Austria. Silvestre Cattaneo, the envoy to Don John, found him at Naples.

During the course of these Genoese affairs Don John was more than once brought, greatly against his will, into collision and controversy with the policy and ministers of Gregory XIII. Regarding the Pope as the powerful friend in whose aid lay his chief hope of obtaining a crown, either in some conquered dominion or by marriage, he was naturally anxious to preserve his favour. That he should have risked losing it is one of many proofs of the loyalty with which he served his cold and gloomy master. But during the progress of the transactions above related, he deemed it prudent to send the Count of Priego to Rome, to afford full explanations of his conduct—explanations which appear to have satisfied the Pontiff.

Of the private life and amusements of Don John during his residence in the North of Italy in 1574, a few notices have been preserved.

At Vigevano he found time to improve his dancing by taking

¹ In 1797. Fragments of the statues are said to be preserved in the cloister of the church of San Matteo, a church founded by the Dorias, and filled with their monuments and trophies.

lessons from Cesare Negri, the Milanese professor whose performances had delighted him at the Doria palace at Genoa in 1571. "On the 6th of May 1574," says Negri in his book, "I danced before Don John of Austria in the palace at Vigevano; and I remained there eight days and taught His Highness many things which pleased him exceeding well, so that he gave orders that I should receive infinite donatives." On the 26th



CESARE NEGRI, DANCING MASTER OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA.

of the same month Negri again appeared before Don John and the Viceroy, the Marquess of Ayamonte, at Milan. On this occasion he was accompanied by six of his pupils, with whom he danced the galliard and other dances with an agility and address, "the like of which," says the professor, "the noble spectators had never before witnessed."¹

On the 26th of June Negri himself produced at his own

¹ *Le Gratie d' Amore di Cesare Negri detto il Trombone, professore di ballare*, Milano, 1602, sm. folio, p. 8. Of this rare and curious volume, which has a fine portrait of the author, and many interesting plates of dances and costumes by Leon Pallavieino, there is a later edition entitled *Nuove Inventioni di Balli*, Milano, 1604, sm. fol., which is probably the same book with a new title.

expense a masque of his own invention, in honour of Don John. It took place at Milan in the Corso of the Porta Romana, and it was beheld by Don John and the Prince of Parma from the windows of the palace of Agosto Vicino. Of this pageant the proud and happy author has left a minute description. It appears to have been a kind of saltatory and musical procession, in which allegorical figures moved majestically amongst gamesome shepherds dancing and playing on various instruments. No less than eighty-two persons took part in it. Led by the god Pan, the procession was closed by a triumphal car drawn by eight slaves, and containing the goddess Venus. Four kings, four queens, four dwarfs, and four wild men, then executed an elaborate and fantastic dance before the balcony occupied by the princely spectators.¹

During his stay at Milan Don John invited Henry III. of France, then at Venice, on his way home from Poland, to visit him in the Lombard capital, but the invitation was declined.²

In the following month Don John of Austria, being still at Milan, determined to visit the Court of Parma, to pay his respects to the Princess Maria of Portugal, the wife of his kinsman and friend Alexander Farnese. Ottavio, Duke of Parma, aware of the important affairs which had brought Don John to Milan, determined to meet him at Piacenza, half-way between Milan and his own capital, and to hold in that city a grand tournament in honour of his visitor.³ The Count Alberto Scotti was appointed defender of the lists (*mantenitore del Torneo*), and preparations were made on a scale of great magnificence to attract all the nobles and gentlemen of Italy to "receive and do honour to the " first knight of Christendom, the only hope of our oppressed and " afflicted religion."

Some time beforehand the following challenge to the chivalry of the world, and conditions of the combat, were put forth by Count Alberto Scotti, who assumed for the occasion the title of the Destined Knight :—

" THE DESTINED KNIGHT TO HIS READERS.

" IL CAVALIERE DESTINATO A' LETTORI.

" It being no less fitting that every gentleman should love " with sincere faith her whom choice or destiny has given him

¹ *Gratie d'Amore*, pp. 8-9-11.

² Botta.

³ There is a rare and curious tract giving an account of this entertainment entitled *Il nobilissimo et ricchissimo Torneo fatto nella magnifica Città di Piacenza nella venuta del serenissimo Don Giovanni d' Austria, et da M. Antonio Bendinelli descritto*. In Piacenza appresso Francesco Conti, 1574, 4to, p. 59, from which the following notice of it is taken.

" for lady, than that he should by valiant deeds show forth in
 " every action her beauty and deserts ; and that I may not fail
 " in the duty towards my lady imposed upon me by the laws
 " of chivalry, seeing that I make profession to transcend all
 " others in serving her faithfully, and that she excels all others
 " in beauty and virtue, I have resolved with all my strength to
 " make it known to the world, not losing the fair occasion which
 " is now offered to me. Here, therefore, where to honour the
 " coming of the most serene Don John of Austria are met many
 " of the most famous knights of the world, I propound that she,
 " to serve whom my destiny calls me, is more beautiful and more
 " virtuous than any other lady to whom any other knight who-
 " soever may bear affection. And whoever shall be so bold
 " as to presume that his lady is to be preferred before mine, or
 " even to be equalled with her in beauty or in virtue, or in both,
 " on this coming Thursday, which will be the 29th of July, in the
 " Piazza Maggiore of this city, where the most illustrious and
 " most excellent Lord Duke, my lord, will grant a secure and
 " open field, with three encounters of lance and five of sword,
 " under the conditions here set down below, I will maintain with
 " him my proposition, and will make him feel how greatly he has
 " deceived himself. In case, however, that the number of the
 " knights who shall come against me shall be as great as may be
 " expected, I reserve to myself the right of deferring till the next
 " day the end of the battle, or of selecting for the maintenance
 " of my challenge one or more such knights whose ladies approach
 " most nearly to mine in beauty and virtue. Given in Piacenza
 " on the 24th of July 1574."

Conditions of the Tournament.

" Four prizes will be offered. One to him who shall on the
 " whole best break a lance. Another to the best swordsman.
 " The third to him who shall bear himself best in the general
 " combat (*folla*). The fourth to him whose equipments shall be
 " judged the bravest (*à chi nel comparire sarà giudicato mas
 " galano*).

" Every knight is to wear a favour of gold or other material
 " given him by his lady.

" It shall be judged at once whether the defender or the assail-
 " ant (*venturiero*) shall have best broken his lance or used his sword,
 " and to him who shall have done so the favour shall be given.

" He who does not break his lance loses the course.

"No prize shall be given to the knight who shall strike below the belt, or shall fall from his saddle, or shall touch the barrier" (*sbarra*), or shall be disarmed of his sword."

The Judges of the Tournament.

"The Signor Duke.

"The Signor Castellano.

"The Signor Don Roderigo de Benavides.

"The Signor Don Pedro Manrique."

The Master of the Field.

"The Signor Fabio Farnese.

"To guard the field the city authorities will post, with their armed bands,

"The Signor Count Alessandro Anguisciola.

"The Signor Count Carlo Scotti.

"The Signor Captain Ventura da Gazza.

"The Signor Captain Giacopo Sanguineo."

Don John set out from Milan on Tuesday, 27th of July, with a cavalcade of twenty-four persons, and slept at Lodi, where he was splendidly entertained by Count Claudio Landi. The next day he accomplished the rest of the journey. At Mirandola he was met by Alexander Farnese, attended by twenty gentlemen on horseback, and was accompanied by him to the ferry of the Po, on the further bank of which the Duke Ottavio with three hundred of his courtiers stood ready to receive him in a fair pavilion. A handsome palfrey (*cortaldo*) with gold-fringed velvet housings was here offered to Don John, who however preferred accompanying his host on the same horse which had brought him thither. They entered Piacenza by the gate of Sant' Antonio, the neighbouring castle saluting with all its artillery, and its garrison presenting arms on the walls. Passing by the cathedral and the Great Piazza the cavalcade reached the citadel and the palace. Here Don John was received at the foot of the staircase by the Bishop, and, half-way up, by the Princess. A banquet and ball concluded the day, and lasted far into the night.

In the afternoon of the next day (29th July) the tournament took place. The Piazza Maggiore was inclosed with lists, around which had been erected a great theatre for the spectators. The defender and his opponents made their entry with great pomp,

one or two at a time parading round the inclosure and making their obeisances before the royal box, which was occupied by the Princess and Don John. The martial spectacle of the tourney, at this late period of its existence, had become at least as much a contest of decoration, fancy, and splendour, as a trial of personal prowess and dexterity. The academy with its allegories and mythologies, a parade of

“tilting furniture, emblazon’d shields,
Impresses quaint, caparisons and steeds,”¹

had now invaded and almost taken possession of the tilt-yard, as in earlier days the habits and heraldries of the tilt-yard had modified the usages of the academy. Each knight made his appearance in the lists with some equipage or following, illustrative of the chivalrous title which he had assumed. The defender of the tournament, the Destined Knight, was preceded by four drummers and four trumpeters in red and white liveries, sounding their warlike notes before a car or an architecturally-decorated platform (*lilza ò trezzula ò treggia*), on which stood three figures representing the three Fates, attired in various symbolical colours. In addition to the seven planets which formed the diadem of the Fate Clotho, seven beautiful boys were arranged round the car as the representatives of Saturn and his companion stars. The black and white horses which drew the car were driven by a man dressed as Time. The machine was followed by a couple of pages in red and white, carrying the lance and the gauntlets of their master. Then came two gentlemen, his seconds, or god-fathers as they were called, in crimson and cloth of gold. Last of all came the Knight of Destiny himself, resplendent in crimson and gold, with a mighty plume of white and crimson, and bearing on his arm a shield, on which were depicted the seven stars forming Charles’s Wain, with the motto *Ipsò ducente*. Reining in his steeds before the royal box, Time recited some verses, in which he informed the public that, by the command of Destiny, he had brought thither a knight who, for the sake of his lady, was about to display prowess such as the world had never yet beheld. The cavalcade then passed round the lists, and the defender placed himself in his appointed station.

A second car soon made its appearance. It was in the shape of a galley, superbly painted and gilt; and on the poop a figure of Victory and four chained Turks allegorized, in compliment to

¹ Milton : *Paradise Lost*, ix. 34

Don John, the victory of Lepanto. Two knights adventurers, Cesare Todesco and Guaspari Vezzuola, with their four seconds, trumpeters, and pages, stood on the deck, while some gunners fired salutes from the toy artillery. The structure rested on a



platform representing the sea, which was itself upheld and moved by unseen bearers. No poetry was recited from the deck, but as they passed along the knights flung amongst the crowd printed copies of a sonnet, in praise of "John of Austria, valiant and " wise, of whom the Turk was forced to confess that he came " and saw and conquered."


The knights of Desire (*Desideroso*) and of Politeness (*Manso*) came preceded by Abundance, Hercules, the Lernæan Hydra, and the world-sustaining Atlas. The Judicious knight (*Giudizioso*) made his entry in the bowels of a moving mountain, up which Sisyphus was seen rolling his intractable stone. Four knights appeared in an architectural structure of three orders, from the recesses of which issued the music of a band of wind instruments. Six others were conducted to the lists by Apollo and the Muses; Mount Parnassus, with the Castalian spring and the winged steed, being also in attendance. An enchanted tower brought the knight of Good Intent (*Intento*), and on a sudden, at the command of a necromancer, burst asunder and vanished in a blaze of fireworks, leaving that champion in blue and gold bowing, sword in hand, to the Infanta and the ladies. Pier-Maria di Rossi, Count of San Secondo, and Cesare Trecco sought to do honour to Don John by parading before him the car of Jove, drawn by an eagle and adorned with martial trophies, and to which four captive Turkish Pashas were chained. A couple of camels followed, bearing other Turkish spoils. Hippolyto Visdomini, a newly-married knight, to do honour to his bride, rode behind a car drawn by unicorns, and bearing the figure of Wedded Concord (*Concordia Jugale*). Over the crimson-and-gold helmet and armour of this devoted husband there floated a huge plume of the same colours, marvellously interwoven; and the device upon his crimson shield was a golden ox yoke, with the motto *Nihil suavius*.¹

The Prince of Parma also figured in the procession. He did not exhibit any allegorical car or edifice, but was conspicuous by his golden armour, and by having his helmet borne before him by a page, in the fashion of Spanish tournaments. His crest was of great height, and formed of feathers so disposed as to represent the lantern of an admiral's galley. The device on his azure and argent shield was a stork destroying serpents, and the motto *Publicæ Saluti*, by which he was supposed to indicate his watchful care for those over whom he might be set to rule. Venus in her shell, the Fountain of the Dodonean Grove, and other conceits more or less complicated and costly, closed the long procession of the fifty-three knight adventurers who had responded to the challenge of the defender.

The guest of the day, having surveyed, from his seat beside

¹ This device and motto is cited with approval by Seipio Bargagli, *Dell' Imprese*, Venetia, 1594, 4to, p. 132; where other examples of the use of the device are mentioned with the motto *Snave* and *Non bene ab uno*.

the Portuguese Infanta, the unfolding of the various pageant, was seized with a desire to take a part in the tilting which was about to commence. "The most serene Don John," says the chronicler of the festival, "being the honourable and unconquered knight for which the world knows him, could not restrain himself from appearing, although without forethought or preparation, in the tourney, in company with those most noble and valiant cavaliers, Ottavio Gonzaga, Don Cesare Davalos, and Don Roderigo Piemontello, with the following arms and equipments. All came in black armour inlaid with gold. The crest of the most serene Don John was of black plumes garnished with gold, with certain yellow and white banderoles, and a single long drooping white



KNIGHTS TILTING.

"feather (*fatto a la fontana*). The crest of Don Cesare was of the same material. That of Don Roderigo was of green plumes garnished with gold. His Highness wore breeches, cut in sailor's fashion, of black velvet richly worked in gold and silver. Those of Don Cesare, of white velvet embroidered with gold and silver, were a marvel to behold. Don Roderigo's breeches were of black velvet like those of His Highness. All four knights passed round the lists with their lances in their hands, preceded by four drummers in livery of black, white, and green, and took their stations within the inclosure."¹

Although the chronicler tells "in high-born words the worth of many a knight,"² he does not undertake to present his readers with a picture of the tournament itself, which, however magnificent, might in description," he says, "appear faulty to those who from having read, perhaps without well understanding, the Poems and Impreses of the Occult Academicians, the Discourses and Dialogues of Massimo Trojano, and other works of that kind, affect learning and philosophy about devices and mottoes, and

¹ A. Bendinelli: *Il Torneo nella Città di Piacenza*, 45

² *Love's Labour's Lost*, Act I. Sc. i. l. 173.

“ might perhaps prove tedious to other readers. However this may
“ be,” he continues, “ the tournament was most beautiful, every-
“ thing having succeeded perfectly and to the incredible pleasure
“ and wonder of the spectators, who, after their manner and
“ capacity, interpreted and discussed what they saw. All the
“ knights having appeared, and being in greater numbers than was
“ expected, it was clearly manifest that if they were all to meet in
“ single combat the tournament would last all night ; to avoid
“ which inconvenience His Excellency the Duke gave orders that
“ they should fight first one against one, then in pairs, and then in
“ threes and fours. The most serene Don John and his com-
“ panions having first fought amongst the adventurers, the Duke
“ afterwards directed that they should pass to the side of the
“ defender of the challenge ; and in his band they accordingly
“ fought in the general combat, or chance-medley (*folla*), which
“ took place about sunset (*alle ventiquattro hore*). And the affair
“ between the most noble and valiant knights, defenders and
“ adventurers, so passed that it was most difficult to decide to
“ which party the victory belonged. For if one was thought to
“ have best broken a lance, another was esteemed to have borne
“ himself best as a swordsman ; so that it appeared that no one was
“ wholly defeated or wholly conqueror. The judges therefore had
“ no small difficulty in awarding the prizes. Nevertheless the
“ defender had the prize for the bravest equipments. To Don
“ Honesto Orato (*Aranda ?*), a Spaniard, was given the prize of
“ the sword ; to Don Roderigo Piemontello that of the general
“ combat ; and to the most serene Don John that of the lance.

“ The tournament ended, Don John retired with the most
“ serene Princess to the citadel, where, after supper, there being
“ assembled there many gentle ladies full of grace and marvellous
“ beauty, and superbly adorned with jewels, and pearls, and gold,
“ the ball began, which lasted until a late hour, with infinite
“ pleasure to that noble company. In the middle of this festival
“ appeared the eagle who had so wonderfully drawn in the
“ tournament the car of Jove, the invention of the illustrious Count
“ of San Secondo. After a fitting reverence to the most serene
“ Don John, the eagle with his beak presented to him a petition,
“ the tenor of which was not made known. Whatever it may have
“ been, His Highness, having read it, passed it to His Excellency
“ the Duke.

“ The following morning, 30th July, before breakfast, the most
“ serene Don John, His Excellency, and the most illustrious

“ Prince, went to see the castle and its magazines, and were
“ received by the Governor with five salvos of arquebuses and
“ other artillery, which lasted during their stay in the fortress.
“ Thence, having returned to breakfast in the citadel, the most
“ serene Don John passed the rest of the day in agreeable conver-
“ sation with the most serene Princess, who, at home and abroad,
“ at table and elsewhere, honoured him with every kind of noble
“ entertainment, and always gave him the place of honour.
“ Amongst many other marks of singular affection Her Highness
“ gave him fifty pairs of the finest gloves, and two large basinsful
“ of certain pasties and sweet and precious compositions of her
“ own, made of civet, musk, amber, benzoin, and other things of
“ most pleasant savour.

“ The day following, 31st July, at a very early hour he took
“ post, accompanied by the Prince and an honourable company of
“ many lords and noble gentlemen, on his way to Genoa, and there
“ embarked for Naples, whence, on the 24th of August,¹ he set
“ sail with a great armament to succour or recover the Goletta.
“ May God, in His piety and mercy, show him such favour that he
“ may destroy the eternal and cruel enemies of His holy faith and
“ His most holy name !”

¹ The chronicler is here mistaken. Don John sailed from Spezia on the 7th, and reached Naples on the 24th. See p. 46.



KNIGHTS IN A MÊLÉE.



CHAPTER III.

THE LOSS OF TUNIS AND GOLETTA ; DON JOHN'S VISIT TO SPAIN IN 1575 ; HIS RETURN TO ITALY AS VICAR-GENERAL FOR THE KING ; HIS APPOINTMENT AS VICEROY OF THE NETHERLANDS ; AND HIS SECOND VISIT TO SPAIN ; FROM AUGUST 1574 TO OCTOBER 1576.



URING the winter of 1573-4 the engincer Gabriel Serbellone had been engaged in constructing, with all possible speed, a new fortress at Tunis. The reasons which induced Don John of Austria to order its construction have been already indicated. It might have been supposed that during the winter, either these reasons would have been approved by the King, or that they

would have been disapproved and the work stopped. It is a proof of the multiplicity of affairs pressing on his attention that in April Philip II. was still in doubt as to the wisdom of the course taken in October. On the 5th of April 1574 he wrote to Don John of Austria that he had hitherto delayed considering the matter, hoping to decide it after their meeting ; but that, now that Don John was fixed for some time in Lombardy, it was needful that a decision should be taken. He then proceeded, in a very rambling and confused style, to state the argument for and against holding Tunis. Briefly it stood thus : Tunis ought to be held, because the Pope had urged that it should be held ; because to give it up merely in apprehension of a serious attack

by the Turk would involve a great loss of reputation ; and because its retention even during the current year would prevent the Turk from concentrating his forces against the Goletta, or from making damaging descents on the coasts of Italy and Sicily.



DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA.

For the evacuation of Tunis it might be urged that it would be better to go than to be driven out by force ; that its recovery by force would encourage the Turk to attack the Goletta ; that the influx of fugitives would hamper and dismay the garrison there ; that the loss of the garrison of Tunis would be a very serious disaster ; and lastly, that the new fortress, besides being unfinished,

laboured under the serious disadvantage of being commanded from two adjacent heights, and of being, for this year at least, likely to be but badly supplied with water. As to the all-important question, how far the new dependency, if retained, would be capable of bearing the cost of defending and ruling it, the King had formed no opinion; he desired further information, and remitted it to his brother's consideration, bidding him remember its importance, and "how often people are deceived in these things," and also that "for those who have their hands full at home, it is not fitting to undertake fresh obligations." The policy of finishing the fortress and holding Tunis, or dismantling it and withdrawing the troops, was referred to the discretion of Don John after consultation with Serbellone. If he determined to hold the place, it must be done with Italian troops only, as the King could not submit to the possible loss of a large force of Spaniards. If the place were abandoned, care must be taken to bring away the troops in good time, and before the Turkish fleet could attack them in the confusion of their departure. The despatch, in its feeble verbosity, seems to have been dictated by Philip II. himself. A postscript, in the King's own hand, explained his own view of the matter:—"In this letter," he wrote, "you have what occurs to me about this affair; and although both on one side and the other difficulties offer and present themselves, it appears to me that by far the greatest will be found in holding the fort; and therefore my opinion is, that it will be better to abandon it, supposing this can be done in good time; and so I earnestly entreat you to look at the matter as one of great importance, and without regard to anything except what is most suitable for the success of the business itself."¹

This despatch probably reached the hands of Don John at Genoa, or at Vigevano, and found him involved in the novel intricacies of Genoese politics. A less satisfactory document could hardly have been presented to him. The objection to the site of the fortress, now raised by the King, had been considered and set aside before the work had been begun; and it is difficult to suppose that the water question had not been also anxiously discussed. Of whatever had been resolved in October there can

¹ "Por esta carta savreys lo que sobre este negocio se offrece, y aunque en lo uno y en lo otro se offrecen y representan dificultades, mucho mayores parecen las del entretenerlo, y así me parece que lo que mas conviene es que aquello se dexasse pudiendose hazer con tiempo, y assi os ruego mucho que lo mireis como cosa de tanta importancia sin mirar a otra cosa sino a lo que mas conuendra al bien del mismo negocio."—Philip II. to Don John of Austria. De S. Lorenzo a v. de Abril 1574. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 1142.

be no doubt that Philip II. and his counsellors had been minutely informed. The resources of Tunis and its territory must have been, or at least ought to have been, well known to a Government which for nearly forty years had held possession of the Goletta; and Don John had good reason to be surprised at being asked whether he supposed that his conquest was capable of being made to pay its own expenses if retained as a Spanish dependency. He appears to have taken a very reasonable way of replying to the questions referred to him by desiring Juan de Soto, commissary of the fleet, to report to the King on the affairs of Tunis. The report, a comprehensive and statesmanlike paper, was presented by Soto himself on the 20th June 1574,¹ just about the time that the Turkish fleet might be expected on the Calabrian and African shores. He was sent to Court by Don John in order that he might personally urge upon the King the necessity of providing for the protection of Tunis.

The report began by recapitulating the circumstances of the conquest, and the reasons for placing the new fortress at the west end of the lake. The probable annual cost of the military occupation of Tunis and Biserta was estimated at two hundred and thirty-three thousand five hundred ducats.² A commission appointed to inquire into the resources of the country showed that the revenue which might be expected from it would far exceed that sum. The ordinary land revenue of Muley Hassan had been three hundred and seventy-five thousand nine hundred and thirty-five ducats; there was other property at the disposal of the State, besides the produce of fines; and on the gold imported from the south and the trade with Europe valuable taxes were levied. All that was required to develop these large resources was a good and stable Government. To provide this Soto offered various suggestions. He thought that Muley Mahomet ought to be removed, being a Prince who neither enjoyed any credit with his own subjects nor evinced any gratitude to the King of Spain. He would place as alcaide, or governor of the fortress, a gentleman of quality and conscience, not greedy nor covetous, who would treat the Moors kindly and prudently, and respect their

¹ *Relacion de Juan de Soto*; 20 Junio 1574, already cited.

² The details were as follows:—

Garrison for the new fortress—		Brought forward	145,500
From Oct. 1 to March 31, 1500 foot, at		1000 native horse, at 4 ducats a month	48,000
6000 ducats a month	36,000	Officers and extraordinary expenses	12,000
From April 1 to Sept. 30, 4000 foot, at		Frigates and look-out boats, etc.	8,000
16,000 ducats a month	96,000	Garrison at Porto Farina of 150 men	10,000
100 Spanish horse, at 1000 ducats a month	12,000	„ Biserta	10,000
Captain and officers of horse, at 1500 a year	1,500		
Carry forward	145,500		233,500

religion, a recommendation which seemed to reflect upon the character and administration of Serbellone. The municipal government of the city he would entrust to twelve Moors to be chosen by the inhabitants. Full and free exercise of their religion should be allowed to the people, and the Christians should be forbidden, as they had been forbidden by an order of Don John, to enter the mosques, or interfere in any way with the ceremonies of the Mussulman faith. Under these conditions Soto had no doubt that Tunis would soon become a peaceful and prosperous dependency of the Spanish Crown. The rule of the Turks had been so harsh and cruel that they were universally detested, and the people were everywhere ready to welcome the King of Spain as their deliverer, and, if mildly and justly governed, to be his loyal subjects. The country abounded in natural products of all kinds—cotton, flax, oils, honey, wax, dates, cattle; there were salt marshes, tunny fisheries, and coral fisheries, which would be of great value to the King and to his Italian provinces. The wines of Spain and Italy would find a ready market amongst the Moors. With Tunis in the King's hands, the garrison of the Goletta would be victualled at much less than its usual cost, and the country afforded excellent and salubrious winter quarters for troops. As the Pope desired that the King should retain his conquest, His Holiness might perhaps be willing to grant to His Majesty some slight tax on the Church property of Naples and Sicily in aid of the cost of holding it. Whatever the future and ultimate decision of the King, it was too late to dismantle and abandon the fortress during the present summer. Nor could the Spanish troops of the garrison be withdrawn. That step would insure the loss of the place and the destruction of the Italians, and it could not be honourably taken. This, concluded Soto, was the unanimous opinion of the King's ministers and counsellors in Italy.

This report, so creditable to the judgment and foresight of Don John of Austria, indicated a policy which might have inaugurated a new and happy era for Africa and Spain, but which was far too enlightened to be approved by Philip II. There is something almost grotesque in finding the young soldier, who had been the instrument of the royal vengeance on the Moriscos of Granada, and who was soon to undertake the suppression of the rights of the Netherlands, thus pleading for justice, mercy, and toleration for the Moors of Tunis. Soto's mission to Madrid and his report seem to have had at least one result—that Philip

II. ceased to insist on the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from the African fortress.

The King's despatch of the 1st of April must have added in no small degree to the anxieties of Don John of Austria. He had passed the winter in urging Granvelle and Terranova, the Viceroy of Naples and Sicily, to furnish the supplies required by Serbellone at Tunis, and had found them perhaps not very able and certainly most unwilling to comply. Tunis and its fortification were his affair, not theirs, and "every man for himself" was the maxim of the ill-provided representatives of the King of Spain. Don John had now the mortification to learn that the King and his ministers at Madrid were hardly better informed of the exigencies of the defenders of Tunis, or more ready to meet them, than the jealous Viceroy. He sent Soto to present his report in person, that he might be at hand to give the King any further information that might be asked for, and he hoped that the envoy might be speedily sent back to Italy with the needed funds, and with orders so peremptory as to override all official excuses and delays. But his hope was disappointed. Soto was detained at Madrid all the summer, during which he had interests of his own to look after, and to protect himself from some slight or wrong attempted to be done him in his office, with the cordial aid of Don John, who wrote "that his services of more than thirty years deserved very different treatment."¹ Escovedo, Don John's secretary, was also at Court during this summer, doubtless charged with a similar mission. But no funds were forthcoming, nor was the passive resistance opposed at Naples and Palermo to the progress of the works at Tunis overcome by the appeal to Madrid.

From Genoa, Vigevano, or Milan, amidst the festivities of Piacenza and the conferences of Albenga, Don John kept vigilant watch over the affairs of Tunis and the movements of the Turkish fleet. Soon after he reached Vigevano he was followed thither by Giovanni Margliano, nephew of Serbellone, whom that officer had sent to inform him that if all things went well he hoped his new fortress would, by the 20th of May, be sufficiently advanced to resist any force that was likely to attack it. Less satisfactory tidings, however, soon followed. On the 4th of June he wrote to Escovedo that he trusted the next posts would bring better news, and clear away the clouds which now threatened them, as

¹ Don John of Austria to Juan de Escovedo, secretario y del consejo del Rey; Vigevano, 4 Junio 1574. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Hacienda, Legajo 136.

he would see by the enclosed advices of the Turkish fleet :—" I am well aware, God knows, how necessary it is to look after " things at Court ; and that, although affairs may be forgotten for " a while, the time will come when a remedy must be applied, " perhaps at double cost of cash and credit. ' Of that dust has " ' come this mud,' as the saying goes ; and for want of foresight " one is driven to much greater outlay, which after all sometimes " proves useless." ¹ But the clouds, instead of clearing away, gathered more thickly. The Turkish fleet, which had been reported to have sailed from the Levant, was heard of on the Italian coasts, and descents had been made on Calabria and Sicily.

Arab hordes from the desert and troops of horsemen from Fez were gathering upon the borders of Tunis. At last, at Albenga, Don John received a piteous despatch from the Governor of Goletta, informing him that Goletta and Tunis were closely besieged, and praying for speedy succour. It was brought from Naples by Captain Pedro Martinez Ortuño, whose galley was much shattered by a gale during the passage. With this disagreeable missive in his pocket there is no wonder if Don John ceased to wish to visit Genoa, whether with a force sufficiently imposing to overawe the contending Porticos, or with the slender squadron permitted by the Senate. He immediately ordered down from the Milanese all the troops that could be spared for embarkation at Spezia. The Italian regiments of foot commanded by Ottavio and Sigismondo Gonzaga, and the Spanish regiments, likewise of infantry, of Garcia de Mendoça and his old friend and comrade Lope de Figueroa, responded to the call. It was probably during the march of these forces to the coast that Don John made the visit to Piacenza recorded in the previous chapter. They embarked at Spezia early in August. A summer storm, however, of unusual violence, breaking over the port, destroyed the water-barrels of many of the vessels, considerably damaged the flagship, and necessitated a few days' delay. At last on the 7th of August they set sail, but it was not till the 24th that they cast anchor at Naples. It may easily be conceived that the days during which Don John lay in the harbour of Spezia delayed by the squall and the necessity of repairing the mischief which it had effected, and the tedious fortnight which he afterwards passed at sea, must have been amongst the most anxious days of his life.

To the jealousy with which Granvelle regarded Don John, the disasters which soon turned the conquest of Tunis into an

¹ Don John of Austria to Juan de Escovedo, 4th June 1574, already quoted.

ignominious defeat may be mainly ascribed. The Cardinal may fairly have disapproved of the policy of extending the African dominions of the Crown. With the Netherlands in rebellion and the sovereigns of England and France openly or secretly encouraging the rebels ; with Genoa in a state of ferment which required an armed observation highly displeasing to the Pope and the Italian Princes ; and with a war on hand with the Turk, he may reasonably have thought that this was not the time for planting a new and expensive dependency on the sands of Numidia. But the step was taken with the King's acquiescence, and it was too late to recede without dishonour. Granvelle, nevertheless, washed his hands of the whole affair. In vain Don John urged the Duke of Sesa to intercede with him, the King to issue orders to him, that the commanders at Tunis might be furnished with needful supplies ; in vain those commanders themselves represented to him the urgency of their wants. The Cardinal pleaded the extent of the territory for which he himself was responsible, the want of money, the absence of orders. At the end of June, indeed, he advised Serbellone that a very large and well-appointed Turkish fleet had sailed from the Golden Horn for Tunis, and recommended him, in case his works were unfinished, to retire to Goletta, which with his force and skill would thus be rendered impregnable. At Palermo, the officers sent from Tunis found the Viceroy Terranova less able and hardly more willing to render an efficient assistance. In the past autumn he had recommended the dismantling of Tunis before the invading armament had sailed ; he had been always opposed to the building of the new fort ; and during the occupation, his despatches to the King conveyed frequent predictions of disaster, which his own niggardliness in lending aid did much to fulfil.¹

Arriving at Naples on the 22d of August, Don John added such slender reinforcements as he could procure to his troops and his military chest, and then on the 23d steered for Messina. At Naples or Messina, Don John received from the King a despatch which must have been very embarrassing and annoying. It was dated the 30th of July, and informed him of what he must already have long since known, namely, that the Turkish fleet was off the Barbary coast, and apparently about to attack Tunis. The King hoped, scarcely it seems expected, that he had received from the Marquess of Ayamonte the hundred thousand ducats

¹ Duke of Terranova to Philip II. ; Palermo, 16th September 1573, 14th March, 7th April, 24th May, 1574. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Sicilia, Legajos 1139 and 1141.

which he had desired to be paid to him ; and he approved of his going to Sicily because his presence would quicken and stimulate work, and “supply much that was apt to be wanting.” After giving various directions as to the troops to be employed, and the places from which they were to be drawn—arrangements which, if the troops were to be of any use in Africa, ought to have been long since completed—the King confessed that Don John’s “hand and “diligence must make amends for many faults ;” that although the present pressing necessities had not been unforeseen, it was impossible to provide for them without money, which both here and everywhere else was lacking ; that for that reason he had been unable to send off Juan de Soto, or do anything more than give the order on Ayamonte for the aforesaid hundred thousand ducats ; and that Don John must make that sum last as he best could until he could send him another remittance, which he was straining every nerve to accomplish. The Viceroy of Naples and Sicily had received repeated orders to give all aid in their power ; and he must use his discretion in insisting on compliance with his demands, “having regard to his own needs and to theirs.” The King estimated the naval force at Don John’s disposal at one hundred and twenty galleys. He was therefore to understand that although his going with the fleet to Sicily was approved, he was positively forbidden to go further. His force was so inferior to the Turkish fleet that it could but hang on the rear of the enemy, cutting off stragglers and retreating ; and “in such “work,” added the King, “it comports neither with your authority “and reputation nor with mine, nor my service, that you should “be engaged in person ; and you must therefore direct such “operations as may be possible from some point that may be “convenient. And so,” he proceeded, with his usual weak wordiness, “one of the things which I most expressly charge and “order you is that in no manner and for no cause you go on “board the fleet while the enemy remains in those seas, for this “is what is proper ; and I insist upon this order the more because “I know how necessary it is, seeing that your courage and your “desire to be active in my service are not slight, and may make “you endanger your person and the fleet, whose safety is of much “more importance than those places which you might desire to “relieve, or indeed anything else ; wherefore I charge you, if “it be needful to employ any part of the fleet, or the whole, in “relief of the Goletta or Tunis, you should be very careful in “looking into the matter before exposing it to such risk.” If

Don Garcia de Toledo were well enough to undertake the duty, it was the King's opinion that he ought to go to sea with the fleet; and in any case he ought to be with Don John. Failing Don Garcia, Giovanni Andrea Doria would be the next best commander of the expedition. This order, so discreditable to the King's common sense, received its finishing touch of baseness in the following words:—"One thing has here seemed convenient, and it is this, that although you are not to go on board the fleet, the fact is to be kept secret, because by so doing more people of importance will desire to join you in the enterprise, and afterwards it will be easy to provide that they shall continue in it and share its fortunes, seeing that there will be no help for them; and so on this point you are advised."¹ A postscript in the royal autograph added that Juan de Soto would soon be sent back, and that "what is said here with regard to your own person is my precise order."²

To hasten from Lombardy to Naples, hoist his flag, lead the royal fleet from port to port in Sicily, make the signal to sail for Tunis, and then himself slink ashore, leaving his volunteer companions impounded on board, and the command in the hands of an old paralytic lieutenant, was a course not likely to commend itself to the young chief who had, three years before, led the navy of Christendom to victory at Lepanto. It was, however, the course not only approved but strictly prescribed to him by his master the Catholic King. The fortune of war relieved Don John of Austria from the necessity of choosing between dishonour and a reprimand; but we shall see that, if need had been, he would have preferred the latter alternative.

Detained by contrary winds at Messina, Don John had hardly left that port when a furious storm drove him into Melazzo, and compelled him to remain there for eight days, refitting as well as he could for his voyage to Palermo. At Palermo he had the satisfaction of finding Alonzo Bazan, with forty galleys; and Marcello Doria arrived, a day or two later, with twenty-four more, having on board some companies of Italian foot. Moved by the gravity of the danger, the Duke of Terranova had at last provided a force of three hundred picked Spaniards for the assistance of

¹ Una cosa ha parecido aca conveniente y es que aunque vuestra persona no aya de entrar en la armada se tenga esto secreto, porque acuda assi mas gente principal hallarse con vos en tal ocasion y despues, sera facil que no dexten de hallarse en los effectos que se offrecieren viendose en la necesidad y assi estareis advertido deste punto.—Philip II. to Don John of Austria; Madrid, 30 de Julio 1574. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 451.

² Lo que se dize aqui de vuestra persona os lo cargo assi precisamente.—*Ibid.*

Tunis. These Don John immediately put on board two of Bazan's galleys and despatched to Goletta, promising the rowing-gangs that they should receive their freedom if they would throw themselves with the soldiers into the fort. The winds and waves, however, now sided with the enemy. All that men could do was done by the officers and crews, but the galleys were driven back disabled to Palermo. When the weather moderated they were again sent out, this time with their high poops and forecastles cut down for the sake of escaping observation, and laden with gunners and munitions. Again contrary winds compelled their return. Don John next sent out Gil de Andrade, the bold seaman who had performed so many similar services, with four light galleys, to observe the motions of the enemy, obtain intelligence, and, if possible, throw some reinforcements into Goletta. Andrade was not more fortunate than the others. His little squadron was driven upon the coast of Sardinia, and for eighteen days, no tidings of him being received, it was feared that he had fallen into the hands of the Turk.

September was drawing near its close, and Don John was still detained at Palermo, when news arrived there of the loss of the Goletta, taken on the 23d of August by the Turks, after a siege of about five weeks. The fort of Tunis was also reported to be in great danger. "I have received this intelligence," wrote Don John to the King, "with the great regret which the case demands, seeing "the poor means I have of affording relief, and of doing what is "required, and that this might have been otherwise had we all in "concert provided for the most pressing needs." He added that he would nevertheless do his best in these discouraging circumstances; and that, if the new fort should fall, he should think it right to go to Court to confer with His Majesty.¹

Weather at length permitting, Don John, after holding a council of war, set sail for Trapani with all the vessels he could muster, being one hundred and six sail, and having on board about five thousand troops. His sailing was the signal of a fresh tempest, which raged with little intermission for four days. Many of the ships were dismasted and otherwise injured. The fleet was detained in the harbour of Trapani, by the necessities of repair and by continuous gales, until the 3d of October. During these days Don John received further bad news in a letter from Serbellone, who told him that he was in desperate straits,

¹ Don John of Austria to Philip II. ; *De galera*, Palermo, 23 de Setiembre 1574. *Arch. Gen. de Simancas*, Estado, Legajo 450.

and that his only hope lay in the speedy appearance of the whole royal fleet in the Bay of Tunis, to compel the Turks to fight a naval battle.

We must now turn to the African shore and survey the position of the Christian army, engaged in an unequal struggle with the Turk. Serbellone had undertaken the task of constructing the new fort at Tunis with some reluctance, well knowing the certainty of a vigorous attack from Constantinople, and the uncertainty of efficient support from those who took their orders from Madrid. But having undertaken it he pushed it on with great energy, and at first with some success. The fortress was of a form nearly square, with four principal bastions and the usual outworks. During winter and spring the personal watchfulness of Don John insured a tolerably regular supply of the necessary tools, materials, and workmen; and Serbellone, as we have seen, reported that the place would be in a state of defence by the 20th of May. But he had not reckoned upon Don John's mission to Lombardy, and the consequent cessation of supplies. In spite of all his efforts, summer found him still amongst half-raised walls and half-traced trenches.

He had been left at the head of about six thousand foot, half Spaniards and half Italians, under Andrea de Salazar and Pagano Doria, a hundred horse under Lope Hurtado de Mendoza, and some sappers and miners. He had been promised a reinforcement of two thousand men, and troops had been indicated for this purpose by Don John to the Duke of Sesa. But, when the time came for their embarkation, Granvelle said he had no orders with respect to their pay, and refused to make any advance. The squadron of twenty galleys, destined to convey them, accordingly sailed without them, having on board some munitions of great importance. Even these did not reach Serbellone until the middle of June. He begged hard that the galleys should remain at Goletta for a while, that he might have the assistance of the rowing-gangs at his works. The commanders, Don Juan de Cardona and Don Bernardino Velasco, would not, however, consent to leave more than ten of their vessels. The troops meanwhile were worn out with toil under the burning sun, and although they were reinforced by the garrison of Biserta, and although Pagano Doria and other officers carried their baskets of earth to the ramparts like the common soldiers, July did not see the fulfilment of the promise made for May.

Besides the difficulties arising from the neglect of his superiors,

Serbellone had to contend with the evils of a divided command. He was Captain-General at Tunis, but the older possession of Goletta had its own garrison and governor. This governor, Don Pedro Portocarrero, was a man of family and interest, but of no military experience or capacity, no vigour of character, and was almost destitute of ordinary personal courage. Stupidly confident in the strength of his fortress, and blind to the impending struggle, he passed the winter in a state of careless sloth, which would have been hardly excusable in a Governor of Lerida or Segovia. One trait will sufficiently paint the character of the man. Six months before the enemy appeared, Serbellone, visiting the fortifications of Goletta, remarked that the parapets on the rampart were too low to shelter the men, and ought to be raised by two feet. "Yes," said the indolent Spaniard; "but where is earth to be got in this land of rock?" "Well," replied the energetic Italian, "why not lower by two feet the surface behind the parapet?" Nevertheless, the Turkish sharpshooters had begun to pick off the exposed Spanish gunners ere Portocarrero had set a mattock or spade in motion, and the work had in the end to be accomplished by the aid and under the superintendence of Serbellone.

Tunis, as has been already narrated, had been conquered for the Sultan in 1570 by Aluch Ali. It was the feat of arms by which that gallant marauder had signalized his viceroyalty at Algiers. It had been, in truth, an exploit of no great difficulty, the native sovereign being very unpopular, and the people not averse to accept the yoke of a Sultan. Lepanto had rendered it impossible for Selim to occupy the country with any considerable force. In 1573 his fleet was at too great a distance to offer, perhaps not prepared to risk, another general action, and his new subjects were still less prepared to fight for their new master. The city and province, therefore, as we have seen, submitted to Don John as quietly as, three years before, they had submitted to Aluch Ali. But Aluch Ali was now all-powerful at Constantinople; he was at the head of a fleet which he had been carefully forming and training since the disastrous autumn of 1571; and he determined both to regain Tunis and to endeavour to make Goletta pay for the laurels of Lepanto. The winter of 1573-4 was therefore devoted to earnest preparation for an expedition of overwhelming force.

Some years before there had been employed in a subordinate post at Goletta one Giacomo Zitlolomini, an Italian engineer. He had served there long enough to be perfectly familiar with the

entire plan of the fortifications. He afterwards went to Spain to seek promotion, and joined the hapless host of petitioners who, in threadbare raiment and with bundles of interminable papers, haunted the antechambers and courts of the royal residence. At Aranjuez his purse was so empty that he was glad to descend into the still lower rank which waited for the broken victuals in the purlieus of the kitchens. Here, for some cause unrecorded, he fell under the staff of a cross-grained alguazil. The poor engineer remonstrated, and proclaimed his name and services, but nevertheless was soundly beaten. Vowing vengeance, he turned his back on the inhospitable Court of the ungrateful King. He found his way to Constantinople and fortune, and was now, under the name of Mustafa, a thriving renegade in the service of the Sultan.

Attended by this useful ally, Aluch Ali brought his fleet to anchor in the Bay of Tunis on the 11th or 12th of July. He was in command of two hundred and thirty galleys, thirty galliots, and forty vessels of burden—in all, three hundred sail. Forty thousand soldiers, of whom seven thousand were janissaries, stood on his decks under the command of Sinan Pasha, brother-in-law of the Sultan. About one half of this force were armed with firelocks, and the other half with bows and arrows. A landing was effected near Cape Carthage without opposition from the Christians. The expedition had been greatly delayed by contrary winds; and from Cape Stilo in Sicily, where Aluch Ali touched for water, it had been twenty days in making the African shore. A long continuance of the same baffling winds now proved the best ally of the Turkish leaders.

Towards the end of June, Haidar Pasha, late Turkish Governor of Tunis, had appeared on the frontiers of its territories with his troops and a swarm of Arab auxiliaries from Tripoli, from Bona, and even from Constantina. Radaman Pasha joined him with a Turkish force from Algiers. Six thousand Arab horsemen hovered in clouds in the van and on the flanks of this motley host. The Pashas were evidently acting in concert with the Turkish fleet, and seeking to threaten Tunis by land at the same time that the Goletta was attacked by sea.

Muley Mahomet, the Prince, or, as the Spaniards called him the Infant of Tunis, though he had proved a very inefficient and troublesome ally, was still under Spanish protection the ruler of the city. He now called his partisans together, and entered into arrangements with friendly sheikhs which placed at his disposal a

force of from two to three thousand horsemen. With these he proposed to keep the Turkish Pashas in check, or at least to harass their operations by cutting off their supplies. On the 11th July they were within four leagues of Tunis, encamped on the river Majardava. Thither the Moorish Prince sent a part of his troops on a reconnoitring expedition, and it acquitted itself tolerably well, retiring in good order before a Turkish detachment, of which the Moors killed one and captured two. Next day the Pashas continued their slow advance, and were near the Bardo, the country palace of the Princes of Tunis, about two miles from the city. Muley Mahomet again offered to send out a skirmishing party if Serbellone would support his Moors with a Spanish detachment. The offer was made to the warden Andres de Salazar,¹ who urged Serbellone to accept it, adding that it would be well to see what the Moorish Prince, whose conduct had hitherto been so unsatisfactory, was made of, and what his troops could do. Serbellone, being of the same opinion, directed Salazar to go forth in support of the Moors with nine hundred foot and the hundred horse of Lope de Mendoc̃a. They accordingly marched out of the Alcazaba with Muley Mahomet and his immediate followers; his sheikhs and their cavalry, with their flocks and herds and camels, being encamped outside. The whole motley array being put in motion, they advanced over the broken ground which lies to the south-west of the town in the direction of the Bardo. The wary warden, however, was by no means encouraged by the aspect of his companions-in-arms. "On a height near an olive grove, about a gunshot from the Alcazaba," so runs his record of the event, "I caused my troops to halt, being much more afraid of the Infant's Moors and Arabs than of the Turks, and my real object being to see whether he and his people would venture to attack the enemy, the dust of whose advance we could already descry." From out of the dust-clouds

¹ This officer, whose official title was "el Castellano" of the fort, presented to the Duke of Terranova, on his return from captivity at Constantinople in 1575, a very interesting "*Relacion*" of the loss of the fort of Tunis. In forwarding that document to the King, the Duke informed him, in a despatch dated Messina, 17th June 1575, that he had been so much struck by Salazar's account of what he had seen that he asked him to put his statement on paper, and he strongly recommended the writer to the royal notice and bounty as an experienced soldier of rare valour and merit. The *Relacion del Castellano Salazar sobre las cosas de Berberia* seems to justify the Viceroy's opinion, and is a very interesting document. The earlier portion relating to the events of July appears to have been taken from notes made from day to day, but latterly dates disappear, and the narrative is more rapid and condensed. The transcript in my possession fills thirty-nine small quarto pages. The despatch of Terranova and the *Relacion* are in the Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 1144.

the Turkish host in due time emerged, marching upon Tunis, until it came within two or three miles, when it too made a halt. Muley Mahomet and his troops, observing the position taken up by the Spaniards, were also at a stand in the plain below. After a while he sent a message to Salazar, requesting him to come down into the plain that they might all move on together. To this the Spaniard replied that the Prince ought to send his cavalry forward to skirmish with the enemy, and place his musketeers in positions commanding the approaches to the town; and that if these arrangements were made he might depend on being well supported by the Christian force. "Yet, with all this counsel," said Salazar, "not one inch would the man move, being suspicious of what might occur." A few horsemen were now seen pushing forward from the Turkish host, and a handful of the cavalry of the Prince galloped out to meet them. Instead of coming to blows these representatives of the opposite sides "met, and "greeted each other in a very brotherly manner;" and in a few minutes the bulk of the wild following of the unhappy Infant was in motion, with their flocks and herds, filing along the lake which lies to the east of the city towards the enemy's country. In less than an hour the last straggler had disappeared. The Turks meanwhile advanced towards Tunis. As they approached Muley Mahomet, the greater part of the remains of his force went over to them and joined them in their march to the gate called Babazueça, which they entered without opposition. The Prince, still followed by about a hundred horsemen, rode back unmolested to the Alcazaba, the Spaniards covering his retreat and closing the gate behind them. To Salazar the wholesale desertion of the Infant's people appeared to have been previously concerted with the enemy. As he stood watching it from his olive-clad height, Juan de Senoguera rode up with the last news from the Goletta that the Turkish fleet was entering the bay. An hour later, while employed in looking to the safety of the Alcazaba, strengthening the guards, and placing sentries along the walls, Salazar himself saw it coming to anchor off Cape Carthage, where next day the landing was made. "Had a fort been built, as I thought there ought to have been," said his journal, "at the Cisterns,¹ this "could not have been effected."

Such was the first inauspicious day of the conflict between the Spaniards who had conquered Tunis and the Turks who sought

¹ These Cisterns were the great subterranean water-tanks of Carthage, the principal remains of the city, on hills overlooking the sea.

to regain it. Having occupied the suburb outside the Babazueça gate, with the consent, as it seemed, of the inhabitants, the Turks next morning, battering and burning that gate, gained a footing within the city. From thence they were gallantly dislodged by Pagano Doria and a picked party ; and they were again repulsed from a breach which they made in another part of the wall. But Serbellone, seeing that to hold both the city and his own unfinished fortress was an undertaking beyond his powers, determined to leave the former to its fate. He therefore ordered the withdrawal of all the troops and stores from the Alcazar, and succeeded in conveying them without loss to within his own lines. The city, for the protection of which these costly lines had been drawn, was then once more occupied in the name of Selim.

When the disaster, now imminent, had actually occurred, it was easy and not unnatural to blame Serbellone for rejecting Granvelle's counsel to retire with his troops to Goletta. He had, however, promised Don John to defend the new citadel to the last extremity ; and, if the defence of Goletta had been in good hands, he might probably have held his own against the enemy. He had not fully appreciated the incapacity of Portocarrero, nor could he possibly foresee that contrary winds would shut up in Sicily the armament which, it was certain, Don John would endeavour to bring to their relief. To dismantle the fortress before the landing of the Turks, and in the prospect of speedy aid, was a step which a cunning and irresponsible Cardinal might advise, but which a gallant soldier could hardly be expected to approve or to take. After the landing of the Turks it was too late to dismantle the fortress ; and to have left them the fortress was to leave them the means of securing Tunis and perpetually menacing Goletta. The stout engineer, therefore, may be fairly acquitted of incurring a risk unwarranted by the magnitude of the stake for which he was playing the bloody game of war.

The Sultan's army was divided into two portions. One of these, under Sinan in person, besieged Goletta, while the other beleaguered the new citadel. It was against Goletta, as being more accessible to relief, that their chief efforts were directed. Aluch Ali landed his rowing-gangs and crews, and undertook a part of the siege. A few guns were soon placed on an adjacent height, and began to batter the walls. Where the ground was too rocky or too sandy for trenching, approaches were formed by means of sandbags. Portocarrero for some time observed their operations in silence, his principal act of self-defence being to

despatch a swift-sailing bark to Italy with urgent prayers for aid—prayers which reached Don John at Albenga. It was some days before he would permit his impatient troops to make a sally against the enemy. When at last he yielded to the entreaties of his chafing officers, the Turks were driven headlong from their trenches with considerable slaughter. But even this success could not induce the pusillanimous Christian commander to repeat the experiment, and, as the besiegers pushed forward their works, he dispirited his unhappy garrison by withdrawing them from outwork after outwork, in spite of their assurances that they were still easily defensible, and their entreaties to be allowed to defend them. The only energy he displayed was in sending to Serbellone for reinforcements. The veteran at first demurred, reminding Portocarrero that the fortifications of Goletta were finished and armed, and far better than his own. But he eventually yielded to his solicitations, and sent him by water two detachments, one of five hundred men and one of four hundred and sixty—the first in boats, and the second, after the Turks had cut off that means of transport, wading under cover of night. Of the first of these expeditions, so perilous did it seem, Serbellone himself offered to take the command, but his officers would not permit him to leave his post.

The Turks on their side were in great apprehensions of the coming of Don John with his comrades of Lepanto. They therefore pushed on their works with all diligence. The side on which Aluch Ali, counselled by the renegade Mustafa, commanded had become the main attack. The sailors had constructed an artificial mound, on which they had placed a battery, and beneath this they had collected a great mass of olive timber for the purpose of filling up the castle ditch, towards which they were working. In consequence of the lavish manner in which Aluch Ali paid for labour and material, this elevation was called amongst the Turks the hill of gold. Its guns effected the first practicable breach in the walls of Goletta, and through this breach, on the 23d of August, about a month after the siege had commenced, the final assault was given. The languor of the Christian commander had by this time communicated itself to his troops. The Turkish stormers did not meet with the resistance looked for by those who had known the gory trenches of Malta and the ghastly breaches of Famagosta. Nevertheless, most of the Christian troops were put to the sword. Portocarrero and about three hundred men, with about two hundred women, children, and

slaves, were made prisoners in the part of the buildings known as the old castle, in which they had taken refuge. A considerable booty, in valuables, arms, munitions, and provisions, also fell into the hands of the enemy. The provisions were especially acceptable, as food was beginning to be scarce in the Turkish camp. The greater part of the elaborate fortress of Charles V. was then blown up and destroyed, according to orders given by the Sultan when the expedition left Constantinople. Only so much of it was spared as served for a protection to the shipping and the port.

At the new citadel Haidar found an antagonist very different in temper from Portocarrero. When the siege was formed none of the bastions of the place were yet finished, and even of the connecting walls there were portions not more than lance high. Serbellone, however, made up in activity and daring what his position wanted in strength. The Turks found themselves harassed by perpetual sallies, and they were unable to commence their bombardment until the 27th of July. Their principal batteries were erected within the shelter of the town, the incomplete defences of the Christians enabling Haidar to raise commanding platforms on the old walls. Between these and the fort they had constructed a series of approaches, which were often the scene of severe conflicts, both hand to hand and by means of mines, in which, according to Salazar, the Christians generally had the best. Again and again he records with honest pride how he or Diego Maldonado, or the Italian Hercules de Pisa, swept the trenches quite clear of Turks, and how rich was the spoil of arms or purses which they won ; but he laments the difficulty which the officers found in preventing their men from following up the fugitives too closely and falling under the fire of the town. He especially records the death of the ensign Escobar, who, having in one of these sallies slain three or four Turks, refused to halt though the bugle had sounded the retreat, saying he would not go back till he had killed a hundred, and pushing on till he was himself laid low by a musket shot from the wall. To his Italian comrades, of whom the King took so little count, he gives due credit for their gallantry, and says that they fought just as well as his own Spaniards.¹

Nearly four weeks elapsed without any visible impression being made on the place ; but all this daily fighting, and the continuous drain made upon the garrison by the necessities of Portocarrero, had reduced the number of Serbellone's effective

¹ *Relacion* de Andres de Salazar, already quoted.

troops to fourteen hundred. On the 25th of August the fall of Goletta set Sinan and Aluch Ali at liberty ; and the devoted band saw before their walls the standards of the two Pashas,



GABRIEL SERBELLONE, GENERAL OF ARTILLERY.

surrounded by their janissaries and seamen. New and stronger batteries were raised ; the attacks of Serbellone were met by more numerous foes ; the artificial fires, with which he galled their working parties, were warded off by strong timber sheds, roofed

with fresh skins ; and on the 7th of September breaches were effected, which enabled the Turks to assault the fortress at three points. At each they were driven back with great slaughter ; and the next day similar attacks were repelled with equal success. But the triumph was achieved at the expense of half of the gallant little garrison. Serbellone wrote to Don John that he had but seven hundred men left, and, confident in the assurance of being relieved, he explained how reinforcements might be landed at Camarta, an undefended point of the coast, and thence marched to the citadel. On an islet of the lake there was a detached tower, which had not as yet been seriously molested by the enemy, and in which Don Juan de Senoguera had been stationed with a hundred men, chiefly for the purpose of guarding the water communication with Goletta. This officer also wrote to Don John, but in less hopeful terms. He said the Christians were in extreme peril ; that there was little hope of reinforcements arriving in time ; and that he saw no means of retrieving affairs, except by Don John himself coming, with the whole strength of his fleet, and forcing the Turks to fight a naval battle. ' It was with great difficulty and hazard that these letters were sent, it being necessary to transport a boat by night from the lake, overland on men's shoulders, to the sea-coast at Arais. The transit to Sicily, however, was safely effected, and the letters reached the hands of Don John.

Three days after the second assault, on the 11th of September, the Turks once more rushed upon the now almost dismantled fortifications. They were again driven back at all points but one, the Doria bastion, where a few daring men gained and held a footing amongst the ruins. Of the Christians a hundred were slain, and as many wounded. Next day they were kept continually on the alert by feigned attacks, and in the evening the Turks succeeded in placing on the captured bastion two guns, with which they cannonaded the inner works during the night, and destroyed or prevented much of the hasty repair with which the wearied Christians were wont, in the darkness, to patch up the defences shattered during the day. It was evident that any lengthened resistance was impossible. The bastion where Salazar commanded had only twenty soldiers left to defend it. Most of the surviving officers were wounded, and the two companies which at first had been the strongest were reduced, the one to six, and the other to five, combatants. On the 12th Serbellone called his captains together in council, when it was resolved to retire to the island tower, and there make their final stand. That night a

supply of victuals and water was safely conveyed thither, and it was hoped that the next night the troops might follow. But on the 13th, at daybreak, again the Turks swarmed to the assault. Serbellone, for the last time, repulsed them from the bastion bearing his own name. Thence he hurried to join a conflict near the Doria bastion, from which the enemy was pouring in overwhelming force. The Pashas had given orders to their men to seize his person. He was easily distinguished by his great corpulence, which equalled his activity, and he was, of course, well known to the Moors of Tunis. Surrounded and taken prisoner, he was borne off in triumph to the Turkish camp, leaving his son amongst the slain. His captivity was shared by the warden Salazar, desperately wounded in three places, Pedro de Bobadilla, and many others of his officers. Of the rank and file all were slain and taken except two hundred who contrived to escape to their comrades in the island tower.

The barbarian conquerors bestowed small courtesy on the brave leader, who had so long fought against such fearful odds. When brought into the presence of Sinan, that Turk, plucking him by the beard, first dealt him a blow on the face, and then inquired what he meant by defending himself so long on an earthen mound against the fleets and armies of the Sultan. Mounting his horse, Sinan afterwards caused Serbellone to be driven before him on foot, reviling him at intervals as they passed through the Turkish army to the ruins of Goletta.

On reviewing the toil and the loss which their gallant captive and his earthen mound had cost them, the Pashas were not disposed to enter upon a new trial of skill and endurance with the Christian forlorn hope in the lake. Goletta and the new citadel had been won—it was afterwards asserted, perhaps with some exaggeration by the losers—at an expense of thirty-three thousand Turkish and Moorish lives. Many janissaries and officers of rank were among the slain; and the renegade engineer Mustafa, highly valued for his skill, and now avenged of Philip and his alguazil, had fallen in obtaining his revenge. The autumnal equinox, with its gales, was certainly at hand; Don John, with his fleet, was probably not far off. The conquerors were naturally anxious to carry their spoils and laurels safely and speedily home to Constantinople. They therefore desired Serbellone to write to Senoguera, advising him to surrender on the favourable terms which they professed to be willing to grant. Serbellone, who must have been well assured that holding the

tower for any considerable time was hopeless, wrote as was desired. A correspondence ensued between Senoguera and the Pashas, in which the Pashas distinctly pledged themselves that on the tower and its contents being yielded up, the Christian commander and the three hundred persons who, it was understood, were with him, should be set at liberty, and furnished with a vessel to convey them to Italy.

The proposal was joyfully accepted. Pagano Doria alone, who had been sent to the tower on account of sickness, from which he was not yet recovered, doubted the exact fulfilment of the bargain. Weak and ill, he preferred the risk of escaping to the risk of a Turkish prison. He therefore went off at night, disguised and in a boat with four Moors, to whom he promised ten thousand crowns if they should conduct him safely to Tabarca. Some dispute arose on the way, which ended in the Moors cutting off Doria's head and carrying it to Sinan Pasha. Senoguera and his companions soon after arrived at the pavilion, where Sinan and his chief officers were waiting to receive them. The Christian captain, speaking for the rest, said that they had come to surrender themselves on the faith of the Pasha's promise; and he proceeded to fulfil his part of the engagement by producing and delivering up a bag containing fifteen thousand crowns. Sinan replied that it must be understood that liberty was to be granted, not to all, but only to those who had formed the original garrison of the tower, the fugitives who had taken refuge there being at the time of their flight already in fact his slaves. Senoguera claimed the exact fulfilment of a plain promise, and appealed to Aluch Ali and to Muley Malek, the son of the Bey of Fez, who had made a Turkish translation of his letters for the Pasha's use. Strong in his power of wrong-doing, Sinan replied by showing him the head of poor Pagano Doria, and added that if he indulged in further argument a fate worse than Doria's would overtake him. He then ordered him to select fifty of his companions and be gone. Senoguera was compelled to enter on the miserable task of choosing out of three hundred men who had landed in full certainty of being set at liberty, one-sixth of the number to accompany him to Italy, and of condemning the other five-sixths to slavery in the loathsome galleys and dungeons of the Turk. Aluch Ali performed his promise of providing a ship, and professed great concern at Sinan's breach of faith. He himself, he said, when he was a poor corsair, and ever since, had always strictly kept his word. He gave some proof of

his sincerity by procuring the liberation of four of the prisoners and the execution of the Moors who had murdered Doria, for whom, as a promising scion of a great race of seamen, he expressed a sailor's sorrow.

Blowing up the new citadel, and leaving four thousand men in the city of Tunis, the Turks with their plunder and prisoners set sail on the 27th of September for the Levant. Serbellone and Portocarrero were released from the galley-slave's chain which Sinan had imposed upon them, at the intercession of Aluch Ali. Portocarrero died at sea, off the coast of the Morea. Stout old Serbellone reached Constantinople in safety; and next year he was exchanged for a certain Mahomet Pasha, a prisoner of Lepanto, through the good offices of the Venetian ministers.

Aluch Ali continued to flourish for some years at the Court of the Sultan, holding the chief naval command. In 1576, during the summer, he led a fleet of sixty sail to the coast of Calabria, sacked various villages near Squillacci, and reached his own native country near Cape Colonna. In 1577 he was sent to suppress some disturbances amongst the janissaries at Cyprus, and did it with great severity. He was subsequently in the Black Sea with fifty sail, but failed in an attack on a castle defended by Georgians, near Trebizond. He died of poison some time after 1580. He was, says Haedo, the most powerful of all the Pashas who had ever commanded the Turkish marine. He ruled it with an absolute authority never attained by any of his predecessors. In person he was tall, robust, brown, and hoarse of voice, so that his words could not be well heard at any distance. At seventy-two he was not very gray. He had a sumptuous palace five miles from Constantinople, looking on the Black Sea, where he maintained a household of five hundred renegades; and also a mosque which he built, and in which he was buried.¹

We left Don John of Austria with his fleet in the harbour of Trapani windbound, and with no news since those alarming letters from Serbellone and Senoguera. Day after day the baleful sirocco continued hopelessly blowing. At length Gil de Andrade with his little squadron beat painfully into port, his place of shelter in some savage creek of Sardinia, and bringing no information about the struggle in Africa. At last the weather moderated and the wind changed. Signals were made to prepare for sea; the fleet was to weigh anchor and sail

¹ Haedo: *Topografía y Historia de Argil*, Valladolid, 1612, fol., ff. 77-80 (for life and exploits); for death, f. 89.

at nightfall. But ere sunset a strange sail was seen in the offing. She showed a Turkish flag, yet stood into the harbour. On board were Senoguera and his fifty-four war-worn companions from the tower in the Tunis lake. They were all that remained to the King of Spain of Goletta and the new citadel, of the city and kingdom of Tunis. Their sad tale was soon told. The works of thirty-nine years of patient labour and incalculable cost were lying in blackened heaps; ten thousand good soldiers were slain or slaves; the brave and skilful Serbellone, who directed the gunnery at Lepanto, was a prisoner on his way to Constantinople. By every soldier and sailor in the fleet at Trapani the news must have been heard with a pang. For their commander the intelligence had peculiar bitterness. Day and night he had laboured to provide for the defence of Tunis; month after month he had spoken, written, argued, and entreated, but in vain. Granvelle and his other rivals might nevertheless point to his ambition as the cause of the death and captivity of the brave men who had followed him, of the loss of his father's conquest, of the blight fallen upon the laurels of Lepanto, and of the restored credit of Turkish prowess and power.

He communicated the accounts which had reached him to the King on the 3d of October, and wrote thus with his own hand:—"The Goletta and the fort of Tunis are lost, as your Majesty will see by the relations sent herewith. No grief can be more sincere than mine, seeing that so short a time has brought so great a loss. I resolved to send Juan de Soto to your Majesty because I dreaded such a disaster, as the papers of which he was the bearer will show; and I enjoined him specially to urge that provision should be made for the safety of the two places, because we had been so often advised of the approach of the enemy; and my apprehensions even led me to put all other business aside, and hasten hither to see if matters might in any way be mended. But nothing could be done; the Goletta was lost on the day on which I sailed from Naples, and the fort of Tunis ere I had been able to assemble half the fleet at Palermo; and there was no opportunity of attempting anything, and no time for any of the plans I had devised for their relief. Moreover, the supply of money which your Majesty was pleased to order to be sent by Juan de Soto had not come to hand." He then announced his intention of going to Spain as speedily as possible, as the only way of preventing further disaster, "the difficulties in business being so many, and the dis-

"tance between Italy and Madrid so great, that time, however precious, was always being wasted." After saying that he had not as yet sent any squadron after the enemy, not wishing to incur needless risk, he proceeded to comment on the royal order, that he was to remain on shore if the fleet went against the Turks.¹ "Your Majesty does me great honour in stating the reasons for which you forbid me to go in person against the enemy. I must nevertheless take leave to observe, that knowing what the safety of this fleet requires, and keeping in view my duty to please and serve your Majesty, no personal object or interest shall ever deter me from undertaking that which I may deem most for the advantage of your service; and I therefore venture once more to entreat your Majesty to be pleased sometimes to refer such questions as these to us who are on the spot where they arise, for it may be that things will be better done in the absence of orders so very precise." When Juan de Soto, who was reported to have reached Italy, arrived, he would see what enterprise was feasible, and would take care that in that, and in paying off the fleet, no money should be spent that could be spared. The letter ended with an earnest appeal in behalf of the prisoners of war, Serbellone, Salazar, Bobadilla, and others taken by the Turks at Tunis. "I remind your Majesty of these gentlemen," he said, "thus urgently, although, I know, unnecessarily, to discharge the duty I owe both to them and to your royal service; and I entreat that negotiations for their rescue may at once be opened. Meanwhile I will use all diligence here to learn with certainty the names of the prisoners, and by what means they may be ransomed."²

The first impulse of Don John was to send fifty or sixty of his best galleys in pursuit of the victorious Turks; but foul weather for some days forbade it. Nor did the information furnished by Senoguera encourage it. That officer had seen the greater part of the enemy's fleet, and reported that it was so well provided both with rowers and combatants, that Aluch Ali would not need to tow any of his vessels except the ships and galleasses when they could not sail, and that he had at least seventy galleys

¹ Philip II. to Don John of Austria; Madrid, 30th July 1574, quoted above.

² Don John of Austria to Philip II.; Trapani, 3d October 1574. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 450. The King was evidently prepared for the worst on the 21st October, for there is a despatch of his to Don John of that date, in which Don John is ordered, if the Goletta should be taken, not to attempt its recovery, but to hold Porto Farina and Biserta. The fort of Tunis is to be dismantled and the city-wall razed, and this is to be done forthwith and without waiting for any further orders, or making any reference to him. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 451.

in excellent fighting trim.¹ When the weather moderated, Don John contented himself with sending Marcello Doria with six light galleys to follow the fleet and watch its course. In a few days Doria returned with news that the Turk had watered at Gozo, and was standing to the east. The weather continued to be boisterous. No chance remained of striking a blow to retrieve or lessen the recent disaster. Don John therefore sailed for Palermo, and soon afterwards proceeded to Naples. He arrived there on the 29th of October.

Don John's despatches, with the tidings of the loss of Tunis, were an unusually long time on the road to Madrid. The King received the news with his habitual composure. He replied on the 21st of November, excusing the delay on the ground that his letter, which was to go overland, had to be put into cipher. "Yours of the 3d and 4th of last month," he wrote to Don John, "reached me on the 12th of this month, with advice of the loss of the fort of Tunis, which I regret as much as is reasonable." The proposed visit of Don John to Court was forbidden. The fleet would require looking after; plans must be made for the next year; "and so," wrote the King, "although I should be exceedingly glad to see you here, I have determined to postpone my private gratification to the benefit and security of public affairs, and you must be content to do the same."²

The Spanish discomfiture in Africa probably gave no great concern to the Viceroy of Naples and Sicily, to whose supineness it seems to have been mainly due. It was a blow to their master, but it was also a humiliation to a political rival. By the independent Italian Princes a check received by their formidable neighbour the King of Spain was generally esteemed as good news. By the Pope the loss of Tunis was not so regarded. "These unhappy events in Africa," wrote Gregory XIII. with his own hand to Philip II., "have filled us with grief and confusion. Never could we have believed that the ministers of your Majesty would have been so negligent in giving aid of all kinds to these poor people! We do not blame one more than another; but we say in general that your Majesty is very ill served, and that if you do not provide some remedy in time to come, and let it be

¹ *Relacion simple del Señor Don Juan*; an Italian copy of a despatch from Don John probably to Philip II.; Trapani, 4th October 1574. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 1333. My transcript of this paper says that Senoguera brought only ten of his companions from the tower in the lake of Tunis, but it may be an error of the transcriber in copying the numeral.

² Philip II. to Don John of Austria; Madrid, 21st November 1574. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 451.

“ seen that it is so, we fear that, old as we are, we shall ourselves
 “ witness the ruin of Christendom, which God forbid ! These
 “ things we say to your Majesty, because you are our right arm,
 “ and we know that you have at heart the service of God and the
 “ public weal, having above all other men an interest in these,
 “ and your realms being in such manifest danger. In these great
 “ anxieties, which gave us no rest night or day, we had a desire
 “ to send a special person to lay our opinion before your Majesty.
 “ But, fearing to set the world talking, and wishing to use all
 “ secrecy, we shall avail ourselves of the opportunity afforded by
 “ Cardinal Pacheco, whom we have commissioned to speak with
 “ your Majesty in our name. And so we entreat you to believe
 “ him as ourselves, and to accept our remembrances, not only as
 “ the unworthy vicar of the blessed Christ, but also as your loving
 “ father, who desires and ever will desire the greatness, glory, and
 “ prosperity of your Majesty, whom may our Lord God preserve
 “ and satisfy !”¹

In France both the Court and the Huguenot party rejoiced in the success of the Turk and the misfortunes of the King of Spain. So also did the rebels of Holland and Zealand, who looked on all the enemies of Philip II. as their allies, and drove a lucrative trade in oars, spars, and cordage with the piratical powers. But in England a different view was taken ; and the Spanish ambassador there reported to his master that Lord Treasurer Burghley had assured him that the Queen and her council were much grieved at the loss of the *Goletta*, and that Elizabeth had offered her mediation between the Governor of the Netherlands and the Prince of Orange as a step towards a general union,² for which she thought the time had come, of the Christian powers against the dangerous aggrandizement of the Turk.

During the winter of 1575-6 Don John of Austria continued to reside at Naples. Besides the regular duties of his post, as Admiral of the Fleet, he was engaged in correspondence with the various Italian powers and with Madrid on the subject of the troubles in Genoa, of which some account has already been given.

In the course of 1575, apparently early in the year, an envoy had been sent to him by the Doge and Senate of Venice. This emissary was Girolamo Lippomano, one of the most acute of the

¹ Gregory XIII. to Philip II., 20th October 1574. Sent by Cardinal Pacheco. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 926, fol. 94.

² *Abstract of the Despatches* of Antonio de Guarras, 7th, 14th, 21st, and 28th December, and 5th December 1574. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 828, fol. 78.

able men who in that age served the Republic in the field of diplomacy. His mission to Naples was at first expected to be a brief one, as he calculated on returning home in two months; but nine months elapsed before his business was despatched. He embodied the result of his observations in one of those comprehensive reports which it was the custom of Venetian ambassadors to prepare, for the use of their Government, on the state of the countries to which they had been sent. In this interesting paper,¹ after a survey of the resources of the kingdom of Naples, and of the state of its defences, Lippomano thus sketches the character and habits of the Prince to whom he had been accredited:—²

“ It is now time that I should speak of the Lord Don John of
 “ Austria, the chief object of my embassy and of my report. His
 “ Highness is, as your Serenity knows, thirty years of age, although
 “ he endeavours to suppress a year or two, and to make himself
 “ out somewhat younger than he is, which he does, as I have
 “ heard, because he is ashamed that being the son of an Emperor
 “ like Charles V. he should have reached the age of thirty without
 “ having acquired any State or kingdom. He is of middle stature,
 “ well made, of a most beautiful countenance, and of admirable
 “ grace. He has little beard, but large moustache of a pale
 “ colour; he wears his hair long and turned upward, which
 “ becomes him greatly; he dresses sumptuously, and with such
 “ nicety that it is a marvel to see him. Active and perfectly
 “ skilful, he has no rival in the management of horses, and in
 “ jousting, in all kinds of military sports and tournaments; and
 “ in the pursuit of these exercises he is unwearied, playing at
 “ tennis five or six hours together, and in that sort of game not
 “ sparing himself more than the others, but contending with all
 “ his might, and not enduring defeat, however small the stakes,
 “ but thinking that even in these little things honour is in
 “ question. Don John is born of Madame Plomber, a lady of a
 “ noble race in Flanders, who now lives at Antwerp with a

¹ *Relazione di Napoli del Senatore* Girolamo Lippomano *ritornato ambasciatore del serenissimo D. Giovanni d' Austria, l'anno 1575*, printed by Eugenio Alberi, in his *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato*, Firenze, 1841, Serie II. vol. ii. pp. 265, 311. The editor says in his preface that Lippomano was sent to Don John to excuse Venice for withdrawing from the Holy League; but as the envoy made his report in 1575 (Lippomano was at Naples on the 12th December 1575. *Doc. Ined.*, xxviii. p. 286), and as the allusion to the loss of Tunis (p. 29) indicates that he must have been at Naples after that event, and as he tells us that his mission lasted only nine months (p. 267), it is probable that his business with Don John related to other matters. Vanderhammen (*D. J. de Austria*, p. 235) says that Don John had to explain to Lippomano, the Venetian ambassador, his conduct with regard to Genoa.

² *Relazione di Lippomano*, p. 289.

“ husband whom Charles V. gave her, with a pension of two thousand ducats. His Highness is not at all ashamed of being a natural son, as plainly appears by his language, and I have heard that once in Spain having disagreed in a game of tennis with the late Prince Don Carlos, and the Prince having told him not to dispute with him because he was not his equal, His Highness replied that he was born of a most honourable mother, and of a father greater than the Prince ; which saying being reported by the Prince to the King, His Majesty answered that Don John had spoken the truth, because his mother was a very noble lady, and his father our Lord the Emperor. His Highness, however, has had cause to say with grief that the Emperor, having acknowledged him for his son in his lifetime, ought also to have given him wherewithal to live in a manner becoming the son of so great a sire, without making him dependent on others, meaning the Council of Spain. With these high thoughts he has also a determination to supply the deficiencies of his fortune, and to show that he has not degenerated from the valour of his father. His Excellency is wise and very prudent, eloquent, wary, and dexterous in business, knowing well how to dissemble and to use courtesy and caresses to all kinds of persons, and with me he has ever employed the most honourable expressions. He is well versed in fortification and artillery, and speaks of little else than warlike enterprises and victories, which occasioned one Giome,¹ a person of importance and much in his confidence, in conversing freely with His Highness, to say jestingly : ‘ My Lord, your father was some-what proud after his expedition to Tunis, but I doubt your Highness will become insolent on the strength of your victory over the Turks.’ These words were afterwards noised abroad in ridicule everywhere. Some say that he is much given to women, which may well be true, seeing that he is so young, but nevertheless he has never given any cause for scandal by which disquiet or dissatisfaction has arisen amongst the nobility of Naples ; because he is careful to seek his pleasure with those women who are in the habit of intriguing with Princes, and does not employ in this way any time which ought to be otherwise spent. For in the morning he rises betimes, hears mass, gives audience to those persons of the fleet or of the Court who have need of anything, and then retires with his two secretaries to read letters, examine and answer memorials, and

¹ Probably Juan de Soto, or Juan de Escovedo.

“ consult on public affairs. This done, he comes out to talk with
“ the Spanish and Neapolitan gentlemen who come to pay their
“ respects to him. If there is no meeting of the Council of State,
“ he listens until dinner time to those who have anything to say
“ to him, not altogether in public audience nor quite privately,
“ but in the presence of persons of condition ; and after dinner,
“ if there be no Council of War or of State, he applies himself to
“ the studies aforesaid, but this not every day, because he often
“ remains till the evening in the study writing with his own hand.
“ Besides the Spanish tongue, he has spoken French with me
“ excellently well ; he understands Flemish and German, and he
“ can also speak Italian, but not with great confidence ; but his
“ desire, in short, is to be considered in all things a Spaniard.

“ His council, since he has been at Naples, consists of six
“ persons, that is to say, the Viceroy, Don Garcia [de Toledo],
“ [Giovanni] Antonio Doria, the Duke of Sesa, the Marquess of
“ Santa Cruz, and Don Juan de Cardona. For the expenses of
“ his house he is allowed annually forty thousand ducats, and
“ every two or three years eighty to a hundred thousand ducats
“ are given him over and above ; but this allowance is little for
“ Don John, seeing that he is of a very liberal nature, and thinks
“ that hoarding gold is industry, and spending is virtue, and that
“ the more he has the more he should give to the soldiers and
“ captains, desiring to be reckoned by the world the greatest
“ warrior who has appeared in it for many a day ; wherefore he
“ takes every means of showing that he knows that a grade of
“ noble fame more profits the memory of an honourable man
“ than millions of gold the greed of a miser ; and he said one
“ day in public, that if he believed there was in the world a man
“ more desirous of honour and glory than himself he would fling
“ himself out of the window in despair. This, as I may call it,
“ honourable ambition he cherishes in secret, greatly vexed by the
“ slowness of Spain, which to His Highness seems not only to be
“ hurtful to the States of the Catholic King, but also to check the
“ course of his own glory, by means of which it may well be
“ believed he designs one day to obtain a State for himself, if
“ indeed he does not think himself already to have deserved it by
“ his achievements in Granada against the Moors, or by his battle
“ against the Turks, or by his conquest of Tunis. But it is
“ evident he will not be content with little ; for when the Council
“ of Spain was considering a proposal to confer upon him the
“ Archbishopric of Toledo with its revenue of two hundred

“ thousand ducats, His Highness took it very much amiss, and
 “ going to the King entreated him rather to give him nothing
 “ than such an appointment as that. He would have liked much
 “ to go to Flanders ; but it being made plain to him that the
 “ King did not relish the proposal, because of his mother being
 “ Flemish and his name being famous in the Low Countries, the
 “ thought was dismissed from his mind. During the League, and
 “ whilst he was pursuing his enterprise against the Turks, he
 “ entertained the idea, as I have been told, that your Serenity
 “ might give him some State in the Levant ; but this idea ended
 “ with the rupture of the League. By His Catholic Majesty he
 “ had been promised to be made King of Tunis ; but when that
 “ kingdom went back to the hands of the infidels this hope was
 “ lost. For some time his attention was turned to the affairs of
 “ Genoa, and there was much reason to suspect that he intended
 “ an armed intervention, aided and favoured by Don Giovanni
 “ Andrea Doria ; but, God be praised ! for the quiet of Italy he
 “ allowed these rumours to cease, notwithstanding that the dis-
 “ orders of these citizens afforded cause to judge him unfavourably.
 “ Many would have it, as I have said, that His Highness had so
 “ seriously turned his mind to the affairs of Genoa that he thought
 “ of nothing but effecting an entrance there, and that he had even
 “ chosen for this purpose as commanders, Don Juan de Cardona,
 “ Admiral of Sicily, for the naval forces, and the Governor of
 “ Milan for the army ; but in truth when I, by the instructions of
 “ your Serenity, exhorted His Highness to a course of accommo-
 “ dation and peace, he replied that he especially desired the end
 “ of that affair in order to set free in spring the forces of the
 “ Catholic King and those dependent on His Majesty, which were
 “ the galleys of Doria and other Genoese captains, thirty in all,
 “ that they might go against the Turk, and that however his
 “ conduct might be otherwise interpreted, he charged me to
 “ signify to your Serenity that this was his aim. He then
 “ added : ‘ Ambassador, do not let their Lordships of Venice
 “ ‘ believe all that is written to them, as much of it comes from
 “ ‘ interested parties, because I, so far as I am concerned, care no
 “ ‘ more for one party than another, and so that they will come to
 “ ‘ an agreement, I will be *Old* or *New*,¹ or what they please, but
 “ ‘ if they are designing any trick upon my Lord the King, that
 “ ‘ is what I will never submit to. And I tell you once more

¹ *Vecchio* or *Nuovo*, the names of the two Porticos into which the Genoese nobility was divided.

“ ‘that I have no design to make myself master of Genoa, but will
 “ ‘do what I can to bring the Genoese to a good understanding
 “ ‘amongst themselves, and to promote the security of the Italian
 “ ‘provinces which belong to the King, in order that the fleet
 “ ‘under my orders may not be hindered in the ensuing year.’

“ Now to conclude this discourse of the thoughts and designs
 “ of Don John, of which I have mentioned some, yet not those
 “ which are most deeply seated, I would say that he must be, and
 “ I believe that he is, chiefly intent upon Turkish affairs ; and
 “ if in this direction he is not careful to maintain a good
 “ understanding with the Christian Princes, who upon occasion may
 “ be able to open to him a field of perfect glory, your Serenity
 “ should not believe that this conduct proceeds from thoughtless-
 “ ness or ignorance, but that it is the result of design, he being
 “ thus enabled to let the King know that he desires always to
 “ depend on His Majesty, and that he has no projects of rising,
 “ either by his own efforts or by the favour of others. I cannot
 “ say how far His Highness, being in his present condition, and
 “ without any [permanent position or support],¹ considers that
 “ which I think he ought to consider, that States are not always
 “ strong, and that Princes do not live for ever ; that the King,
 “ dying, might leave very young children ; and that, in short, time
 “ changes all things. But knowing that he is prudent and rich in
 “ partisans, I think that his actions do not arise from chance, but
 “ are framed with a steadfast regard to Turkish affairs, and to the
 “ better security of the States of the Catholic King ; and His High-
 “ ness deems, as I understand, a large fleet to be very necessary, and
 “ does all in his power to move the King to content him in this
 “ matter, demonstrating to him by reasons that His Majesty, if he
 “ had three hundred armed galleys, would be at less expense than
 “ he is at present ; and that if he were so minded he might easily
 “ have such a force, which would enable him to confront the
 “ Turkish fleet at sea and dispense with part of the ordinary
 “ garrisons which he now maintains in the kingdom of Naples,
 “ in Sicily, Sardinia, Majorca, Minorca, Malta, and in Spain. As
 “ to these garrisons, to speak first of the kingdom of Naples, its
 “ coast-line, beginning at Giulia-Nuova in the Adriatic and
 “ extending to Terracina in the Mediterranean, touching at each
 “ end the States of the Church, requires for its defence at least
 “ forty thousand men, besides the army and its cavalry maintained

¹ “ *E senza nulla*” are the words, which appear to imply the need of some additional words, such as I have inserted within brackets, to complete the sense (page 295).

“ for domestic purposes ; by which forces and the various garrisons
“ the people are more severely harassed than they would be if the
“ enemy were quartered amongst them. The kingdom of Sicily,
“ as I am informed, would require in times when an attack was
“ expected, for the defence of its southern coast from Messina to
“ Melazzo, twenty-five thousand infantry ; and besides for the two
“ valleys, and for reinforcements to weak points, two strong bodies
“ would be needed. For the defence of Sardinia it is estimated
“ that from fifteen to twenty thousand men would be necessary.
“ Majorca and Minorca would require twelve thousand, and the
“ coast of Spain some thousands more. Malta with its new
“ fortress needs ten thousand, of which the King usually provides
“ one half ; and this year he has sent thither five thousand under
“ Don Miguel de Monçada. Moreover, it is important to observe
“ that every time the Turkish fleet comes out all these places
“ must be put in a position of defence at once. And if it be
“ urged that a part of the troops are people of the country, it
“ ought also to be considered how much loss is and may be
“ thereby occasioned to the population, and how great an
“ expense falls upon His Catholic Majesty, without any certainty
“ of the defence of the point assailed by the enemy. Hence, in
“ truth, some of the Council of His Majesty have come to the
“ conclusion that it is more costly to the King to have his people
“ harassed and consumed by their endeavours to defend their
“ shores than to maintain a fleet, which he might do with more
“ satisfaction to his subjects and with less danger and outlay than
“ is now caused by the perpetual fear of the Turks. His Catholic
“ Majesty is allowed by the Pope, between the subsidy of the
“ clergy, the crusade tax, and a certain exemption accorded to
“ Spain alone, according to report, one million two hundred
“ thousand ducats. Now with the half of this sum he could
“ well maintain one hundred galleys, taking the men, whether
“ rowers or soldiers, from his dominions generally, or even from
“ foreign countries, for where money is going men will readily
“ go after it ; and he might at his pleasure keep the greater part
“ of these vessels at Brindisi, and disperse the rest, giving twenty
“ of them to Florence, with an annual allowance of six thousand
“ ducats each ; twenty to the Republic of Genoa, ten to Savoy,
“ four to Malta, and others to private gentlemen, who would
“ willingly accept them. The kingdom of Naples now maintains
“ forty galleys and sometimes fifty. Relieved of a third of its
“ cavalry and troops in garrison, it could more easily maintain

“ eighty ; and I say that it would even offer to keep a hundred
“ armed all the year round. For Sicily, which now keeps twelve
“ galleys, fifteen would suffice when disburdened of part of its
“ garrisons. Sardinia, Majorca, and Minorca might between them
“ keep twelve ; and the coast of Spain, which now in ordinary
“ times maintains thirty, might maintain thirty more. All these
“ together, with the vessels of private Genoese owners, would
“ amount to three hundred, which, kept armed, manned, and
“ victualled for five or six months, and a hundred and fifty all
“ the year round, would not cost more, as I am assured by a
“ gentleman of high position, than two millions and a half of
“ ducats annually, and would give great facilities for enterprises
“ which your Serenity can well imagine. Under the present
“ system, in the mere defence of the aforesaid States, from four
“ to six millions are yearly expended, and every year the Catholic
“ fleet must shut itself up in some harbour. There are, besides,
“ the galleys of the Pope, Savoy, Tuscany, Malta, and Genoa,
“ amounting to at least twenty-five, which would always, when
“ wanted, join the fleet, and the Princes of these States would
“ soon have a larger number if the King were willing to pay
“ them at the rate aforesaid. There is no doubt that in this way
“ Christendom might find means of balancing the power of the
“ Turk ; and the King could never want for materials for building
“ and arming ships, being the lord of such flourishing maritime
“ kingdoms.

“ It may be said,” continues Lippomano, “ that if the King
“ were to have three hundred galleys the Turks would have four
“ or five hundred. To this argument Don John attaches little
“ weight, it being, he asserts, notorious that the Turk has the
“ greatest difficulty in manning his present fleet, that his terri-
“ tories could not bear the drain of an increased armament, and
“ that his power of alarming his maritime rivals is far greater
“ than his power of hurting them. If the Catholic King had a
“ fleet of three hundred or even two hundred vessels, there would
“ be no chance of the Sultan attempting anything against him.
“ Don John, knowing the advantage of such naval superiority and
“ the increased dignity which it would give to his command,
“ never loses sight of it, but has little hope of bringing it to
“ pass. The King is slow to move ; and some of his councillors
“ say that if this policy of diminishing the land forces and
“ increasing the fleet had been deemed wise by Charles V. he
“ would have adopted it, being very ardent for the maritime

“service. But they forget two things ; first, that the Emperor “was much guided in his naval affairs by Andrea Doria, who “always opposed any great increase of the fleet, fearing lest the “command, becoming too important to be entrusted to a subject, “should be given to a Prince of the blood ; and secondly, that the “Turkish navy had not at that time reached its present dimensions.

“I have thus discoursed,” says Lippomano, “knowing that “His Highness thinks as I have said ; but his hope not being so “strong as his desire, he wishes once more to be at the head of a “League like the last.”

The envoy then reports that Don John founded his expectations of a new League upon his belief either that the Turk would break faith with Venice, or that Venice would not fail the King if he were to be attacked by the common enemy. He had frequently expressed this belief in conversation with himself and others. Lippomano pointed out to him that the position of Venice was very different from that of the King, her territories being in great part conterminous with those of the Sultan, and many of them so exposed to attack that her possession of them must ever depend much more upon commercial relations than upon military force. This close proximity to a dangerous neighbour rendered it impossible for the Republic to save expense, as the King might do, by diminishing her garrisons and adding to her fleet ; nor were her financiers in a state to bear any addition to the present cost of her armaments.

Lippomano represented Don John as being obviously very desirous to stand well with the Doge and Signiory. He acknowledged the force of the envoy’s argument that it was of the utmost importance both to the influence of Venice in the Levant and the safety of Christian commerce that the Turk should have no reason to suspect the existence of any hostility or coolness between the Republic and the Catholic King ; and he ordered the release of a Venetian ship which had been improperly captured and brought to Naples by the Spanish cruisers. He likewise assured Lippomano that the Doge might count upon his cordial assistance in any sudden emergency, when he would avail himself of his plenary powers, and lead the fleet out in person, without waiting for orders from Spain.

The report next discusses at some length the terms upon which Don John stood with the sovereigns of Europe, “because,” says Lippomano, “although he is not himself a reigning Prince, “his quality is such as to make his will an element for good or

“ evil in the affairs of Christendom. With the chief Princes of Italy he does not, to say the truth, stand well. The Pope is dissatisfied with his conduct in the affairs of Genoa, about which many unpleasant words have passed on both sides ; although His Highness endeavours to conciliate His Holiness by showing him every respect.

“ With Savoy he is not well pleased, and although they write letters to one another, calling each other ‘ Most Serene ’ and ‘ Highness,’ in truth there is bad blood between them.

“ Of Florence and Genoa I will say nothing, the reciprocal displeasure and ill-will between these States and Don John being clear and public.

“ With the Emperor he is not at heart very well pleased, perhaps because he thinks His Majesty does not give him due consideration, and perhaps because the Emperor would have been glad to obtain for one of his own sons the employments held by His Highness, who nevertheless, behaves to His Majesty with all befitting respect, and is especially fond of the Most Serene Prince Ernest, the second son of His Cæsarean Majesty.

“ With the King of France he is on the worst terms, which may be accounted for by the feeling which exists between the French and Spaniards, and by the envy with which each looks upon the victories of the other. The Duke of Mayenne told me that, conversing one day on board ship, Don John said to him ‘ that he would have given a good deal had Monsieur ‘ d’Anjou (who was not then King) been present at the victory over the Turks ;’ to which he himself replied ; ‘ Then your Highness, as a brave soldier, would also have given a good deal to have been present at the victories which my Lord of Anjou gained over the rebels at home.’

“ With respect to this Most Serene Republic, although after the rupture of the League, an event so hurtful to his aggrandizement and glory, he was inwardly displeased, yet he esteems as a great honour the sending of an ambassador to him, and those other favours which he receives from your Serenity, with whom, in the hope of another League, he seeks to maintain the best understanding. I think, therefore, that it will be judicious for your Serenity to continue your good offices towards him, ever mentioning him with honour to the resident ambassador, who will give him an account of everything ; and this will be sufficient to keep him well disposed to our affairs.”

The envoy then expresses his belief that the high services of

Don John to the Crown of Spain, and his disclosure of the treasonable overtures made to him by Don Carlos, command a high share of the royal favour ; that he does not stand so well with the Council of State, with which he is himself little satisfied ; and that, although it is clear that the King will never give him as an independent possession any portion of the Spanish dominions, Don John may some day or other find—and will certainly not let slip—an opportunity of establishing himself as a sovereign Prince elsewhere. There is good ground for expecting that the King will keep his promise of making him Vicar-General of Italy, with a council to assist him—a charge which would give him supreme authority by land and sea, and, in each of the Italian seats of Spanish rule, would entitle him to the honours of the chair and canopy of estate, the Viceroy becoming during his stay his lieutenant.

Admiral of the Fleets of Spain, and with a prospect of wielding at will the entire Italian resources of Spain, and even of becoming one day an independent Italian Prince, the friendship of Don John ought to be carefully cultivated by the Republic. It was desirable also that it should be publicly known that he is well disposed towards Venice, and that he has full power over the movements of his fleet ; it being for the interest of the Republic, both in Europe and the Levant, that it should be believed both by the Christian Princes and the Turk that she might at pleasure enter into a league with Spain.

Lippomano concludes his report with a request to be allowed to retain, as a mark of the Senate's approval of his services, the silver-gilt bottles given him by Don John on taking leave, " a small present truly, as His Highness acknowledged, but which " he accompanied with many courteous words, saying that if he " gave little it was because he had but little to give."

In November 1574, probably towards the end of the month, Don John was once more at Genoa, partly on the affairs of that turbulent Republic, and partly because that city lay on his way to Spain. He was evidently not aware when he set out from Naples that he would be forbidden to visit Spain ; and he wrote from Genoa to the King on the 2d of December, expressing his regret at being detained by bad weather, and at the disturbed state of France, which rendered an overland journey unsafe and inexpedient, " having," he said, " so extreme a desire to kiss your " Majesty's hand, and to lay before you many things relating to " your service, which no man can tell you so well as I, seeing

“that they concern me and grieve me more than any other person, saving only your Majesty.” “In this journey, therefore,” he proceeded, “I will use all possible diligence, having first once more reminded your ministers by letter, as I have so often done before by word of mouth, of the work they have to do, and the need of doing it secretly and without noise.”¹

The winter's work allotted to Don John himself, in a despatch which he perhaps did not receive, certainly justified the King in ordering his brother to remain at Messina. He was to make himself fully acquainted with the state of affairs on the African coast, and with what the enemy had done and designed to do, and especially with the condition of Biserta and Porto Farina; and, if necessary and possible, a trusty messenger was to be sent thither to make a report, so that Don John might be able to form an opinion as to the expediency of occupying these places in the following year. The Pope was to be urged to make preparations for aiding, and to induce other Italian Princes to aid, the royal fleet with a contingent of galleys. The same delicate and somewhat hopeless proposal was to be made to the Signiory of Venice. The famous engineer Campi was coming out to visit the chief fortified places on the coast of Naples and Sicily, and to report to Don John on their condition; and Don John was to see that the Viceroy ordered the execution of the necessary repairs. Minute instructions were given for strengthening, drilling, and inspecting the militia of Naples and Sicily; in Sicily a new force of light horse was to be raised; and Don John was told that the Viceroy had orders to do nothing without consulting him. He was to send a commissioner to Sardinia to report on the defences of that island. The Spanish regiments in each of the Italian viceroyalties were to be recruited, especially that of Lombardy, that the King's neighbours in the north of Italy might not suppose that his force there had been weakened by the drain of African service. A new levy of twelve thousand foot was to be raised for the general defence of Italy. The fleet was to be ready in good time in the spring, to oppose the Turk if his fleet should come out of the Levant; or if he remained in his own waters, to occupy, fortify, and provision Biserta and Porto Farina. Upon all these grave and pressing matters Don John was to form his own opinion and collect the opinions of his council, and report them to the King with as much speed and secrecy as the case might permit. This

¹ Don John of Austria to Philip II.; Genoa, 2d December 1574. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 1405.

long and important despatch concluded in words which bear the stamp of the King's own style:—"That all these things may be accomplished, it is above all important that you should be at Messina, and from thence urge on my ministers in the work they have to do; and observing that your last letter mentions that you think of coming hither, I have ordered a courier to be sent off with this despatch in triplicate, that it may reach you in Italy; and I especially charge you not to come hither, but to return to Messina, to aid in the execution and fulfilment of all that has to be prepared and provided for the coming year, knowing, as you also know, that without your presence nothing will be ready and done in time; and so I entreat you that on receiving this order you will go, as you ought to do, to Messina, for that is the place where on all accounts it is most fitting that you should reside."¹ Here was certainly a sufficiently formidable list of new duties for Don John, already charged with the care of the fleet and the royal interests at Genoa, and on no pleasant terms with two out of the three Italian Viceroy, whose work he was now ordered to supervise. These various functions were to be performed, as usual, with the resources of an empty exchequer.

Whether Don John knew, ere he sailed from Genoa, all that was expected of him may be doubtful; but ere landing in Spain he was aware that his visit was not desired. On the 30th of December he wrote from Palamos to Antonio Perez that the reasons of which he had informed His Majesty, and many others which he reserved for their meeting, had brought him thither, though it might appear somewhat strange, considering the last orders he had received. "Yet God is my witness," he proceeded, "that I know, believe, and can affirm, that that which I do is that which ought to be done, and that up to this time no one has chosen to understand how dangerous is the state of His Majesty's affairs in Italy, and how entirely the treatment of them must be changed if it is ever to be better. I may also add that not to see myself any longer a minister of mischief from which there is no honourable escape—mischief long foreseen and denounced—I have left my post, and incurred the guilt of disobedience, rather than the certainty of dishonour. Now I wish very much to know how my coming to Barcelona is taken, and what kind of welcome I have to expect; for welcome I do not look for,

¹ Philip II. to Don John of Austria [place and day not mentioned], December 1574. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Legajo 1064. The transcript in my possession fills twenty-three small quarto pages.

"however my zeal may deserve it." He begged that Escovedo might meet him at Guadalajara, or a post nearer Madrid, that they might have time to talk. From Barcelona, where he hoped to arrive next day, he would make all haste to Monserrat, where he intended to stay only two days. He inclosed a letter for Don Pedro Manuel, who was to find him a lodging until his servants and baggage should arrive; and he also inclosed a copy of his letter to the King, that his friends might see it and "take note "how it was received and read."¹

In spite of the loss of Tunis the King received him graciously, and listened to his petition for the rank of Infant, and for extended powers in Italy. In favour of the latter request he might not unfairly urge the disaster that had taken place in Africa. That disaster was in a great measure owing to the divided authority, with regard to military affairs, which was possessed by the Italian Viceroy, and the jealousy of each other with which it was usually exercised. A supreme jurisdiction over the whole, to be exercised on the spot, seemed desirable for the interests of the King's service. Philip therefore referred the matter to the Council of Italy for its consideration. As to the rank of Infant, he neither granted nor directly refused it, but postponed the question until a more convenient season.

In March he went northwards to Abrojo to visit his foster-mother, Doña Magdalena de Ulloa. Wishing to visit the Escorial on his way, he encountered on the road a storm of unusual fury, even for the stormy district of the Guadarramas. The morning when he set out was still and bright, but ere he had accomplished half his seven-league ride the wind had risen to a hurricane. Thunder and lightning, rain and hail, mingled their forces; the ilex-covered chase was strewn with broken boughs and upturned trees; and masses of rock rattled down the sides of the misty hills. Of Don John's attendants some were driven to seek shelter by the violence of the storm; others, with their horses, were laid prone by the wind; but he, being excellently mounted, pushed on, and alighted alone at the gate of the gray palace-convent. When the Prior and monks came to meet him at the gate, he would not allow them to emerge beyond the threshold, saying it was weather fit only for soldiers like him to be out in.

He was received with the usual splendid hospitality of the royal monks of St. Jerome, who showed him all the wonders of

¹ Don John of Austria to Antonio Perez; Palamos, 30th December 1574. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 335.

their house, itself the eighth wonder of the world, as Spaniards delighted to call it, and now approaching completion. The precious collection of relics and other treasures of the sacristy were duly unlocked for his inspection and homage. Having attended service in the church, he was led through the unfinished library, where were afterwards deposited two of the great lanterns which adorned the poop of the Turkish admiral's galley at Lepanto.¹ He afterwards visited Fray Hernando de Ciudad-Real and Fray Juan de Colmenar, two aged monks, formerly Priors of the house, and now confined to their cells by illness. He also went to the village to see another old monastic acquaintance, one Fray Lorenzo de Monserrate, to whom he gave some considerable presents.² Having passed the night at the convent, he next day proceeded on his journey. At Abrojo,³ as usual, Doña Magdalena came to meet her darling, bringing him the usual supply of linen made by her own hands. Having spent some days with her, he returned to Court, and soon afterwards to Cartagena. He sailed from thence on 9th May, reached Spezia on 9th June, having called at Genoa on his way,⁴ where he embarked for Naples. He landed there on the 18th of June, and was received by the Neapolitans with rejoicings and congratulations.

The affairs of Genoa continued to engross much of his attention. It was during the summer of this year that those negotiations with the nobles of St. Luke took place, which resulted in the secret and very dishonest loan of Spanish troops by the King, to enable that party to restore tranquillity in the Republic.⁵ Ere these negotiations were concluded, Don John found it necessary to send Escovedo to make personal explanations, relating to Genoese and Italian affairs, to the Government at Madrid.

Gregory XIII., like his predecessor, ever cherished the hope of signalizing his pontificate by restoring the realm of England to the Church. The Vatican was never without English or Irish exiles ready to flatter this hope by accounts of the power and influence of the Catholics at home, and assurances that the descent of any considerable foreign force on the English coast

¹ Monconys : *Voyages*, Lyon, 1665-6, 3 tom. 4to, iii. p. 46.

² *Memorias de Fr. Juan de San Geronimo*, a curious journal, kept by a friar of the Escorial, printed amongst the *Documentos Inéditos para la historia de España*, por M. Fernandez Navarrete, tom. vii. pp. 123-4.

³ Vanderhammen (f. 238) says he went there "por no poder entrar en Valladolid ; la causa no se."

⁴ See letter to Don Garcia de Toledo, 10th June 1575. *Doc. Inéd.*, iii. pp. 174-5.

⁵ Chap. II. p. 49.

would at once raise half the population in arms against their heretic Queen. In March 1575, the Nuncio at Madrid presented, in the Pope's name, to Philip II. a paper wherein the advantages of an invasion of England were set forth, its chances examined, and the policy of such an attempt warmly advocated. Philip returned one of his characteristic answers, half-approving, half-evasive. He had often contemplated such an expedition as a means of depriving his rebel Netherlands of English aid ; but now, either because these provinces were keeping his hands so full, or because he attached little importance to the proposal, he allowed several months to elapse before he communicated it to his ambassador at Rome. Towards the end of June that minister, Don Juan de Zuñiga, announced to the King the arrival in the Papal capital of Friar Patrick O'Hely, who was the bearer of a letter from His Majesty. The Irish monk reported that his business at Rome was to obtain the Pope's sanction for a certain influential Irish Catholic gentleman, whose name was not mentioned, to rise in revolt against Queen Elizabeth, and also assistance towards that step ; and he assured the ambassador that if the Irish Catholics were but certain that their leader acted under the authority of the Holy Father they would in a very few days wrest Ireland from the Queen, and that they would afterwards, with very good-will, accept Don John of Austria as their King. The whole plan, he said, he had had the honour of laying before the King of Spain, and His Majesty had assured him of his desire to favour and forward it. Zuñiga was, of course, too cautious to commit himself to any approval of the eager Irishman's scheme, and told him that it was advisable that he, as the King's representative, should refrain from taking any part in the negotiations. But he counselled him to go to Cardinal Alciato,¹ the vice-protector of Ireland, and through him ascertain the views of His Holiness, taking care, however, to make no mention of Don John's name, and to press for a favourable answer from the Pope as a preliminary indispensable to any further appeal to the King. Zuñiga informed his master that he had advised the suppression of Don John's name because he had observed that the Pope, in talking of the affairs of England, never failed to say that no Spanish or French claimant of the Crown must be put forward, but that they must support the claims of some

¹ Francesco Alciato of Milan, born at Milan 1522, was created a Cardinal by Pius IV. in 1560, and died at Rome 1580. He was nephew of Andrea Alciato, the famous jurisconsult and emblemist, and was himself a man of considerable learning.

native-born Catholic ; and that His Holiness insisted on this point so strongly as to render it probable that he did so, not merely because he believed an English candidate would have the fairest chance of success, but also because, wrote the ambassador, " he was very much resolved that your Majesty should not acquire more territory than you now have ; and it might be that if Don John were to obtain the kingdom of Ireland His Holiness would think it as much the property of your Majesty as any of the realms God has already given you." In conclusion he begged the King to furnish him with precise directions for his guidance in dealing with so important an affair.¹

Philip's reply was not written until the 8th of September.² It enclosed, for the information of the ambassador, a copy of the Papal paper presented by the Nuncio in March, and confessed that, in spite of the importunities of the Nuncio, urgent business had prevented the King from giving due attention to the subject. As to Father O'Hely, Philip said that the letter with which he had been furnished was merely a letter of recommendation ; and he had received no authority to enter upon the discussion of any public business. The Pope's apprehension lest the Spanish Crown should obtain any increase of territory, and his expected opposition to a scheme for placing Don John on the throne of Ireland, were not conformable to the sentiments of the Nuncio's paper. That document, as the ambassador would see, distinctly promised that if the Pope were aided by the King in the English enterprise, a sovereign should be chosen for England to the King's satisfaction ; and urged the enterprise on the grounds that it was one by which many souls would be saved from perdition, and much temporal advantage would be reaped by the Crown of Spain. But notwithstanding the reported mistrust of the Pontiff, the King, after mature deliberation, was disposed to promise the pay of two thousand men for six months, and the cost of their transport to England, on condition that the enterprise was conducted wholly in the Pope's name, seeing that if it were even partially successful it would give Queen Elizabeth employment at home, and cut off the aid she was affording to the Flemish rebels, and, if it failed, no loss would be incurred beyond the money expended,

¹ Despatch in cipher from Don Juan de Zuñiga to the King, dated 24th June, and received 14th July 1575. Archives of Simancas, Negociado de Estado, Legajo No. 925.

² Of this reply the draft, in the handwriting of Antonio Perez, with many marginal notes and additions by the King, is preserved with the above-mentioned despatch of Zuñiga at Simancas. I have to thank Don Pascual de Gayangos for furnishing me with transcripts of both.

and that would be a drop in the ocean of the expenditure on Belgium. Even this money loss might be partly met by concessions from the Pope, of which the Nuncio had hinted hopes, and Zuñiga was therefore directed to act on the hint, and endeavour at once to secure a prolongation of the bull of the crusade. Having impressed upon the Pope the necessity of the greatest secrecy and caution, he was next to ascertain the wishes and intentions of His Holiness as to the time and place of the invasion, the choice of troops and a commander, and the sum expected from the King. He was also to ask whether any attempt was intended against the Queen's person, because it was plain that if she were out of the way there would be the greater confusion amongst the heretics, and the greater confidence in the ranks of the Catholics.¹ When the ambassador had obtained information on these points the King would then send him his final decision.

The required information was obtained by Zuñiga on the 17th of October. His despatch, bearing that date, seemed to indicate that Gregory XIII. had somewhat cooled in the autumn towards the project which he so warmly favoured in spring. As to the questions submitted to him on the part of the King, he said he had not yet considered them, and he had forgotten what had been told him by the English Catholics. But he referred the ambassador to the Cardinal of Como,² with whom Zuñiga accordingly held a long conference, the results of which he minutely reported. The scheme had been proposed by two or three persons of zeal, who were now at a distance from Rome, but the Cardinal would recall them by the beginning of November to give full information. They had considered five thousand men as the force that ought to be employed, and thought that the landing should take place at some point of the English coast near the prison of the Queen of Scots, where the invaders were sure to be joined by a large body of Catholics. But on their return to Rome the question of landing in England or in Ireland could be more fully discussed. Believing Queen Mary to be the rightful heir to the Crown, the Pope desired to act in her favour; she had placed herself unreservedly in his hands, looking for

¹ Si tienen algun particular tratado contra la persona de la reina, porque si la dicha reina faltase, mayor confusion habria entre los hereges, y mayor ánimo y resolucion en los Catolicos.

² Tolomeo Galli of Como, Bishop of Rieti and afterwards of Ostia, created a Cardinal by Pius IV. in 1560, Secretary of State to Gregory XIII., was usually called the Cardinal of Como. He died in 1607, aged eighty-two.

deliverance to him alone, and engaging to marry whom he pleased ; and he, on his part, would agree to her marriage with Don John of Austria or any other Prince the King might prefer. The expedition might sail from Civita Vecchia under the Papal flag, and the commander should possess the King's confidence. But as the King would reap all the benefit of the undertaking he must bear the entire cost ; and the Cardinal named a hundred thousand crowns as the sum to be paid down. Zuñiga observed that as the expedition, if successful, would tend so much to the glory of God and the Pope, he thought His Holiness might bear a part of the expense. Little dazzled by such glory, Como replied that perhaps his master might do so were he to share in the temporal profits, and suggested that as it was impossible for the Pope to hold any territory in England or Ireland, the King might give him some accession of Italian dominion. Zuñiga said that this suggestion might form the subject of future negotiation, excusing himself to his master for so far entertaining it, by adding that it was plain that without encouraging some such hope nothing was to be obtained from the Pontiff.

Zuñiga's own view of the matter was that the enterprise did not as yet rest on any sound foundation, and that its cost would be far beyond the estimate of the Nuncio ; but, considering the strength of the English Catholics, and the Queen's want of both troops and generals, it might perhaps be worth trying, if the Pope would bear half the expense. In any case Elizabeth would be intimidated, and compelled to withdraw her aid from the Netherlanders ; and even were she to suspect the King's participation in the attack, what could she do to injure him more than she was already doing ? It was of the first importance to obtain from Queen Mary, while still a prisoner, some sufficient pledge that she would marry as the King wished ; for, once at liberty, she might marry the Duke of Alençon ; and the Pope, in spite of his present professions, might consent to that match if it appeared likely to pacify France. As to the commander of the expedition, a Spaniard was to be preferred ; but if it must be an Italian, the ambassador thought he ought to be a married man ; for, with the captive Queen in his power, there was no saying what an ambitious and victorious leader might not do. Marc Antonio Colonna was perhaps the fittest man for the post, but it might attract too much attention to the expedition if a person of his quality were to be employed. Pompeo Colonna and Latino Orsini seemed to stand next : the first was devoted to the King,

and the second had desired to enter his service. Of the Duke of Atri Zuñiga thought highly, and although not a Papal vassal, the Pope might be well pleased to choose him. He was a widower, with sons, fine gallant young fellows, whom he would of course take with him, and whose presence near the imprisoned Queen might be inconvenient. The ambassador closed his despatch with an entreaty that the King would send some definite answer, if possible by December, that the Pope might see that they were not trying to amuse him with words, that His Majesty sincerely desired the enterprise to go on, and that if at last he declined to take part in it, it was for good and sufficient reasons, which could be laid before His Holiness.¹

During the course of this correspondence an English exile, doubtless one of the "persons of good zeal" of whom the Cardinal of Como spoke, repaired to Naples and waited upon Don John of Austria within a few days after his arrival from Spain. Their conference was thus reported by Don John in a despatch to the King:—

"Thomas Stukeley² has come hither from Rome, and in great confidence and secrecy has informed me that, while at that Court, he had found means to make the Pope aware of the great service to God, and benefit to Christendom, that would be rendered if a resolution were taken to assist the Catholics of England, seeing that they are so many and of such quality that, with proper means and industry, there was reason to hope an affair which appeared difficult might obtain all the success that could be desired. The Pope replied that this affair concerned your Majesty and the King of France, as the Princes most nearly interested, and as possessing the power necessary for so important an undertaking; and after many questions, answers, and rejoinders, referred him to the Cardinal of Como. After various other conferences on the business with His Holiness and the Cardinal, they resolved to enter into it by giving one thousand five hundred Italian soldiers, paid for six months, and providing them with food and means of transport; and with these troops, and one thousand five hundred more which Stukeley expected to

¹ Don Juan de Zuñiga, ambassador at Rome, to Philip II.; Rome, 17th Oct. 1575. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 925, fol. 212.

² He is called in the despatches Thomas Estude, but Stukeley was his real name. This younger son of an old Devon family was one of the most active and adventurous of the English Catholic exiles. He called himself Duke of Ireland, with which island he had some connexion, and seems to have been created Duke of Leinster by Philip II., whose ear he gained. A graphic account of him and his career will be found in Froude's *Hist. of England*, London, 1870, 12 vols. sm. 8vo, x. pp. 268-277.

“ be able to raise, he looked forward to sailing for England early in the month of October, passing through the Strait, and landing in a convenient place which he named ; and that having raised in arms some persons in whom he had great confidence, he would then be able to deliver the Queen of Scotland from prison, and she being free, he hoped in a very few days to be in possession of the whole kingdom, and to send to call me for the purpose which has been on other occasions treated of. But it was first of all necessary that I should assist him in raising the one thousand five hundred foot soldiers whom he had offered to His Holiness, and that it must be done in such a way as would insure the secrecy on which depended the whole advantage of the business. I asked if any account of the affair had been given to your Majesty ; he said no, but that he had written something of it to Dr. Sanders.¹ I then represented to him certain obvious difficulties : the first being that so grave a matter should not be entered upon except at the pleasure and by order of your Majesty, upon whom at present depended the support and safety of Christendom. To this he answered that he much feared the weighty affairs in which your Majesty was usually engaged would defer the taking of any resolution, as had happened in time past, and that such delay would prevent the desired end being attained. I then observed that three thousand men appeared to me a very small number for so important an enterprise, and that I could give him no assistance, great or small, without the express order of your Majesty. His reliance, he said, was not on his foreign auxiliaries, but on the native force of the kingdom ; and a small number was sufficient to form a rallying-point for those who he was sure would come to his aid. I then placed before him other difficulties ; such as, that it would be easy for the Queen of England to move the Queen of Scotland to some place further inland, where her rescue could not be effected with the facility which he expected ; that levying and embarking troops in Italy could not be done without a good deal of noise, and that secrets of this kind were hard to keep ; to all which objections he answered by making light of them, as is the way of men driven from home and longing to return to it ; and he finally said that if the enterprise were conducted as he would plan it, and in the Pope’s name, it would have a better issue

¹ Dr. Nicholas Sanders, born about 1527, and one of the ablest and most busy of the English Catholic exiles, was at this time at Madrid, and often consulted by Philip II. on English affairs. In 1579 he was sent by Gregory XIII. as his Nuncio to Ireland, and died there during the rebellion of 1581-3.

" than if it were to be undertaken in the name of your Majesty. " I ended our long conversation by telling Stukeley that, as there " was time between now and October to look about us carefully, " he ought to go back to Rome and continue the negotiation, while " I would advise him of anything that should occur to me on the " subject. On this understanding he will set out in two or three " days for Rome, I having made him promise, and having promised " on my own part, to keep the matter secret, which was the point, " he says, on which His Holiness and the Cardinal were most " urgent, and which is of equal importance to the affair and to his " own personal safety. I humbly beg your Majesty will order due " consideration to be given as to what ought to be done in this " business for your service. To me it appears that if the Pope " shall resolve to take up the enterprise in earnest, and defray the " cost of it, it may open a way by which the affairs of Flanders " may be helped, and your Majesty may be considerably served."¹

Philip II., in his answer, threw cold water on the project. He said that his brother had done well to inform him of Stukeley's proposal, and that what he had said in reply was judicious. But he must be very careful in giving heed to such overtures, because, besides the impossibility of executing any scheme of the kind, the mere fact of his having entertained it might come to the Queen of England's ears and do harm. He therefore again charged him to be cautious in his dealings with Stukeley or any other Englishman, though it was well to hear what they had to say.²

The "purpose which had been treated of on former occasions," and for which Stukeley was to summon Don John to England at the fitting moment, was obviously his marriage with Mary of Scotland, projected by the Pope. From the tone of the King's letter to Zuñiga it appears that Philip regarded that plan with some favour, and that he considered an invasion of England under the Papal flag more feasible than he thought proper to admit to Don John. On the subject of the marriage Don John was afterwards in correspondence with Gregory XIII., who assured him that he took an interest in his personal advancement warmer than he chose to evince in his communications with Madrid. During the winter of 1575-6 Escovedo went several times to Rome, probably on this affair, though ostensibly on other business. The frequency of his visits, and his mysterious meetings with person-

¹ Don John of Austria to the King, in cipher; Naples, 28th of June 1575. Archives of Simancas, Estado, No. 1067.

² Philip II. to Don John of Austria; The Pardo, 23d of September 1575. Archives of Simancas, Estado, No. 1144.

ages whom his professed business did not concern, were reported by Zuñiga to the King.¹ The fine schemes of Father O'Hely and Stukeley fell to the ground, and no attempt was made by Spanish troops marching under the banner of the Keys to deliver Queen Mary from the castle of Sheffield. But three years later the English adventurer had sufficient influence at the Vatican to obtain from Gregory XIII. eight hundred good Italian soldiers, with whom he embarked for England in some crazy vessels which he was obliged to take into Lisbon for repairs. There he was persuaded by the young King, Don Sebastian, to join his ill-fated expedition to Barbary; and he fell on the field of Alcazar on the 4th of August 1578.²

On the 9th of December 1574 Sultan Selim II. had been gathered to his fathers, and was succeeded by his son Amurath III. It was rumoured that the new Sultan meditated designs of an attack upon the Italian shores, and Don John was again busied in placing the seaports of the Two Sicilies in a state of defence.

Granvelle's term of office at Naples having come to an end, he was succeeded in that viceroyalty by the Marquess of Mondejar, the same whom we have seen in a similar capacity at Granada, at the outbreak of the Morisco rebellion.³ After his recall from Granada he was sent to govern Valencia, from whence he was promoted to the chief vice-regal throne in Italy. At Naples he enjoyed the reputation of having increased eightfold his patrimonial revenue of five or six thousand crowns during his official career, and he never lost an opportunity of heaping military or ecclesiastical preferment upon his sons, of whom he had seven. He was now about seventy years of age, spare in person and reserved in manner, and, in the transaction of business, dilatory beyond the average Spanish slowness. The grand maxims of his policy seemed to be to maintain his transcendent personal and official dignity, and to undo all that had been done by his predecessor. His extreme stateliness of demeanour led one of his Neapolitan visitors to remark, on leaving the audience-chamber, that he had gone to see the Viceroy of Naples, but had found the King of Spain.⁴

Neither the change of Viceroys nor his own accession of power as Vicar-General appears to have lightened the cares and difficulties of Don John of Austria. Mondejar, although com-

¹ Vanderhammen, f. 290 *verso*.

² Froude: *Hist. of England*, x. pp. 476-7.

³ Vol. I. p. 122.

⁴ G. Lippomano: *Relazione di Napoli*, pp. 288-9.

pelled to yield him precedence, had abundant means of thwarting him. Don John was soon on as indifferent terms with the soldier as he had been with the Cardinal; and in his despatches he complained so bitterly of Mondejar's wilful ways, and of his neglect of those military interests of which he himself was the especial guardian, that Antonio Perez, in a letter to Escovedo, professed—probably falsely—to have withheld one of these despatches from the King, out of regard for the credit of the writer.¹ Escovedo did what he could to keep the peace between them, but, as he told Don Juan de Cardona, without receiving much assistance from the Marquess. As Cardona was going to Madrid the zealous secretary privately begged him to speak to the King, if Antonio Perez should approve, about giving Don John some other employment which would relieve him from the daily vexations to which his official connexion with Mondejar exposed him, provide him with some ready money, and remove him from exposure to the constant begging of needy persons belonging to the fleet.²

In the winter of 1575-6 he performed the vow to the Virgin, which he had made at Lepanto, to visit her shrine at Loreto. He had hitherto been prevented by public business from fulfilling this obligation, and he had obtained a dispensation to enable him to defer it with a safe conscience.³ During the journey he found the roads bad, the rivers in heavy flood, and the weather very severe. It was raining heavily when he passed the port of Recanati and obtained his first view of the great dome which covers the holy house of Our Lady. In spite of the rain he took off his hat and cloak, and, so long as the church remained in sight, rode bareheaded and uncloaked, "as if," says a pious and admiring chronicler, "he desired to make an offering of himself

¹ Gachard : *Correspondance de Philippe II. sur les affaires des Pays-Bas*, tom. iv. p. 51, No. 1570.

² Paper endorsed *Juan de Escovedo*, and beginning *La merced que el Señor Don Juan de Cardona ha de hazer a su servidor Escovedo es la siguiente*, and dated 12th March 1576. The above request is the first of those made to Cardona; the others are to get the King to appoint Escovedo's son one of the royal secretaries, according to his written promise; to ask for an increase of pay for himself, and an allowance for work done at Rome in bringing the Pope over to the Spanish policy at Genoa; and to obtain for Juan de Soto the redress of certain grievances, according to a plan suggested by Don John—Soto, it seems, having been much disappointed at having been removed from the post of Don John's secretary to that of *Proveedor* of the fleet. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 158.

³ Amongst the *Advices from Rome*, etc., in our State Paper Office, under the head of Italian States 1568-1579, No. 9, and under date 26th Dec. 1573, it is mentioned that Don John had obtained "la prolungatione di sodisfar al suo voto di visitar la santa " casa di Loreto."

"to the Blessed Virgin, to whose benignity he had owed his life."¹ Arrived at Loreto, he visited the church and its contents, and performed all the rites and ceremonies of the pilgrimage with great devotion; confessed and communicated, and presented some splendid gifts to the richly-dowered treasury.²

The Grand Commander Requesens, Governor of the Netherlands, died suddenly on the 5th of March 1576 at a very critical point of the struggle between the people and the King. It was of the highest importance to Spanish interests in the Provinces, as we shall see in the next chapter, that his successor should be appointed without a day's delay. Even Philip was aroused to break through his usual habit of procrastination, and to make a choice after only a fortnight's deliberation. He determined to appoint Don John of Austria, and he notified to him this determination on the 8th of April in a letter which exhibits the strongest anxiety and alarm. To pacify the Provinces and to maintain religion required, he wrote,³ new measures, the first of which was to confide the government to a Prince of his own blood. Don John was therefore immediately to set out for Lombardy, where instructions and powers should be sent to him. The sooner the remedy of his presence could be applied to the calamities the better; and the King wished that his letter had wings, that it might fly into his brother's hands, and that Don John himself had wings, that he might the sooner reach Flanders. He was to travel with as small a retinue as possible; his cavalcade ought not to exceed a dozen horse; and no one but Escovedo was to be informed of the object of his journey. The fleet was to be left under the command of the Duke of Sesa, as if for a very short time; and Don John was to take no one with him from Naples except Escovedo and his personal servants, and of them as few as possible, because the Netherlands seeing him arrive amongst them without arms, or troops, or counsellors, or

¹ Horacio Torsellini: *Historia della Santissima Casa della B. Virgine di Loreto* . . . trad. da Bast. Zucchi, Venetia, 1604, sm. 8vo, pp. 321-2.

² Brislé de Montpleinchamp: *Histoire de Don Jean d'Autriche*, Amsterdam, 1690, sm. 8vo. The visit to Loreto is not mentioned by Vanderhammen, but I see no reason to doubt it. The date, however, is not very certain. It may have been in the winter of 1574-5 or 1575-6. Torsellini says he gave a "ricco dono di denari." In the *Notizie della Sta Casa di Loreto* . . . da Ant. Lucidi, Loreto, 1772, 12mo, p. 74, mention is made, in the list of treasures of "duo collane di oro, una con 38 diamanti, l'altra con 38 rubini, dono del Principe D. Giov. d'Austria," but as no date is given it is uncertain whether these were offerings of the son of Charles V. or the second Don John of Austria, the son of Philip IV.

³ Gachard: *Correspondance de Philippe II. sur les affaires des Pays-Bas*, iv. 38-41.

household, putting himself as it were with all confidence into their power, would receive him with the greater love and satisfaction.

Don John received this letter at Naples on the 3d of May. The anxiety of the King, sufficiently apparent in it, was further evinced by no less than three letters on the same subject, brought by the same courier, addressed by Antonio Perez to Escovedo. In these, which were of course intended for the ear or eye of Don John, Perez used every argument which he could devise to induce Don John to hasten to the Low Countries ; reminding him of his duty to the King and to God, the urgency of the crisis, and the glory which would accrue to him if alone he were able to pacify the Provinces, and which would eclipse that which he had acquired at Lepanto. The greatest secrecy was to be observed, and even the Pope was not to be told of Don John's appointment except by a letter despatched by Don John himself to the Spanish ambassador from his northward road. He was to take fifteen or twenty thousand ducats for his expenses from the last payment of cash made on account of the fleet. In the third letter, a sort of postscript added by the King's order, Escovedo was desired, before giving into his master's hands the letter from the King, to obtain from Don John a promise that he would inform no other person whatsoever of its contents ; and the secretary was further told that Don John was on no account to think of repairing to Madrid.

The anxiety of Philip on the subject of this appointment may be traced, even more distinctly than in his own letter to his brother, in the additions which he made to these letters from Perez to Escovedo. The drafts of them, with marginal notes and interpolations in the King's own hand, are preserved at Simancas. Philip's desire evidently was to heighten and enforce the effect on Don John's mind of the arguments of Perez. One instance will suffice. Perez writes:—"Thus, Sir, I am of opinion that Don John should obey His Majesty with much love and eagerness, setting off at once, imitating his father, who on a like occasion ventured himself into the midst of his enemies in order to bring the single city of Ghent to reason, and who by that means obtained his end. And I hope that the result of a like determination will, in this case, be as much the greater as the necessity is the more urgent." To the end of the first of these sentences Philip, who loved repetitions and irrelevant matter, tacked the following additional incident from the life of the Emperor:—"Who afterwards, being in Germany—I believe at Innsbruck—

“ and learning that the French were marching to attack the Low Countries, old and sick as he was, having dyed his beard and otherwise disguised himself, set off with only two or three attendants, in order to reach the Provinces with the greater secrecy, which he would have done, for he had already made two or three days’ journey, had he not been seized with so violent a fit of the gout that he could go no further, and was forced to turn back to the bed in which he had left Adrian,¹ to whom mass had been said and meals brought, in order that the world might think the Emperor still there, until his journey had been nearly accomplished.”²

It may also be noted that although these letters were revised by the King, and in part written by him, they contain several passages by which Perez evidently endeavours to lead Escovedo to believe that, although they conveyed the King’s orders, they were in the main private and confidential communications, inspired by a strong regard for the secretary and his master. How far Don John of Austria and Escovedo enjoyed the good-will of Perez we shall have subsequent occasion to see.

The government of the Netherlands seemed likely to place Don John at the head of a force, by means of which he might realize the Pope’s splendid dream of a conquest of England, deliver Mary, seat her and himself on the throne of Elizabeth, and restore the British kingdoms to the bosom of the Church.

There were English exiles to whom this scheme did not seem altogether impracticable, and who warmly encouraged the attempt. He did not, however, accept it with the eager enthusiasm which might have been expected. Although the King’s commands, conveyed in an autograph letter, reached him on the 3d of May, he allowed twenty-four days to elapse before he made any reply to it. On the 27th of May he wrote to his brother,³ professing his readiness to obey his orders in all things, but at the same time showing plainly enough that he considered that in consenting to govern the Low Countries he was rather conferring than receiving a favour. He began by reminding him how, on the occasion of Escovedo’s last visit to Madrid, that secretary had been commissioned, in consequence of certain rumours of his appointment to Flanders, to point out to the King the reasons which appeared to render such an appointment unadvisable, and how glad he (Don

¹ Adrian de Bues or Dubois, one of the Emperor’s chamberlains, for whose son Don John when a child at one time passed. See Vol. I. p. 7.

² Gachard : *Correspondance de Philippe II.*, iv. pp. 43-4.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 161-6.

John) had been on learning that His Majesty had relinquished the intention. Since then the state of affairs in the Low Countries had become much more alarming ; the King's enemies were far more powerful ; disaffection and heresy had made great progress ; there was good reason to expect an invasion from England and France ; the Provinces were wasted by the royal troops, whom the low state of the King's credit forbade him either to pay or dismiss ; the Spanish name was abhorred by the people ; and the King's ministers were many of them implicated in the rebellious policy of the Estates. Ere he undertook to endeavour to bring all this confusion into order, he was naturally most anxious for a personal interview with the King, in order that he might receive from His Majesty's own lips instructions which neither letters nor messengers could convey ; but since this had been denied him, he sent his secretary Escovedo to Madrid in his stead. Meanwhile, he entreated His Majesty that he might not be bound down by too rigid orders, but that he might be allowed a certain latitude of judgment, to act according to the shifting exigencies of the time rather than the strict letter of directions drawn up at a distance, which, however useful as guides, could not be absolutely followed in all cases without detriment to the King's service.

He then indicated his own views of the policy which ought to be adopted. "All ordinances," he wrote, "contrary to the laws and customs of the Provinces, which have been issued by late governors, and which give so much offence, ought to be annulled.

"All possible means of bringing back to the royal service the vassals of your Majesty, who may repent of their faults, should be adopted.

"In appointing to places of trust, and in the general administration, the ancient customs of the country ought to be observed.

"No person should be attached to my service who can give offence, and no foreign lawyers, who are so unpopular, should be employed.

"As affairs are to be conducted without the employment of force, and solely by the authority of your Majesty and myself, I must have a household well appointed and respectable, and composed of persons of all nations.

"To meet the unavoidable expense of even such an establishment as I have at present, I can assure your Majesty that neither the ordinary allowance nor the extraordinary subvention

“ is sufficient, and that I am in debt to the amount of several
“ thousand ducats. As I have no means of meeting these
“ liabilities, I must entreat your Majesty, in this as in all things
“ else, to supply my needs, with due regard to the part which
“ your Majesty desires that I should sustain in the world.

“ One of the things which will most contribute to the success
“ of my mission is, that I should be held in high esteem at home,
“ and that all men should know and believe that your Majesty,
“ being unable to go in person to the Low Countries, has invested
“ me with all the powers I could desire. Your Majesty will see
“ that I will use them for the re-establishment of your authority,
“ now so fallen, in its due place. And if my conduct shall not
“ satisfy your Majesty, you can resume these powers without fear
“ of murmur on my part, or of opposition founded on my private
“ interests.

“ The true remedy for the evil condition of the Netherlands,
“ in the judgment of all men, is that England should be in the
“ power of a person devoted and well-affectioned to your Majesty’s
“ service ; and it is the general opinion that the ruin of these
“ countries, and the impossibility of preserving them to your
“ Majesty’s Crown, will result from the contrary position of English
“ affairs. At Rome and elsewhere the rumour prevails that in
“ this belief your Majesty and His Holiness have thought of me
“ as the best instrument you could choose for the execution of
“ your designs, offended as you both are by the evil proceedings of
“ the Queen of England, and by the wrongs which she has done to
“ the Queen of Scotland, especially in sustaining, against her will,
“ heresy in that kingdom. Although neither for that nor for
“ aught else do I believe myself to be fitted except in so far as
“ it is your Majesty’s pleasure ; yet, as in the world’s opinion
“ that task is incumbent on me, and as your Majesty, ever ready
“ to show your kindness to me, lends a willing ear to the project,
“ and gives such evident marks of your desire that it should succeed,
“ I cannot but long to kiss your hands for this favour ; for
“ although I esteem it at its just value, my own sentiments
“ considered, it is of still greater value in my eyes, because it is
“ conformable with my fixed purpose to desire nothing from your
“ Crown, even should your Majesty offer it, beyond that which as
“ your creature I can and ought to have, and beyond those
“ things which by your grace and favour, when your arms are
“ at liberty, may dispose me to manifest my zeal for your
“ service and aggrandizement. That this zeal cannot be greater

"either in vassal, servant, or son, I hope your Majesty will believe ; and I hope God will grant me his grace to make it good."

After an assurance that the writer will set off to Lombardy as soon as possible, the letter ends with a request that he may be empowered to draw, when he requires money, on the Bank of Fugger, at Antwerp, and that Lorencio Spinola, apparently another capitalist, should be sent, or should send thither a representative, to aid the new Governor in the financial difficulties which were evidently ever present to his thoughts.

Escovedo, the bearer of this letter, was also furnished with a paper of instructions for his guidance at Court. He was reminded that he was sent to confer with the King in place of Don John, who was most anxious to have seen His Majesty, but was forbidden to go to Madrid. The secretary was to impress on the King and the ministers the necessity of providing funds, and of giving Don John ample powers of all kinds, that of pardon being one of essential importance to the success of his mission. As he was to endeavour by all means to make himself popular, he would have to take frequent part in the amusements of the Netherlanders. The King must therefore remember that, as Don John was not old, this course of life might give occasion to scandal, and His Majesty was therefore to be entreated to keep a favourable ear for his brother. He was also to be told that Don John was aware that his going to Flanders will excite many pretensions to the command of the fleet ; but that that command having enabled him to perform some signal service to His Majesty, he loved it above all other preferment, and would be unwilling to accept anything else, even a kingdom, on the condition of resigning the post of General of the Sea. To obtain money was of course a main object of the secretary's mission. He was to repeat to the King that Don John's ordinary and extraordinary allowances had not been sufficient to meet his expenses ; that he owed some thousands of ducats ; and desired to be provided with the means of paying his debts before leaving Italy. Don John also wished instructions how to treat his mother, and intimated that he thought she ought to lead a very private life while she remained in the Low Countries. He suggested that, if a peaceful policy failed, and troops must be sent to Flanders, the Prior, Don Hernando de Toledo, would be the fittest person, on account of his experience and personal popularity, to command them ; and he requested

that Lope de Figueroa and his regiment might form part of the force, on account of Don John's regard both for that officer and his men.¹

In July, Escovedo and Don John's letter reached Madrid. The active secretary had business of his own to push at Court, to obtain for his son the fulfilment of a promise, made by the King, that he was to be appointed one of the royal secretaries, and, for himself, an increase of salary, and some allowance for extra work done at Rome in bringing the Pope round to the Spanish policy in the affairs of Genoa.² The King soon afterwards wrote to his brother,³ thanking him for his zeal for the royal service, and for his acceptance of the offered post. Affairs in the Low Countries, said Philip, were going from bad to worse, and the presence of a governor was the only remedy. Escovedo was therefore to be sent back to Naples as soon as possible with all the necessary papers, and Don John must hold himself in readiness to start the day after the secretary's arrival. He was to take the road through Savoy for which the Viceroy of Milan, Ayamonte, was to provide horses and an escort, which escort, in Burgundy, would be relieved by a squadron of cavalry from the Belgian provinces. No notice was taken of Don John's suggestions as to the future treatment of the rebellion.

By a memorandum given to him, Escovedo, on the part of the King, was instructed to remind Don John of the extreme difficulty of finding money, and that but for the timely arrival of the fleet from New Spain none would have been forthcoming. As to his household, the King thought two or three stewards (*mayor domos*), with twelve to eighteen gentlemen of the mouth (*gentilhombres de la boca*), would suffice. These, as well as his pages and inferior servants, with the exception of a few old ones, ought to be Netherlanders; and of the gentlemen of his chamber not more than two or three should be Spaniards. The way for Don John to obtain the confidence and good-will of the Provinces was, in the King's opinion, to trust and employ the people, use their language and adopt their manners and customs, so that he might himself come to be esteemed a native. As to "Madame, "his mother," the suggestion of Don John that she should live in

¹ Figueroa and his men fought on board Don John's flagship at Lepanto. See Vol. I. pp. 406, 422.

² Paper endorsed Juan de Escovedo, 12th March 1576. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 158. See above, page 114, note 2.

³ The substance of the letter, which is without date, is given by Gachard: *Correspondance de Philippe II.*, iv. p. 260. No. 1671.

retirement was approved by the King; and her son Pyramus might be sent to Italy with a pension.¹

A few days later the King again wrote² in reply to a letter from Don John, which has not been preserved, but in which the new Governor seems to have again pleaded for a personal interview. Philip now told him that he must give up the idea, on account of the great inconvenience of any change of the plans already laid down. "Although," he adds, "I am well aware that as to this" and everything else it is enough for you once to be informed of "my wishes, I have thought proper again to charge you in no wise" and for no cause whatsoever to think of coming hither,³ for, "when your coming is permissible, no one would more desire or" invite it than I should, on account of the delight I take in seeing "you."

Peremptory and unmistakable as was this order, Don John took upon himself the grave responsibility of disobeying it. He sailed for Spain with a squadron of three vessels; and his next despatch to the King is dated, on the 22d of August, from his galley in the roads of Barcelona. It is very short, entreating the King not to take amiss his coming to Spain, a step to which he had been impelled, he said, "not only by his desire to kiss His Majesty's hands, but by the interests of His Majesty's service, which were the guide of his conduct at all times, as Escovedo" would more fully explain, until he himself could reach Court."⁴

Escovedo's explanations must have been in some measure satisfactory, for his master was allowed to continue his inland journey. The King even wrote to him kindly, accepting his excuses, and saying that although the state of affairs prevented him from looking forward to their meeting with his usual satisfaction, he was persuaded that Don John came for the purpose not of raising but of smoothing difficulties in the way of his mission to Flanders.⁵ The Court was then at the Escorial. Don John arrived there early in September. In spite of his disobedience the King gave him a favourable reception. But his first audience was marked by an incident which may well have seemed ominous of evil in that gloomy abode of superstition and etiquette.

¹ *Resolución de Su Magestad sobre los memoriales que el secretario Escovedo ha dado a S. M. de parte del Señor Don Juan*, 1576. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 569, fol. 141.

² Gachard: *Correspondance de Philippe II.*, iv. pp. 266-7, No. 1674; date not given.

³ Os he querido tornar aquí á encargar que en ninguna manera ni por ninguna causa no trateis de venir vos.—Gachard: *Correspondance de Philippe II.*, iv. p. 276.

⁴ Gachard: *Correspondance de Philippe II.*, iv. p. 321, No. 1695.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 322, No. 1696.

Having received the embrace of the King, and having also made his obeisance to the Queen, Don John was in the act of turning to kiss the hand of the boy-Prince Don Fernando when he stumbled backward against him, and with the chape of his sword's scabbard (*contera*) dealt the child such a blow on the face that he too fell on his back and bruised his head. In his terror and confusion Don John murmured the most humble apologies, mingled with tears. The King, however, seeing that his heir-apparent was not much hurt, assured him there was no harm done, and that it was well it was no worse. "Is there no window to fling me out of?" pursued the penitent offender. "Nay, nay," replied the King; "why should you talk thus of what was nothing but an accident?"¹

Into the scheme for the invasion of England, and the marriage with Mary Stuart, Philip appears to have entered with real or affected warmth. In the feasibility of invasion, at one time at least, he had so firmly believed as to be disappointed with the Duke of Alba for not accomplishing it. In the marriage he foresaw an object which would turn all the energies of Don John into a channel by which his own interests in the Netherlands would be benefited. He therefore gave his full sanction and approbation to the gigantic plan of conquest and aggrandizement which had been laid down at Rome, subject to such conditions and instructions as might be sent after Don John to the Netherlands.

On the 22d September the King and Don John repaired to Madrid, and were for several days engaged in business connected with the Netherlands. Prayers were ordered in the churches for the safe journey of the new Governor to the seat of his government, with vigils and the exposition of the Holy Sacrament upon the altars. It was given out that he would travel by way of Barcelona and the north of Italy; but, time being precious, it was secretly determined that he should take a more direct road.

Once more he mounted his horse and crossed the Guadarramas to Abrojo, to meet Doña Magdalena de Ulloa. This was the last time that that loving foster-mother was to embrace her son. It had been purposely announced that he would return to Madrid to take leave of the royal family. But at Abrojo he assumed the disguise of a Moorish slave, perhaps in imitation of his sire at Innsbruck,² staining his hair and beard black, and his face and

¹ The story seems also to be related by Juan Euseb. Nieremberg: *Virtud Coronada*, cap. iv. sect. 2, Madrid, 1643, 4to, *Diccion. de la Acad. Esp.*, ii. 552, voce *Contera*.

² See p. 116.

hands of tawny hue, and set forth on his journey northwards.¹ Ottavio Gonzaga, brother of the Prince of Melfi, was his companion, and passed for his master. Three servants attended them, and they took the road through France.

Amongst the advisers of Don John as to his conduct in the Netherlands was his old colleague or rival, Cardinal Granvelle, whose long mismanagement of affairs in those Provinces had given him at least great experience of the subject on which his counsel was asked. It appears to have been given to one of Don John's staff, probably to Escovedo, and to have been submitted to Don Juan de Zuñiga, the ambassador at Rome, for his remarks. The Cardinal recommended that Don John should take care that he had the fullest powers that could be obtained, and insisted that without a good supply of money it was useless to think of going to the Netherlands. The real cause of the troubles had not been religion, but the tenth penny. He ought to be very cautious in his amours, and avoid giving offence in that respect to people of importance. In society he should be gentle, and in business grave, like his father; and he should avoid saying anything that was false, lest when he spoke the truth he should not be believed. He ought to know that the Princes of Germany, holding bastards in little esteem, might perhaps be discourteous in their manner of addressing him in writing; but that he should bear with them, and reply politely, as he might have need of their assistance. On no account should he consent to the calling of the Estates-General, whatever should be the reason alleged, nor should he give any occasion for it. Of certain personages, of whom more will be said in the next chapter, the Cardinal gave his opinion with much candour. Roda was very unpopular, and should not be employed. Viglius was well versed in the affairs of the Netherlands, and could give useful information if his health allowed. Sancho de Avila and Julian Romero, two distinguished colonels, had had much more power than they ought to have had, and their places might be better filled by others. Barlaymont had had much experience; but he was always writing to the King, taking credit for everything that was done well, and throwing on others the blame of failure. Don Juan de Zuñiga, being the brother of the late Governor of the Netherlands, Don Luis de Requesens, had had ample opportunities of learning the

¹ Don John was at the Pardo on the 17th October 1576. In the *Doc. Ined.* (iii. p. 177) there is a letter with that date from him to Don Garcia de Toledo, which gives a curious picture of the hopelessness with which he regarded the enterprise which he was about to undertake.

true state of Belgian affairs ; but he added little to the hints of the Cardinal. He believed that Roda was experienced, and had once been popular, but in what esteem he was now held he could not say. The Cardinal pronounced Sancho de Avila good for nothing, because he had quarrelled with the Cardinal's brother. In Zuñiga's opinion Requesens had done himself much harm in the Provinces by following the advice of the Duke of Alba. Hernando de Toledo was a good soldier, who deserved promotion, but Valdés should be removed.¹

The instructions for the invasion of England were drawn up soon after the departure of Don John of Austria, and were conveyed to him verbally, as it would seem, by the mouth of Escovedo. To avoid the interruption of the subsequent narrative they may be noticed here, as showing the curious incapacity of Philip to comprehend the character and force of the events which his laborious days and nights were spent in watching and in striving to control. Of the seventeen Provinces of the Netherlands, fifteen, as we shall see, were in open revolt ; the royal army was in a state of mutiny ; the rebel Hollanders commanded the estuaries and the sea ; " money," by the King's own confession, " was wanting here and everywhere ;" and, while Philip wrote, his representative was stealing like a midnight thief into the country which was governed, so far as it was governed at all, by the Prince of Orange and a National Committee. Yet here was the King planning the conquest, from Belgium and by Belgian resources, of England, the ally and the protector of his Belgian rebels ! Philip was unable to perceive that the Netherlanders of 1576, sore and fierce from the misgovernment and cruelties of twenty-one years, were not the same Netherlanders, prosperous and loyal, whom he had seen weeping over the abdication of his father in 1555.

The instructions began, it is true, with the injunction that England was not to be invaded until the Low Countries were pacified, and until it was certain that no opposition would be offered by France. " You are to consider," said the King solemnly, " what a mistake it would be to leave our own " dominions in danger, while we are trying to take possession " of those of other people." The help that was to be had from the English Catholics was to be rigidly examined and weighed,

¹ From an unsigned and undated paper endorsed *Lo que en sustancia me dixo el Cardinal de Granvela que acordase al Señor Don Juan.* Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Estado, Legajo 569, fol. 222.

“for no kingdom is so weak that it can be conquered without aid from within.” Don John was to enter into the most amicable relations with Queen Elizabeth, to ascertain the exact amount and state of her naval and military resources, and to take every means of corrupting her ministers and favourites. “And as you are aware,” pursued the royal writer, “of the nature of that Queen, and how she usually gets into correspondence and relations with the persons whom she thinks she might perhaps marry, it may be that, by some roundabout way, she may entertain the same notions about you, and draw you into correspondence. If this should happen, you must not be by any means backward, but let her run on as she pleases, as it will afford a good occasion of furthering the design aforesaid.”¹ It had been agreed that the Spanish troops were to be withdrawn from the Netherlands; it must therefore be given out that they were going to Barbary, and with them the invasion of England must be effected. Victuals, munitions, and artillery must be provided in reasonable quantities, and also arms for the English Catholics. All these things must be done in profound secrecy. The objects of the enterprise were the restoration of England to the Church and of the Queen of Scots to her rights; but nothing was to be said about them at first, lest Mary should be put to death. When her liberty had been achieved she was to be placed at the head of the enterprise. It was to be considered what English seaport was to be chosen for disembarkation—Plymouth, Falmouth, Southampton, or Liverpool; and the one nearest to the prison of the Queen of Scots was to be preferred. Don John was not to lead the expedition until a landing had been effected and some success obtained. Julian Romero, Sancho de Avila, and Alonzo de Vargas, were all eligible for the command; but the King inclined to Romero, as being better acquainted with England and English affairs. It would be best to conduct the affair wholly in the name of Don John, as if it had been a sudden thought of his own, on which he had been led to act by the tempting opportunity afforded by the dismissal of the Spanish troops, and by his sympathy with the wrongs and sufferings of the Queen of Scots, the English Catholics, and the Church. The Pope’s name was not to be put forward; but, if success were

¹ Y porque como teneis entendido de la calidad de aquella reyna, ordinariamente ha tenido tratras e intelligencias con las personas con quien le ha parescido que se podria casar, y podria ser que por alguno rodeo entrasse en este pensamiento y platica con vos, parece que sucendiendo el caso no se deue huyr, sino dexarla correr quanto ella quisiere porque sera buena ocasion para lo que arriba se adiuerte.

obtained, His Holiness might be asked to supply the necessary benediction, briefs, and a Nuncio, and to interpose if any of the Catholic powers sought to support Queen Elizabeth. The enterprise must be carried on in a spirit of "liberality, kindness, and forgiveness," and nothing must be said about rebellion or heresy to the Catholics or others who might join the Spanish standard. The instructions concluded in these characteristic words:—"The great brotherly love with which I regard and always have regarded you makes me desire the success of this affair, because I consider in it, next to the service of God, the means it may afford me of showing how much I love you; in token whereof




MARY, QUEEN OF SCOTLAND. MEDAL.

"I now assure you that, if all goes well with this enterprise of England, it will please me to see you settled there and married to the Queen of Scots—a marriage which I understand she desires, and which indeed will be due to the man who shall deliver her from so great misery, and set her free and in possession of her realms, even to one whose quality and valour might not, as yours do, of themselves deserve it. In case of success there will be some things to fix and determine; but upon these it is not expedient to enter till the time shall come. Meanwhile, it is sufficient to advise you that your settlement in the aforesaid kingdom will have to be in such form and on such conditions as shall appear to me expedient for my service and for the good of our affairs and States." These instructions, although committed to writing, were, it seems, only read to Escovedo. But he was furnished with a short note, in which

Don John was told that the bearer was charged with a verbal message from the King on a certain business which he did not choose to enter upon on paper because of the insecurity of the roads; and "you will hear and believe him," added the King, "as you would hear and believe myself, seeing that he is a person "in whom all confidence may be placed."¹

¹ *Encreancia de Escovedo al Señor Don Juan sobre lo de Inglaterra; a 11 de Noviembre 1576.* This paper is followed by two others, containing a series of heads of instructions, and those by the instructions themselves, endorsed "*Al Señor Don Juan de Nov. 1576 sobre lo de Inglaterra; no se firmo, pero tomo Escovedo los puntos della.*" Last of all comes the short letter to Don John from the King, translated above. Arch. Gen. de Simancas, Legajo 570. I am inclined to think that the instructions were written for the purpose of being carried by Escovedo, but that upon second thoughts the King determined not to risk so compromising a paper out of his own keeping, and ordered Escovedo to make himself master of its substance and convey it verbally to Don John.



BURGONET OF DON JOHN.



DUKE OF ALBA, GOVERNOR OF THE NETHERLANDS.

CHAPTER IV.

SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE NETHERLANDS, ESPECIALLY
OF THE TROUBLES SINCE THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP II.
(1555-1576).



PERHAPS none of all the possessions of the House of Austria was more important as an arsenal of the materials of power than her Belgian territory. In all that belonged to civilisation, in agriculture and commerce, in art and learning, in realized wealth, and in the monuments of intellectual energy, the Netherlands were in advance of all the other countries which owned the sway of the Spanish sceptre. Their

place in the world's history is far more important than that occupied by many fairer and broader regions canopied by serener skies. For if in them political freedom cannot be said to have been

born, on their soil at least were fought many of its most famous and decisive battles.

Between the dethronement of Charles the Simple (A.D. 925), who had held feeble rule in the Netherlands as heir of Charlemagne, and the accession of Philip Duke of Burgundy to the undivided sovereignty of the heritage of Jacqueline of Holland (1437), five centuries elapsed. During these centuries the land had been subdivided into many petty domains, amongst which the counties of Holland, Flanders, and Hainault, the Duchy of Brabant, and the Bishopric of Utrecht, were usually pre-eminent by their size and resources, or by the character of their Princes. Out of feudal wars and crusading adventures grew those feudal necessities which here, as in other parts of Europe, gave rise to municipal institutions and civic association. In plains, thickly studded with castles and abbeys, in due time appeared, on the navigable stream or beside the landlocked haven, towns and cities, incorporated under charters, linking themselves to the great Hanseatic chain, growing rich by the work of their hands and the profits of their trade, holding their own against princely violence, and constituting themselves into a knot of allied but independent Republics. As they increased in strength and population, these towns ceased to be content with the power of making and administering law within their own walls, and aspired to take part in the affairs of the communities to which they brought wealth and importance. The Count or Duke was often glad, in the assembly of his Estates, to balance with civic voices the votes of his turbulent nobles or refractory priests; and to his scanty coffers the contributions of civic opulence and generosity were always acceptable. The liberties of each petty State were thus strengthened and consolidated, and each state or Province thus enjoyed the blessings of a real, though rude, parliamentary government. The maritime district of East Friesland, cut off from the rest of the country by the Zuyder Zee, can, indeed, hardly be said to have had any other government until the whole of the Netherlands fell under the sway of the foreigner, strong in the resources of other lands.

Philip Duke of Burgundy (1419-1467) was the first modern sovereign who possessed, with a trifling exception, the whole country bounded by France, the Rhine, and the ocean. He acquired this territory by many evil courses, and he governed it, like the rest of his dominions, solely with a view to his own interests; but he has nevertheless been decorated by history with the title of the Good. Although the gradual extinction of all

popular rights was a main object of his policy, he was cautious and moderate in pursuing it ; and he was wise enough to perceive that his own power and prosperity depended on the contentment and the material prosperity of his subjects. He protected commerce and manufactures, literature and art. He founded the great Burgundian Library, as well as the Burgundian Order of the Golden Fleece. The pencils of the Van Eycks and of Hemling at Bruges, and the printing-press of Coster at Haarlem, illustrated his reign.

His son, Charles the Bold (1467-1477), hated liberty like his father, but he was far less sagacious in the choice either of the ends or the means of his ambition ; and his insane career of aggression upon his neighbours left him little time to compass the destruction of the liberties of his people. Philip had infringed the rights of the Hollanders by making the Judges of the Supreme Court of the Hague hold office at his will and pleasure. Charles followed up the blow by transferring the seat of the Court to Mechlin, and by investing it with authority to deal with the charters of all his Provinces. By the creation of a formidable standing army he laid the foundations of a despotism the completion of which was averted only by his defeat and death before Nancy.

The Duchess Mary, only daughter of Charles, found herself the heiress of an empty treasury, of disaffection at home, and of powerful hostility abroad. The secret intrigues and open attacks of Louis XI. could be resisted only by means of ample and timely concessions to her own subjects. Hence the Great Privilege, the Magna Charta of the Netherlands, granted by the Duchess to the representatives of the people at Ghent. By this celebrated charter the Supreme Court of Holland was restored to the Hague. It was to resume its proper functions as a Court of Appeal, without original jurisdiction, or any right of interference with municipal or provincial tribunals. To each State and city the administration of justice within its own boundaries was assured. The consent of the Estates was declared necessary to the imposition of every tax, to the coining or altering the value of money, and to the undertaking of war, either offensive or defensive ; and the sovereign was pledged to appear in person before the Estates when in need of supplies. Bound by these solemn obligations, the young Duchess married Maximilian, King of the Romans, and transferred Burgundy and the Netherlands to the House of Hapsburg. She died soon afterwards, and Maximilian became Regent for his son. After various difficulties and humiliations, by the skilful use of party jealousies and popular feuds, and by the aid of German troops, the Regent succeeded in

violating the Great Privilege in almost all its clauses, and in quelling the Provinces which sought to defend their rights.

When Philip the Handsome (1494-1506) ascended the Ducal throne he swore to maintain and observe only the privileges granted by Philip the Good and Charles the Bold. This foolish Prince was notable solely for his splendid alliance with the heiress of Ferdinand and Isabella, by which he added Spain and the Indies to the heritage of his fortunate house, and became father of the Emperor Charles V.

During the minority of Charles the Netherlands were again under the guardianship of his grandfather, the Emperor Maximilian ; and their territory was completed by the purchase of East Friesland. This remote and primitive land of freemen had some years before elected for its constitutional sovereign the Duke of Saxony, who rewarded the confidence of the Frieslanders by selling them into bondage under the yoke of Austria.

Under the Emperor Charles V. (1506-1555) the Netherlands formed the richest portion of the greatest empire in the world. Born in Flanders, Charles loved the country of his birth, quitted it with regret, and returned to it with pleasure. Of all his palaces, the abode which he preferred was the Ducal castle of Brabant cresting the top of the hill on which Bruxelles hung, and spreading its wings and gardens almost to the forest of Soigne. But his presence was so frequently required in other parts of his dominions that the ordinary affairs of government in the Low Countries were always confided to a Regent. During his reign that post was held by two Princesses of his house. His aunt Margaret, Duchess of Savoy, had been named Regent by her father Maximilian in 1506, and she exercised vice-regal power until her death in 1530. She was succeeded by her niece Mary, Queen-Dowager of Hungary, a woman of masculine habits, will, and understanding, who ruled the country with a rod of iron until 1555, when she shared in the abdication of her brother. Over public affairs in the Netherlands Charles, when on the spot, exercised strict personal control ; nor were they forgotten by him in his busiest days, at Augsburg or Algiers, at Naples or Toledo. A main object of his policy, as of the policy of all monarchs of the sixteenth century, and many of the nineteenth, was to break down, undermine, or in one way or another remove or destroy any power which he found opposed to his own. Against the potential rights of his subjects he fought and intrigued as constantly and as unscrupulously as against the material forces of the King of France

or the foreign influence of the King of England. He was more successful in crushing liberty at home than in exhausting the resources or quelling the rivalry of the foreigner. The spirit of nationality was already a giant ; the spirit of freedom was still a weakling. Men had not yet generally learnt that popular rights are no less sacred than the rights of kings ; and monarchs had not even begun to learn that the power inherent in the people and the determination to defend that power, while it curtails prerogative, is the true life of kingdoms and the real strength of thrones. Popular rights too often resolved themselves into local privilege, partaking of the nature of monopolies and conflicting with the privileges of rival neighbours ; and local ignorance or selfishness frequently prompted men to look on with apathy or even approval when others were stricken down by the sceptre which, sooner or later, was sure to descend upon their own heads. It was by the help of these sordid feelings that Charles was able to overthrow the liberties of the commons of Castille, and to tear in pieces the ancient charters of the wealthy and warlike burghers of Ghent. Of the various turns in the great religious struggle of the Reformation in the Netherlands some were eminently favourable, for the time at least, to the arbitrary power of the sovereign. The fires which began to be fed with human fuel in 1523 at Bruxelles might have awakened a deeper indignation in the heart of the people had the Church remained the sole persecutor of free thought. But when the new sectaries were found to use the faggot and the axe as freely as the partisans of the old faith, many reasonable men were inclined rather to halt with Erasmus than to rush on with Luther. The abominations of the Anabaptists produced a natural reaction against all religious change, and drove the timid and the doubting to take refuge from the frenzy of modern fanaticism in the comparative safety and decency of the older superstition. The reformed doctrines steadily gained ground in the Netherlands during the whole reign of the Emperor. Sanguinary edicts, or placards, as they were called, were published against heresy, under the superintendence of a Papal Court of Inquisition ; but they were on the whole mildly administered,¹ and the smoke of an occasional victim went up to heaven from every chief town without exciting any violent outburst of popular indignation. Although Charles was through life opposed to the Reformers, he had, during at least a great portion of his career, no fanatical prejudice against them, but

¹ Gachard : *Don Carlos et Philippe II.*, Bruxelles, 1863, 2 vols. 8vo, i. 293.

withstood the inconvenient investigations of Luther into the grounds of Papal authority, when that authority was enlisted on his own side, just as he withstood the claims of Clement or Julius whenever Papal rights or pretensions clashed with Imperial policy or prerogative. Ever ready to strike a blow at liberty in whatever garb it appeared, Charles knew when to strike and when to forbear. Knowing human nature well, he possessed much of the tact, which distinguished his kinsfolk of the House of Tudor, to discern the precise limit beyond which he might not tax the patience of mankind. His tastes and pursuits, his occasional magnificence, and his habitual simplicity of manners and life, made him personally popular with all classes of his subjects. On the whole, in spite of violated privileges and martyred heretics, of severe taxation and French and German wars, the Netherlands had prospered under Charles of Ghent. Of his revenues of five millions of ducats, two-fifths were contributed by their industry and good-will. The whole assembly gathered in the Hall of the Golden Fleece to witness his abdication wept abundantly even before he began to address them; and their tears justify and in part explain the extravagant assumptions of his own speech and the still more extravagant eulogy which filled the orations which it followed and preceded.¹

When the Netherlands passed in 1555 under the sway of Philip II., the new sovereign appointed as Regent his cousin, Philibert Emmanuel, the dispossessed Duke of Savoy, a soldier of fortune trained in the wars of the Emperor. During his regency foreign affairs and great military operations engrossed public attention. The peace between the Houses of France and Austria, with which the Emperor had hoped to signalize his retirement from the world's stage, had dwindled to the mere five years' truce of Vaucelles, which was not signed until some months after his abdication. Even before he embarked for Spain and Yuste he heard the mutterings of a new storm. The fiery old Pontiff, Paul IV., whose hatred to Austria was inextinguishable, succeeded in kindling strife between Philip II. and Henry II., and in the winter of 1556-7 hostile armies were on foot both in Italy and the Netherlands. The fortune of a two years' war was on the whole greatly in favour of the King of Spain. In Italy the Duke of Alba had Rome at his mercy; but his successes served no other end than to display to the world the treachery of the Pope to his French ally, and the subserviency of the Spanish King to

¹ In *Cloister Life of Charles V.*, chap. i., 3d edition; London, 1853, sm. Svo.

his Papal enemy. In the north the French had but the capture of Calais and Thionville to set against the great Austrian victories of St. Quentin and Gravelines, in which two French armies were destroyed, and the Count of Egmont became the popular hero of the Netherlands. At the Peace of Cateau Cambresis, in 1559, the stipulation which required the restitution of nearly all the French conquests restored the Duke of Savoy to his hereditary States, and withdrew him from his Spanish regency.

The viceroyalty of the Netherlands was now conferred on Margaret, Duchess of Parma, who held it for eight stormy and disastrous years (1559-1567). The natural daughter of Charles V. by a lady of Flanders, Margaret was personally popular in the Provinces. Her chief adviser was Anthony Perrenot, Bishop of Arras, whom, as Cardinal Granvelle, we have since seen Viceroy of Naples. Trained in the school of the Emperor, he had for many years held the first place in the direction of the affairs of the Spanish monarchy. As able, versatile, and indefatigable as any contemporary statesman; selfish, crafty, and unscrupulous even beyond the usual measure of tinselled politicians; he had secured the entire confidence of Philip II., and, professing the most slavish submission to His Majesty's judgment and will, was often the real master of the timid, suspicious, and narrow-minded monarch. Royal prerogative, so long as it could be wielded by himself and for his own advantage, was the object of his worship, and the unceasing labour of his head and hand was given to maintain and extend it. For the people, "that wretched animal," as he called it, and even for the class of gentry from which he had himself sprung, and for all rights save those of the Crown and the Church, he entertained a contempt as profound as if he had been born in the purple. He was too clear-sighted and too well versed in the character of his countrymen not to foresee the storm which some of the King's measures would awaken, and he even ventured to remind his master that the Netherlands were not like his Italian territories, to be dealt with entirely according to his royal convenience and pleasure.¹ But, as he undertook to enforce these hateful measures, he must be held mainly responsible for the misery which they inflicted on the people, and the loss which they entailed on the Crown.

The first great cause of dissension between the people of the Netherlands and their new sovereign was the alteration of the

¹ Letter to Gonzalo Perez, July 6, 1562. Arch. de Simancas, Leg. 522. Quoted by Gachard: *Don Carlos et Philippe II.*, Bruxelles, 1863, 2 vols. 8vo, i. 299.

hierarchy. Of the four Bishoprics, Arras, Cambray, and Tournay owed spiritual allegiance to the metropolitan See of Rheims, while Utrecht was suffragan to Cologne. A subdivision of dioceses and the creation of a national archiepiscopate had long before been planned by Charles V. and his predecessors. Philip, who loved to deal with ecclesiastical matters, took up the question with great warmth; and the ignominious peace with which he suddenly closed a successful war with Paul IV. was, with some appearance of reason, attributed to his eager desire to obtain the necessary sanction of that Pontiff. By a bull issued in May 1559 the four Bishoprics were converted into three Provinces, each with its Primate, and with six, five, and four respective suffragan Sees. The change was on many grounds distasteful and alarming to the country. The revenues of the new dignitaries were to be provided mainly by annexing to their Sees the greater abbeys, institutions which had hitherto elected their own chiefs under the influence of the provincial nobles, and usually from that order. In right of these abbeys the new Bishops would sit in the Estates of the Provinces.¹ It was felt by the people that this creation and endowment of eighteen Prelates instead of four implied a great increase of royal influence in their popular assemblies, and a more stringent enforcement of the laws against heresy, which was daily gaining fresh converts. But the part of the plan which awakened the most serious fears and opposition was the direction contained in the bull for the appointment by each Bishop of nine new prebendaries, who were to aid him in the matter of the Inquisition, and of whom two were themselves Inquisitors. Men saw impending over them a branch of the terrible Inquisition of Spain; and both the orthodox believer in Rome and the follower, or favourer, of the new doctrines saw it with dismay.

One of the first acts of Philip's reign had been to republish, in the most solemn manner, an edict promulgated in 1550 by the Emperor, and consolidating into one law all previous enactments against heresy. This edict forbade the printing, copying, buying, selling, giving, or possessing any writing of any person denounced by the Church as a heretic. It prohibited any lay or unlearned person to dispute or converse about the Holy Scriptures, or to expound or read them. It further forbade any person to teach or entertain any heretical opinion, or to give shelter, food, clothing, or aid of whatsoever kind to those who were known or suspected to be guilty of heresy. The penalties were few and simple.

¹ Gachard : *Don Carlos et Philippe II.*, 1863, 2 vols. 8vo, i. 297.

Any breach of the law was to be punished with death—by fire in the case of the impenitent ; by the sword in the case of repentant men ; by burying alive in that of repentant women. It was impossible to set over the human mind and conscience a despotism more comprehensive or more merciless.

Enforced with intermittent rigour to the close of the Emperor's reign, this edict had been allowed to lie dormant during the two first years of the reign of Philip. The war with France and the Holy See otherwise and sufficiently engaged the attention of the King and his ministers ; and the necessity of obtaining ample supplies from the Estates compelled a prudent avoidance or withdrawal of causes of popular grievance or offence. The provincial agents of the Crown were rarely very zealous in hunting their neighbours to the block or the stake. The new teachers had therefore two years of quiet in which to spread their tenets, and they made the most of the golden opportunity.

But with returning peace came the return of persecution, and the creation of the new Sees and the Inquisition. The opposition to both measures was so open that the King met it by leaving behind him, on his departure for Spain, four thousand Spanish troops who had served in the late campaigns, and to whom he could intrust the support of his authority. This foreign force having incurred the hatred of the people by its excesses, the attempt to fix it upon them at once aroused their jealousy and became a fresh cause of discontent. To the departing monarch the Provincial Estates voted their last supplies, on the express condition that the troops were to be removed before the contributions were to be exigible ; and the States-General presented a strong remonstrance against the presence of alien soldiery in the Netherlands. By the remonstrance, signed as it was by the most powerful nobles, Philip was stung into a reply of unusual fury. Springing from his seat he rushed from the hall, asking, as he strode away, if he too as a Spaniard was to leave the country and resign his power ? He afterwards, however, thought it more prudent to temporize and dissemble ; professing that the troops were left solely to protect the country in case of invasion, and that if he had known they were disagreeable to the people he would have provided for their departure, announcing that they were under the command of the two greatest nobles in Flanders and Holland, the Count of Egmont and the Prince of Orange, and promising that in three or four months at furthest they should be withdrawn.

The creation of the new Bishoprics and the establishment of

the Inquisition were acts clearly contrary both to the spirit and the letter of the ancient constitutions of the Provinces which Philip had solemnly sworn to maintain, protect, and obey. These constitutions declared in substance that the sovereign could not elevate the clerical Estate higher than its accustomed position, without the consent of the other two Estates, the nobility and the cities ; and they provided that no man could be tried, civilly or criminally, except in the open and ordinary courts of the Province ; that foreigners were ineligible for provincial offices ; and finally, that any violation of their privileges by the sovereign released the people from their oath of allegiance.

All constitutional and peaceful means of resisting the innovations were therefore tried by the people and their leaders. They eventually succeeded in getting rid of the Spanish troops, but not until after the King, by every kind of subterfuge, had prolonged their stay to three times the stipulated period, after Orange had resigned the command in disgust, and after the people of Zeland, the submarine island in which they were quartered, had refused to proceed with the annual repair of their dykes until the hated soldiers had sailed from their shores. The surprise of the African isle of Zerbi and the slaughter of its Spanish garrison by the Turks afforded the King a decent pretext for the partial performance of his promise to the States-General.

The new Bishopricks, with their new Courts of Inquisition, were evils not so easily cured as the presence of Spanish troops. The Papal and royal plans were steadily pushed forward. The prisons were filled with prisoners for conscience sake ; and every week their blood flowed more freely on fresh scaffolds, and the smoke of their burning cast a thicker gloom over the heavens. Poor ignorant obscure men, weavers or gardeners, for holding or for having formerly held, doctrines of which they could give no intelligible account, were burnt or beheaded by wretches equally incapable of understanding the monstrous tenets in vindication of which they tortured and slew. It was a battle fought in the dark by blind combatants, in which the blood of the slain was in due time to prepare the soil for the fruits of freedom, and the records of which may possibly help to give clearness of vision to generations yet unborn. To us who contemplate the whole tremendous struggle calmly and from afar, perhaps even more painful than pictures of the sufferings of those who have long since ceased to suffer, is the reflexion that so few of these valiant pioneers of liberty of conscience knew the real worth of the cause

which they maintained. They fought against the persecution of one creed, in hope of obtaining the power of persecuting in the name of another. From St. Andrews to Seville men's minds were deeply impressed with the absurdity of dogmas which they had long implicitly believed, and of the iniquity of Papal and princely pretensions to compel belief in them still. Yet after a century of strife these same pretensions, under the old names of "the power of the keys" and "the duty of the civil magistrate to suppress heresy," were asserted in all their naked deformity in that Calvinistic Confession of Westminster, which is still recognized as their formula of faith by several religious sects who especially glory in their antagonism to Rome.¹

The loyalty of the Netherlands to their sovereign seemed to flow from a source almost inexhaustible. Their patriotism was rather local than general; and each Province was more jealous of its peculiar privileges than of those greater rights which belonged to the whole nation. This deep loyalty and this divided patriotism enabled Philip to oppress and outrage his subjects for many years without provoking actual rebellion. To the last they gave him credit for being a well-intentioned King, "clement and debonair" as they loved to call him in petitions and orations; and they attributed to the wickedness of his agents the evil that was perpetrated in his name. Granvelle had to bear the burden of unpopularity both for himself and his master. For most of the worst measures of the Government he was justly responsible. The bull for the new Bishopricks had indeed been obtained without his knowledge, and he regarded it with disapproval, partly as he confessed with honest selfishness, because it damaged his episcopal position and profits, and partly because he foresaw the storm which it would excite. But as, under its operation, he became Primate of the Netherlands, impropiator of several fat abbeys, and a zealous advocate of the new order of things, the people set down to his account both the new Bishopricks, which he disliked, as well as the Inquisition, of which he heartily approved in everything but the use of the name.

At the time of the King's departure Granvelle was the right hand of the Regent, and the friend of the great nobles. Margaret was so fond of him, that his red hat was obtained by her from Pius IV. as a personal favour to herself, and as an agreeable surprise for her trusty counsellor. In the Prince of Orange the

¹ *The Confession of Faith*, chap. xxiii. sect. iii., and chap. xxx. sect. ii. Edinburgh, 1836, 8vo, pp. 141-166.

astute Cardinal had early discovered those remarkable qualities which, combined with his rank, wealth, and hereditary power, were sure to make him a formidable foe and a desirable ally. He had therefore improved every opportunity of acquiring his good-will and confidence. In 1559 they were already bound to each other by the ties of mutual good offices and close social intimacy.

But from the moment when the policy of the Cardinal and the interests of the Netherlands seemed to Orange to diverge, the Prince steadily espoused the cause of his country. From the first he opposed the increase of Bishoprics, the introduction of the Inquisition, and the schemes and excuses for retaining the Spanish troops. He and Egmont were members of the Council of State—a council of eight persons which assisted the Regent and the ministers in the functions of Government. Finding their opposition troublesome, Granvelle fell on the plan of transacting all the real business by means of a secret committee of three. When the council met, therefore, nothing remained to be done but to register decisions, for which all the members were to be held responsible, although they had not discussed, and did not approve them. Protest after protest was made by Orange and his friends. They appealed first to the Regent and afterwards to the King, in writing and by a representative sent to Madrid. Philip was courteous, evasive, and enigmatical in his replies. But in his private despatches Granvelle was instructed not to bate a jot of his despotic policy. Under the pressure of dire necessity, supplies were demanded from the Estates; but the Estates would vote nothing but remonstrances, petitions for redress of grievances suffered from tax-gatherers and Inquisitors. Here and there the proceedings of the Inquisition were interrupted by the populace, who rose and rescued its victims from the stake. With the difficulties of their position, differences, daily more frequent and important, arose between the Regent and the Cardinal; and the Cardinal grew more and more imperious in overruling her counsels and in following his own. Within three years from the departure of the King it was hard to say whether Granvelle was more hated by Margaret, or by the party of Orange, or by the people.

The beginning of 1564 found the Netherlands in such a state of ferment, that the King, most reluctantly, resolved to remove his unpopular minister. He privately instructed him to withdraw to his estate in Burgundy; but he endeavoured to save the

Cardinal's dignity by desiring him to apply to the Regent for leave of absence to visit his mother, and to request her to write to Madrid for the royal approval of the permission she had accorded. The 13th of March, the day of his departure, was a joyful day for the Duchess, the nobles, and the people. The secret of his recall and of the slender probability of his return was not so well kept as to escape the keen eye of Orange. At his charming seat at Orchamps, amidst wooded hills and trout streams, the Cardinal employed part of his leisure in exchanging friendly epistles with the Duchess of Parma, and defaming her at the same time in his correspondence with the King—treachery for which the Duchess was, unconsciously, retaliating in her private letters to Philip. Returning to the literary pursuits of his youth, and entertaining his neighbours with free and sumptuous hospitality, he affected to be delighted with his rural repose, yet left no stone unturned to compass his restoration to politics and power. When his beard, which he had vowed not to cut until recalled to Bruxelles, had grown to his waist, he emerged from retirement and betook himself to Rome. There he took part in the election of Pius V., and, after assisting in the negotiations for the League against the Turk, he became, as we have seen, Viceroy of Naples.

We may here glance at the character and past career of the remarkable man who may be said to have achieved, in the recall of the Cardinal, his first political success—of a life chequered with noble successes and not less noble misfortunes. William, ninth Prince of Orange, was a chief of a younger branch of the princely German House of Nassau, which, although still possessing a small sovereign State in Germany, had long settled in the Netherlands, where it had acquired great possessions and had long exercised great public influence. The French title of Orange came to him by inheritance from a cousin, to whom it had come by marriage with the heiress of the House of Chalons. William had been brought up in the household of Charles V., who was very fond of him, kept him constantly about his person, conversed with him familiarly on public affairs from his boyhood, and intrusted him, before he was twenty-one, with the command of an army on the French frontier. It was upon the shoulder of Orange that the Emperor leaned when he pronounced his abdication speech before the Estates at Bruxelles; and it was by the hand of Orange that he transmitted, some time later, the Imperial insignia to his successor on the throne of Charlemagne. Philip, at the beginning

of his reign, appeared to have inherited his father's predilection for the young noble. Orange was employed by him in the secret and delicate preliminary negotiations for peace with France, which resulted in the treaty of 1559; and at the time of the King's departure for Spain he held the place of Stadtholder in three Provinces—Holland, Zeland, and Utrecht—and shared with Egmont the command of the four thousand Spanish troops who remained in the Netherlands. Philip's confidence in him had indeed been somewhat shaken by discovering his leaning to the side of national right and constitutional freedom. At their last meeting at Flushing the King bitterly reproached him with his support of the remonstrance against the continuance of the Spanish soldiery in the country.¹ Orange replied, mildly and respectfully, that this remonstrance had come from the Estates, in their public capacity and in the form prescribed by law. "No," cried Philip, with great heat, and violently shaking him by the arm, "no, not from the Estates, but from you, you, you!"² Yet, in spite of this insult, openly offered, the monarch still regarded Orange as a loyal subject; and he evinced his reliance on his orthodoxy by leaving him private instructions for the rigorous chastisement of all heretics within the bounds of his governments.

Although the son of a Protestant sire, Orange was at this time still a Catholic. It was not unnatural that a lad, who had been almost the adopted son of Charles V., should have conformed to the Emperor's religion; and he held the creed with that passive, unquestioning, careless adhesion, with which most creeds are held by most men. Persecution in itself, and for its own sake, he appears always to have regarded with the aversion which he displayed from the moment when he was called upon to administer persecuting laws. This feeling of respect for the rights of conscience would alone be sufficient to mark him as a man of clearer and loftier view than most of his contemporaries. His mind seems to have received its first deep impression on this subject from an accident of courtly life. In 1559 he and the Duke of Alba were at the Court of France, hostages for the due execution of the newly-concluded treaty. Philip II. had been rendered especially impatient for peace by some secret overtures, made on the part of Henry II., towards a league between the two Crowns against their heretic subjects; and both Kings were very

¹ P. 137. ² "No los estados, mas vos, vos, vos!" The second person plural, though employed by Philip II. in addressing his ministers in writing, is now never used in Spanish where courtesy is intended.

eager to conclude a convention for that end. With the conduct of the secret negotiations, on the Spanish side, Alba was charged. At a hunting-party in the forest of Vincennes it happened that the French King and the Prince of Orange found themselves together, apart from the rest of the chase. Full of his project, Henry imprudently took for granted that Orange was cognisant of it as well as Alba; and on that supposition entered into unreserved conversation. As they rode along the woodland ways the King unfolded to his astonished companion the whole scheme by which their Most Christian and Most Catholic Majesties proposed to deal with "the accursed vermin," as he called their subjects who would not acknowledge the Pope as their spiritual father; how they were to be tracked and registered, and at some convenient season simultaneously massacred.¹ With admirable coolness William the Silent contrived to conceal both his ignorance and his emotion, and to elicit full details of a conspiracy which it was so important for him to fathom to its depths.² From that moment he resolved to dedicate his life to the work of protecting his unhappy countrymen from the wickedness of their sovereign. The scheme was happily foiled for a time by the sudden death of one of the wretches who had conceived it. The fortunate splinter of Montgomery's lance, sending Henry soon after from the wedding tournament to his doom, postponed St. Bartholomew for fourteen years. It is impossible, even after the lapse of three centuries, to review the black record of Philip's career without regretting that he too had not been removed from the earth, of which he was a scourge, before the cup of his iniquities was full.

Although his eyes had been thus opened to the true character of his sovereign and the dangers impending over his country, William of Orange did not for some time, nor until near the close of the regency of the Duchess of Parma, enter upon the earnest political labours which were the glory of his life. He watched public events keenly and closely, and year by year found him

¹ "Des lors j'entrepris à bon escient d'aider à faire chasser ceste vermine d'Espaignols hors de ce pais!" *Apologie du Prince d'Orange*, Leyden, 1581, 4to, p. 50.

² The position of William at Vincennes was something like that of his descendant William of Orange, during his visit to England in 1670, when the negotiations for the secret treaty—which was to dismember his States and destroy the Dutch Republic—were going on between his uncle Charles II. and Louis XIV. He was sounded, but was "too zealous a Dutchman and Protestant to be entrusted with any part of the secret." Charles II., however, told him that he himself had embraced the Roman Catholic faith (Burnet, 382). See Hallam, *Const. History of England*, chap. xi.; vol. ii. 384-5 and note in 35 (tenth edition).

fitting himself more and more diligently for that direction and control of the affairs of his party which these events compelled him to assume. But for some years he was chiefly pre-eminent as the great noble of the Belgian Provinces and capital, splendid, almost regal, in his houses, his hospitality, his amusements, and his mode of life ; less famous for his soldiership and his statesmanship than for his cooks, his horses, his hounds, and his hawks ; and in acquiring that social reputation he encumbered his magnificent revenues with a debt of proportionate magnitude. "'Tis said of William of Nassau, Prince of Aurange, that every time " he put off his hat he won a subject from the King of Spain." ¹

The nobility, of which he was the most favourable type, had few merits or illustrations beyond the common endowment of personal gallantry. In war they were ever ready to distinguish themselves by deeds of daring, and to fill their coffers with the ransoms of their wealthy and less fortunate antagonists. In peace their staple occupations were the chase and the bottle. They freely spent the gains of war in the tourney, the masque, and the banquet ; and their ideal of social felicity seemed to consist in thrusting their friends out of their saddles into the sawdust in the morning, and laying them prone beneath the table amongst the rushes at night. Excepting his own brothers, the Counts Louis, Adolphus, Henry, and John of Nassau, William the Silent found himself surrounded by few men of congenial views and similar powers, few worthy competitors in the noble race set before him. Egmont, his equal in wealth and station, the finest gentleman of his time, was also a soldier, with a reputation far exceeding his real merits. At St. Quentin, it is true, his brilliant and fortunate valour had confounded the counsels of famous strategists, and caused kings and armies to flee apace ; but his arrogance and ignorance were as great as his bravery, his very rashness was chequered with fits of hesitation, and his slender intellect and strong vanity made him the tool of the last knave who gained his ear. Count Horn, the companion of his tragic story, was honest and manly, but of narrow judgment, and more distinguished by a tendency to quarrel with his friends than by any capacity to deal with difficulties and overcome foes. The Count of Brederode and the Duke of Aerschot were insignificant men made important by their wealth and their names. The Count was a drunken debauched buffoon, rough and turbulent, and casting by his grotesque

¹ *The Defined Courtier* (a paraphrase of the *Galateo* of Giovanni della Casa, by N. W.), London, 1679, 12mo. Dedicated to James, Duke of Monmouth. A. 5.

behaviour a certain ridicule on the cause which he espoused. The Duke, the courtly chief of the great House of Croy, was a self-seeking, restless, unprincipled intriguer, without tenacity of purpose, yet stung with ambition to reach high places which he



had no capacity to fill. The Baron of Montigny, Horn's brother, and the Marquess of Berghen, were honest men who were averse to oppression and hated persecution, who meant well and died nobly, but who are remembered rather for their misfortunes than for their ability in the desperate game in which they found themselves principal players. Philip de Marnix, Baron of St. Alde-

gonde, was perhaps the only fellow-labourer who was also the intellectual equal of William of Orange. Superior to the Prince in the cultivation and variety of his faculties, he belongs to that select order of all accomplished minds of which Bacon is the chief. An approved soldier and diplomatist, a profound scholar and theologian, a skilful orator and poet, and a writer whose style is still a model of French prose, he failed in one point only to attain the level of William of Orange; for he could never learn to regard religious toleration as a philosophical necessity or as a Christian duty.

During the three years and a half which elapsed between the retirement of Granvelle and the close of the regency of Margaret of Parma, the struggle between royal might and popular right was wholly in favour of the people. Early in 1565 Egmont was sent by the Regent and her council to Madrid to urge upon the King's attention the alarming state of affairs, the emptiness of the treasury, the growing disaffection of the people, and the necessity of concession. The brilliant courtier, though deeply impressed with the gravity of his message, unfortunately thought fit to take the opportunity presented by his mission to apply for grants of land and other favours for himself. Graciously conceding all the Count's personal requests, Philip, as regarded those made in behalf of the Provinces, wrapped himself in his usual mantle of reserve and evasion. Egmont returned to the Regent at Bruxelles with a little money and some faint hope of the further consideration of his proposals. The King seemed to think that the withdrawal of the Cardinal ought to have satisfied all demands. He would rather lose a thousand lives, if he had so many, he said, than consent to anything which would bring about any change in religion.¹ He would neither abolish nor even suspend the Inquisition. On this point he wrote to his sister in so peremptory a tone that Orange, Egmont, and others of the State Council who had never concealed their disapproval of the policy, admitted that no room was left for discussion, and that the Regent had no alternative but to enforce the edicts.

When it was found that the persecuting system was to be maintained with all its novel and hateful machinery, the cry of popular discontent rose as loudly as before. The Provinces protested, each in its several way, against the continued infraction of their ancient charters. The four chief cities of Brabant—Bruxelles, Ghent, Antwerp, and Mechlin—stated their case in a joint-petition,

¹ Gachard : *Don Carlos et Philippe II.*, i. 315-318.

in which the chief point was that no ecclesiastical tribunal was recognized by the Brabantine constitution except that of the Bishop of Cambray, and that he had no jurisdiction except over marriages and wills. The Duchess-Regent submitted the petition to the Council of Brabant, trusting to the influence of her creatures in that body. But, in spite of all the efforts of the president and his friends of the Spanish party, the case was so clear that the council reported that the cities were right. Brabant was therefore proclaimed free of the Inquisition.

In other Provinces the Inquisitors for a while continued to burn their victims, but always in the face of increasing opposition and increasing danger to themselves. From the ashes of each martyr ten heretics seemed to arise. Amongst the upper ranks heresy was defended by men who had no sympathy with its doctrines, and with whom loyalty to the crown was still a faith. These men said to each other: "I am the King's vassal and servant: I would give my estate and my life for his service. But what has the King to do with my soul? If I choose to give it to the devil, what is that to him?"¹ Amongst the vulgar the new sectaries grew bolder in their aggressions. Content at first with caricaturing ecclesiastical costume, they began to insult the clergy and their processions, and in the church itself some reckless enthusiasts would snatch the holy wafer from the hands of the priest and trample it under foot. The frightful cruelties which punished these outrages only stimulated the disposition to commit them. In the seats of commerce and industry, trade and manufactures began to be disastrously affected by the unsettled state of public affairs. The tide of emigration was setting steadily towards the English shore. The cloth and silk weavers of Flanders sought safety and religious freedom under the sceptre of Elizabeth, and by her wise policy Leeds and Norwich successfully vied with the staple products and rose on the misfortunes of Ghent and Antwerp.

The revenues of the Government, deeply indebted and fore-stalled, declined even more rapidly than the resources of the country. The produce of the taxes and the Crown domains naturally fell off in provinces where tax-payers and rent-payers were ceasing to exist. The Regent knew not where to look for means to meet the salaries of public servants, the pay of troops,

¹ Memoir addressed to Philip II. by Fray Lorenzo de Villavicencio in 1565. Quoted by Gachard: *Don Carlos et Philippe II.*, Bruxelles, 1863, 2 vols. 8vo, i. p. 309, note 3. A similar statement will be found in the *Discours de la Pacification de Gand*, 1579, 8vo, p. 27.

the maintenance of fortresses, and other current expenses of the State; and she was obliged to inform the King that if the criminals in the gaols could not be removed to Spain they must either be put to death or set at liberty, as the treasury was unable to supply the cost of their wretched existence.¹

Orange, Egmont, Berghen, and some of their friends who held high offices under the Crown, tendered their resignations, which the perplexed Regent refused to accept, or entreated them to recall. These great nobles endeavoured as long as they could to act as mediators between the royal authority and the lesser nobles and gentry, who were now, almost to a man, in the ranks of opposition. Even their influence could hardly restrain their order, staunch Catholics as well as Protestants, or favourers of the Protestant doctrines, from indulging in political demonstrations hardly less extravagant than the religious excesses of their humbler countrymen. A meeting of provincial nobles agreed upon a covenant, founded on their grievances against the Government, which was called the Compromise, and which in less than two months received upwards of two thousand signatures.

The association thus formed determined to present to the Regent, in a public and solemn manner, a statement of their complaints under the name of a Request. The greater nobles in general kept aloof both from the Compromise and the Request. Orange thought it his duty as a member of the Council of State to inform the Regent of the step that was in preparation, and he also used his influence with the framers of the Request to make its language temperate and respectful. Two hundred gentlemen, who were deputed to be the bearers of the document, rode into Bruxelles on an April evening in gallant and imposing cavalcade. Next day (14th of April 1566) they filed through the streets on foot, walking two and two, to the palace. Margaret, surrounded by her councillors, received them in the council-chamber. Brederode was the leader, and introduced them in a brief speech. The Request was then read aloud. The language was moderate and loyal, and breathed the most entire devotion to the King and the Regent. But the paper also stated with perfect plainness that the edicts and the Inquisition were driving the country to rebellion; that those who signed it had long hoped that the great lords or the Estates would interpose and stay the evil; and that being disappointed in this hope, they themselves, being exposed to the double danger of being pillaged in civil commo-

¹ Duchess of Parma to Philip II., Jan. 6, 1564, *Correspondance de Philippe II.*

tions or of being cast into prison and stripped of their property at the pleasure of any enemy who chose to denounce them to the Inquisition, had ventured to petition the Duchess to send an envoy to Madrid to implore His Majesty to abolish the edicts, and in the meantime to suspend the action of the Inquisition, as well as the execution of its sentences already pronounced, until the King's will should be known. The Regent, as the reading went on, became greatly agitated, and tears rolled down her cheeks before it was ended. She briefly replied, saying that she must consult her council as to the nature of her more formal answer.

When the deputies retired an important debate arose in the council. Orange pointed out the weight and influence of the petitioners, the reality of the evils of which they complained, and the earnestness and apparent sincerity with which they sought to avert from their country calamities which were obviously impending. The partisans of the royal policy were violent on the other side. The Count of Aremberg wanted the Regent to order the confederates to quit Bruxelles. Barlaymont, the finance minister, was for driving them out of the palace with ignominy, exclaiming: "Can your Highness really be a friend of these "beggars (*gueux*)?"

The result of two sittings of the council was communicated to Brederode and his friends two days after the presentation of the Request. The document was returned to them with a written assurance that the Regent would immediately send an envoy to Madrid to lay their wishes before His Majesty, and that she and her advisers were considering a scheme for moderating the edicts, which would also be submitted to the King. But as her authority did not enable her to suspend the edicts and the Inquisition, Margaret added that she could only order the Inquisitors "to proceed modestly and discreetly" in their functions; and she trusted that the petitioners on their part would behave loyally, and avoid political agitation and religious innovation. Two or three further communications passed between Brederode and the Regent, the one pressing for further concessions and the other refusing them.

The proceedings connected with the presentation of the Request closed with a great banquet given by Brederode, in which a fitting name for the confederacy of nobles who adhered to it was a topic of after-dinner discussion. Brederode had already provided a name, which he now produced with the aid of

premeditated circumstances. In a set speech he informed his guests of the sarcastic remarks made upon them by Barlaymont. "They call us beggars," he cried, "and beggars let us be!" A page in waiting here handed him a wallet and wooden bowl, such as were commonly worn by beggars. Amidst the acclamations of the company the speaker hung the wallet round his neck, and filling the bowl with wine, drained it to the prosperity of the new fraternity. The beggar's badges then went the round of the table, passing from neck to neck and from mouth to mouth with universal enthusiasm; and thus, with copious libations, and from the hand of one of its most foolish members, the popular party in the Netherlands received its baptism, and a name which, in various forms, was destined to become famous in history. Brederode and his friends afterwards adopted a costume of coarse gray cloth, in which they appeared in public with bag and bowl by their



PHILIP II. MEDAL OF THE BEGGARS.

sides, or with buttons or medals, stamped with those insignia, on their coats and hats.

The Regent redeemed her promise that she and her council were to produce a scheme, to be submitted to the King, by which the edicts were to be pruned of their excessive severity. It came forth in the shape of a paper entitled a Moderation, and consisting of fifty-three articles, many of them of doubtful or double meaning. It was little more than a repetition of the obnoxious edicts, with the substitution of hanging for burning, and, in some few cases, of banishment for death. Preaching or teaching the new doctrines, expounding the Scriptures, or holding any office in the new sects, were still capital offences. The people laughed at the document, and called it, by a quibble nearly the same in our language as in theirs, the Murderation instead of the Moderation. The Baron Montigny and the Marquess of Berghen were now sent to Spain by the Regent, ostensibly to lay the complaints of the nobles and the people before the King, but really to be punished for the part which they had taken in defence of the national liberties. For

while Margaret was promulgating her Moderation, and giving the two lords their credentials and instructions, she was in possession of private letters from Philip assuring her that he meant to maintain and execute the edicts in their full integrity and rigour.

Encouraged by the apparent successes of their leaders, and by the temporary lull in the persecution, the people grew daily bolder in their assertion of their right to the ministrations of their reformed teachers. Heretical sermons were publicly preached outside the towns, and vast crowds collected to hear them. In the summer days, and sometimes at midnight, the multitudes thus assembled near Tournay and Ghent, Haarlem and Antwerp, were estimated at six, eight, ten, fifteen, twenty, and on one occasion at thirty thousand. Most of the men were armed, and the accesses to the place of meeting barricaded with carts and waggons. The preachers were sometimes converted monks or priests, sometimes tanners, dyers, and weavers. Although the Regent offered seven hundred crowns for every captured orator, not one was betrayed or taken. On Sundays the cities and churches were deserted; for one person who worshipped in the ancient temples five were out in the country at the field preachings, where book-hawkers likewise resorted and sold the forbidden books of devotion by thousands. In vain the Regent ordered the magistrates to send their burgher-guard to disperse these illegal assemblages. She was told that the multitudes were too great and too well armed to be thus dealt with, and, besides, that the burgher-guards formed part of the heretic congregations.

The policy of the nobles and the enthusiasm of the people acted and reacted on each other. While the people flocked into the fields after their favourite preachers, the supporters of the Request assembled to harangue each other. Upwards of fifteen hundred of them, with their attendants, met at St. Trond, filling the village taverns, the country mansions, and the farm-houses of the district with noisy political talk and drunken revelry. The topics chiefly discussed indicated councils greatly in need of firm and sagacious leaders. The main questions were, first—Supposing the claims of the Request conceded by the Regent, were they to make any further claims? and, secondly—Were they now to insist on the Government giving a pledge not to punish them for their past conduct? Some of the men who discussed these questions also took upon themselves the grave responsibility of announcing to the people that they would guarantee them against violent interference with their religious opinions, and of engaging,

by a retaining fee, the services of some thousands of German horse and foot.

Orange was at this time at Antwerp, whither he had gone, at the earnest desire both of the magistrates and the Regent, to endeavour to calm the excitement of the people. Margaret now entreated him to go and meet a deputation of the St. Trond assembly at Duffel. He could be ill spared from Antwerp, yet he undertook the mission, in which Egmont was also associated with him. Brederode, Culemborg, and others represented the confederate nobles. Orange told them that they ought not to hold these riotous meetings so long as the Regent adhered to her promises made in April; that she had sent envoys to Madrid to state their case to the King; that, until His Majesty's reply was received, she had a right to expect that they would discourage all armed assemblies; and lastly, that if they would undertake to aid in suppressing the illegal and tumultuous gatherings she was ready to declare, in her own name and the King's, that their Request had been attended with beneficial results. The latter offer appeared to imply the promise of impunity for past acts which some of the confederates had been so anxious to secure. The representatives from St. Trond, however, met the concession with fresh demands. They said that, the Moderation being a mere mockery, the Regent had not fulfilled her pledge; that while a price was set on the head of each reformed preacher the persecution could not be held to be relaxed; and that the camp-meetings, far from being tumultuous or disloyal, were held for no other purpose than to afford men a peaceable opportunity of worshipping God in their own way. Orange and Egmont found their arguments of no avail. The result of the conference was a new address from the confederates to the Regent, a second and stronger edition of the Request. It was presented to Margaret at the end of July by Louis of Nassau and twelve associates, who were called his twelve apostles. In this document the nobles told her that while they were ever ready to meet the King's enemies in the field, they would not draw a sword against their innocent countrymen; and they declined to answer for the public peace, unless they were assured of safety from prosecutions for themselves and their friends, of the advice of Horn, Egmont, and Orange being adopted in the council, and above all, of the speedy assembling of the States-General. Although the Duchess replied, in a style sufficiently haughty, that this address was even more distasteful than the last, she permitted the deputies to open

a parley, in which things still more bold and bitter were said on each side. Complaining that their actions were daily misrepresented and calumniated, the nobles demanded to be confronted with their slanderers. The Regent replied that it was evident they wished both to administer justice and to conduct the Government. They retorted that if they were driven by violence to measures of self-defence it would be found that they were not without friends abroad. The bewildered Duchess demanded explanations; and she was told that they had resources both in the Provinces and in Germany. To such an address followed by such menaces the Regent and her council could give but one answer—a refusal to entertain the proposals of the confederacy. In her letters to Madrid Margaret had good reason to draw an alarming picture of the attitude of the nobles and the prospects of her helpless Government.

The public mind being in a state of the highest combustibility, the spark which was wanting to set the nation in a blaze was supplied by the concurrence of a religious festival and a civic blunder. From the beautiful church of Our Lady at Antwerp, enriched within and without by the genius, the wealth, and the piety of ages, the great image of the Virgin was carried forth on the Feast of her Assumption, in customary and solemn procession. During an August afternoon the sacred figure, once the object of every citizen's affectionate reverence, accompanied by the usual pomp of pall and canopy, gorgeous banners and robes, and long lines of churchmen of various degrees, and members of trading guilds and charitable societies, went glittering through the tapes-tried streets. But the ancient and familiar splendour was received by the people in a new and hostile spirit. The customary prostrations and plaudits were wanting, and the divine effigy passed on through an angry silence, now and then broken by cries of "Molly, this is your last round," or by the whizzing of a few missiles from the crowd. When the dismayed clergy regained the church they thought it prudent to place the statue, not, as usual, in the centre of the building where the majestic nave is crossed by the soaring transepts, but within the tall and strong iron screen of the choir. This precaution became next day the jest of a jeering crowd. One of the rabble, a saddler, mounted the pulpit and began a mock sermon, which became the signal for a party brawl. After some missiles had been exchanged between the preacher and his congregation, a Catholic skipper stormed the pulpit, and after a severe struggle rolled

down the steps with the orator in his grasp. Arms now began to gleam amongst the combatants, and a pistol-shot was fired, lodging a ball in the arm of the orthodox sailor. Nevertheless the mob dispersed at nightfall without doing further damage. Next day they again assembled and the scenes of riot were renewed. The magistrates were summoned, and remained in the church till evening endeavouring to quell the disturbance. Observing that the crowd was thinning, they flattered themselves that they had accomplished their mission, and went home, leaving only a side door of the church open for the egress of the loiterers. No sooner, however, had the authorities departed than the rioters returned, flung open the doors, and led the fierce worship of destruction and revenge. Before the advancing throng the little band of vergers and wardens was at once swept away, and no civic dignitary or municipal halberdier ventured himself that night within the portals. To the hoarse music of vernacular psalms howled forth by a thousand throats, the ringleaders rushed upon the image of Our Lady, dragged it from its pedestal, and hewed it in pieces. The colossal crucifix of the high altar shared the same fate, the tall companion crosses, with the two thieves, being left standing, as if these, as a Catholic historian remarked, had been the gods of the vile marauders. Ropes and ladders were brought, and as long as anything remained to overturn and to shatter, the axe, the hammer, and the crowbar were plied by strong and skilful arms; women of the town lighting the labourers at their work with the massive waxen torches of the desecrated altars, and refreshing them with wine from the precious chalices of the sacristy. At daybreak the lofty shrine of the Host, a miracle of woven stone, whose fretted pinnacles rose to the groinings of the vaulted roof; the painted windows; the mural monuments; the countless statues and pictures; the illuminated books of the choir; the silver candlesticks, and vases, and jewelled reliquaries, lay heaped together, a mass of rubbish and ruin. The number of the actual destroyers was supposed not to exceed a hundred. While they offered every possible outrage to the furniture and implements of devotion—dancing on holy wafers with shoes smeared with consecrated oil—they appear to have abstained from vulgar pillage. Broken, torn, and destroyed, the property of the church was left within the building. It was also noted as remarkable that in carrying on the dangerous and difficult work of destruction in haste and by dim uncertain light, tearing vast masses of wood and stone and

metal from organs and choir and pillars, exploring dizzy heights of wall and arch for the sacred symbols or saintly statues which crowned every coign or nestled in every niche, no injury was suffered in life or limb by the busy and furious iconoclasts. It seemed to the horrified Catholic as if the devil and his angels had taken them into their especial favour and keeping.¹

The cathedral sacked, the spoilers rushed to the other churches. Ere the sun was high thirty of these were swept with the besom of destruction. The friaries and nunneries were also attacked, their chapels devastated, their libraries burnt, their recluses sent flying through the streets. Bands of marauders ravaged the country, gutting the churches, and eating and drinking at the monasteries, where they paid for their entertainment by diligent use of the torch and hammer. The spirit of destruction was carried through the land with the tidings of it. In Flanders alone it was computed that four hundred churches were laid waste. As it was in the Cathedral of Antwerp, so it was in other venerable and splendid shrines of devotion and precious depositories of learning—at Ypres and Tournay ; at Ghent, Bois-le-Duc, and Mechlin ; at Utrecht, and Delft, and Amsterdam. Of the accumulated treasures of art and literature, the persecuting policy of Philip II. had in three days lost to the world a hundredfold more than his utmost munificence could ever hope to gather into the galleries and libraries of his Escorial. The monotony of mischief was varied at Amsterdam by the gallant and successful defence of a favourite chapel by the ladies who worshipped there, and at Delft by the hardihood of a company of female iconoclasts, who stormed a Franciscan monastery, routed the monks, and gutted their church. Bruxelles was almost the only town of any note whose shrines were unvisited by the whirlwind of image-breaking frenzy. There it was arrested by the wisdom and courage of the magistracy, backed by Orange and Egmont and their friends in the council. But, deplorable as was the destruction of so many fine works of art and relics of antiquity, it must not be forgotten that the popular fury was expended only upon inanimate objects which had become associated in the vulgar mind with a haughty and cruel superstition. Not a drop of blood was spilt ; nor did any priest or monk or other clerical person, however active he may have been in torturing or burning heretics, suffer any injury or outrage beyond the destruction of the tools of his trade, or the clearing of his larder or his cellar. The instincts of

¹ Strada : *De Bello Belgico*, lib. v.

a furious and triumphant rabble need not fear comparison with the reason of Inquisitorial boards, which had goaded the mob to madness, and of statesmen who were soon to visit its excesses upon the noblest heads of the nation.

When the news reached the capital from city after city that the people were destroying the churches, the Regent fell into alternate paroxysms of rage and terror. At three o'clock in the morning of the 22d of August she suddenly called her council together. The members found her equipped for the road, and the courtyard of the palace filled with horses and mules saddled and packed for flight to the fortress of Mons. Persuaded to relinquish so unwise a step, she was in the evening of the same day again on the point of taking it. Better counsels again prevailed; and she was saved the disgrace of flying from her capital, because in the other cities there had been outbreaks upon stocks and stones without bloodshed or any single act of personal violence. Within a week the disturbances had come to an end. In each town there either were no more churches to sack, or a party of order had appeared, armed and resolute against further outrage. But the threatening aspect of affairs, and the universal antagonism which the Government had raised up against itself, compelled Margaret to adopt a course of which she was probably much more ashamed than flight, and which her bad faith rendered in the end much more disgraceful. On the 25th of August she signed an agreement with Count Louis of Nassau and the confederates, by which she abolished the Inquisition, guaranteed oblivion of all past transactions, and conceded to the reformed sects liberty of religious worship in all places where it already existed. The nobles, on their part, engaged that their confederacy should be considered as dissolved so long as the Regent adhered to her own conditions, and that they would give every assistance in their power to the maintenance of her authority and that of the King. The publication of the Accord, a decree so called in which this bargain was ratified, was received with universal joy. Order was restored. The reformed congregations assembled in vast numbers to hear their favourite preachers; sometimes, as in Antwerp, in some of the desecrated churches; sometimes, as in Tournay, in suburban spots, until suitable buildings could be erected for their reception. Some of the ringleaders in the image-breaking, being convicted of that outrage by the ordinary tribunals, were hanged like ordinary malefactors. For a moment peace and prosperity appeared to be returning to the Netherlands.

Never, however, were appearances more delusive. The Regent had signed the Accord, partly under the influence of panic, partly as a means of gaining time, and without any intention of binding the King or herself. She wrote to him that she hoped he would not think it necessary to abide by the engagement. In her communications, indeed, she generally took for granted the royal repudiation of her bond, which she excused herself for signing, solely on the ground that want of men and money rendered a bolder policy for the time impossible. Availing herself to the utmost of the aid of Orange, Egmont, Horn, and all the other nobles who supported the popular rights, and loading them with thanks and caresses, this faithless woman was at the same time, in her secret letters to the King, daily painting them as traitors, with slight differences in their treason's depth of dye.

The King met the crisis with his usual resources of deceit and delay. Highly displeased at the Request, he nevertheless received Berghen and Montigny with a show of cordiality, and in frequent private conferences encouraged them to state, with all frankness, the popular objections to his Inquisition and edicts, and their opinion as to the probable consequences of maintaining these measures. He listened and took notes with apparent calmness, but with a secret resolve that the two honest and loyal gentlemen should pay with their lives for taking him at his word and speaking without reserve. He professed to object rather to the form than to the principle of their proposals; he said that the Papal Inquisition—meaning that which had existed in the last reign—might be abolished if the Episcopal Inquisition were maintained; he required to have a draft of a new Moderation; and as to the desired indemnity for past transactions, he said it might be necessary to make certain exceptions. Even when the rapid stream of events, submerging these topics beneath weightier matters, had rendered further discussion of them futile, he still made them subjects of tedious analysis. The news of the image-breaking, indeed, startled him out of his usual frigid self-possession. He swore by the soul of his father that it should cost the Provinces dear, and he went to bed with a tertian fever, which his attendants attributed to his rage and vexation.¹ Yet in his public despatches, and in his letters to some of the great nobles, he still dissembled, still talked of mildness and grace, and of his intention of speedily visiting the Netherlands to superintend their complete pacification. By private letters, however, the Regent

¹ Gachard : *Don Carlos et Philippe II.*, Bruxelles, 1863, 2 vols. 8vo, ii. p. 355.

was secretly instructed that under no circumstances would he ever permit the States-General to be assembled ; and the Pope, the inexorable persecutor Pius V., was implored not to take offence at the temporizing policy which Philip's necessities imposed upon him, but to be assured that he would not mitigate his severities against heresy, or ever consent to reign over hereties. To us, to whom the whole web of Philip's treachery lies patent, there is some satisfaction in observing that even in his own day, and without means of gauging the lower depths of his falsity, men did not trust him. Orange never believed that he would be bound by the Regent's promises. The Regent did not believe that he would visit Flanders, nor did Granvelle, nor Perez. Some part of every statement which he made the person to whom it was addressed felt to be a lie.

The Spanish members of the Spanish Council of the Netherlands, who discussed the affairs of the Provinces in the summer of 1566 at the country palace of the Wood of Segovia, were, as might be expected, unanimous in holding the attempt of the people to maintain their charters and defend their rights to be rank treason. In the eyes of those dutiful sons of the Church the image-breaking riots added to the popular movement a new and unheard-of horror. They conceived that the Netherlanders had revolted at once against their King and against God ; and they were for treating the whole country as Charles V. had treated Ghent. There were differences as to the best mode of giving effect to that policy ; but no man was wise enough to see its folly or bold enough to express a fear of its success, or sufficiently far-sighted even to suspect the vast resistance which was to rise up against the gigantic power of the Spanish Crown.

Philip sufficiently conquered his habits of procrastination and parsimony to supply the Regent with money wherewith to increase and pay her troops. Under the care of officers whom she could entirely trust, she had been secretly raising fresh levies. This operation was much aided by the reaction which immediately followed the image-breaking. Men wiser than those who formed the ranks of the Catholic nobility and gentry would have been deeply moved by the wholesale destruction of temples in which they had worshipped from childhood, and in which they had laid, in stately ancestral tombs, the bones of their kindred. Persons still in middle life could remember the abominations of the Anabaptists, a sect born of the Belgic soil, and how Leyden and Amsterdam had trembled before inspired butchers and bakers

who had led a rabble rout across the Rhine to practise rapine and preach polygamy. It was natural to look with distrust and dislike on a movement which seemed to revive those evil times, and, in the interest of order and property, to rally to the cause of royalty and superstition. Even of those who sympathized with the reformed doctrines and who were concerned for the national charters, many were deterred by the iconoclastic excesses from taking any part against the measures of the Government. Town after town therefore found itself in the power of a garrison which, from a handful of men, had mysteriously grown to a considerable force. In every place in which the military commander was strong enough to enforce the orders he had received from Bruxelles against religious toleration, the conditions of the Accord ceased to be observed. The reformed worship was suppressed, the congregations dispersed, and the preachers thrown into prison. If a town demurred about receiving a garrison a strong body of royal troops immediately appeared before it. The civic authorities were generally disposed to yield, being desirous of quiet, or friendly to the Catholic cause, or unprovided with means of resistance. The greater cities, however, being the strongholds of the reformed doctrines and much under the influence of their popular preachers, were less tractable. Antwerp, Bois-le-Duc, Maëstricht, and Valenciennes, resolutely refused to admit the royal troops. Some of the confederate nobles promised aid from without ; and even Orange approved of a resistance founded on strict constitutional right. Valenciennes was selected by the Regent as the place of which it was most advisable to make an example. The town was invested by the Count of Noircarmes, one of the staunchest and fiercest of the adherents of despotism. The siege lasted from the middle of December (1566) to the middle of March (1567). At first the townsmen made bold and successful sallies, while their friends in the country rose in desultory parties to make diversions in their favour. Noircarmes remained purposely inactive until a band of three thousand reformers ventured themselves within his reach. At these he struck his first blow, and left two thousand of them dead on the swampy meadows. Other attempts to relieve the place being equally unsuccessful, it was compelled to surrender under a capitulation whereby the lives and property of the inhabitants were to be respected. Technically these conditions were observed, because the town was not sacked. But a garrison quartered on the inhabitants exercised permanent pillage with impunity, and the restored Inquisition entered with new

rigour on a long career of judicial murder. Intimidated by the fate of Valenciennes, the other cities submitted to receive the royal troops and to relinquish the liberty of worship. Antwerp was the last to yield, "being shaken," says a Catholic historian, "by its heretical ministers like a possessed body under the power of the exorcist."¹ But even the proud Antwerpers could not hold out alone; the royal banner floated on their walls; and the Regent heard a *Te Deum* sung in the desecrated and ruined cathedral.

During the winter and spring, in various parts of the country, collisions took place between undisciplined mobs of reformers and the royal troops. In all cases the victory of the soldiers was easy, and in most the defeat of the rabble was bloody. Some of the confederate nobles fought and fell on the popular side. Others, like Brederode, were in their hereditary towns languidly raising their followers, and diligently carousing to the confusion of the Government. Their proceedings showed little concert and no judgment. Some of the chiefs of the party—who, while they hated the pretensions of despotism, had no taste for rebellion—allied themselves more closely to the Government, and openly supported its efforts to repress disorder. Egmont was in command of troops at the surrender of Valenciennes; Hoogstraaten, in a religious riot at Antwerp, slew three men with his own hand, and hanged several of the ringleaders without trial. At a still more formidable tumult in that city, Orange, although always protesting against the bad faith of the Regent, in his efforts to repress the outbreak narrowly escaped being shot by the infuriated Calvinists.

Emboldened by the reaction in her favour, and by the successes of her arts and her arms, the Duchess of Parma determined, in the course of the winter (1556-7), to test the loyalty of official persons by requiring from all the servants of the Crown a new oath of allegiance which bound them to obey the orders of the King in all places and against all persons without limitation or exception. The supporters of her policy at once accepted it. Egmont hesitated for a while, but at last took it. Orange boldly declared that he had already taken all necessary oaths and had broken none of them; that there were certain things in which obedience to the King might be a violation of other engagements to which he had also sworn fidelity; and that he would on no account take this oath. At the same time he offered his resignation of all appointments held by him under the Crown. His example

¹ Strada: *De Bello Belgico*, lib. vi.

was followed by Horn, Hoogstraaten, and other nobles. Margaret again temporized and dissembled. She was not prepared to make enemies whom she feared and could not crush. She refused the resignation of the greater recusants, and entered into courteous negotiations with them. It was after the refusal of Orange to take the oath, and after he might be said to have retired from the service of the Crown, that he rendered to the King and the Regent the signal good office of preserving the peace at Antwerp and dispersing a vast multitude of Lutherans, Calvinists, and Catholics, who had assembled in arms to fight out their religious quarrel. He effected this service at the peril of his life, and by inducing all parties to acquiesce in an agreement based on the concessions of the previous year, and by which freedom of religious worship was secured and a foreign garrison debarred. This agreement was accepted by the Regent so long as the tranquillity which it purchased was of importance to her. But, in her letters to the King, she founded on its conditions a grave charge against Orange; and she repudiated the agreement as soon as successes elsewhere enabled her to overawe the citizens of Antwerp.

The negotiations between Orange and the Regent on the subject of the new oath, conducted by means of letters and agents, were protracted, on the part of the Regent, for several months. The Prince adhered on all occasions to his distinct refusal to take the oath. His final answer was given to a deputation of nobles sent by the Duchess to confer with him, one of them being his friend Egmont. He then resigned all his employments, and retired beyond the Rhine to his principality of Dillenburg. He saw that the time was come when Netherlanders must choose between allegiance to their Spanish King and fidelity to their ancient liberties. As a member of the Council of State he had long been privy to the principal acts of the provincial Government at Bruxelles, and familiar with the public policy of the supreme Government at Madrid. Since accident had made him acquainted with the secret designs of Philip against his heretic subjects, he had provided himself with means of knowing what passed in the King's own closet. The silent, mysterious, suspicious Philip, who maintained spies in every Court in Europe, was foiled at his own weapons by his vassal. Copies of the most secret State Papers were in the hands of Orange almost as soon as the originals could be conveyed to those of the Duchess at Bruxelles. He was as well informed of what was resolved at the Escorial, in the King's private cabinet, as of what was discussed in the orgies of

Brederode and his Beggars in Holland. The flattering letters of Philip and the cajoleries of Margaret deceived him therefore no more than the drunken swagger of the confederate lords. He knew that a great blow was preparing, which it was too late to avert, and which there was now no means of resisting. Before he retired to Germany he warned his friends, especially those who had been shocked by the excesses of the heretics and deluded by the professions of the Regent, of the danger which threatened and the treachery which surrounded them. To Egmont his parting words were that he would find himself a bridge which the Spaniards would use to aid their passage into the Netherlands and afterwards destroy. He left the country in the middle of April. At the end of May an edict appeared re-establishing in the whole land the reign of the Inquisition. The new worship was rigidly suppressed, the congregations were dispersed by soldiers, the new temples were pulled down, and their timbers made into gallows whereon to hang the preachers. The tide of emigration began to flow with ominous rapidity. From every port, and over every frontier, men who professed the reformed doctrines, and who were not wholly blind to the signs of the times, hastened, according to their pursuits and sympathies, to the seats of peaceful industry in England and Germany, or to the banners of the Huguenot leaders in France.

From the moment when the news of the image-breaking reached Spain, the King began, slowly as was his wont, to perceive that the Netherlands must be conquered by force of arms. He resolved that every man who had embraced heretical opinions, or who, being still a Catholic, had been in any manner implicated in the opposition to his Government, should die. As the instrument of his vengeance he selected the Duke of Alba, on account of his military capacity, his entire loyalty, his iron nature, and his Castillian antipathy to the Netherlands and their people. The autumn and winter of 1566 were devoted to diligent preparation. In the spring of 1567 the regiments of Lombardy, Sardinia, Naples, and Sicily, the flower of the armies of Spain, were concentrated in the Milanese; and the garrisons from which they had been withdrawn were filled up with young troops, sent by sea from Cartagena. When the Duke of Alba reviewed his force at Asti, he found himself at the head of eight thousand seven hundred foot and twelve hundred horse, all veterans and perfectly equipped—a sight satisfactory to a commander, one of whose military maxims it was to prefer stout men to a long muster-roll.

Crossing Mont Cenis, he led these choice battalions through Burgundy and Lorraine to Luxemburg; the more direct road through France having been refused by Charles IX. on the plea that the march of a Spanish army would exasperate his Huguenot subjects. Alba reached Luxemburg about the middle of August. The country, which had only a few years before compelled the dismissal of the Spanish troops, again beheld with silent dismay, streaming across its frontier, the red-and-yellow flags and dark faces of the southern soldiery. The bold citizens who had maintained its rights were some of them dead, most of them in exile; while some, deluded by superstition or bought with royal smiles or a coarser price, were doing homage, hat in hand, to the haughty Castillian who had come to put his foot on their necks. In a few days Alba was at Bruxelles, installed as Governor-General with new and extraordinary powers. The Duchess-Regent, often as she had entreated Philip to ease her of the burden of power, was by no means pleased when the relief was granted. She received her successor very ungraciously, and had the effrontery to pretend a sympathy with the popular feeling against him. Nor, indeed, when mollified with gifts and pensions she departed for Italy, was she wholly unregretted by the Provinces which she had misgoverned; so completely were the whips, with which she had chastised them, forgotten when they writhed under the scorpion lash of Alba.

For many weeks before the Duke's arrival, and for some time after it, every effort was made by the Government to revive the threadbare belief in the coming of the King. Preparations were made in the palace for his reception; eight sail were kept in readiness to put out to meet him at sea the moment when the news of his embarkation should be received; prayers for his safe voyage were ordered in the churches—prayers which some sceptics said "His Majesty needed not, meaning to stay at home."¹ Under cover of this expected royal visit Alba posted his troops to the best advantage in Bruxelles, Antwerp, and Ghent, and by every art of flattery and dissimulation lured to the capital the chief nobles who had belonged to the Beggars' confederacy, or who had at any time shown a disposition to maintain the independence of their country.

Orange was of course too wise to be drawn into the snare. Hoogstraaten, enticed from Germany, was saved from destruction by the accident of wounding himself with a pistol, which confined

¹ Strada : *De Bello Belgico*, lib. vi.

him to bed at Cologne. Egmont and Horn were arrested while guests of Alba on the 9th of September 1567. From that moment the Duke ceased to observe any form of law or usage which impeded the march of his purely arbitrary government. The Council of State and all the ordinary tribunals were superseded in their functions by a new Court filled with the creatures of Alba, and called the Council of Troubles. It was created without any direct or sufficient authority from the King, and its members held their places by simple nomination and without any commission in writing even from the Duke. Its acts were to be guided by a code of instructions which defined treason and prescribed its punishment in the most compendious manner. To have presented or signed any petition against any of the obnoxious measures or institutions of the previous Government, against the new Bishopricks, or the Inquisition, or the edicts ; to have tolerated the preaching of the new doctrines ; to have failed to resist the image-breaking and the delivery of the Request to the Duchess-Regent ; to question the right of the King, his deputy, or this council, to set aside any charter or constitutional privilege ; to do or to have done any of those acts which for several years had been constantly, openly, and legally done by a majority of the people of the Low Countries, was declared to be treason. All treason was punishable with death.

Before this terrible Court, Orange, his brothers, and their chief adherents were summoned, and on their non-appearance proclaimed traitors and outlaws, and received capital sentence. The eldest son of Orange, a lad who had been incautiously left to pursue his studies at the University of Louvain, was seized and sent to Spain. The Inquisition was of course ready to second the new governor in all his lawless violence. In February 1568 it pronounced a sentence which in extravagant absurdity has rarely been equalled even by an ecclesiastical tribunal, and by which all the inhabitants of the Netherlands, except a few who were exempted from it by name, were condemned to death as heretics. Within three months Alba's new Court had sent eighteen hundred persons to the scaffold, justifying the name, which the popular instinct had given it on its creation, of the Council of Blood. In or near the principal cities were erected strong fortresses, amongst which that of Antwerp was considered a model of military architecture ; and the cities were lawlessly compelled to defray a great part of the expense of the works constructed for the purpose of overawing them.

The origin and the progress thus far of the contest between despotism and liberty in the Netherlands have been here narrated with considerable minuteness of detail, because the key of later events is to be found in the early history of the long struggle. Until the image-breaking riots the King believed that he could annihilate the obnoxious constitutional rights of the Provinces by the patient use of chicanery and fraud within certain constitutional forms, and without having recourse to open military violence. That outburst of fury from a few of the dregs of the populace, and the alacrity with which the people at large availed themselves of it for the purpose of dictating terms to a feeble Government, convinced him of his error. Duchess Margaret was therefore furnished with the means of violating her engagements, and she began the conquest of the country which the Duke of Alba was sent to complete. Between the institution of Alba's Blood Council and the arrival of Don John, the chief intervening events were judicial murders together with encounters between the two hostile camps into which the unhappy land was henceforward for two generations to be divided. Of these events a very brief indication will here suffice.

In the spring of 1568 the Prince of Orange took the decisive step of appearing in arms against the King of Spain. He endeavoured indeed to preserve some appearance of loyalty by levying troops in the name of Philip himself, whose royal authority he asserted had been abused and jeopardized by the arbitrary and illegal conduct of his Viceroy. The troops were raised in Germany with funds supplied by Orange himself, his brothers, the great nobles, and many of the cities of the Netherlands. Of the first operations the fortune was doubtful. In April the Spaniards cut to pieces two thousand patriots at Dalem; but in May Louis of Nassau destroyed a force of about one thousand five hundred picked Spaniards under Aremberg at Heiliger Zee in the swampy pastures between the Ems and the Lippe. This disaster awoke Alba from his dream of easy victory over the antagonists whom he called men of butter. His first measure of retaliation was to hurry on the execution of Egmont and Horn, who were beheaded at Bruxelles early in June. He then led an army of chosen veterans into Friesland, and utterly annihilated the patriot forces at Jemmingem. In that fatal field seven Spaniards were slain, and seven thousand rebels. Louis of Nassau escaped to Germany, and the terror-stricken Netherlands remained helpless in the hands of the brutal Spanish soldiery.

In September, however, Orange at the head of his main army of thirty thousand men, crossing the Rhine and the Meuse, marched into Brabant. Alba adopted a policy of delay, manœuvred with admirable skill, refused every invitation to a general action, but obtained considerable advantage in several smart skirmishes. After losing several thousand men in a month's campaign, Orange was compelled at the approach of winter to retire into Germany, baffled in arms, lowered in military reputation, and beggared in resources.

Alba, who was not the man to enjoy his victory with moderation, celebrated it by erecting, in the citadel of Antwerp, a colossal statue of himself, trampling on a double-headed monster, emblematical of heresy and rebellion. For nearly two years (1569-1570) he reigned, in tolerable tranquillity, over a population, cowed and prostrate, from which his Blood Council selected every month a hecatomb of victims for the scaffold. His chief difficulty lay in his finances. His confiscations were less productive, and his fortifications and his troops more costly, than he had anticipated. To his schemes of arbitrary taxation the States and the people offered a passive but effectual resistance; and his master lent a deaf ear to his appeals for aid from Spain. Not only did he find it impossible to collect the revenues, but the sources of revenue were daily dried up by the decay of commerce and manufacture, and by the constant outflow of the wealth and the skill of the country to more peaceful lands. His policy and his personal demeanour were daily alienating even those of the nobles who adhered to the royal cause.

Their loyalty was further shaken by the shameful treatment of Berghen and Montigny, who had been sent in 1567 on a joint mission, by the Duchess of Parma and the confederate nobles, to lay before the King the grievances of the Netherlands. These unhappy gentlemen had been detained in Spain, on various pretexts, long after they had ceased to entertain hopes of effecting anything for their country; and they soon found that their position was that of hostages, or prisoners within the limits of the Court. When Alba was sent to govern the Netherlands, they felt themselves to be doomed men. Berghen soon after sickened and died of fever, not without suspicion of poison; and his property in the Netherlands was confiscated by the Crown. In the autumn of 1567 Montigny was arrested and immured at Segovia, and while there underwent a mock trial, in his absence, before the Blood Council of Bruxelles. In March 1570 that

tribunal condemned him to die. The Spanish Council of the Netherlands, sitting at Madrid, perceiving, it seems, that the severities of Alba had not been successful in pacifying the Provinces, advised the King against the public execution of another distinguished Netherlander, but recommended that he should be taken off in prison by slow poison. The King declared in favour of a private execution, but agreed that it was better that it should be given out that the victim had died of fever. Montigny was therefore strangled in the castle of Simancas, in the night between the 15th and 16th of October 1570. Of this assassination, with its forged letters, by which the poor prisoner was to be seduced into an attempt to escape, the minutest details were planned by Philip himself, as well as the elaborate contrivances by which the world was to be prepared for the death, and induced to believe it natural.¹ These contrivances, though very ingenious, were not very successful. Although the precise course of this crime has only recently been traced and discovered, the death of Montigny was at once generally attributed to violence and its true author; and it afforded a new proof to the nobles and the people of the Netherlands, if proof were still wanting, that no faith could be placed in the word of their King.

Driven for a season from the land, the champions of liberty took refuge on the ocean. Furnished with letters of marque from Orange, the bold sailors of Holland, or the "Beggars of the Sea," as they were called, levied large contributions on the commerce of Spain, beginning among the isles and estuaries of the Low Countries that determined and successful warfare against the Spanish flag which they soon carried into the North Sea and the Channel, and ere long into the oceans of both hemispheres. Their daring and profitable exploits replenished the coffers and raised the hopes of their party. At last, in April 1572, William de la Marck surprised the seaport and fortress of Brill, and gave Dutch freedom its first firm foothold on the soil of Holland. Flushing also was taken and garrisoned partly with English volunteers.

As the prospects of Orange brightened the attitude of foreign powers also became more promising. In his low estate the Emperor Maximilian and the Catholic electors had frowned upon his schemes and bade him beware of giving umbrage to the King of

¹ The original documents, or abstracts of them, will be found in Gachard: *Correspondance de Philippe II. sur les Affaires des Pays-Bas*, ii. pp. 152-162. The narrative of the transaction, followed through the windings of its turpitude, may be most advantageously read in Motley's *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, vol. ii. pp. 262-270.

Spain. Even the Protestant Princes had looked coldly on the struggle. But when it became evident that the spirit of rebellion in the Netherlands was to be broken neither by the victories of Alba nor by the fury of his Blood Council, and when successes at sea began to repair disasters on shore, Maximilian, changing his tone, urged Philip to make some concession before it should be too late. Queen Elizabeth became more convinced that the interests of England were bound up in the fortunes of the patriot Netherlanders. The Huguenots having gained an apparent ascendancy in the councils of Charles IX., efficient French aid swelled the strength of Orange. This support, indeed, was lent but for a very brief space, because the peace between the Catholic and Protestant parties was a mere device of the Queen-Mother to insure the success of the treachery of St. Bartholomew. But it enabled Louis of Nassau to capture the southern fortress of Mons almost at the same time that Alkmaar and Dort, Leyden, Haarlem, and other northern cities declared for Orange.¹

These successes of the despised patriots were wormwood and gall to the haughty Alba, who was compelled to watch, without being able to check, their progress. He had also to contend with the difficulties of an empty treasury, of troops mutinous for pay, and the deep hatred of the whole population. His temper, never very enduring, utterly gave way. He quarrelled bitterly with the councillors who had hitherto been his most obsequious tools, because they hesitated to approve of his attempt to cure the evils of an absurd and cruel policy by remedies still more cruel and absurd. An arbitrary tax of the tenth penny on all articles bought and sold had closed the shops and almost put an end to buying and selling. A simple plan for restoring commercial confidence by hanging eighteen of the chief tradesmen of Bruxelles at their shop-doors would have been carried out but for the opportune arrival of the tidings of the capture of Brill. The King

¹ In the *Apologie du Prince d'Orange*, 1581, 4to, p. 24, occurs the following curious passage relating to the religious opinions of Maximilian II. After saying that but for the services of his ancestors of the Houses of Nassau and Orange to the House of Austria Philip II. would not have been able to place so proud an array of titles at the head of the Ban against him, he proceeds thus, proclaiming him a traitor and malefactor: "Mais qu'on me responde par le commandement de qui le Cardinal de Granvelle a empoisonné l'Empereur Maximilian dernier, n'estant encore Roi des Romains? Je scai ce qu'il m'en a dit, et que depuis il a eu telle crainte du Roi et des Espagnols, qu'il en a este plus craintif à faire profession de la Religion laquelle il cognoissoit toutes fois estre la meilleure." Can this attempt at poisoning have taken place on the occasion of one of the visits of Maximilian—then King of Bohemia—to Charles V. at Bruxelles shortly before his abdication, or after it, in 1555 or 1556, when Granvelle was all-powerful in the Netherlands?

added to the perplexities of Alba by teasing him with elaborate and ridiculous schemes for the assassination of Queen Elizabeth, the invasion of her kingdom, and the transfer of her crown to the captive Queen of Scots, schemes which the Duke was required to execute so secretly that they were neither to come to the knowledge of his council nor to disturb his relations with England. The unhappy Viceroy, while admitting the wisdom and justice of these projects, urged the necessity of postponing them to a more convenient season : and at last, driven to his wits' end, he begged to be relieved from his complicated and arduous duties. Philip, as usual, took counsel with the Duke's enemies, spoke him fair, and temporized in interminable and unmeaning despatches. At length, yielding to Alba's entreaties, he nominated the Duke of Medina-Celi as his successor. But although Medina-Celi received his commission in September 1571 he was not allowed to reach the Netherlands till June 1572. Off the mouth of the Scheldt his fleet was thrown into disorder by a light squadron of the Beggars of the Sea, a foretaste of the disgrace which he was to sustain when, sixteen years later, he led the great Armada into the English Channel. Alba had permission to use his own discretion as to the moment of his resignation ; and the arrival of his successor seemed at once to lessen his desire to relinquish power, and to increase the vexations which attended its possession.

The Massacre of St. Bartholomew (August 23, 1572) was a heavy blow to the hopes of freedom in the Netherlands, and a great and unexpected advantage to the policy of the Spanish King. It is no wonder that Philip II. received the news with a burst of unwonted laughter. By paralysing the Huguenot party, that worst of Catholic crimes deprived Orange of his best support, and the loathing which it excited through Europe converted Charles IX. from a jealous and dangerous rival of Philip, for a time at least, into Philip's firm and subservient ally. On the struggle in the Netherlands its effect was at once visible. Louis of Nassau was compelled to evacuate Mons ; and there and at Mechlin Alba had once more the satisfaction of wreaking his vengeance on the unhappy population. Orange concentrated his forces in Holland and Zeland, where the war continued to rage during the ensuing year (1572-3). The contest was maintained with the greatest determination ; and acts of the noblest daring, the most gallant endurance, or the most frightful ferocity, were performed on both sides. Perhaps the most memorable achievements were the Spanish relief of Tergoes and the Dutch defence

of Haarlem. Beleaguered and hard pressed by the patriots, Tergoes was relieved by Mondragone, who, in the darkness of an October night, led three thousand veterans, wading, often to their necks, across ten miles of water, and drove the besiegers from their entrenchments. Haarlem, defended by very insufficient fortifications, held out against the whole power of Alba for seven months. It was necessary to march three regiments from Milan to supply the losses of the besiegers and to carry on the siege. The Spaniards lost twelve thousand men before the place, and the cruelties with which they avenged its resistance went far to render the quarrel between Philip and his Dutch subjects irreconcilable. Alkmaar also held out with equal courage and happier fortune ; and the siege was raised in consequence of the discovery of Orange's determination to cut the dykes and sacrifice North Holland and its persecutors to the ocean. The deliverance of Alkmaar was closely followed by a great naval victory, in which the patriot squadron took and destroyed a considerable Spanish fleet in the Zuyder Zee.

As the difficulties of Alba became more formidable, his policy became more contemptible. Finding that he could not subdue the patriots by force he resorted to the expedient of a proclamation, in which he promised pardon to those who would submit to the royal authority, and threatened vengeance yet more cruel against those who continued to resist it. His promises and his threats excited nothing but scorn. He had rejoiced in the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, as placing an impassable barrier between Orange and the French King ; but he had the mortification of learning, within a year of that event, that the ever-treacherous Valois was negotiating with Louis of Nassau a bargain whereby French aid was to be given to the Netherlanders at the price of a French Protectorate, and on the condition that the influence of Orange should be exercised on the side of the Duke of Anjou at the approaching election to the throne of Poland. Money was growing scarcer every day, and Alba was driven to the sorry shift of evading his creditors at Amsterdam, by making a midnight retreat from that city. In his council, composed as it was of tools and creatures, there was not a single native member with whom he had remained on decent terms ; and he had formally advised the King to dismiss them all and fill their places with Spaniards. In his despatches even the savage and unscrupulous Noircarmes was painted as an object of distrust and suspicion. The presence of Medina-Celi was a per-

petual and increasing annoyance to Alba, and their hatred for each other became every day more hearty. Medina-Celi criticized Alba's measures, and Alba sneered at Medina-Celi's incapacity. The reigning Viceroy would rather remain in an employment which he detested, than resign it to the expectant Viceroy, whom he detested still more. His victory over his rival's pretensions and patience was the sole success that marked the close of his administration. The commission of Medina-Celi was transferred to the Grand-Commander Requesens,¹ and the discomfited Duke departed from Bruxelles without taking leave of the governor whom he had come to replace. For a few weeks Alba remained to enjoy his triumph, spending most of his time in bed to nurse his gout and shun his creditors. On the 18th of December 1573 he turned his face southward, complaining that he had lost the King's favour and incurred the hatred of every inhabitant of the Netherlands, but deriving some consolation from the thought that of these unjust Netherlanders he had sent eighteen thousand six hundred to the scaffold.² During his administration forty million of ducats had been spent; and he left behind him upwards of sixty-two thousand men in arms, a force too great for the King of Spain to maintain, yet too small to complete the conquest of the country. His parting advice to his master was a sufficient confession of the failure of his policy. Conciliation, he said, was hopeless; extermination was the sole

¹ Sir Roger Williams (*The Actions of the Lowe Countries*, London, printed by Humphrey Lownes, 1618) gives the following estimate, most likely the popular one, of the character of Don Luis de Requesens:—"Don Lewis de Requesence, Commendador "Maior de Castillia, a souldier of great reputation for counsaile, but nobody for execution, as the battaile of Lapanta could witnesse. For the Commendador being "chiefe Counceller to Don John de Austria, did what he could to procure the Christian "armie not to hazard battaile with the Turkes. Also being in the fight, he aduanced "so slowly with a rere-guarde of Gallies, that he nor his came to any blowes; so as bothe "there and in other places, alwaies the Commendador was reputed a coward. But "belike in respect of his wit and mildnesse the King sent him into the Lowe Countries, "perhaps perswaded that a milde Captain would winne the hearts of the people farre "better with faire meanes then Duke d'Alva with his cruelty. But in troth both King "and Councell deceiued themselves in calling away Duke d'Alva and in making choyce "of such a Generall as the Commendador Maior. For by all reason, if the Duke had "beene royally maintained as he ought, he had made his master absolute King over all "the seauenteene Prouinces. To say troth, furie and resolution well used or executed "had been the onely waies to suppresse that nation . . . which had beene farre more "easie in the hands of Duke d'Alva then of the poor Commendador."—pp. 116, 117.

² In 1550 Don Pedro de Toledo, Viceroy of Naples, discussing with the Tuscan agent the robbery of a courier, said that during his administration of eight years eighteen thousand people had died by the hands of the hangman; "he did not know what more "he could do." Franc. Babbi to Duke Cosmo de Medici; Naples, March 12, 1550. Quoted by F. Palermo: *Documenti nella storia di Napoli*, p. 124, Firenze, 1846, 8vo. See Reumont's *Carafes of Maddaloni*, pp. 28-9.

remaining course; and all the towns which could not be garrisoned by royal troops ought to be burned to the ground.¹

The new Viceroy was received at Bruxelles with great rejoicings, less because the people desired to do him honour than because they wished to make it apparent to the departing governor that any change was welcome which relieved them of his hated rule. Alba remained in the country for nearly three weeks after Requesens had assumed the reins, in order, as he said, to render him every assistance. But he did little beyond handing him the key of a treasury, empty of money and stored with nothing but unintelligible accounts and obligations, upon which Alba declined to throw any light. With no insight into the financial position of his government, but with bitter experience which taught him to believe the worst, Requesens had to encounter far greater difficulties upon still more slender resources than he had left behind him at Milan.² Without a revenue, without supplies from Spain, with nothing remaining to confiscate, and with troops clamorous for pay, he had to relieve Middelburg, hard pressed by the patriots by sea and land, and to conduct the siege of the important city of Leyden. An attempt to effect the first of these objects led to a great naval action, in which the Spanish fleet of seventy-five sail was utterly defeated and in great part destroyed (29th January 1574). Mondragone was compelled to surrender Middelburg on honourable terms to the Prince of Orange, he himself undertaking to obtain the release of Sainte Aldegonde and other important patriot prisoners, or to return into captivity—a bargain which Requesens would neither ratify nor permit Mondragone on his own part to fulfil.

Count Louis of Nassau soon after crossed the Rhine at the head of eight or nine thousand men, and, advancing upon Maesricht, forced the Royalists to raise the siege of Leyden. But by the superior generalship of Don Sancho de Avila, he was defeated at Mookerheyde with great slaughter, he himself and his brother Henry being among the slain. This loss to the House of Nassau was, however, the sole gain accruing from this victory to the royal cause. An empty military chest here, as in many other cases, presented to the Spanish leader an obstacle more formidable than a siege or a battle. Instead of pursuing their advantages his troops mutinied for pay, deposed their officers, marched upon Antwerp, and remained there for many weeks in full possession of the town, defying the Viceroy and pillaging the unhappy

¹ Gachard : *Correspondance de Philippe II.*, ii. 1293.

² Vol. I, p. 479.

citizens. Requesens was at last obliged to come to their terms ; and while they were noisily celebrating their triumph and their return to duty, the patriot Admiral Boisot sailed up the Scheldt and destroyed the remainder of the royal fleet which had escaped from before Middelburg.

Notwithstanding this disaster the abandoned leaguer of Leyden was resumed in May. The Royalist assailants were commanded by Don Francisco de Valdes ; the defence was conducted by John Van der Does. It lasted for four months, and is one of the noblest passages in the long war. To effect the reduction of the place the Spanish power in the Netherlands was strained to the uttermost. To aid its resistance no external land force was available, the destruction of Louis and his army having exhausted the military resources, and for a time paralysed the movements of the patriots. To save Leyden Orange could look only to his Beggars of the Sea and his old ally the ocean. A flotilla having been collected, dyke after dyke was resolutely pierced, until the salt waves flowed in upon the fair pastures and fruit-laden orchards of Rhynland. Boisot and his sailors followed the advancing tide, making boat attacks upon the outposts of the Spaniards, and chafing at the long delays opposed to their progress by incessant easterly gales. Within the town, famine and pestilence were even more deadly than the artillery of the enemy ; but in spite of these calamities and the heart-sickness of deferred hope, the citizens were ever ready to harass or repulse the besieger. The Spaniards fought with their accustomed bravery, on one side pushing on their operations against the walls, and on the other launching light vessels to meet the relieving flotilla. Post after post, however, was driven in by the slow but sure rise of the tide ; and as regiment after regiment found its encampment turning into an island, communications with headquarters became daily more difficult and dangerous. At length, after many a fierce conflict on the water and on the half-drowned land, where the northern sailors harpooned the pikemen and musketeers like seals, a storm arose in the south-west, and swept the fleet of Boisot up to the walls of Lammen Fort, the key of the Spanish position. The town was at its last gasp, but the country around was no longer tenable. On the hundred and thirty-fourth day of the siege, in the darkness of a tempestuous midnight, fifty paces length of the wall fell down, undermined by the surging waters. The foe was, however, in no condition to take advantage of this unexpected breach, for at the moment when it was opened he was stealing

from his entrenchments, and retreating eastwards with great confusion and loss along pathways half submerged beneath the sea. On the morrow (3d October 1574) Leyden welcomed her deliverers. Amongst the many striking and touching manifestations of joy and thankfulness, the most lasting was the foundation of the famous Protestant university, endowed with the spoils of rich abbeys, under a charter granted by Orange in the name of the King of Spain, in which, with grave and humorous irony, Philip was made to say that he desired to reward his good city of Leyden for its faithfulness in bearing the heavy burdens of the war.

Requesens approved, and would have adopted if he could, all the violent policy of Alba and all the treacherous policy of Philip. But with every disposition he soon found that he lacked the power to crush the rebellion. He had, therefore, almost from the first, in his timid hesitating way, urged upon the King the propriety of making some compromise with the disaffected Provinces. Before the second siege of Leyden had been raised he had obtained leave to publish an amnesty, in which, although there were no real concessions, there were no menaces, and few excepted names. This document was treated with as little respect as Alba's last attempt of the same kind. The Emperor, also, had been in active correspondence both with Philip and Orange, labouring to impress upon each the advantages of making peace. After the relief of Leyden, as the war languished, the efforts of diplomacy were doubled. They were so far successful, that on the 3d of March 1575 ten commissioners from the refractory States met five commissioners on the part of the King at Breda. The conferences of these personages—fruitless, except in the interval of repose which they gave to the unhappy country—lasted for more than four months. The King would yield absolutely nothing. He denied that the privileges of the Netherlands had been infringed, and he insisted on the complete and exclusive re-establishment of the Roman Catholic religion, even in Provinces where there were no Roman Catholic inhabitants. The patriots desired, and the King appeared to consent, that all matters in dispute should be submitted to the decision of a general assembly of the Estates. But when the question of guarantees came to be discussed, the royal commissioners offered the word and sign-manual of the King, of which the worthlessness had been so amply tested, together with those of the Emperor; and they demanded the oaths of the Estates and of the Prince of Orange, together with the surrender, as hostages, not only of several

eminent persons, but of four maritime cities. The manifest inequality between the offer and the demand broke up the negotiations (4th July 1575).

The war was soon after reopened, with some advantages on the side of the King. The troops of Requesens captured, after an obstinate resistance, the town of Oudewater, and butchered the inhabitants with the usual barbarity. This success was soon followed by the most brilliant feat of arms which illustrated his brief viceroyalty. Of the larger islands of the Scheldt, Tholen still remained in the hands of the Spaniards. The adjacent island of Duiveland was held by the patriots. A channel, six miles wide, separated them; but athwart it there lay a narrow sand-bank, always in great part submerged, but at low water affording a dangerous fording-place. Across this perilous pass, in a September midnight, Don Osorio de Ulloa led a force of three thousand foot. The patriots were aware of the attempt, and their flotilla was moored along the sandbank for the purpose of frustrating it. The daring adventurers, however, marching through water generally breast high and a storm of artillery and musketry, effected their purpose, though with considerable loss; and they landed in Duiveland in sufficient numbers to overthrow the troops that opposed them. Crossing a narrow channel, they next occupied the neighbouring island of Schouwen, and, aided by a fleet of light vessels bringing reinforcements and supplies, they laid siege to the town of Zierick-Zee.

Soon after the recommencement of hostilities the Provinces of Holland and Zeland took the step of proclaiming in form that which had so long been accomplished in fact—their independence of the King of Spain. Some months before their abortive negotiations with the royal commissioners at Breda, they had reconsidered and readjusted their relations with the Prince of Orange. The powers which Orange had hitherto exercised as Stadtholder were large, but somewhat indefinite; and they had brought him into occasional conflict with the Estates, and especially with the cities. On one of these occasions he offered to resign his authority if the Estates were prepared either to exercise it themselves or to dispose of it otherwise to better public advantage. The discussion which ensued terminated in the investiture of the Prince with still more ample powers. On the declaration of independence these powers were confirmed to him. The supreme executive authority, both civil and military, was placed in his hands, the Estates retaining the right of voting the supplies and ratifying his

appointments to the higher judicial and financial offices. To the discretion of William was also committed the delicate task of negotiating with the great neighbouring powers, and selecting for the Provinces a sovereign able and willing to protect them against the attacks of Spain.

In the discharge of these high functions the noble character of Orange, his singleness of purpose, his gentle courage, his patient industry, and his consummate ability, won every day more and more the love and confidence of his country. At home his power was ever exerted on the side of justice, of equal rights, and of that liberty of conscience which the Romish sect—which he had now quitted—hated, and the Protestants—whom he had joined—had not yet learned to love. Abroad he entered into active negotiations with all who were able to aid the Provinces in their struggle—with the Emperor, with the King of France, and the Queen of England. It was to France and England that he looked for a sovereign and protector of his native land. Elizabeth was not averse to accept for herself the sceptre of the Netherlands, but she dreaded the expense of acquiring and defending it. Henry II. (who had lately succeeded Charles IX.) wished to obtain it for his worthless brother Francis, Duke of Alençon. Both were lavish of promises, niggardly in performance, desirous of flattering the hopes of the Provinces, and afraid of offending the powerful monarch of Spain.

These negotiations were in progress, and the Spanish troops were besieging Zierick-Zee, when Requesens died of a sudden fever at Bruxelles on the 5th of March 1576. Like most governors of the Netherlands, he was heartily weary of his work. He was wont often to say that he desired nothing in life so much as to leave the Provinces, were it only for the affronts which he daily looked for from his own countrymen; and that the Spaniards would certainly lose the Netherlands for their King, unless they amended their insolence and learned discipline and justice.¹

This event happened at the moment most inopportune for the King's interests. Seldom has the removal of so commonplace a man produced effects so important. It paralysed the military operations from which the Spanish party, not without reason, hoped for the reconquest of the Provinces. To the achievement of this object it was essential that the vacant post

¹ Frederic Perrenot, Seigneur de Champagny, to the King: Antwerp, 10th August 1576. Gachard: *Correspondance de Philippe II.*, iv. p. 293.

should be filled by the ablest man that could be found with the least possible delay. Philip for once saw the necessity of promptitude, and made up his mind within a fortnight.


Requesens having died too suddenly to name an interim successor, the supreme power fell into the hands of the Council of State. By this body, presided over by the Duke of Aerschot, and now recruited by royal decree with one Spaniard and three Netherlanders, a semblance of government was carried on for some months. Don John of Austria was named Governor, as we have already seen, in April, and he accepted the post towards the end of May. But the aspect of affairs was so black, and the royal preparations so little promising, that, in spite of positive orders to proceed direct to Bruxelles, he thought it necessary first to visit Madrid, to take his instructions from the King's lips, and to urge his own views and requirements on the King's ear. If any justification of the step were necessary, it was furnished by the letter of congratulation addressed to Don John, on the 6th of August, by the Belgian Council of State.¹ This dismal document, after the usual compliments, expressed hopes that His Highness would soon appear in the Low Countries, bringing with him those remedies of pacification promised by His Majesty for the troubles, and enabling the Provinces to escape "from the dangerous strait and labyrinth into which affairs had during past years been brought by the attempt to place the government on a footing different from the old one, the ill success of which all men saw and knew." The new Governor was warned that he must bring no more troops, "the country already groaning under the weight of fifty or sixty thousand of them of all nations, so badly paid that it is impossible to get any service out of them, or employ them otherwise than in living in the towns and eating up the people;" that some of these troops were already in open mutiny, and had seized Alost; and that fresh disturbances between the soldiery and the population were expected to break out every day. Finally, he was entreated to help them to "some provision of funds, the want of which is the chief cause of the troubles;" to send them some immediate remittance, "were it but a hundred thousand crowns," for without money "all would go to ruin." To this appeal Don John, of course, could make no reply beyond assuring the Council (11th September) that he hoped to meet them very shortly,² and by laying it before the

¹ Gachard: *Correspondance de Philippe II.*, iv. pp. 285-7. No. 1680.

² *Ibid.* p. 371. No. 1717.

King, before whom so many similar petitions had been fruitlessly laid. But it confirmed the opinion, which he had expressed with tolerable distinctness in accepting the appointment, that the want of money was the greatest of the difficulties in the Netherlands ; and it justified his anxiety to come to a clear understanding on this and other difficulties before plunging into the chaos of Belgian affairs. The delay of his northern journey may have been partly the result and partly the cause of events now to be briefly sketched, which added fresh perils and troubles to the career on which he was entering, and shook to its foundations the royal authority in the Low Countries.

The military successes of Requesens, by reawakening public alarm, had considerably increased the influence of Orange. The



ARMS OF DON JOHN.

adherents of the various reformed sects saw in him their sole protector against renewed persecution. The Provinces of Holland and Zeland, uniting themselves by closer ties, conferred upon him fuller powers. His envoys, both in London and Paris, were enabled to point not only to the dangers which threatened him, but also to the confidence which the people of the Netherlands reposed in him. Both Elizabeth and Henry entered into more serious negotiations than they had yet ventured to open.

The military enterprises of Orange were less promising than his diplomatic affairs. Towards the end of May his fleet failed in an attempt to relieve Zierick-Zee, and some weeks afterwards that town capitulated to Mondragone. But this was the last success which attended the operations planned by Requesens. The Spanish army entered upon a career which neutralized its

previous victories, and ended in its second ignominious expulsion from the Netherlands. The troops of Mondragone took possession of Zierick-Zee in very ill humour. At the end of a long and severe winter siege they found themselves defrauded of the prize which they had marched through the sea to obtain. Without plunder, they were likewise left without pay, without clothing, and but scantily provided with food. In vain the officers applied to the State Council for remittances and supplies. The council was powerless because the treasury was empty. The soldiers, becoming outrageous, plundered the island of Schouwen and moved into Brabant under leaders of their own choosing. The terrified council sent Mansfeldt and some other officers to treat with them. Immediate payment of the arrears due, or the delivery into their hands of a town by way of pledge, were the terms which the troops demanded. The emissaries could accept neither alternative, and returned discomfited to Bruxelles.

Similar causes of dissatisfaction being at work elsewhere, other garrisons and divisions of the army sent large reinforcements to the mutineers. After threatening Mechlin and other towns the roving band finally stormed and occupied Alost, and laid the adjacent country under heavy contribution. The burghers of Bruxelles rose in arms to defend the capital; and the State Council, governing in the name of the King of Spain, issued an edict proclaiming his soldiers outlaws, and empowering the citizens to slay them wherever they could be found. This edict exasperated the troops who had not joined the mutiny, and even the Spanish officers, whom the insurgent regiments had expelled from their commands. Antwerp and its citadel became at once two hostile camps. Don Sancho de Avila, who commanded in the citadel, pronounced the edict infamous and refused to publish it. Champagny, the governor of the city, armed the burghers, and, fearing the temper of some German infantry quartered in the place, obtained its withdrawal and the substitution in its stead of another regiment less likely to sympathize with the Spaniards. A similar movement prevailed over the whole country. The Spanish army was arrayed on one side, the nation on the other.

Meanwhile the sole depositary of the royal authority, the perplexed and feeble State Council, itself disappeared from the scene. Its Spanish member, Jerome de Roda, secretly fled to Antwerp citadel, and, installing himself there, asserted his right to exercise the whole power of the entire body on the plea that his colleagues were acting under the dictation of the mob at

Bruxelles. The rest of the council continued for some time to sit and deliberate until their proceedings were abruptly closed by De Heze, to whom they had lately entrusted the government of Bruxelles, and who, professing to act under the authority of the Estates of Brabant, and backed by five hundred soldiers, arrested them all in their council-chamber. The individual councillors were most of them soon set at liberty; but from the day of the arrest the power of the council was annihilated, and public affairs were languidly administered in the name of the Brabantine Estates acting professedly on behalf of the King. Troops, levied by the Estates, soon afterwards laid siege to the citadel of Ghent.

For this eclipse of the royal authority the chief actors in it afterwards disowned their responsibility; but it was with good reason believed to have been contrived by the Prince of Orange, although neither he nor any of his leading adherents appeared in the transaction. For the purpose of extending and consolidating the national party he entered into communications with each of the Provinces, and induced nearly all of them to send representatives to a Congress, or unofficial States-General, which, it was determined, should meet at Ghent to deliberate on the affairs of the country. By the middle of October a considerable number of the delegates had assembled in that city, and one of the first acts of the congress was to appoint the Duke of Aerschot superintendent of military affairs.

During the summer various conflicts took place between the mutinous Spanish soldiery and the national militia, or bodies of volunteers, hastily mustered against the marauders. The victory was usually with the skilful and disciplined Spaniards, who were joined by most of the German mercenaries. The field of Tisnacq was a battle of Jemmingem on a small scale. Two thousand Netherlanders were slain there, with the loss of two Spaniards. At Maestricht only, the national cause, to which some German troops had there allied themselves, obtained a partial success. The Spaniards were expelled from the town, and driven across the Meuse to the village of Wieck. There, however, they rallied, and devised the infernal scheme of attacking the batteries, which were erected to prevent their return, from behind a file of women, who had taken refuge at Wieck, and whom they placed in front of their van. The stratagem succeeded, the batteries were carried, and the town was stormed and sacked with the usual barbarity.

The mutineers, however, did not venture to march upon the

capital, or even to relieve the beleaguered citadel of Ghent. The Brabantines, on their side, were not strong enough in regularly-trained troops to effect the reduction of that fortress. At length they applied to the Prince of Orange for reinforcements. The Catholic patriots did not venture upon this step without much hesitation, and the negotiations were more than once in danger of being broken off. Orange finally furnished from his own levies twenty-eight companies to the siege of the Ghent citadel, and received in security of the payment of their expenses the town of Nieupoort. The siege was thenceforwards pushed on with great vigour.

As exasperation grew between the foreign army and the armed nation, the line which at first divided the royalist party and the mutineers was absolutely effaced. Sancho de Avila, the commander of Antwerp citadel, was tacitly recognized by the mutineers, as well as the loyal troops, as their leader for all purposes of combined action against the country. His policy was approved and partly guided by Roda, the State councillor who claimed to be the State Council. They now determined to gratify the soldiery and overawe the Provinces by the sack of the city of Antwerp. Partly suspected by Champagny, their design was at last wholly revealed to him by Count Oberstein, a German colonel, who, while drunk, was drawn into complicity in the plot, of which, when sober, he repented. A strong body of troops, three thousand foot, and eight hundred to a thousand horse,¹ under the Marquess of Havrech, was despatched from Ghent to the assistance of the devoted town. Havrech brought with him intercepted letters, proving that Avila had ordered or incited the concentration of various bodies of troops upon Antwerp. This concentration was nevertheless effected whilst the national officers—all of them, except Champagny, lamentably unequal to the crisis—disputed as to the means of meeting the danger. A ditch and breastwork were, however, thrown up on the side of the town which fronted the citadel, 4th November,² and with ordinary skill and prudence Antwerp might have been saved. The garrison and the troops from without numbered but four thousand, while the forces of Havrech and the armed townsmen were estimated at fifteen or sixteen thousand. But the skill of the Spanish leaders, and the discipline of their soldiers, more than counterbalanced the difference of one to three. The attack

¹ George Gascoyne : *The Spoyle of Antwerp*, London, 1576, sm. 8vo, reprinted 1872, p. 21.

² *Ibid.*

was made about ten o'clock in the morning of the 4th of November, and ere noon all the defences were carried. The richest mart in Europe, "the Indies in a single city," was sacked and pillaged with a ferocity and a devastation which paralleled the excesses of the reign of Alba. "In this conflict there were slain six hundred Spaniards or thereabouts, and on the Thursday next following, a view of the dead bodies in the town being taken, it was estimated at seventeen thousand men, women, and children."¹ In this Spanish Fury as the massacre was called, eight thousand Netherlanders were slain, and two hundred Spaniards. Five thousand Spanish soldiers shared among them plunder estimated at five or six millions. "For person and country," said the English poet Gascoyne, who was there, "they spared neither friend nor foe, Portugal nor Turk. The rich was spoiled because he had, the poor were hanged because they had nothing. And this I must needs say for them, that as their continual training in service doth make them expert in all warlike stratagem, so their daily trade in spoiling hath made them the cunningest ransackers of houses, and the best able to bring their spoil unto a quick market, of any soldiers or master-thieves that ever I heard of."² Many of them obtained so much bullion that they sought to secure and conceal it by causing it to be made into sword-hilts and pieces of armour, which they painted black and wore on their persons.


Against the Spanish army the wrath and hatred of the whole country were now inextinguishably aroused. The Antwerp Fury and the undisguised approval of it, expressed in some intercepted despatches addressed by Roda to the King, quickened the deliberations of the Congress at Ghent. On the 8th of November the treaty known as the Pacification of Ghent was signed by the representatives of Holland and Zeland on one side, and by those of Brabant, Flanders, Artois, Hainault, Valenciennes, Lille, Douay, Orchies, Namur, Tournay, Utrecht, and Mechlin, on the other. It was a treaty of friendship and close alliance, by which these contracting parties bound themselves to expel the Spanish troops from the land. When relieved from their hated presence, a States-General was to be summoned, on the basis of that which received the abdication of the Emperor. Until then the affairs of religion were to remain on their present footing, Holland and Zeland professing the new religion, and the Catholic Provinces

¹ George Gascoyne : *The Spoyle of Antwerp*, London, 1576, sm. Svo, reprinted 1872, p. 27.

² *Ibid.* pp. 28-31.

the old, each without molestation from the other. All prisoners were to be released without ransom, the Inquisition was formally abolished, all edicts and ordinances against heresy were suspended, and all confiscations since 1566 were declared null and void. To the States-General all questions of internal policy were to be referred, such as the restoration of fortresses to the King and the repayment to the Prince of Orange of his expenses in the war. The treaty was open to the adhesion of the rest of the Provinces. On the day when it was signed, the 8th of November, the castle of Ghent surrendered to the national troops. About the same time Mondragone, who had hitherto maintained himself in Zierick-Zee with a handful of loyal soldiers, evacuated that dear-bought town and the isle of Schouwen ; and almost the whole of Zeland returned to the possession of the adherents of Orange.¹

¹ For the above account of the affairs in the Netherlands previous to the arrival of Don John of Austria, I am mainly indebted to Mr. Motley's *Rise of the Dutch Republic* (London, 1858, 3 vols. 8vo), a work which, in patient research, lucid arrangement, and graphic power, has few equals in modern literature.



ROYAL ARMS OF SPAIN.



CHAPTER V.

THE NETHERLANDS; JOURNEY THITHER OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA, AND EVENTS THERE FROM THE END OF OCTOBER 1576 TO THE 1ST OF MAY 1577.



HAVING set forward on his northern ride, as we have seen, towards the end of October, from Abrojo, near Valladolid, Don John of Austria was accompanied by Ottavio Gonzaga¹ and two or three servants, amongst whom was a French postilion who in after days, travelling with the historian Brantôme, was described by that writer as a Frenchified Swiss, or half Savoyard, half Spaniard, knowing all the posts, highroads, and byways of France.² Don

John is said by his biographer to have travelled disguised, with stained face and dyed frizzled hair, as the Moorish slave of Gonzaga.³ Of this disguise, which may, as we have seen, have been adopted partly in imitation of his father at Innsbruck,⁴ no

¹ Son to Ferrante, so famous formerly in arms, who was Viceroy in Sicily, and afterwards under Charles V. governor of Milan. Bartidoglio: *Warre of Flanders*, translated by Henry, Earl of Monmouth, London, 1654, fol., p. 150.

² *Vies des Hommes Illustres et Grandes Capitaines Estrangers. Discours XLI. Œuvres de Brantôme.* Paris, 1787, 8 tomes 8vo, iv. p. 344.

³ Vanderhammen: *Don Juan de Austria*, f. 292.

⁴ See p. 116.

mention is made in his letters addressed during the journey to the King. The first of them, written from Irun, on the 24th of October, ran thus :—

“SIR—I have just arrived here at Irun, never in my life having experienced so much fatigue as in this single journey, for, the horses being few, we have been obliged to ride the same often for twelve leagues, and sometimes for sixteen,¹ and withal to consider ourselves lucky if we could get away from the post-houses within two hours, or a little less after our coming thither. So your Majesty will believe we have undergone much fatigue and had little sleep, although our pace has been slow, in spite of which I have been troubled by a return of some old ailments. Yet, God willing, they shall not stop me, seeing it is so important to the service of God and your Majesty that I should surmount all complaints and difficulties. I am therefore only waiting for Ottavio” (Gonzaga) “who, in order to save time, went by Fuenterrabia, while I came on here to have all things ready to proceed. A French merchant has just arrived. He does not speak favourably, they tell me, of the safety of the roads ; but I am neither doubtful nor apprehensive of pushing on, since there are so many reasons and obligations to do so. Now, sir, the pressing matter is that you should conclude the arrangements for money, and along with that send me Escovedo ; for without these two things I do not know how to make a beginning, and it is at first that I especially wish to be provided with means, which afterwards may be supplied to me with little advantage. And as cases may arise in which you would be glad to aid me with your own blood, if it would avail anything, I once more entreat that your Majesty will now assist with what I require, which is money, money, and more money, for without this it would have been better not to have hazarded so great a stake.² I know not that I have anything further to tell or to ask of your Majesty. Ottavio has just arrived with Garcia de Arce ; and I therefore end my letter in order to proceed on our journey, praying Our Lord to keep your Majesty in weal and content.”

The ride from Irun to Paris was accomplished in six or seven

¹ Forty-two or fifty-six English miles.

² Y pues puede suceder caso en que se me acudiría con la sangre propia, si valiese, suplico de nuevo agora á V. M. se me acuda con lo que digo, que es dinero, dinero, y mas dinero, porque sin este valiera mas no haber puesto tantas prendas.—Gachard : *Correspondance*, iv. p. 446, note 1.

days. Don John thus described it to the King, on the 31st of October :—

“SIR—After having suffered much fatigue on the way on account of the bad state of the roads and the constant rain, and having been detained half a day at Bourdeaux, not being allowed to pass, and having fallen in with a Frenchman, in whose company I travelled for two days, we acting as his servants, and I having carried his portmanteau for three posts ; in short, having suffered much fatigue and taken little rest, it has pleased God that we should arrive here last night. I should have been here the day before but for these delays, about which, if I can, I will write more at large to Antonio Perez, though it will not be now, for I am in haste to depart, because in coming to this house of the ambassador, as he will write, I have been seen and recognised by his servants, and the houses of ambassadors are closely watched. I believe, therefore, that it will not be long ere some report of my arrival gets wind, seeing that all men are expecting it ; and since a reasonable suspicion and a few whispers may coincide with each other, your Majesty will perceive that it is better to avoid the danger which may thus arise.”

As to the best road to the Netherlands, Don John informed the King that he had been in constant deliberation with the ambassador, Don Diego de Zuñiga, and with Don Alonso de Sotomayor and Captain Diego Felices, officers whom he found at Zuñiga's house, as well as with his own companion Gonzaga. Gravelines and Cambray had at first been thought of as points at which to enter the Provinces. But as it was possible that the inhabitants might either refuse to receive him, or, receiving him, afterwards play him some trick which would place His Majesty in fresh difficulties, or that he might be besieged by the rebels, it was necessary to provide some place of retreat in prospect of such events. From Gravelines or Cambray he could retire only to Paris, where his arrival would of course soon be known, and where he could expect no safety in the transaction of the King's business, the French Government itself not being safe there. Under these circumstances they had agreed that Luxemburg was the town to which he had better go. He again concludes his letter by urging the King to enable him to make a good commencement of his labours in the Netherlands, and of his encounter with so many difficulties, by sending him money and Escovedo.

This letter was dated on the 31st of October at six o'clock in the morning, and on that same day the ambassador Zuñiga announced to the King Don John's departure for Metz. The expression used by Don John that he had been seen coming "to



"this house," seems to imply that he was writing under Zuñiga's roof, and it is therefore most probable that he had also slept there. The story, as told by his biographer Vanderhammen, is that he alighted in an inn of the meaner kind (*se apeè en un meson*) and visited the ambassador at nightfall.¹ Brantôme further relates that there being that night a ball at the Louvre, Don John went

¹ Vanderhammen : *Don Juan de Austria*, f. 292.

thither in disguise, and saw the Court and great personages with whom he was so soon to enter into political relations or collision. Queen Margaret of Navarre was there in all her beauty, and she, it is said, made a deep impression on his susceptible heart.

That Don John should have attended a royal ball, where, of course, there must have been many persons present to whom he had been known in Spain or Italy, is not wholly impossible, or directly contradicted by the evidence of his own letter. It is, however, not very reconcilable with his expressed anxiety to escape notice, with his long conference about his road to the Netherlands and the state of affairs there, the late hour of his arrival in Paris, his fatigues during the previous days, and the fact that he was up and writing a letter at six o'clock on the following morning.

On leaving Paris on the 31st of October his little party was augmented by the two officers with whom he had conferred at the ambassador's, Sotomayor and Felices. They took the road through Metz, pausing at Joinville, where Don John had an interview with the young Duke of Guise,¹ cousin of the Queen of Scots, and chief of the Catholic party in France. On the 3d of November they alighted within the small fortress which then frowned over the romantic ravine, and which has been swallowed up by the vast modern stronghold of Luxemburg. In the absence of the governor, Count Mansfeldt, they were received by Monsieur de Naves, his lieutenant. While Don John of Austria washed the dark tinge from his face, combed his frizzled locks into their wonted arrangement, and assumed his usual attire, he had to listen to tidings little favourable to the hopes which had cheered his rapid and toilsome journey. Whatever advantages he had derived from his visit to Spain, he had much reason to regret that he had not made more haste to his post. Since the beginning of the troubles in the Netherlands the royal cause had never seemed in so hopeless a condition, nor the prospects of the rebellion so fair. So far as the realization of his own dream of delivering the beautiful Mary from her English prison and placing her by his side on the English throne depended on the subjugation of the Low Countries, it must have appeared doomed to indefinite postponement.

The few days which preceded and followed the arrival of

¹ Vandervynckt : *Histoire des Troubles des Pays-Bas, corrigé par J. Tarte*, 4 vols. 8vo, Bruxelles, 1822, ii. p. 384.

Don John at Luxemburg were the most eventful days of a year full of great events for the Netherlands. The latest information furnished to him in Spain, or even the still fresher news which he may have learned from Zuniga at Paris, could hardly have prepared him for the intelligence now brought by each succeeding courier. The day before he reached Luxemburg Antwerp had been lawlessly sacked by the Spanish soldiery, who had been for some months in open mutiny, and against whom even the Spanish authorities had thought it right to arm the inhabitants of the defenceless towns. Of the first commercial capital in the north a great part was a smoking ruin ; and several other towns had shared a similar fate. Negotiations had long been going on between the two Protestant States of Holland and Zeland, which had openly cast off the royal authority, and the other States in which the Catholic faith had still preserved a real or nominal obedience to the Crown. The Spanish Fury of Antwerp, as the massacre there was called, inspiring the whole country with rage and a thirst for vengeance, had given a conclusive impulse to the progress of these negotiations. The Pacification of Ghent, which was signed on the 8th of November, bound Catholic Brabant, Hainault, Flanders, Artois, Namur, and various important Catholic cities, to support Protestant Holland and Zeland in resistance to royal authority until the Spanish troops should be withdrawn, the States-General convoked, and the oppressive edicts of late administrations unconditionally rescinded by the Crown. To this treaty Province after Province declared its adhesion, until only two of them, Luxemburg and Limburg, remained aloof from the confederacy. The islands on the north-west, which had been reconquered from the rebellion under the government of Requesens, fell piecemeal into the hands of the patriots, and the gallant Mondragone, unsupported by his mutinous soldiery, was forced to surrender Zierick-Zee to the troops of Orange. These were the tidings which each post brought to the new Governor at Luxemburg.

Although Don John had received from the King general directions for his guidance in the Netherlands, the formal instructions under which he was to act were not ready at the time of his departure from Madrid. His patent "as Lieutenant, Governor, and Captain-General of the Low Countries and the county of Burgundy," had been issued on the 18th of September.¹ Various other papers, patents, and instructions, bearing

¹ Gachard : *Correspondance de Philippe II.*, iv. p. 346.

date 30th of October,¹ were sent after him by the hands of the Baron of Rassenghien, who had been despatched to the capital in September by the State Council to lay before the King the alarming condition of the Provinces. These documents, intended, all of them, to be seen by the Council of State, and some of them to be made public, showed every desire to conciliate, so far as conciliation could be brought about by words. In the French patent Don John was styled "*Messire* Jean d'Autriche," instead of *Don*, by way of adopting a style used in the Netherlands instead of the customary Spanish title.² The King's instructions bade him repair to the Provinces, which had for some years been in troubles and agitations "to our great regret," in order to procure, "by good, just, and reasonable means," "a true, stable, and "durable pacification therein." To this end he was to rule with his usual "love, gentleness, and benevolence," "according to the "ancient laws, rights, and customs, had and kept in the time of "His Imperial Majesty, now in glory," "putting an end to all "causes of offence arising out of the neglect of these, and giving "just and reasonable contentment to all." The Councils of State, both general and privy, of finances, the Assembly of Estates, administration of law, and exercise of privileges, were all to be placed on the old footing, and the council known as the Council of the Troubles was to be abolished. A general pardon—"the most ample which before God and our conscience can be "allowed"—is to be granted, with "the single exception of the "Prince of Orange, the inventor, author, and contriver of all the "evils that afflict the country." As to the disbanding of the troops, the King trusted to the Estates for assistance in money and credit, as far as in their power, towards making the necessary payments, it being his desire not to foment but wholly to extinguish the war. For this purpose Don John was directed to treat with the Estates of each Province separately, or to convoke the Estates-General, as might seem best, "always and before all "things maintaining the rights of the holy Roman Catholic faith "and of the Crown." Amongst some other instructions of minor importance he was ordered to assume, as his predecessors had usually done, in addition to the duties of Governor-General, the government of Brabant and Flanders in particular, and to place in their castles of Antwerp and Ghent such commanders as

¹ These papers, *Instructions, Lettres patentes, Declaration*, etc., have been printed by Gachard: *Correspondance de Philippe II.*, iv. pp. 453, 464.

² Gachard: *Correspondance*, iv. p. 453.

should to him seem most fitting for the royal service and the public peace.

A private letter dated 31st October,¹ one day later than the papers sent by Rassenghien, and written by the King to Don John, throws some curious light on the tortuous policy of Philip. Rassenghien, it seems, had been detained in hopes of accompanying Don John on his journey to Bruxelles, having been led to suppose that Don John was to return to Madrid from Old Castille. He was not undeceived until some days had elapsed. When Rassenghien arrives with the patents and instructions Don John is to take care not to let him know that these documents are merely formal; for although he is worthy of confidence, and the King considers him "one of the best conducted" of his Flemish subjects, it must never be forgotten that he is by birth a Fleming. In dealing with him, therefore, and the rest of the State Council, Don John is to make it appear that he has no private orders from the King, and no instructions beyond what are to be found in the despatches laid before the council. The general rule laid down in the rambling letter is that Don John is to make the best bargain possible with the Provinces, shaping his course according to circumstances, conceding as little, and saving as much, of the royal prerogative as he can. On one point the King is explicit enough. The withdrawal of the Spanish troops is of all questions the one of the highest importance, and if by yielding in this matter Don John sees his way to pacifying the country and bringing it once more under the royal authority, he may do so, preserving as far as possible the rights of religion and the Crown. But in that case the Estates are to be plainly told that if they are to have their own way they must pay for it, by finding the ready money needful for the troops, and taking upon them the whole liability of any arrear that may remain over—"a thing which they have always professed to be willing to do, in order to be relieved of the soldiery." This letter was sent by way of Paris through the hands of the ambassador Zuñiga, that it might not appear to come from the King. Zuñiga is also to receive, and forward to Philip, Don John's private letters; "be-cause," says the King, "I especially wish that, neither here nor there, it should be suspected that I write anything to you on the affairs of the Provinces, except through the channel of the ordinary ministers and officers."² Another private paper

¹ Gachard: *Correspondance de Philippe II.*, iv. pp. 468-72.

² *Ibid.* iv. p. 472.

in the King's own hand, and apparently given by him to Don John, contains instructions of a similar nature, with the characteristic advice that he should be "very careful of his soul," and "very wary in his love affairs."¹

The first steps taken by Don John were to announce his arrival by a message to the States-General at Bruxelles, and to issue orders to the Spanish troops in their various quarters to cease from all acts of hostility. He was well aware that, in the present posture of affairs, he would not be permitted to enter upon the exercise of his functions until he had agreed to certain conditions, and he was anxious to mark at the outset his desire to adopt a policy of conciliation. That he had not misjudged the tempers of the people was made plain to him a few days later, when he declared his intention of moving on to Namur, and entering that town with a guard of fifty horse. The Estates declined to permit this step to be taken, and forbade the burghers of Namur to render the customary oaths of fidelity until Don John should have complied with the demands of the Provinces. In order to lay these demands before him, a deputation of the Estates was sent to Luxemburg. Their first meeting was not satisfactory. Don John received the deputies with his accustomed courtesy. They, on the other hand, at first met his civilities with coldness and distrust, which, however, gradually thawed before the charm of his manners. One of the envoys, it has been said, though apparently with very insufficient authority, went so far as to propose that he should assume the sovereignty of the Provinces in his own name, and promised him that the Estates would adhere to him and support his government. This proposal, appearing to Don John an imputation upon his own loyalty, gave him great offence, and he is said to have evinced his indignation by drawing his dagger on the offender.²

After some preliminary meetings and discussions the proposals of the Estates were formally presented to Don John in writing on the 6th of December. These proposals had been drawn up, if not under the eye, at least under the inspiration of the Prince of Orange. The paper embodied eight demands, and

¹ Instrucción secreta que el Rey D. Felipe II. dió al Sr. D. J. de Austria, escribió la de mano propia. Bibl. de Bourgogne, MS., No xvii. 385. Quoted by Motley: *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, iii. P. v. ch. i. p. 78.

² Mr. Motley relates the story (iii. 82-3), though he admits that the variations with which it has been told must throw considerable doubt upon it in any shape. He mentions the discrepancies in a note, to which may be added the fact that Vanderhammen (f. 299), in mentioning the occurrence, makes it appear that it took place not at Luxemburg, but several months later at Louvain.

ten offers, conditional on the demands being granted. The principal demands were—the immediate departure of the Spanish troops for ever ; the immediate release of all prisoners ; the acceptance of the principles of the Ghent Treaty, which was affirmed to contain nothing which does not tend to the furtherance of the Catholic religion ; an act of amnesty for the past ; the convocation of the States-General on the basis of that which received the abdication of Charles V. ; and an oath by Don John to maintain all the charters and customs of the country. These demands acceded to, the Estates would acknowledge him as Governor, maintain the royal authority and the Catholic religion, renounce foreign alliances, disband their foreign soldiery, and provide a guard of honour of native Netherlanders.

To this paper Don John replied very briefly. While he was willing to dismiss his troops he would not engage not to recall them if the public service required it ; and their dismissal was to be contingent on the disbanding of the soldiery in the pay of the States. Of the Ghent Treaty he said merely that he was ready to enter upon negotiations for a pacification. On the act of amnesty he must consult his State Council. He was glad that the Estates were in favour of the royal authority and the Catholic religion, which he had come at the peril of his life to defend. As to a bodyguard, he was about to move to Marché-en-Famine, and he would use for that purpose what troops he had at hand. With regard to the privileges of the Provinces, he would govern as his Imperial father had governed.

This reply produced a rejoinder, and the rejoinder further discussion. The result of the discussion tended rather to increased bitterness and distrust than to conciliation and compromise. Each party grew more and more suspicious of the other, and Don John demanded hostages for his personal safety. The demand was not wholly unjustifiable, seeing that the Prince of Orange had advised the seizure of the person of the Governor as the best step towards a definite arrangement with the King.

Orange had never been so powerful as at the present moment. The outrages committed by the Spaniards at Antwerp, Alost, and other towns, were still fresh in men's minds and the evidence of them before their eyes. These illustrated his warnings neglected in the past, and gave weight to his advice for the future ; and all his power and influence were steadily directed to the object of sowing jealousy and distrust between the new Governor and those whom he came to govern. The two parties in the game sat

watching each other, making promises which each knew the other must consider worthless, and exchanging fictions by which neither was deceived. It must have been obvious to the patriot party that their assertion that the Ghent Treaty furthered the Catholic religion could never make Don John accept a document which established heresy in ten Provinces, and tolerated it in all. It must have been likewise plain to the advisers of Don John, if not to himself, that his promise to observe the privileges and charters of the States and towns as the Emperor had observed them, was merely one form of stating his intention to violate them whenever he had the power and the desire so to do.

In one respect Don John had the advantage of his great antagonist. The royal cause, which he had come to maintain, was at so low an ebb that delay could hardly injure its prospects. The first point in dispute was the removal of the Spanish troops. They were, it was true, mutinous for pay, and demoralized by long insubordination; but their presence was a scourge to Provinces which deserved scourging. Don John could therefore afford to wait. Orange and his party could not. The Spaniards were eating up the country, partly by their own exactions, partly by the expense of the mercenaries paid to keep them in check. The next step, therefore, of the Prince and his friends was one of which it is difficult in these days to see the wisdom, but which was perhaps necessary to salve the consciences of some of the less steadfast Catholic patriots. In the course of December a formal opinion was obtained from eleven theologians of Louvain that the Ghent Treaty contained nothing hostile to the supremacy of the Catholic faith. Most of the Bishops and important churchmen of the Netherlands adhered to this extraordinary opinion, which ere long bore good fruits for the popular cause.

The Treaty of Ghent had been an agreement between Orange and the two Protestant Provinces on the one hand, and the representatives of various Catholic Provinces and cities on the other. Although warmly approved by a great majority of the nation, it had been signed by only eight commissioners. It was now embodied in a new form under the name of the Union of Bruxelles. The new document assumed for its main objects the expulsion of the Spaniards, the execution of the Ghent Treaty, and those incompatible ends, the royal authority, Catholic supremacy, and the constitutional rights of the Provinces. By the authority of the States it was circulated in all parts of the country, and in all, except in Luxemburg, it received the signature of nearly

every man to whose name birth, wealth, dignity, or station, lent any weight.

During his residence at Luxemburg Don John was visited by his mother, now the widow Kegel, whose establishment at Ghent had given so much trouble to the Duke of Alba. It was the first and last time that Barbara Blomberg saw her son since his babyhood. No record has been discovered of the feelings with which they met, or what passed between them. The glimpses which State Papers have afforded us of her wanton widowhood do not render her a very pleasing historical character. Her visit may not improbably have been connected with her subsequent removal to Spain, which had been frequently proposed by the King, and by herself always strenuously resisted. It was natural that Don John should be desirous of her departure. Having been in the habit of making her a liberal allowance, in addition to the royal pension of three thousand ducats which she regularly exceeded, he may have further bribed her into acquiescence with the King's wish. She, on her part, does not appear to have been altogether satisfied with his conduct, as she was afterwards in the habit of saying that it was a mistake to call him the son of the Emperor, an assertion which she must have well known must have been likely to touch him to the quick, and which was eagerly caught up by the wits who galled his government with their light artillery of satire.¹ She soon after quitted her home at Ghent and embarked in a royal squadron for Biscay, leaving behind her a second son by Kegel, who, sharing his mother's fondness for thwarting Philip II., was a persevering poacher in the royal parks, and married a Flemish lady of distinction, instead of entering holy orders as suggested by the King.

At the beginning of 1577 Don John moved from Luxemburg to Huy, a fortified town belonging to the Bishop of Liege, on the banks of the Meuse. Here the negotiation with the States was resumed, if indeed it had ever been entirely interrupted. Envoys arrived from Bruxelles armed with fresh instructions and new demands. The success of the Union had made the popular party feel its strength, and its representatives were determined to use it. Amongst these representatives was Champagny, the brother of Cardinal Granvelle, who had lately done good service in marshalling the burghers of Antwerp and heading their resistance to the Spanish Fury. He and his colleagues now thought

¹ Motley : *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, iii. 66-7 ; especially note in p. 67, in which is cited a long list of authorities.

fit to hold even bolder language than that which had been used by their predecessors at Luxemburg. Strong in the sympathy and support of the nation, they spoke its sentiments without disguise, and denounced the Spanish troops and the Spanish Government with a plainness and energy to which neither the Castillian nor the Italian experience of Don John could furnish a parallel. He complained of their tone at the outset, and said that "the Netherlanders appeared to be new-born, that instead of "bending the knee they were inclined to grasp the sceptre."

The progress of the negotiations was retarded not only by the play of fence, inseparable from such transactions, but by unseemly altercations of a personal character. These altercations were the more unseemly and the more damaging to the position and influence of the new Governor, that his interviews with the commissioners were conducted with more form and state than they had been at Luxemburg. Not only had the members of the State Council come from Bruxelles to attend them, but there were also present the Bishop of Liege and representatives from the Emperor and the Duke of Cleves.

There was one point, at first sight apparently trivial, but nevertheless of vital importance to the plans and prospects of Don John himself, in which the envoys had altered their demands as stated at Luxemburg. There the withdrawal of the Spanish troops had been insisted on as a necessary step towards any accommodation with the King's representative; but no stipulation had been made as to the mode of their withdrawal. They might be removed, as they had come, by land, or they might be removed by sea. From the first moment when Don John had signified his consent to their departure, he had also expressed his intention of embarking them in the vessels which remained of the squadron of Medina-Celi, and in such others as he could collect in the seaports of the Netherlands. His consent to their departure had doubtless been obtained with the less difficulty, because, his plan being to employ them in a descent on England, their apparent embarkation for Spain would cloak and favour that design. To march them through Lorraine and Savoy to the Milanese would be to deprive himself for an indefinite period of the means of striking a blow for the Crown which was the dream of his life.

At Luxemburg the envoys of the States had made no objection to the removal of the troops by sea. So that they were released from the presence of the Spanish soldiery, they were indifferent as to the means by which that relief was effected.

But at Huy they declared that their opinion was altered, and insisted that the Spaniards should depart by land. The frequent communications between Don John and the Spanish commanders had aroused their suspicions of some mysterious design being in contemplation. The policy of Orange and his party naturally led them to thwart every scheme that was likely to aggrandize their Spanish Governor or their Spanish King. Whether the Estates suspected the real destination for which the troops were secretly intended, or whether they were animated by a vague and general fear of some new treachery, may be doubtful. The reason which they alleged for resisting a mode of departure to which they had so recently consented was that the difficulty of providing a sufficient number of vessels might entail the necessity of postponing the voyage until spring, and so put the wasted country to heavy additional charges for the maintenance of its hated guests.

After some days of bitter and angry discussion, the commissioners endeavoured to bring matters to a close by submitting to Don John two very simple questions—Would he give his approval to the Ghent Treaty? and would he dismiss his Spanish troops at once and by land? The answer to these questions was given by Don John, on the 24th of January, in writing. For length and diffuseness the paper might have been drawn up by the King himself. It consisted of twenty-seven clauses. It was in effect an amplification of the reply which he had already given at Luxemburg. Dismissal of the foreign troops, pacification, amnesty, the release of prisoners, and government on the principles of Charles V., were once more promised. The King would be consulted as to the assembling of the States-General. On the other hand, the Governor required the Estates to pay the arrears due to the troops and to provide vessels to convey them to Spain, their removal by sea having been already agreed on at Luxemburg. The Estates were to dismiss their own troops, and to show, on sound ecclesiastical and legal authority, that the Ghent Treaty contained nothing at variance with the interests of the Catholic religion or the royal supremacy, and to provide for the maintenance of that religion and supremacy in Holland and Zeland. The States were further to engage that the Prince of Orange should take no measures to remove, secretly or by force, his son, the Count of Buren, from his residence in Spain; and the Governor claimed for himself the right of surrounding his own person with guards and civil servants of whatever nation he might prefer to employ.

In the points in which this reply differed from the reply made

by Don John at Luxemburg, it was less satisfactory. It was even less satisfactory in tone. It was addressed to men not more but less disposed to bear evasion with patience, or meet haughtiness with meekness. The commissioners were highly exasperated by the Governor's twenty-seven elaborate answers to their two simple questions. They spent the whole night in composing a copious and damaging rejoinder. In the morning they waited on Don John with this document, and in presenting it inquired whether he intended to give his adhesion to the Ghent Treaty or not. Thus pressed, the Governor's command of diplomatic truisms forsook him, and he answered somewhat bluntly that he did not. A Treaty which called the soldiers of his sovereign rebels, and which stipulated for things such as the release of Count Buren, which he had no power to grant, could not be accepted as binding by the representative of the King of Spain. A discussion thereupon ensued which became very violent and lasted very long. The meeting did not break up till nightfall. At ten o'clock at night the commissioners again demanded an audience of Don John, and upon being admitted they handed him a protest in which they disclaimed all responsibility for the close of the negotiations and the bloodshed and other consequences which might follow the rupture. This document was too much for the temper of Don John, tried severely as it had been during the day. He swore that the commissioners were rebels and traitors, and that what they called a rupture had been by them premeditated and preordained. He was weary of their ways, and the King would visit them with merited chastisement. In the King's name he was ready to draw the sword, and if he did so they might depend upon the war which they were kindling being the fiercest which had ever raged in their country. The commissioners became as angry as the Governor, and retorted with equal vigour. One of them replied in words so exasperating that Don John seized a heavy silver bell and was about to hurl it at him when the Imperial envoys interfered and brought the unseemly spectacle to a close.

Don John was soon sensible that he had gone too far, and that, in the present state of popular feeling, conciliation was absolutely necessary. The commissioners had already retired to rest, when they were aroused by a Father Trigoso, a Jesuit much in the Governor's confidence,¹ and now the bearer of a note from

¹ Dr. Wylson, the English envoy, in his despatch to Lord Burghley, January 14 (State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577; No. 28), says: "Pater Tregosa, chief of the Jesuit

him. They rose and were soon joined by some of the State Councillors and the Bishop of Liege. The note was read, but without producing any very satisfactory impression. It announced Don John's agreement to the Ghent Treaty, assuming that it contained nothing detrimental to the supremacy of the King and the Catholic faith, and reserving the points touched upon in his last paper.

The commissioners went back to bed, and on the morrow were about to mount their horses and return to Bruxelles, when a second billet was sent them by Don John. He now agreed to accept the Treaty of Ghent, on condition of receiving from the heads of the Church and the doctors of Louvain an assurance that it was in no way prejudicial to the authority of His Majesty or religion. These assurances, whatever they were worth, had already been obtained by the Estates, and Don John himself had no doubt been furnished with copies. He had, in fact, at last yielded to the chief demands of the commissioners. They accordingly waited upon him, were courteously received, and the storm of the previous day seemed to be forgotten. Returning to the questions before them, they once more urged the immediate departure of the troops by land. To this proposal the Governor refused his consent, and complained that a new demand was made just as he had conceded the principal point at issue, a point of great importance, and had made the concession on his sole responsibility and without reference to the King. The deputies did not further press him, but taking a friendly leave returned to Bruxelles.

It would be tedious and unprofitable to follow through their various windings the negotiations, chiefly conducted in writing, of the next fortnight. On all important matters Don John was compelled to yield a most reluctant submission to the will of the Provinces he had come to govern, which, being more nearly united in their desires and demands than at any previous or subsequent period in their history, were at this juncture irresistible. He was obliged to content himself with what saving of his dignity was to be found in certain vague reservations in favour of royal and ecclesiastical authority, which the King might cite as pretexts—whereof his quiver was ever full—for violating, when he found himself strong enough, the inconvenient portions of the bargain.

“Spaniards in Antwerp, is now with Don John and directeth him more than any other.” Nicolaus Trigaultius, a famous Belgian Jesuit and missionary to China is recorded in the *Bibliotheca Scriptorum Soc. Jesu*, Antwerpiæ, 1643, fol., p. 357, as having left the Netherlands for the East in 1610, and died in 1628.

Don John had been sent to pacify the Netherlands, and he could neither accept the responsibility nor did he possess the means of recommencing a war under circumstances most unfavourable to the royal cause. The Spanish Fury, which had so lately laid waste so many fair cities, had greatly increased the power of the Prince of Orange both at home and abroad. It was notorious to the world that the servants of the King of Spain had been obliged to treat his Spanish soldiery as banditti, and this knowledge could not but have its weight in favour of the suffering Netherlands, both in the cabinet of the cautious Elizabeth and in the councils of the Huguenots of France. The Princes who were sincere well-wishers to Spanish interests directed their agents both at Madrid and at Bruxelles to urge on Philip and his representatives the necessity of putting an end to so scandalous and so dangerous a condition of affairs. A lawless freebooting army, containing some of the best soldiers in the world, fresh from some of the most daring achievements in modern warfare, was not likely to respect natural or artificial frontiers, or to treat the rich towns on one side of an imaginary line more tenderly than those on the other. Foremost amongst the foreign envoys who pressed the necessity of peace and order upon the consideration of Don John were those of his kinsman and early friend and companion the young Emperor Rudolph. Maximilian II., having lately paid the penalty of his love of good cheer, had carried to the grave, in the month of October 1576, all that the House of Austria had ever possessed of sympathy with religious toleration. His son, Rudolph II., nurtured in Spain amongst Inquisitors and *autos-da-fé*, was a Prince of the true Austrian stamp, and hated a heretic with true Spanish hate. But he had not yet begun to persecute on his own account, and his envoys, still following the policy of their late master, implored Don John not to prolong a controversy in which he and a few placemen, actual or expectant, were on one side, and a whole people, Catholic as well as Protestant, were on the other.

The English Queen, whose dominions were tolerably safe from the maraudings of Spanish mutineers, was too wary not to take a deep interest in the question of the mode of their removal. If she had not herself been nervously alive to the dangers which might follow any approach of a Catholic army towards the prison of a captive Catholic Queen, the Prince of Orange would not have failed to suggest them to her mind. Her envoy in the Netherlands, Mr. Rogers, was instructed plainly to express her uneasiness at the departure of the troops by sea, and her suspicions that

England and not Spain might in that case be their destination. Don John, affecting to laugh at the scheme which was the cherished project of his heart, assured him that whatever their road their destination must be the Levant ; begged for Her Majesty's portrait ; and expressed his intention of going to England privately, as soon as affairs would allow, for the pleasure of kissing her hand.¹ These compliments were repaid with interest. Don John received assurances of Elizabeth's most cordial friendship, and he was told that she not only had refused aid to the Estates, but would aid the King of Spain against them if the French King took any part in the quarrel. But he was also given to understand that the continuance of these friendly intentions depended wholly on the troops being removed from the Provinces by land and not by sea.²

The document in which the agreement between the Governor and the Provinces was embodied was called the Perpetual Edict. It consisted of a long preamble and eighteen articles and a final attesting clause. Of these articles the most important were those which provided for complete oblivion of past offences ; for the confirmation by the King of the Ghent Treaty, seeing that it had been pronounced by high authority to contain nothing prejudicial, but, on the contrary, to be rather advantageous to the Catholic faith and royal rights ; for the departure, within forty days, and by land, of the foreign troops, never to be recalled except in case of foreign war ; for reasonable compensation for any damage done by these troops within the Provinces, or within neighbouring territories ; for the immediate release of all prisoners, except the Count of Buren, whose case was to be dealt with as the States-General should determine ; for the maintenance of the privileges, usages, and customs of the Netherlands, without any neutralising reference to the policy of Charles V. ; for the employment of native Netherlanders in the administration ; and for an oath to observe this Edict to be taken by Don John and all succeeding Governors. The Provinces, on the other hand, engaged to disband their troops, to pay six hundred thousand livres towards the expense of removing the retiring royal forces, and to discharge the arrears of pay due to the Germans ; to take an oath to maintain the Catholic religion ; and to receive and acknowledge Don

¹ *Cartas del S. Don Juan*, MS. quoted by Motley, iii. 113, note. On the passage of the despatch in which Don John announced these complimentary speeches to the King, Philip made this marginal note, "Mucho decir fue esto," "This was saying a good deal."

² Motley, iii. 113, quoting letters of Don John, January 1577.

John of Austria as Governor and Captain-General of the Low Countries.¹

The Perpetual Edict may be regarded as a second edition of the Treaty of Ghent, the King becoming really, as he had formerly been only nominally, a party to it. By its terms that Treaty was "approved and ratified" without exception of any of its clauses, and became, therefore, a part of the Edict. The only real concession made by the Estates was that they engaged to furnish a portion of the funds necessary for paying the troops. They also refrained from recapitulating in the Edict those of the clauses of the Treaty which seemed most wounding to royal susceptibility, such as those which denounced the King's troops as robbers who must be driven from the country, which confirmed Orange by name in all his offices under the Crown, and which decreed the destruction of all the monuments erected by the Duke of Alba in honour of the success of the royal arms. But, though not recapitulated, these clauses were nevertheless "ratified and approved" by the words which ratified and approved the entire Treaty. "Some of the conditions of this peace," wrote Don John to Garcia de Toledo, 21st February 1577, "must appear hard, and to me they seem very hard; but to save religion and obedience, when this and States themselves were lost, it has been necessary to bear with them, making account of everything as if happening by chance. For the rest we must trust to time, that which God has given us being not a little."²

This important paper was signed on behalf of the Governor on the 12th of February at Marché-en-Famine, whither he had moved from Huy. It was published the 17th of the same month at Bruxelles, and on the 7th of April it received the royal sanction at Madrid, the King addressing to each of the adhering Provincial Estates a letter, thanking them for their dutiful devotion to his service.³

The Perpetual Edict did much to remove the distrust with which Don John had been regarded, and which could not fail to

¹ The document is printed at length in the *Comentarios* de Don Bernardino de Mendoza, Madrid, 1592, 4to, pp. 328-334.

² In his own hand:—"Algunas condiciones desta paz han de parecer duras y á mi parecen durisimas: pero por salvar religion y la obediencia quando esta y los estados estaban perdidos, fuerza ha sido pasar de presente por ellos, haciendo cuenta de todo como hallado acaso. Lo demas irá el tiempo dando cada dia, que agora no es poco lo que nos ha dado por gracia de Dios." D. John to D. Garcia de Toledo; *De Marcha*, 21st February 1577. *Doc. Ined.*, iii. pp. 181-2.

³ *Sommier discours des justes causes et raisons qu'ont constrainct les Estats Generaux des Pays-Bas de pourveoir à leur deffence contre le Seigneur Don Jehan d'Austrice.* Anvers, 1577, 4to, p. 22.

attach to the representative of the Spanish King. The reaction in favour of the defeated party, which usually follows a political triumph, now began to make itself felt. The tide of popular opinion turned somewhat in favour of the young and baffled Viceroy. It was obvious that conditions had been imposed upon him which must in themselves have been highly distasteful to a royal personage in his position, and to which he had very warmly expressed his repugnance, and which might possibly not improve his interests at Madrid. It also seemed that, having accepted these conditions, he was determined to fulfil them to the letter in all loyalty and good faith. He was therefore very well received, first at Namur and then at Louvain, which, for its central position, he selected as his residence until he should take up his abode in the capital. Still unrecognized as Governor, he came to Louvain with but few followers or guards, trusting to assurances from the leading citizens and students of the university that nothing should be attempted against his personal safety.¹ In compliance with a petition from the Estates he soon dismissed the Spanish soldiers whom he had taken at Luxemburg for his guard, and accepted in their stead a company of eighty Flemish musketeers, of whom he made the Duke of Aerschot captain.

The business of removing the foreign troops was one of no little delicacy and difficulty. There was the usual difficulty in raising the necessary funds. The heavy demands which war expenses had made upon the people, the wasted condition of the towns and Provinces where the locust-legions of Spain were most thickly settled, and the depression of trade and commerce, rendered the process of raising the sum promised by the Estates extremely slow. The six hundred thousand livres for which the Edict bound them were to be paid in two instalments—half down and half in bills payable at Genoa—within two months after the troops had begun their march. The hated soldiery was ready to move ere the first moiety was forthcoming. The sum was completed only by the aid of a considerable loan advanced by Don John of Austria himself,²—no mean proof of his good-will and good faith. Secretary Escovedo, who had lately followed his master to the Netherlands, was unwearied in his exertions to enable the ever bare exchequer of His Majesty to meet the unusual demands upon it. In that faithful servant's despatches

¹ Motley, iii. 100.

² Strada (ix. p. 640) says two hundred thousand florins; Motley (on the authority of Bor, x. 806, 807), iii. p. 105, says twenty-seven thousand florins. One is perhaps too high and the other too low.

the richest monarch in the world was constantly warned of the low ebb of his credit on the Exchange at Antwerp. Escovedo's personal obligation was required by the merchants before they would advance even a small sum to the King, who was accordingly gravely admonished by Escovedo himself to sustain his credit by prompt payment, lest that slender source should be dried up. "I have been unable to borrow a real, nor will any "man here trust your Majesty, without holding some security;" "People have lost all liking to deal with your Majesty, and in "truth they are not wrong;"¹ are passages which may be taken as fair specimens of much of the matter contained in the despatches of the plain-spoken secretary.

The temper of the retiring army was none of the best, and required caution and management. Most of the soldiers had now been long in the country, and had become attached, if not to the soil and people, at least to the opportunities of war and pillage which so constantly occurred, and which were not to be expected in the perfectly enslaved Provinces of Italy. Some of them had married and acquired property, and wished to make their home in the Netherlands.² All were extremely indignant at the manner in which they were to be hurried out of the country to please the very rebels whom they had been sent to subdue. The atrocities in which they had been lately indulging on their own account had been warmly approved by some of the State Council and other royalists, and they were certainly in no respect worse than those which they had been in the habit of perpetrating under the standards of Alba and Requesens. In the ill-paid orthodox ranks of the Spanish army, mutiny, or in other words a violent method of claiming a man's due, was far too common for the mutineer ever to feel that the crime was very heinous, or that it could, under any possible circumstances, place him on a level with a rebel or a heretic. When Don John came to the country, he had issued an order to the royal troops to cease from all active hostilities. This order they had generally obeyed. No such order, however, had been given, and no such forbearance observed, on the other side. Sieges had been pushed on, and fortresses captured in the name of Orange and the Estates, since the operations of the royal troops had been suspended. The sense of injustice which prevailed among the Spaniards was well illustrated by the conduct of Francisco Hernandez, who was defending himself in the castle of

¹ J. Escovedo to the King; Antwerp, 27th March 1577. *Discours Sommier*, 1577. —*Lettres*, leaves A and A 2.

² Strada: *De Bello Belgico*, lib. ix. 637.

Utrecht when the Perpetual Edict was signed. The defences were in a very dilapidated state, the mines of the besieger were far advanced, and the place could not be much longer maintained, when an order arrived from Don John, directing the Governor to give it up to the Count of Bossu. Bossu demanded a surrender, but Hernandez refused to consider the matter in any light but that of a resignation of a command. The Netherlander, trusting to his superior strength, insisted; but the Spaniard would not yield. "If I were so base," he said, "as to consent, my soldiers would not obey me; we have hitherto held the place for the King, and we will now hold it for the sake of our own honour." The end was that the troops marched out, with arms, baggage, and artillery, and retired unmolested to Antwerp.

In spite of all the exertions of Don John to procure the departure of the Spaniards; in spite of his repeated orders in writing and of his entreaties addressed personally to their officers; the country continued to doubt whether they would be induced to go, and apprehensions were entertained that their going would be accompanied by some sudden attack upon the army of the Estates now encamped near Lyre.¹

A troublesome question arose as to the command of the army on its march. Don John wished to appoint Don Alonso de Vargas, the commander of the cavalry; but Valdes, Romero, Avila, and other veteran leaders, refused to serve under him, alleging that they were of superior rank. To avoid this difficulty, Don John named Peter Ernest, Count of Mansfeldt, to the post; but the appointment of a foreigner, instead of exasperating a few officers, displeased the whole army. Very insolent and violent language was held by many of these officers, especially by the disappointed Vargas, to the Governor himself. Escovedo was forced to employ all his address with his friends at the headquarters at Antwerp to obtain the peaceable evacuation of that important place. Sancho de Avila, the governor of that citadel, would not remain to hand over his charge to the Duke of Aerschot, who, as chief of the Catholic nobles, was appointed to succeed him in the name of the King and Estates. That duty was delegated by the proud Spanish veteran to his second in command. The oath was administered to Aerschot on the drawbridge of the castle, by Escovedo, who evinced Spanish contempt for the

¹ Letter of March 25, without signature or address, in State Paper Office; Flanders, 1577. No. 29.

trimming politician by adding, after the Duke had sworn: "God with his angels help you if you keep your oath; if not, may the devil carry you away body and soul!"

Early in April, after many delays and repeated warnings from Don John, the troops had evacuated all the places which they had seized, and were concentrated at Maestricht, so that men began to believe in their departure. Even now, however, difficulties arose about funds to meet the instalment of pay due to the cavalry, and about a quantity of French coin which had been refused by the infantry as being counterfeit. To arrange these matters Escovedo was sent in all haste from Antwerp.¹ At length, towards the end of April, the Spaniards began their southward march. Including the women, children, and followers, the number of the army was near thirty thousand souls. The joy of the inhabitants at their departure was unbounded, and displayed itself in every town through which they passed. The soldiers were still further mortified by being compelled to march without having been reviewed by Don John, an omission which appeared to them as a slight to their services. On the march, about fifteen hundred of them deserted, and enlisted under the banner of the King of France;² the rest proceeded through Lorraine, Burgundy, and Savoy, to the Milanese, where many of them perished by disease in the unhealthy quarters assigned to them amongst the Ligurian hills.

In spite of the ill-temper of the Spanish commanders, Don John of Austria had promised to endeavour to obtain for them adequate rewards on their arrival in Lombardy, and in his despatches to the King he amply fulfilled his promise. Strongly urging upon the consideration of the King the length and brilliancy of their services, the perils and hardships which they had undergone, and their entire devotion to the cause of their Prince and religion, he begged that their claims might not be forgotten or postponed on account of the insubordination to which they had been driven by privation and disappointment. He evidently sympathized with their feelings, and regarded them as loyal servants dismissed and disavowed when they had served the Crown faithfully, the victims of hard political necessity. "Your Highness may send us away now," cried Sancho de Avila, "but you will very soon have to call us back;"³ and Don John being

¹ Despatch of Dr. Wylson to Sir F. Walsingham, April 5. State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 29.

² Vanderhammen: *D. J. de Austria*, f. 299.

³ Bentivoglio.

of the same opinion, desired to make the parting pleasant and the return easy. Of Vargas, who had been especially loud and insolent in his language, he wrote to the King that his complaints had so nearly taken the form of mutiny that it is possible they might reach His Majesty's ears, and that he therefore mentioned the fact that the King might understand what had happened, though he himself could not feel surprised at that officer's impatience, and greatly regretted his having given occasion for it. "It may be," he proceeds, "that in the heat of his passion he may write to your Majesty with the freedom which he has used towards me. I therefore entreat your Majesty not only to take no notice of it, but to show him the favour and give him the reward which he deserves, which I will take as a boon bestowed on myself; and I will also take it kind that your Majesty will let him know that I have spoken in his behalf, and not in vain, that he may change the ill opinion which he has conceived of me."¹

Since Don John had been in the Netherlands he had been in frequent communication with the Queen of England; and he had taken great pains to obtain her confidence by ingratiating himself with Dr. Wylson, her shrewd envoy at Bruxelles. To the letter in which the new Viceroy announced his arrival in the Low Countries, Elizabeth sent, by Mr. De Horsey, Governor of the Isle of Wight, a gracious reply, wherein she expressed her desire to aid him in assuaging the disasters and troubles of the Provinces.² Some English merchantmen having been seized by the Spanish Government in the Scheldt, the claim of their owners for restitution of the vessels was one of the first affairs upon which Dr. Wylson had occasion to apply to Don John; and the Governor evinced in his correspondence on the subject a sincere wish for the amicable settlement of the question, and professed a most earnest desire for the extension of commerce with England, and for the continuance of a good understanding between the English and Spanish Crowns.³

But besides such matters of daily occurrence, and even besides the more important subject of the mode of departure of the Spanish troops, there was a point upon which differences could hardly fail to arise between the Belgian Viceroy and the English

¹ Don John of Austria to the King, 7th April 1577. *Sommier Discours*, 1577, Second Sig., C 3.

² Despatch from Don John of Austria to Queen Elizabeth, January 2. State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 28.

³ Despatches of Don John of Austria to G. de Roda, 7th December, and to Dr. Wylson, 15th December 1576. State Paper Office, Flanders, 1576. No. 27.

Queen. Many English Roman Catholics, exiles for political reasons, had taken refuge in Brabant, where all of them enjoyed the protection of the Government, and some of them subsisted on pensions from the King of Spain. The Countess of Northumberland was residing at Liege. She was, it was alleged, in frequent communication with Don John; and she was supposed to be the channel through whom the prayers and complaints of the captive Queen of Scots reached his willing ears. Other exiles of inferior rank were constantly about the person of Don John, and amongst them was Hamilton of Bothwellhaugh, the assassin of Moray, the Regent of Scotland, and his younger brother James, who had lately escaped out of prison at Bruxelles.¹ These Hamiltons had been strongly recommended to Don John, it was admitted by Escovedo, by Queen Mary herself, who had pensioned, or promised to pension, the murderer of her brother.² In behalf of another exile, one Stanton, who had also been lodged in prison in the Netherlands, Queen Mary had written to Don John's mother, Madame Blomberg, and by her means the prisoner "was presently discharged." Of the presence of such guests at the Governor's Court, Dr. Wylson was constantly complaining; and he at last presented a list of their names to the Duke of Aerschot, praying him, as he wrote to the Queen, "to deal with Don John," concerning these "rebels and fugitives, that they might not be cherished as they are, being always about his person as though they were of counsel with him, but rather that they should be executed as they have deserved, or else delivered to me to be sent into England."³

To these complaints Don John replied on the 7th of March in an elaborate despatch to the Queen, which opened with thanks for her congratulations on the settlement of the terms of pacification between Philip II. and his Flemish subjects, and with an expression of Don John's hope that he should soon be able to restore the Netherlands to their ancient prosperity. His desire, he said, was also to be on the most friendly terms with the neighbouring States and their sovereigns, not merely as preceding Governors had been, but as a Prince of the blood, and especially with the Queen, on account of the relationship existing between

¹ "Hamilton of Bothwellhaugh, who killed the Regent Murray, had been employed to assassinate him (the Prince of Orange) in 1573, and party after party of English Catholic officers had tried it since."—Froude: *Hist.* xi. 561.

² Marie to Archbishop of Glasgow, 20th August 1571. Labanoff, iii. p. 334.

³ Despatch of Dr. Wylson to Queen Elizabeth, February 25. State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 29.

Her Majesty and the King, his lord and brother. He could not therefore but feel hurt by the charge made against him in her last letter, of having cherished and favoured her rebel subjects, which was directly contrary to the truth. For when some of these persons came to him at Marché he ordered them to withdraw to some other retreat, which they accordingly did on the morrow. Her Majesty must remember that being himself of the Roman Catholic faith, and his duty being to maintain and defend



it, he could not but have some interest in these persons; but he had no concern in any of their proceedings tending to the disservice of Her Majesty. He trusted therefore that the Queen would lend no ear to those who wished to sow enmity between them, but rather discountenance and chastise them, there being no one more earnest than himself to maintain concord between the Houses of Burgundy and England.¹

These professions, however, by no means calmed the apprehensions or lulled the vigilance of Dr. Wylson, who, three days later, on the 10th of March, wrote thus to Lord Burghley:—
“Don John useth much courtesy and familiarity to all that come

¹ Despatch from Don John of Austria to Queen Elizabeth, March 7. State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 29.

"unto him, as he winneth credit greatly amongst those that are of least understanding. And to me he showeth himself so well disposed, with such dolce and good words, with many such earnest and so vehement offers of his faith and service to our sovereign, as I doubt him more than others trust him; for I see his deeds contrary to his words, using concert in secrecy with Her Majesty's rebels, and especially with Stewkley, Sir Francis Englefield, the Countess's¹ servant, and others, [and] that he being a vowed Catholic and very ambitious of great things, cannot bear such a faithful good-will to our sovereign as he pretendeth.² . . . He hath secretly charged all rebels and fugitives to absent themselves, but yet he giveth order for their pensions. I was earnest enough with him, but I could not anger him. He telleth me they are all banished, and he will make none account of any that is not faithful to the Queen's Majesty, whom he professeth to honour in such a faithful manner as before God I do not believe him."³

While preparing and superintending the withdrawal of the Spanish troops, Don John of Austria was also engaged in very anxious direct negotiations with the Prince of Orange. His reluctant and tardy assent to the Perpetual Edict with its humiliating provisions had deprived him of the mutinous and discontented army with which he had hoped to win for himself the hand of the Scottish Mary and the throne of the English Elizabeth. But it had also thwarted the plans and checked the policy of his formidable rival. Orange had been the prime mover both in the Ghent Treaty and in the first steps of the proceedings by which it was sought to force that Treaty upon the distrusted representative of the King. He saw that a pacification resting on a compromise between Spanish despotism and the liberties of the Low Countries would form a hollow and temporary truce. Had he conceived the possibility of Don John accepting the Ghent Treaty, that Treaty would have been framed in a spirit

¹ Countess of Northumberland.

² "There was a party among the Belgian Catholics who were loudly hostile to the connexion with Queen Elizabeth. It was observed, too, that the refugees who had been expelled by Requesens were coming back in numbers, and were well received. Sir T. Stukeley, who had come from Spain, the Earl of Westmoreland, Sir F. Englefield, and several more 'were cherished about the person of Don John as though they were of council with him.'" Wylson to Elizabeth, Feb. 25, 1577. MSS. Flanders, Record Office. "Dr. Wylson, Elizabeth's Minister with the States, remonstrated, but no attention was paid to him." Froude: *Hist. of England*, vol. xi. p. 85 (1870).

³ Despatch of Dr. Wylson to Lord Burghley, March 10. State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 29.

still more offensive to the feelings of the royalist party, and it would have contained conditions that could not, under any gloss of words, have been admitted on the part of the King. Don John, however, had accepted it, to the great joy of the nobles and of the Catholic Provinces ; and Orange now found himself under the necessity of repudiating his own handiwork, or of betraying to the world the fatal flaw in that great popular party which he had lately had the triumph of forming. From the moment when Don John and his advisers on one side of the conference-table showed symptoms of yielding, the deputies of Holland and Zeland on the other, acting under the orders of Orange, evinced a desire to break off the negotiation. These deputies at last declined to sign the Perpetual Edict, and Orange refused to permit its publication in Holland and Zeland. The reasons of his refusal he embodied in an elaborate paper. The most important of them were—that the Estates had ratified the Edict, not indeed without asking for his advice, but before it was possible that they could receive it ; that sufficient guarantees for the free exercise of the reformed religion in Holland and Zeland had not been obtained ; that the great fortresses, instead of being razed to the ground as he had always desired, were to be garrisoned by the King and Estates, and were likely ultimately and ere long to fall into the absolute power of the King ; and that it was unjust that not only should the Spanish soldiery be permitted to depart with all their plunder, but that the Provinces should be compelled to provide funds to pay the men who had so long despoiled and oppressed them.

To these objections it might fairly be replied that as the Ghent Treaty was confirmed by the Perpetual Edict, Holland and Zeland still possessed all the guarantees for religious freedom for which that Treaty had stipulated ; that no mention of razing fortresses had been made either in the Treaty or in the discussions which preceded the Edict, and that Orange and his representatives themselves must be held responsible for the omission ; and that, although the Provinces might justly consider it a hardship to pay the Spanish troops, the alternative before the Netherlands was either to purchase the peaceable departure of the Spaniards or to drive them out by force ; and the course agreed on by the Edict was to the full as sure, as speedy, and as cheap, as that other which alone was open to their choice. The true reason of Orange's hostility to the Edict was, that although sufficiently humiliating to the King, it was likely also to discover to the

world the line of separation in the imposing array of adherents to the Union of Bruxelles. This was a reason which could not be openly expressed, and it was necessary, therefore, to give the most specious pretexts which came to hand. Orange's policy at this time betrayed considerable and unusual vacillation. Finding that the Edict was satisfactory to many of his friends in the Catholic Provinces, he at last offered his adhesion to it, on condition that the Estates would, to their pledge not to acknowledge the Governor until the troops were withdrawn, add a further engagement, that if the Spaniards were not removed by a fixed day they would themselves take arms to drive them from the land.¹ It was, in fact, beyond the power of human foresight and sagacity to steer the course which William of Orange was compelled to steer between the conflicting wind and tide of Protestant and Catholic interests and feelings, without making an occasional tack which laid him open to those imputations of double-dealing which he himself so freely and so justly cast upon the conduct of the King of Spain.

By advice of the Duke of Aerschot, Don John now sent to the Prince of Orange, as special envoy, an eminent jurist, Dr. Eibertus Leoninus, to propose the most advantageous terms of reconciliation with the King. The Prince was to be frankly told that his great power and influence would enable him to do His Majesty at the present juncture a service so signal, that the reward of that service would be left to himself to name. No honours or substantial advantages which the Crown could bestow would be thought too great. Don John had come to make peace, to restore the ancient prosperity and the ancient government of the Netherlands, and in the King's name to forgive all the errors of the past, and to promote all the objects which the Prince had been so long striving to attain. If William had thought it his duty for these objects to draw the sword, it was now no less his duty to sheathe it. If he thought fit to write to Don John, he was sure that the Governor would reply in a manner that could not fail to satisfy his utmost desire.

Leoninus saw Orange at Middelburg, and several long interviews passed between them. The Prince replied to the overtures of the envoy with his usual dignity and caution. He was ever falling more and more into the habits and language of the austere Calvinists to whom he had now heartily and openly allied himself. Having heard at their first meeting all that

¹ Motley : *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, iii. 98.

Leoninus had got to say without making any definite reply, he told him, at their second interview, that he had prayed to God for guidance in the matter, and that he would soon lay it before the Estates of Holland and Zeland, whose servant he was. Reviewing the past policy of the King, he reminded the envoy of the utter violation of all the engagements made by the Duchess of Parma, of the treacherous manner in which Egmont and Horn had been put to death, and of the subsequent events which had destroyed all the confidence in the promises of Philip or his representatives. He glanced at the manner in which the French Huguenots had been treated by their sovereign, at the fate of Coligny, and the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. Even now he received constant intelligence from Spain, France, and Italy, of a Catholic League against the followers of the reformed religion, of which one of the objects was to crush that religion in Holland and Zeland. To aid in this plan a Nuncio from the Pope had lately arrived in the Netherlands. He touched upon his objections to the Perpetual Edict, and said that the obligation to maintain the Catholic religion was opposed to the Treaty of Ghent, by which all religious questions were left to be settled by the next States-General. In short, Leoninus, who had hoped for an indication of terms upon which the Prince would make his peace with the King, received nothing but a statement of reasons why no proposals could be entertained. He endeavoured to answer the arguments of Orange, and he especially hinted that the overtures now made to him were made to himself alone, and need not be communicated to the Estates over which he presided. William with equal significance maintained that it was no less his intention than his interest and duty to lay the whole matter before those who implicitly trusted him. Leoninus inquired whether the subject might be considered as open to future arrangement. The Prince held out no hope, but advised him, if he desired to know, to attend the meeting of the Estates at Dort.

Foiled in his first attempt to conciliate Orange, Don John was not disposed to abandon it as hopeless. Every day that he lived in the Netherlands strengthened his conviction of the immense power of this man. If he could by any means be brought over to the royal cause, the opposition would disappear, and the model government of Charles V. would be quietly and firmly re-established. Don John, whatever may have been his sins, actual or meditated, now or afterwards, against the liberties of the Provinces, was a most loyal servant of the hard and thank-

less master to whom alone he acknowledged any duty or allegiance. Honestly and openly he told him the most unpalatable truths. "In the Netherlands the name of your Majesty," he wrote, "is as much abhorred and despised as that of the Prince of Orange is loved and feared. I am negotiating with him, and giving him every security, for I see that the establishment of peace as well as the maintenance of the Catholic religion and obedience to your Majesty depend now upon him. Things have reached that pass that it is necessary to make a virtue of necessity. If he lend an ear to my proposals it will be only upon very advantageous conditions; but to these it will be necessary to submit rather than lose everything."¹ Again he wrote, after the baffled Leoninus had returned from his mission to Middelburg, to intimate that he hoped himself to have an interview with Orange, and to be more successful in bringing him to reason. "I see no remedy to preserve the State from destruction except by gaining over this man, who has so much influence with the nation."²

Don John evidently did not understand either the character or the motives or the ends of William the Silent. If he had understood them, he would himself have been an abler and a less honest man than he was. His experience of public affairs and the men who conducted them—Granvelle, Perez, the King—was not likely to have given him a very exalted idea of human nature. Selfishness, it was plain, was man's ruling principle, a principle sometimes too strong to be checked, even by loyalty to Church and King, in which Don John had been religiously fostered, and in which he steadfastly believed. Loyalty to the rights of a community of obscure mariners and graziers, seriously pleaded by a great lord of almost royal blood as a reason for taking up arms against his sovereign, was a feeling which Don John's education and habits of thought and life must have rendered wholly incomprehensible to a man of his intellectual calibre. When he came, therefore, to study the character and ends of Orange, he naturally and inevitably concluded that William's own interests, and those of his house, were the objects which really lay near his heart, and guided his course; and that the true policy of Philip's representative was to make it plain to his great antagonist that these interests could be served better by

¹ Motley, iii. 99, 100. Gachard: *Correspondance de Guillaume le Taciturne*, iii. Pref. lii.

² Motley, iii. 103. Gachard: *Correspondance de Guillaume le Taciturne*, p. lx. (letter dated 16th March).

submission than by continued opposition, by selling than by defending the people of Holland and Zeland. He was confirmed in this conclusion by the tactics of Orange in the matter of the Edict, which were as shifty and tortuous as any that could have been devised by Perez, or practised by Granvelle. In Don John's opinion, Leoninus had not been instructed to use sufficient plainness of speech; William was too cautious to be more explicit; when the principals themselves came face to face, a bargain would nevertheless be struck; and meanwhile, nothing remained but to warn the King that the aspect of affairs compelled liberality, and that the man who had thwarted him for twenty years was not going to sell himself cheap.

Orange, on his side, regarded Don John with the distrust with which he could not fail to regard any one sent to the Netherlands by Philip II. for the obvious purpose of trying fraud alone in the game where fraud and force had hitherto failed. He studied his character and his policy in the letters which he occasionally contrived to intercept; and it would have been singular indeed if, in the Governor's confidential communications with Spanish military officers in the Netherlands, or with statesmen in Spain, he did not find matter for increasing his suspicions. At first his distrust was mingled with a feeling of contempt which was probably engendered by the want of self-command and of fixed purpose which Don John had displayed at Luxemburg and Huy. "The only difference," he wrote, "between this new governor and Alba or Requesens, is, that he is younger and more foolish, less capable of concealing his venom, and more impatient to dip his hands in blood."¹ This feeling of contempt does not appear to have been lasting. Orange was too wise to despise an antagonist whose power, shorn as it was, was so considerable as that of the King of Spain's Viceroy, and his constant advice, to those who consulted him, to beware of Don John, seemed to show an apprehension that that power was likely to be used with no inconsiderable skill. Nor did he ever relinquish his schemes for obtaining possession of Don John's person, although they were doomed to prove abortive.

At Louvain the Governor used every effort and every art to ingratiate himself with the Netherlanders. He set himself to

¹ Motley, iii. 96, note, referring to Bor, x. 791, Groen v. Prinsterer; *Archives*, v. 559, and *Apologie du P. d'Orange*, p. 97. These are almost the words of the *Apologie*, 1581, Leyden, 4to, p. 90. The *Apology* being written after Don John's death, it may be taken as Orange's deliberate opinion of him; so this passage, in which it appears he afterwards changed his mind, must be correct.

learn the French language, and was soon able to dispense with the services of the interpreter, whom he had hitherto been obliged to employ.¹ The charm of his manners quickly made itself felt, and the power and patronage which were soon to be at his disposal began to exert their unfailing influence. He gradually found a Court forming around him of those whose attachment to the Catholic faith and royal prerogative led them to conceive that the Crown had received sufficient humiliation for its previous arbitrary doings, or who were simply anxious for a return of the honours and profits of royal favour. The fascination of his address, and the power of his presence to turn foes into friends, were admitted even by those who most lamented their baneful influence, and who, distrusting both the King and his representative, looked into the future with gloomy foreboding. "Don John," wrote one of those persons, "surpasses "Circe; no one comes before him without being transformed "into a worshipper. All the lords are drunk with his good "graces. There is but one danger, a second St. Bartholomew, "that being the sole end to which all his liberalities are tending. "In their writings and edicts Princes affect to forget the past; "but in their hearts hatred and revenge remain stamped, biding "their opportunity, be it soon or late, whereof in this age we "have abundant examples, so may God grant that some tragic-comedy is not being prepared for us. Fidelity and faith have "ceased out of the world, especially amongst the great, who will "thus come to their ruin if God does not have mercy upon "them."²

The magistrates of Louvain entertained Don John at banquets in their beautiful Town Hall. He visited and supped with the wealthier burghers at their own houses, gave them feasts in return, and won their hearts by his graceful bearing and agreeable conversation. He especially distinguished himself at a great festival of the guilds, an annual solemnity celebrated with sports and processions. Under his patronage, on the 14th of April, the game of the popinjay, instituted by Duke Philip of Burgundy, was revived with unusual splendour. Don John, who had not forgotten the pleasures and the cunning of his childhood in the cornfields of Leganes,³ appeared with his crossbow amongst the marksmen, and at the fifth shot brought down the popinjay.

¹ See p. 94.

² Letter in French, without signature or address, May 15 or 25. State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 29.

³ See Vol. I. p. 10.

Amidst the shouts of the enraptured multitude, some of whom may have seen similar exploits performed by the Emperor Charles V., he was proclaimed king of the bowmen for the year. A golden popinjay was hung round his neck by the chiefs of the guild, and forming themselves in procession, the brethren followed him to the great church, where it was customary to conclude sport with prayer. "He then," wrote a journalist of the day, "gave to the society of cross-bowes a hundred crowns to drink " and be merry, and banqueted, to his great cost and charge, the " best of the town, he himself [being present] in person with " exceeding familiarity to all men, and getting credit marvellously " by that means."¹ The health of the new king was drunk with the enthusiasm proper to the occasion. After visions of a kingdom in Greece and in Africa, and dreams of one beyond the Channel, this popinjay coronation was fated to furnish the sole crown ever worn by the hero of Lepanto.

Don John was not, however, deceived by this outward show of loyalty and devotion. He valued at their real worth the complimentary toasts of burgomasters, the flatteries and courtesies of the hall of audience, and the cheers of the populace. If he had been disposed to believe that these things indicated security he would have been checked by the plots, of which he occasionally received notice, for the seizure of his person, and the constant vigilance which he was therefore compelled to exercise. By the Marquess of Havrech, the brother of Aerschot, and by Mondoucet, the agent of the French King, he was warned that Orange and his ally the Duke of Anjou had organized a conspiracy with Count Lalaing, Governor of Hainault; and that two Frenchmen, with men and money at their disposal, were actually on the watch for a favourable opportunity to seize Don John and carry him off to La Rochelle. Ottavio Gonzaga was told to lay a formal information of the existence of this plot before the Estates, suppressing, however, the names of the implicated Netherlanders. Some arrests were in consequence made; but when inquiry seemed tending towards the implication of some important personages of the Estates with whom it was desirable to keep on good terms, and who, it was hoped, might be won over to the royal cause, it was thought more prudent to set the prisoners at liberty and allow the matter to drop.² Before Don John trusted himself in Bruxelles, however, he deemed it a proper precaution to

¹ Advertisements from Brussels, April 18. State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 29.

² Vanderhammen: *Don Juan de Austria*, f. 299.

send thither the Marquess of Havrech to take from the military governor of the city and the municipal authorities a sworn assurance that nothing should be attempted against his person, and that they would be in readiness to meet him with a fitting welcome.

Thus compelled by force of circumstances to abstain from punishing a very flagrant plot against his own person, which was also an unjustifiable breach of the engagements of the Perpetual Edict, it is no wonder that Don John was more and more impressed with a sense of his own precarious position, and of the all-pervading influence of Orange. Well might he write to the King that Orange was "the pilot who guided the bark, who could "destroy or save it, and that in gaining him the greatest obstacles "would be removed." It might, indeed, appear to the mere outward observer that, as recorded by Tassis, "a single glance "of Don John's beautiful and vivacious eyes made all hearts his "own."¹ These heart-capturing eyes were sufficiently keen to see, and their owner wise enough to confess to his master, that whatever courtiers might say or do or look, "the whole country, and "almost every one of its inhabitants, was devoted to the Prince of "Orange."²

Upon all the tortuous negotiations and the politic pastimes of the Governor Dr. Wylson continued to keep a watchful and jealous eye. At the end of April the English envoy had an audience of Don John, to offer his congratulations on the pacification, the departure of the Spanish army, and the victory of the popinjay. After the usual civil speeches and professions of a desire to serve the English Queen, Don John complained that he had heard that Her Majesty was preparing ships and money for the use of the Prince of Orange. To this rumour Dr. Wylson gave a flat denial; and he also retorted by mentioning a report which he too had heard, that "the Scottish Queen had written to "His Highness, and he to her; and that there was an intention "to make a sedition or tumult in England, by the help of some "noblemen there, and so, upon her enlargement and deliverance, "His Highness to marry with her, and thereupon to claim the "Crown of England in her right." "I desired, therefore," wrote the envoy, "to have this fellow (Hamilton) that had used these "speeches [in order] to have him examined in England and "Scotland also. Don John upon this speech somewhat changed

¹ J. B. de Tassis : *Commentaria de Tumult. Belg.* lib. iv. 326. Quoted by Motley, iii. 104.

² Motley, iii. 104.

"countenance, and said: 'Is it like that I should seek her who is
" 'a prisoner and has nothing, and I myself as void of living as
" 'she herself is, saving only that which I have in gift from the
" 'King my brother as a pension? I would not have anybody to
" 'be thus abused, nor to think me so void of judgment. For
" 'though I be young, yet I have some experience of the world,
" 'and hope to make my bargain better than so.'"¹

After a few weeks thus spent at Louvain by Don John, in gaining over nobles and plebeians, and endeavouring to quiet suspicious envoys, the march of the Spanish and Italian regiments from Maestricht removed the impediment which lay between him and the formal possession of his office. On the 1st of May he made his public entry into Bruxelles. In spite of all precautions an attempt was made by one Cornelius Straten, a patriot leader of the lower orders, to excite a tumult at the gate at which the cavalcade was to enter. "Will you allow him to enter who brings murder and treason in his train?" cried he to the expectant multitude. His words fell on some not unwilling ears, and but for the opportune interference of some popular magistrates the portcullis would have been forcibly let down. An hour after this ineffectual movement had been suppressed the leading column of the procession reached the drawbridge. Six thousand national soldiers marched in the van. Next came a goodly array of townsmen, ranked in their various guilds and corporations, with music and banners. Don John, in a green mantle, rode between the Bishop of Liege and the Nuncio of the Pope. The Duke of Aerschot, magnificent in crimson velvet and gold lace, headed the bodyguard. Soon after entering the Louvain gate the line of the procession skirted the wall of the royal park, until it fell into the square in front of the palace, or, as it was called, the court, of Bruxelles. The music of trumpets and hautboys enlivened its march. Triumphal arches spanned the streets, flags waved on every side, and the walls were hung with tapestries displaying scenes from the battle of Lepanto. The windows and housetops were filled with gay holiday-makers; and the women rained flowers upon the handsome hero of the day, or strewed them before his charger's feet. Some of these floral offerings were fashioned into the shape of royal crowns. A gilded car, drawn by two horses in gilt trappings, figured in the pageant, and in it was seated a fair Flemish dame representing Abundance, with the arms of

¹ Despatch from Dr. Wylson to Queen Elizabeth, May 1. State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 29.

the seventeen Provinces displayed around her, and a quantity of broken weapons at her feet, to indicate the happy results that were expected from the rule of the new Viceroy. Another car bore a galley with Turkish captives in chains to commemorate his naval victory. A third was laden with the two famous columns and the *Plus Ultra* of his sire.

Don John rode into the great court of the palace about nine o'clock in the morning. There the Estates of the Provinces were drawn up to receive him as their Governor. Alighting from his horse, he proceeded to the chapel-royal, where the solemn mass of the Holy Ghost was celebrated by the Bishop of Bois-le-duc, who has thus recorded the behaviour of some of the actors in the day's ceremonial:—"Some who entreated permission so to do " approached His Highness and in various speeches signified to " him their hope that he would hold and keep to that which he " had promised, touching on other similar matters, and repeating " them even to folly and the weariness of them who heard them. " To these things His Highness always replied very graciously."¹

The day was given up to festivity and holiday-making. Odes, poetical addresses, dramas, and music, composed for the occasion, were said, sung, and performed. All the belfries of the city poured forth the sweet clangour of their rich and varied chimes. Anthems and incense rolled through the collegiate church of St. Gudule; and wine and beer flowed freely in and around the grand Town Hall, whose florid windows and pinnacles had looked down on the merriment and the misery of so many generations. Viglius alone, looking from his window at the show, said scornfully: "Is this the Prince who is to bring us peace?"² For a brief moment the anxious harassed Viceroy, who knew himself the slighted distrusted representative of a hated master, might have fancied himself the idolized Prince of a happy people. But if he indulged in any pleasing dreams, three days afterwards he was awakened to the truth by the hard necessity that he, a Prince of the blood, as he loved to think and to call himself, should take an oath to observe the laws and privileges of the Netherlands, an oath which had not been taken either by Alba or by Requesens.


The events of these eight days were thus reported by the English envoy to his Court:—"The pomp was great on Monday, " for that the people was well disposed to bid Don John welcome,

¹ *Écrit de l'Eveque de Bois-le-duc, Laurent Matsius, sur les causes . . . des troubles de Pays-Bas. Correspondance de Philippe II.*, iv. pp. 788-9.

² Meteren: *Hist. des Pays-Bas*, La Haye, 1618, folio, fol. 135.

“trusting him now more than ever they did mistrust him before. The next day they agreed to his admission. Upon Saturday he had his oath given him, and was established Governor with great approbation of the people. Upon Sunday there was a general procession, Don John bearing his torch bareheaded after the sacrament, the Bishop of Liege on the one side of him and the Pope’s Nuncio on the other side, so many torches [being] carried before the sacrament, as their great light caused darkness with the smoke, especially to those who stood in windows as lookers-on. Upon Monday a post came out of Spain (as they said) and brought King Philip’s ratification for the peace, and for all other things that Don John had agreed unto, besides assurance of money to the value of 400,000 [crowns].”¹

¹ Despatch from Dr. Wylson to Sir Francis Walsingham, May 8. State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 29.





CHAPTER VI.

AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS; FROM THE BEGINNING OF
MAY TO THE END OF JULY 1577.



ON assuming the reins of government for his brother in the palace of his father, Don John of Austria was for a while very closely engaged in business. A press of matters of detail, accumulated during the interregnum which had elapsed since the active rule of the State Council had ceased, required adjustment. Ever since he had arrived at Luxemburg he had toiled hard, often from morning to night, scarcely allowing himself an interval for dinner. Labour and the utter frustration of his hopes of achieving any foreign conquest had affected not only his spirits but his health. He had had at various times three attacks of fever, and he had frequently recurred, in conversation and even in writing, to his ancient scheme of retirement from the world. While winning hearts, as it seemed, at Louvain, he had expressed his dejection by writing to Perez that "he knew not what to think of, except of a hermitage, where the labour of spirit might not be in vain. The people, who appeared to his attendants to be so charmed with him, were beginning, he said, to abhor him, as he certainly abhorred them."¹ He was becoming pale and thin, losing his vivacity of eye and aspect, as well as his buoyancy of feeling.

One of his first cares was to recommence his negotiations with his great enemy at Middelburg. The experience of Orange would not allow him to facilitate a personal interview.² A formal

¹ *Cartas de Don Juan*, quoted by Motley, iii. 117.

² Froude evidently thinks the Prince of Orange and Don John did have a personal

embassy was therefore despatched from the Court of Bruxelles to what may be truly called the Court of Middelburg. The persons sent were the Duke of Aerschot, who was for the time in the closest relations with Don John, the Barons of Hierges and Willerval, and Dr. Meetkercke. Dr. Leoninus and Caspar Schetz, Baron of Grobbendonck, being at Middelburg as envoys on other business from the States-General, took part in the conferences ; and Dr. Andrew Gaill, an agent of the Emperor, was also present. Orange was attended by Sainte Aldegonde and four other councillors.

The conferences between these personages, most of them able and experienced men, all of them long versed in the questions at issue, all animated by the strongest feelings of public and personal interest in them, are of high historical importance in mapping out, as it were, the ground upon which the inevitable contest between the freedom of the Netherlands and the despotism of Spain was to be fought, and the respective positions of the combatants. An ample narrative of the proceedings has been preserved, from the pen, it is supposed, of Sainte Aldegonde.¹ As we can now read the motives and desires of each party by the light of their subsequent actions, we need not follow very minutely the details of these interesting debates. The Duke of Aerschot, a dull and selfish trimmer, had neither capacity nor desire to take any lead in them. He had been sent to attend them on account of his rank and wealth, and perhaps from a desire to parade the Governor of the citadel of Antwerp as a convert to the King's party. The championship of the Spanish cause seems to have devolved less on his special colleagues than on Leoninus and Schetz, the envoys of the Estates. The sagacity of Orange and the eloquence of Sainte Aldegonde sufficiently maintained the interests of freedom and the Netherlands.

The Perpetual Edict has here already been described as the wedge which was to discover and widen the fatal flaw ever lurking

meeting. In noting his efforts in the spring of 1577 to gain the Prince of Orange, he says : "He went so far as to promise Holland and Zealand the liberty of worship ' which they demanded, and he even told the Prince that if his brother would not agree " to the pacification he would himself join the States and take up arms in their cause."

Don John with his own mouth told Dr. Wylson that he had used these words to Orange, and Orange told him so also. "Yet I will never the more trust Don John," said Wylson : "yea, I mistrust him the more. By such speech he either minds to " tempt the Prince or else he bears a false heart to the King his brother." Wylson to Walsingham ; May 1 [1577], MSS., Flanders Record Office.

¹ *Vraye narration des propos de costè et d'aultre tenus entre les députés d'Hollande et de Zelande à Gheertrudenberg au mois de May 1577.* Printed by Gachard : *Corresp. de Guillaume le Tacit.*, iii. pp. 62, 63, and 447-459 ; and quoted by Motley, iii. 130.

in any compact made between the Provinces of the Low Countries against their Spanish oppressor. The object of the King's representatives was to drive this wedge home, and as far and as fast as possible. The object of Orange was to parry the blows, to keep the compact smooth on the surface as long as he could, and to conceal and varnish over with specious argument the weak spot which no man knew better than himself. The first question, therefore, which suggested itself was—Would the Prince accept the Edict for Holland and Zeland, and publish it in these Provinces as it had been published in the others? The Estates had approved of it—the King himself had ratified it—why, therefore, should two of the Provinces refuse that allegiance to their sovereign which had been cheerfully accorded by the rest? Orange defended his refusal on the grounds already mentioned,¹ of grave discrepancies between the Edict and the Ghent Treaty, the maintenance of the fortresses and the violation of the Ghent Treaty by the occasional enforcement of unlawful and oppressive measures of late Governments which that Treaty had repealed, and the withholding from himself the right of exercising his power in the Province of Utrecht, of which he was Stadtholder by the commission of the King. The Spanish advocates replied that the Ghent Treaty would in a short time be completely executed, and pointed to the withdrawal of the Spanish army, by which, as they asserted, its most important condition had been already fulfilled, and by which also the honourable intentions of the King and Don John ought in fairness to be judged. The time and the probable results of the assembling of the new States-General were discussed. The party from Bruxelles were lured or forced to confess that they had no great desire for the meeting of that body, and would rather, if possible, join the Prince in devising some means of preventing it. The Prince, on his side, was drawn by dexterous word-fence to the admission that, if the Estates should decide against the free exercise of the reformed religion provided for Holland and Zeland by the Ghent Treaty, he would not be bound by the condition of that Treaty which left the question to their decision. "You," he said, "would compel us and all the world to the exclusive maintenance of the Catholic religion. This means that we are to be extirpated, and we do not intend to submit to extirpation." Each side enjoyed a triumph by wringing these important admissions from its opponent. But each left off very much where it began. Neither party can have

¹ See p. 211.

entertained any sanguine hope of arriving at an agreement, or have suffered any great disappointment because none was reached. On each side a long document was drawn up embodying the views of the disputants, and copies of these documents were exchanged. The Prince of Orange retired from the conferences before they were closed. But he took an opportunity of speaking alone to most of the envoys from Bruxelles. Some of them he gently reproached for their adherence to those who would enslave their Fatherland. To Aerschot he intimated his intention of taking Utrecht by force, if it were not peaceably given up to him. He also warned the Duke that no Netherlander could trust the King without endangering his head. Aerschot pressed him to join in a compromise which had satisfied so many of the Provinces, and from which they might all enjoy the blessings of peace. "No," said William, playing upon the resemblance of two Spanish words; "my heart is like my head, *Calvo y Calvinista*, I am bald and a Calvinist."

It was plain from these conferences that the pacification was a mere truce, that the sword would soon be again drawn, and that the delay arose chiefly from the desire of each party to fix upon the other the responsibility of drawing it. Orange had taken advantage of the sufferings and panic of the last year to negotiate the Treaty of Ghent, and so to array the whole seventeen Provinces against Philip. He knew that the league could not be lasting; that the difference of religion was the fatal spot which some wedge sooner or later must find; and that the Perpetual Edict, skilfully used, might be as good a wedge as another. From the Treaty and Edict together the Netherlanders had gained some months of repose and the removal of the Spanish soldiery. But he did not intend to permit the wedge of disunion to be used as a weapon of further offence, and the Perpetual Edict to be converted into a league between Philip and fifteen Provinces against himself and the remaining two. His policy depended on his own judgment of events, and on the influence which he could exert abroad, ceaselessly exercised with a view to a single object, the peace and freedom of his Fatherland. The policy of Don John depended upon the will of a distant jealous sovereign, naturally slow to decide, and rendered slower by the conflicting cares of a widely scattered empire.

In spite of the fruitlessness of the mission to Middelburg, Don John, as a last chance, attempted to renew negotiations with the Prince by letter. They exchanged letters filled with

solemn courtesies and expressions of sentiment as remote as possible from the feelings which possessed their hearts. Don John, in his own name and that of the King, held out hopes of the highest honours and promotions that Orange could desire or Philip confer, and invited him to exchange the anxieties and dangers of his present precarious position for the felicities of a tranquil life. Orange thanked him for his magnificent offers, but assured him that he considered of much greater importance the promises of pacification which had been made to the poor people of the Netherlands. He preferred the welfare and security of the public to his own, "having ever placed his particular interests " under his feet, and being still resolved to do so while he lived." It was now clear that Orange was to be induced to accept the Perpetual Edict neither by the arguments of Catholic lords or learned jurists, nor by any bribes and blandishments that could be offered in the name of the King of Spain.

Meanwhile Don John was little more satisfied with his position at Bruxelles than with that in which he had felt so galled at Louvain. He had received the congratulations of various sovereigns, amongst the rest of Queen Elizabeth, on his accession to the seat of government. He had attracted to his Court many of the Catholic nobles, who, like Aerschot, made self-interest their guiding star, and he had to some extent obtained the good-will of the vulgar. Men began to be classed and even to class themselves in three parties—the party of Orange, who desired civil liberty and modified religious freedom; the aristocratic anti-Spanish party, who loved the Catholic religion as well as the ancient rights of the land; and the Johannists, or supporters of Don John and the King of Spain. In the Governor's desponding view, the first two of these parties counted as one, and compared with that one the remaining section of the people seemed insignificant indeed. Against the cheers which often greeted him when he rode through the city, he had to set the fact that his secretaries and servants were sometimes followed home to the palace by a hooting and menacing mob.¹ In his position in a disaffected country, power meant not mere well-wishers, but fortresses, ships, troops, and money. Of fortresses and ships he was wholly destitute. The only troops within his reach were some twelve thousand German mercenaries, commanded by men of whose disposition he knew but little, and so completely masters

¹ *Vera et simplex narratio eorum quæ ab adventu D. Joannis Austriaci . . . gesta sunt.* Luxemburgi, 1578, 8vo, p. 14, quoted by Motley, iii. 143.

of the strongholds which had not fallen to Orange, that they were to an unpleasant degree his masters also. These Germans the Estates had agreed by the Perpetual Edict to pay, and then would have a right to discharge; and this right they were most anxious to exercise. To keep these somewhat doubtful mercenaries in the country was naturally an object of great anxiety to Don John; but it was an object which could not be avowed, and which could be pursued only with the greatest secrecy. The Estates were endeavouring to make a bargain with them to take half of the pay due to them in merchandise and half in cash, and the Governor was using what means he could to induce them to reject the offer. With the remaining element of power, money, he was hardly better provided than with the other three. Like every other Spanish Viceroy, in the old world at least, he was always writing to Madrid for remittances, and receiving every kind of reply but the thing asked for. Some aid, small in amount but very opportune, came from the Roman Pontiff. Gregory XIII., on hearing that the Provinces demurred to receiving Don John, sent a Nuncio, Filippo Sega, a man in whom he placed great reliance, to assist him with his counsel and support. The orders of Sega were to strengthen Don John in his resistance to every proposal injurious to the Catholic faith, and, when peace was restored, to encourage his designs against England, towards which he was further instructed to offer him fifty thousand crowns. When Sega arrived, he found that the gravity of the Belgian difficulties had not been understood at the Vatican, that the Perpetual Edict was already signed, that the Spanish troops were dismissed, and yet that peace was doubtful and the invasion of England impossible. He therefore thought it advisable still to offer the money, which Don John thankfully accepted, and applied, with reluctance and regret, to purposes very different from those for which the Pope destined it. The Nuncio also put himself in communication with the Estates on the subject of the concessions to heresy, and presented a Papal brief exhorting them to remain loyal and Catholic. The messenger and the message came somewhat too late, and were received with much pomp and little respect.¹

While harassed by all these cares, Don John continued to receive frequent warnings of plots for the seizure of his person. Various men of influence were confidently mentioned at various times as being at the head of these conspiracies, now Lalaing,

¹ Strada : *De Bello Belgico*, lib. ix.

now Heez, now Sainte Aldegonde. The stories might be inventions to annoy him, but there was nothing of improbability in them. Attempts of a similar kind had been made, and had very nearly succeeded, against Alba and Requesens, surrounded as they were by their trusty Spanish veterans. How much more easy would success be, and how much more tempting was the prize, in the case of a Governor who was guarded only by his own household and a handful of Flemish musketeers, and who was brother of the King! Had not the King himself set the example of such a step by carrying off the eldest son of Orange and holding him as a hostage? At length it was rumoured that the assassination and not the capture of Don John would be attempted. He was informed of it in the way most likely to impress his mind with full belief in the good faith of his informant, and in the imminence of the peril. In the dead of the night the Viscount of Ghent, at that time a fervent Johannist, forced his way to his bedside, awoke him from his sleep, told him that he had learned the existence of a conspiracy against both his liberty and life, and solemnly assured him that, if he would live and be at large, he must quit Bruxelles without delay. Don John had entered the capital on the 1st of May, and May was not yet past. Impressed by his friend's information, and the earnestness with which it was conveyed, he resolved to remove to Mechlin, on the pretext of being able there more conveniently to confer with the German leaders, and arrange terms for the withdrawal of their troops from the country.

It was about this time, and apparently during his stay in Bruxelles, that Don John was visited by the model and mirror of the Englishman of the days of Elizabeth, Philip Sidney. On the death of the Emperor Maximilian, Sidney had been sent by Queen Elizabeth to carry the usual condolence and congratulation to the Emperor Rudolph of Prague. He set out at the end of February 1577, and was returning through the Low Countries in April and May; and was now in the twenty-second year of his age. "That gallant Prince, Don John," says Sidney's friend and biographer, "when this gentleman came to kiss his hand, " though at first in his Spanish haughtiness he gave him access " as by descent to a youth, of grace as to a stranger, and in " particular competition as he conceived to an enemy; yet after " a while that he had taken his just attitude, he found himself " stricken with this extraordinary planet, that the beholders " wondered to see what ingenious tribute that brave and high-

“minded Prince gave to his worth—giving more honour and respect to this hopefull young gentleman than to the ambassadors of mighty Princes.”¹

Early in June Don John determined to send a mission to England for the purpose of ostensibly conveying to the Queen a formal notice of the pacification, but really of dissuading her from lending countenance and aid to the party of Orange and the patriots. Of this mission the Viscount of Ghent was the head. His approaching departure was announced to Elizabeth on the 5th of June,² and he reached London about the middle of the month.

Meanwhile Elizabeth's agent at Bruxelles continued thus to report on the conduct of the Governor:—“Truth it is, Don John seeketh by all means to be popular, and hath so well carried himself with courtesy to all in general, with his aptness to give audience, and his willingness to apply himself to the humour of the States and other suppliants, particularly using great liberality therewithal to very many, and constancy in his doings, that many of the greatest, yea, and most of the mean sort, are enchanted in his love, and highly esteem him above all others. And yet thus much must I think that he is thus apparently good for necessity, because he cannot otherwise bring that to pass which he hath in his mind to do, seeming now to be somewhat weary of this his cunning dealing, because he is overmuch controlled by the States; yea, almost commanded by them. First, the burgesses of Antwerp, being set on by the States here, are very earnest to have the Almayne soldiers discharged, and the Castle to be defaced, whereof the first is in hand to be done by order from him, and the second resteth in deliberation. Moreover, the nine nations of Brussels here have very lately exhibited their bile, by Monsieur Montesguen, Count Lalaing's brother, for the Spaniards, Italians, and others their adherents, to be presently removed from the person of Don John, which hath greatly troubled him.”³ Wylson also informed his Court that Escovedo and Gonzaga were amongst the foreigners whose removal was demanded; and that, Don John having given out that as the Queen of Navarre was soon expected to go to Spa,

¹ *The Life of Sir Philip Sidney*, by Sir Fulke Grevil, Lord Brook, London, 1652, p. 37. *Memoir of Sir P. Sidney*, by H. R. Fox Bourne, London, 1862, 8vo, pp. 137, 153.

² Letters from Don John to Queen Elizabeth, June 5, and Dr. Wylson to Lord Burghley, June 8. State Paper Office, Flanders, 1877. No. 29.

³ Dr. Wylson to Sir F. Walsingham, June 8. State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 29.

he should meet her at Valenciennes and entertain her at Mons, it was "thought that the Estates would hardly agree that he should " go so far from home until things be on better terms."¹

As to the desire of the Estates to make the Governor a cipher, the English envoy's opinion is confirmed by Escovedo, who, some days before, had written to Perez that if they had their way an old woman with her distaff would be more fit than Don John for the duty of signing papers at their bidding.²

On the 11th of June Wylson wrote to the Queen that on the 9th³ he had had an audience of Don John "to wish him welfare " in his journey to Mechlin for the discharging of the Almayne " soldiers." "He thanked me," continues the envoy, "for my coming, " and said he would very shortly go to Mechlin to persuade the " Almayne captains of Antwerp, Breda, and other places, to leave " this country upon reasonable offers, to take three months' pay in " hand, and the rest to be paid within two years, the whole sum " amounting to many millions—some say ten millions at the " least. And this he told me he would do to assure the world of " his faithful meaning to keep peace and satisfy the Prince [of " Orange] with full restitution of all that he can demand. And " then he began to declare his affection for your Majesty, how " ready he was to serve you, and how well disposed the King his " brother was to maintain amity with your Majesty, praying me " to tell your Highness that no Prince upon earth would be more " assured and faithful to you than the King his brother and he " would be, and therefore wished that your Majesty would not " take any other way, never making any mention of the Prince of " Orange at all more than I have before written. . . . He wished " of God that he might have the leave once to see your Majesty, " and to speak with you. I told him his wish was good, and I " wished no less; for, by that means, two noble natures meeting " together could not but agree in all goodness and virtue, and " the one better understand the other than by messengers and " ambassadors; yea, the sight moving more by the presence than " any report is able to set forth by whatsoever declaration. And " then somewhat to please him for the time I showed him your

¹ Despatch from Dr. Wylson to Lord Burghley, June 8. State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 29.

² Motley, iii. 122.

³ F. Meteren (*Hist. des Pays-Bas*, La Haye, 1618, fol. p. 137) says he quitted Bruxelles "il sorte de Bruxelles le 5^{ème} de Juin." It would seem that Wylson's date is wrong, as he says further on (p. 10) that Don John promised to sit for his picture "on his coming again to Bruxelles within these eight days after the 12th of June." From this it seems not unlikely that Wylson's audience was not on the 9th but on the 4th or 5th.

“ Majesty’s picture, which I had borrowed of Mr Fowlke Grevil,
“ and do send it back by this bearer, for that I could not entreat
“ him to have it. And surely, Madame, Don John was much
“ pleased with the sight of it, and perused it very curiously a
“ good long time, and asked me if your Majesty were not attired
“ sometimes according to the Spanish manner. I told him your
“ Majesty used divers attires—Italian, Spanish, and French—as
“ occasion served, and as you pleased. He said the Spanish
“ attire was the most comely, and then he desired earnestly of me
“ to have your Majesty’s entire stature and making, and the
“ sooner the better. I told him I would do my best upon my
“ return, which I hoped would be shortly ; but in the meantime I
“ desired his whole picture, which he promised I should have in
“ this sort upon his coming again from Mechlin to Brussels within
“ these eight days, after the twelfth of this month [June] that if I
“ cause any painter come to him in my name he will sit [to] him
“ for my sake, and so I shall have him. He told me he is so
“ informed of your Majesty that if you were in the company of
“ your ladies, but in a black velvet French gown and a plain
“ hood to the same, he might discern you for the Queen, although
“ he had never seen your picture before. I told him indeed that
“ God had done much for you, not only to call you to the place
“ of a Queen, but also to give you such a shape fit for any
“ Queen, and therewithal a mind endowed with such several and
“ famous virtues, as, therefore, your Majesty is had in admiration,
“ and a chief spectacle to the whole world.”¹

Whether Don John succeeded in obtaining the “entire stature
“ and making” of Queen Elizabeth, and whether Dr. Wylson
was gratified with the “whole picture” of Don John, are questions
which seem destined to remain unsolved. If the execution of
the promised portrait of the Governor depended on his return to
Bruxelles “within eight days,” it certainly was never painted. Of
the two years during which he represented Philip II. in the
Netherlands, he passed only about six weeks in the capital, which
he was now quitting never to return. Within a few days of the
colloquy with Wylson on the charms and dresses of the English
Queen he took up his abode at Mechlin.

An event soon occurred there which, if it did not alienate
some of Don John’s friends, at least greatly exasperated his more
determined foes. Shortly after his arrival at Bruxelles, a decree

¹ Despatch from Dr. Wylson to Queen Elizabeth, June 11. State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 29.

had been issued requiring all bishops and provincial authorities to enforce with greater strictness the canons of Trent, and to protect the faithful flock of the Church "against heretic wolves." As the Perpetual Edict had carefully provided for the supremacy of the Catholic religion in all the Provinces where it was still dominant, this decree cannot have been regarded as an infringement of the agreement between the King and the States. How far it was politic to issue or at least to enforce such a decree, may have been a question; but it is a question even now not easy to answer. Don John knew well that it was hopeless to conciliate heretics; and he was bidding for the support of that large Catholic party who stood equally aloof from himself and from Orange. Each party exclaimed against the wickedness of persecution when applied to themselves, but no party understood or cared to practise the virtue of toleration in their dealings with their vanquished opponents. Orange was the only statesman who desired to extend toleration to all sects alike; and even his friend Sainte Aldegonde reproached him for refusing to deprive the Anabaptists of their rights of citizenship in Holland.¹ In permitting heresy to be once more treated as a capital offence in a Catholic Province, Don John may therefore have been performing, in the eyes of many not otherwise unreasonable persons, an act of justice at once vigorous and praiseworthy. A certain tailor of Mechlin, one Peter Panis, was taken into custody on a charge of having attended and addressed a conventicle in that town. He confessed the attendance, but he denied the preaching, and it does not appear that the act was proved against him. He, however, refused to inform against any others of the congregation, and on that refusal he was condemned to die. While his trial was pending the Prince of Orange wrote to the tribunal at Mechlin, imploring the judges not to revive the religious persecution which had been happily stayed. The tailor was nevertheless beheaded on the 15th of June, and Don John was present at the execution.

Towards the end of the month the Governor was riding out attended by the Duke of Aerschot, when the Duke thought fit to entertain him with a history of the various plots for his seizure, which had come to Aerschot's knowledge. He also displayed a copy of a private letter written by the Prince of Orange, in which the capture of the Governor was strongly recommended to the attention of the States. If Bruxelles had

¹ Motley, iii. 129.

been unsafe, the Duke feared that Don John was no safer at Mechlin, where, he said, a new conspiracy was at that very time being formed against him. A party had sprung up called the Anti-Johannists, which, according to the political condition of other years, had adopted a certain symbolical costume and embraced nearly all the members of the States-General. "What, then, becomes of their promises?" asked Don John. The Duke said they were not worth that (snapping his fingers), and that in fact "men had ceased to be bound by any engagements in the Netherlands." To a further inquiry as to the probable object of the intending captors, Aerschot replied that their object was to obtain his signature to what papers they pleased, and that the plan had been ere now successfully tried by their forefathers against Princes of his house. How far Aerschot was honestly narrating or maliciously inventing may be a matter of conjecture. To worm himself into the secrets of the leaders on both sides and sell them for his own advantage, was his constant game; and while he unfolded to Don John the schemes of Orange, he kept Orange informed of the movements and all he could learn of the plans of Don John. With these plans his present tidings happened to coincide in suggesting a change of residence. Don John broke up his establishment at Mechlin, sold some of his furniture and wine, and departed to Namur. About this time Escovedo was despatched to Spain, to confer with the King on the affairs of the Netherlands on the part of Don John. He was also the bearer of a letter addressed to Philip by the Estates, and was further charged to wait until he should receive communications respecting the unhappy condition to which misgovernment had brought the once prosperous Provinces. The Estates presented the secretary with a donation of two thousand crowns for the expenses of his journey.¹ He travelled post through France, and, escaping the plots which were formed for his capture on the road,² took shipping at Nantes for Spain.

At the fair little city of Namur, hanging with its strong castle on the rocks and slopes between the confluent waters of the Sambre and the Meuse, a royal visitor was now expected. Margaret of Valois, Queen of Navarre, was on her way from her brother's Court at Paris to the salutary springs of Spa. The bride of "the red-liveried wedding," who had been taken from the arms of the chief of the Catholics to be married to the chief of the Huguenots,

¹ Motley, iii. pp. 152-3.

² Despatch of Dr. Wylson to Lord Burghley, July 24. State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 29.

and whose nuptial couch had been stained with the blood of St. Bartholomew,¹ was now in her twenty-fourth year, and in the summer bloom of that beauty which was the pride, as her open gallantries were the scandal, of the Court of France. In her graphic memoirs she has narrated the causes, the objects, and the various adventures of her journey, with even more than her usual animation. The short-lived peace of Sens had just been broken, and war had recommenced between her husband and his Huguenots, and her brother the King of France and his Leaguers. She



HENRY IV., KING OF NAVARRE.



MARGARET OF VALOIS, QUEEN OF NAVARRE.

desired to absent herself from France during the campaign ; and Mondoucet, the French agent in the Netherlands,² having informed her of the coolness with which his master had received his tidings of the strong inclination towards France manifested by certain lords and municipalities of Flanders, she conceived the design of turning that inclination to the advantage of her favourite brother the Duke of Anjou.³ That worthless Prince, perhaps the basest of the base Valois-Medici brood, had been for several years passing to and fro between the Catholics and the Huguenots, and had also been in communication with the Prince of Orange as a bidder for the sovereignty of the Netherlands. He was at this time a Catholic, and commanded the royal troops against the Huguenots besieged at Issoire—an employment which, if it lost him the countenance of Orange, might perhaps commend him to the favour of the Catholics of Flanders and Hainault. Margaret was at least determined to survey the ground ; and she therefore

¹ *Mémoires de la Reyne Marguerite*, Paris, 1666, 12mo, p. 39, where she narrates how M. de Tejan (whose real name, according to Brantôme, was Leran), escaping wounded from four archers of the guard, took refuge in her bedroom and bed at daybreak after the night of the massacre. The marriage took place on the 18th of August 1572, the massacre on the night of the 24th.

² *Mémoires*, pp. 86-122.

³ François, Duke of Alençon and (since the accession of his elder brother, Henry IV., to the French throne, in 1574) Anjou, fourth son of Henry II. and Catherine de Medicis, b. 1554, d. 1584.

ordered her physicians to prescribe the waters of Spa for a long-cured attack of erysipelas.

She travelled in splendid state, with three horse-litters for herself and her chief ladies, and six coaches for others of inferior degree, and she was besides attended by ten maids of honour on horseback, the Cardinal of Lenoncourt, the Bishop of Langres, and various gentlemen of her household. The courtly magnificence of her train, she assures us, did much to increase the admiration in which Flanders was already disposed to hold France. She on her part was much struck by the handsome towns and sweet chimes of the Netherlands. Nature had admirably fitted Margaret for the game of political seduction which she was about to play. Dark-haired and dark-eyed, her pale face, noble in its upper features, could assume at will any variety of expression ; and if her mouth had somewhat of the bestial coarseness of her mother, her lips were touched with the fire of eloquence, and practised in all the tones of tenderness and persuasion. Her form, tall and rather full, and her carriage, half haughty and half gentle, seemed to her contemporaries the perfection of queenly grace. On public occasions she spoke with a propriety and dignity of language which were thought to eclipse the style of her predecessors, famous for their "mouths of gold," Margaret and Jane of Navarre. In private her vivacity and raillery delighted without offending ; and in the opinion of her Florentine mother, no mean judge, she was endowed with so happy and so ready a wit as to be able in all circumstances to say exactly what she desired, and in the best possible words.¹

At Cambray, her first halting-place in the dominions of Philip II., Margaret began to spread her snares. The Bishop of that See was the first dignitary upon whom she tried her fascinations. Louis de Barlaymont, son of the Count of Barlaymont, was too Spanish in his predilections to be a safe subject for her overtures ; but she completely won the heart of Monsieur D'Inchy, the governor of his important citadel, which thenceforth belonged to her and Anjou. D'Inchy even asked his Bishop's leave to accompany her to Namur, on the plea of seeing her reception by Don John ; and the Spaniardized Fleming, as she calls the Prelate, was so ill advised as to let him go. At Mons she quickly came to the most satisfactory understanding with the Governor of Hainault the Count of Lalaing, and with his beautiful wife a sister of the Marchioness of Havrech. Lalaing was a

¹ Brantôme : *Discours* iii. *Œuvres*, ii. 379, 393.

leader of the Old Catholic party, who hated Spain and the reformed faith with an equal hatred. He would have no dealings with Orange, neither would he do the King of Spain, whose commission he bore, the honour of waiting upon Don John. The King of France being the Suzerain of the Netherlands, the



MARGARET OF VALOIS, QUEEN OF NAVARRE.

lieutenant of the King of Spain conceived that he would be only doing his duty in helping to place Henry III. in actual possession of what was in theory his own. He promised on Margaret's return home, to send his brother Montigny to meet Anjou at her country house at La Fère. Meanwhile, answering for the good disposition of Hainault, he was doubtful as to that of Cambray, and recommended that D'Inchy should be, if possible, gained

over. It is characteristic of the adroit Queen that she said nothing of having already taken that precaution, but begged Lalaing to use his best endeavours in her brother's behalf with his good friend and neighbour, the military Governor of Cambray.

On her day's journey from Mons to Namur Margaret was escorted by the devoted Lalaing and a gallant band of gentlemen. They accompanied her two leagues beyond the frontier of their Province, until they espied the approaching cavalcade of Don John of Austria. The Spaniard-hating representative of the Spanish King then took his leave and rode back to Mons.

Don John, as we have seen, had at first intended to receive the Queen at Mons;¹ and perhaps the ill-will of Lalaing may have in part led him to choose another place for the meeting. We are assured by Brantôme that Don John had already felt the influence of Margaret's bright eyes as he stood unknown amongst the throng at the ball at the Louvre in the previous November. The remark attributed to him by the French chronicler, that "her beauty, divine as it was, seemed more fitted to produce men's perdition than their salvation,"² if it was ever made by Don John, was at this very moment being confirmed in a remarkable manner. Little did he think of the secrets which were hidden by the dust that shrouded the retreat of Lalaing, and by the doublet that covered the bosom of D'Inchy. Dismounting from his horse, the Governor was soon bowing by the side of Margaret's litter, glorious, in the July light, with its gilded pillars, crimson hangings, and glasses painted with forty different solar emblems, with their mottoes in Italian and Spanish. From one of these windows the Queen's smooth white cheek was offered to his salute, an honour likewise accorded to the Duke of Aerschot and the Marquess of Havrech. The title by which Margaret was to be addressed may have been a matter of some difficulty to courtiers bound by the rigid rules of Spanish etiquette. Navarre having been long incorporated with the dominions of Spain,³ the royal title of the chief of the House of Bourbon was not recognized at the Court of Madrid, where he was known only by his paternal name of Duke of Vendome. But as the Queen's memoirs make no mention of this difficulty,

¹ See p. 230.

² Brantôme : *Œuvres*, ii. 379.

³ John II. d'Albret, King of Navarre, was dispossessed by Ferdinand the Catholic of all his territories south of the Pyrenees in 1512. His son, Henry II. of Navarre, was the father of Jane II. (b. 1528, d. June 1572), who married in 1548 Anthony de Bourbon, Duke of Vendome (b. 1518, d. 1562), and by him was mother of Henry III. of Navarre (b. 1553, d. 1610, married in 1572 to Margaret of Valois), afterwards IV of France.

it was probably evaded either in some conventional manner already in use between the Houses of France and Spain, or by the adoption by the Princess of some travelling title.

Remounting his horse, Don John rode for the rest of the way beside the litter of Margaret, conversing with her, she carefully scanning him and his train, and taking silent note that although he had plenty of halberdiers (*estaffiers*) with him, he had not above twenty or thirty gentlemen, that of these only Gonzaga seemed to belong to his household, and that the others were little fellows of shabby appearance. They entered Namur after sunset, but found the streets brilliantly illuminated in a fashion in which the Queen confessed the Spaniards excelled, "shops and windows " shining as with a second dawn." She and her ladies were immediately conducted to their apartments, where they supped alone, marvelling at the decorations which atoned for any want of magnificence in their afternoon's escort. The walls of one great room were hung with rich velvet and satin, superbly embroidered in a style of barbaric splendour unknown to the daughter of France; the stuffs forming part, as Aerschot next day informed her inquisitive Cardinal, of a present of brocade sent to Don John from Constantinople as an acknowledgment for the liberation of the sons of the slain Turkish admiral,¹ and converted into hangings by upholsterers at Milan. The bed-chamber of the Queen and the bed itself were adorned with tapestry wrought with scenes from the battle of Lepanto. On rising next day from this heroic couch, Margaret was attended by Don John to a mass celebrated with fine music from a variety of instruments. A state dinner followed, at which the Queen and Don John were served apart at a table three paces removed from the rest of the company, to whom the Marchioness of Havrech did the honours. Margaret noted, not without a secret sneer, the royal style assumed by the Governor, who drank from a cup presented by Gonzaga on his knees. At the ball in the evening Don John never left the Queen's side, "always," as she records it, "talking to me, often " telling me that he saw in me the resemblance of his lady the " Queen, the late Queen [of Spain] my sister, whom he had " greatly honoured, and by all means in his power showing all " honour and courtesy to me and my company, and testifying " the pleasure he took in seeing me there." Margaret could dance as admirably as she conversed; and it was one of the most vaunted sights of the Court of France to see her move

¹ See p. 1.

through the figures of the gay Italian *Pazzameno*, or the stately *Pavana* of Spain, now advancing with airy alluring grace, and now pausing in the majesty of beautiful disdain.¹ It may well have been on this festal night, while the brilliant Queen trod a measure



with her handsome and gallant host, that some old Spanish captain may have uttered the enthusiastic judgment recorded by Brantôme, that "to win such a beauty was better than to conquer a kingdom, and that the soldier might think himself fortunate who should have the honour to die under her banner."

A difficulty about boats for the river voyage to Liege detained

¹ Brantôme : *Œuvres*, ii. p. 380.

the French party another day at Namur. The morning of it passed like that of the first. A splendid barge, followed by others filled with musicians, then conveyed the Queen and her host with their guests to an island where a banquet was spread in a spacious ivy bower, which in the evening became an agreeable summer ballroom. Next day (24th of July) the same barge was placed at the Queen's disposal for her voyage to Liege, and Havrech and his wife were commissioned to accompany her as far as Huy. Don John handed her on board and then took his leave, the governor of the fortress of Cambray lingering behind to whisper in Margaret's ear that he would ever be found the most faithful servant of Her Majesty and the Duke of Anjou.

The fair mischief being thus sped on her way, rejoicing for reasons which her gallant entertainer little suspected, Don John immediately mounted his horse, for the ostensible purpose of hunting in the woods beyond Namur, but really to execute a scheme which he had for some time meditated. This scheme was the seizure of the citadel. He had already secured the aid of the Count of Barlaymont and his four sons. These noblemen, as if bound on the same sporting excursion, had ridden into the fortress at an earlier hour, informed the governor that Don John would soon be passing that way, and that he was desirous of looking at the place, and suggested the propriety of some hospitality being offered to him. The Governor Monsieur de Froymont accordingly ordered breakfast, and met Don John and his small retinue at the gate, which they entered together. Meanwhile, amidst the rocks and woods behind the castle, a considerable body of picked German soldiers, posted before daybreak, was moving stealthily towards the defences. Some of Don John's attendants kept watch for them at convenient points within. The gates having been secured and certain posts occupied, one of the watchers entered the hall where Don John was sitting at breakfast with the commander, and made a preconcerted signal. Don John immediately sprang up, drew his sword, and called upon his host to surrender. De Barlaymont and his sons drew forth pistols, and the astonished De Froymont saw that resistance was useless. Don John then courteously assured him that no harm was intended against him; he himself, he said, was merely reclaiming His Majesty's property; and he added that from this day forth he would be Governor of the Netherlands in truth as well as in title. The ex-keeper of the castle and his small garrison of old men and invalids were then civilly dismissed and their places supplied by

the Germans. The deed being done, Don John called together the nobles and gentlemen who were in attendance upon him, and explained to those who had not been in the plot the reasons which had inspired it. He told them that all those who did not approve of the step were free to retire. No disapproval was expressed. Even Aerschot and his brother acknowledged that the occupation of the castle was just and necessary, and said that it would be treason to desert the Governor in the present crisis. A few days afterwards, however, they sent away the Prince of Chimay, and, finding that his departure was ill looked upon, departed ere long themselves. Their example was followed by very few of the small band of royalists, but amongst them was the Abbé de Marolles, the almoner of Don John.¹

As all the fortresses of the country, even including those in the possession of the soldiers of Holland and Zeland, were held in the name of the King, Don John had an unquestionable right to take the command of any one that he thought fit to select for his own residence. In no case would the theoretical right have been contested, although the reduction of the theory to practice might have met with a stout resistance. Don John's act was no violation of the letter, though a distinct breach of the spirit of the Perpetual Edict. It was an act, so little unexpected, that when the Governor left Mechlin some of the partisans of the Estates at Bruxelles warned their friends at Namur "to look well to their town," lest he should seize upon it for the sake of obtaining the command of the Meuse.² Nevertheless the seizure was held up to popular indignation as both a treason and a surprise. Orange had at least the satisfaction of flinging back upon those who imputed bad faith to him a plausible imputation of the same kind, of declaring that the King's representative and not he had drawn the sword, and of seeing the blow struck at a point to which so long ago as the previous December he himself had specially called, and called in vain, the attention of the Estates and their military authorities.³ Don John also had some reasons for self-congratulation. He had successfully commenced a policy bolder and more congenial to his nature than that to which he had been so

¹ A. Carnero : *Historia de las Guerras Civiles que ha auido en los estados de Flandes desde el año 1559, hasta el año de 1609*. Bruxelles, 1625, pp. 116-117.

² Despatch of Dr. Wylson to Lord Burghley, 24th July. State Paper Office, Flanders. No. 29.


³ Letter to Count Bossu, quoted by Motley, iii. p. 150. Orange in his *Apologie* (Leyden, 1581, 4to, p. 94) says that Don John possessed himself of the castle of Namur "non sans faire un tort indigne à la Reine de Navarre." The grounds for this charge I am unable to see.

long condemned. It was a policy which would attach to him the German mercenaries and their leaders ; and he might now revolve his plans and write his despatches without fear of being kidnapped by his own guards and carried off to a Dutch or French prison.

Here we may glance at the further movements of the Queen of Navarre in the Low Countries. Instead of going to Spa she caused the waters to be brought to her at Liege, and drank them every morning in the beautiful gardens and in the society of her host the Prince-Bishop. Six weeks she devoted to the care of her health and the occupation of turning the heads of the Prelate and his noble canons. When the time came for her departure she received very discouraging news from the French Court and her brother Anjou. The King, who always disliked him, and liked him perhaps none the better now that he had succeeded in sacking Issoire, had repented of the permission given to Margaret to visit Spa. He was equally displeased with her intrigues in the Netherlands in behalf of the Duke ; and Anjou asserted that, in order to spite him, secret measures had been taken to procure her capture, on her homeward journey, either by the Spaniards or by the Huguenots. He warned her that Don John had received secret intelligence of her doings at Cambray and Mons, and that she had better not offer him another visit. To add to her perplexities, the Queen suspected that some of her attendants, with Huguenot leanings, were bent on delaying her progress for purposes of their own. Her treasurer was or pretended to be short of funds ; her horses were arrested by the stable-keepers at Liege ; and it was necessary to surmount this obstacle by borrowing from one of her ladies. Taking the road by Huy and Dinan, she was exposed to some delay and danger in both these towns by the excited state of their inhabitants. The people of Huy were in revolt against their lord, the Bishop of Liege ; and the people of Dinan had most of them got drunk in electing their burgomasters.

At Dinan the Queen found protection in her adroit use of the name of Lalaing ; but a new difficulty met her in the arrival of an agent of the French King—one Dubois—who told her that he had received his master's orders to wait upon her and facilitate her journey, and that he had therefore begged Don John to send the Baron of Barlaymont with a troop of cavalry to escort her to Namur. Dubois being, as Margaret believed, wholly in the Spanish interest, it was impossible to tell him frankly her reasons for desiring to avoid both Namur and Don John. Handing him over therefore to her Cardinal, who being, in spite of his red hat,

in politics somewhat of a Huguenot, was naturally averse to falling into the hands of the Spaniards, she herself slipped out to her Dinan friends, told them of Don John's offer, and warned them that, if Barlaymont and his troopers were allowed to enter the town, Dinan would certainly share the fate of Namur. The hint took effect, and the royalist cavalry, arriving at the gate soon after, found it shut in their faces. Barlaymont himself was, however, permitted to enter; and he used all his eloquence to induce the burghers to allow his horsemen to follow him, and the Queen to take the road to Namur under his protection. But neither the burghers nor the Queen were to be cajoled. Having secretly made her preparations, Margaret left her inn on foot, attended by Barlaymont and Dubois, and, in spite of their remonstrances, took the way to the southern gate of the town. Built on a narrow slip of ground, between high and precipitous rocks and the deep and rapid Meuse, Dinan consists of little more than a single long street with a gate at either end. The troopers, being shut out at the northern gate, had no means of reaching the other. Through this southern gate Margaret therefore passed unhindered, and crossed the river with her horses and carriages, leaving Barlaymont and Dubois protesting on the bank, amongst the jeering populace, who, warmly espousing her cause, had furnished her with boats and a guide. She and her train were soon out of reach amongst the forest-clad hills of the Ardennes, where they rested for the night in the castle of a kinsman of Lalaing. Not without fresh alarms, but with safety and success, the Queen soon afterwards passed the French frontier and regained her castle of La Fère.



DEVICE OF DON JOHN.



CHAPTER VII.

AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS; FROM THE END OF JULY
 TO THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER 1577.



HE seizure of the citadel of Namur was not the only surprise by which Don John of Austria hoped to strengthen his own hands, and embarrass the policy of his opponents. Nor, indeed, was Namur the stronghold which he was most anxious to obtain. The visit of the Queen of Navarre gave him a good excuse for repairing thither,

and perhaps determined him to conduct in person the enterprise which had been so easy and successful. But the fortress of Antwerp, commanding the commercial capital and the great river of the Netherlands, was the place which above all others he desired

to see in the possession of troops firmly attached to the royal cause.

The citadel of Antwerp had been entrusted, with the approval of the Estates, to the command of the Duke of Aerschot. This nobleman, although he had used every art to ingratiate himself with Don John of Austria, had not succeeded in obtaining his full confidence, and probably had not been able to conceal from the observation of the Governor's spies the fact that he was also in frequent communication with the Prince of Orange. Possibly Aerschot might have been bought; but his slender abilities and his unstable character rendered the purchase unadvisable. Don John therefore removed him from Antwerp by requiring his attendance at Namur to meet the Queen of Navarre, an order which was fulfilled with the greatest alacrity by the Duke, whom Margaret describes as "one of the most gallant old courtiers who waited on Philip II. in Flanders and England, and delighted in Courts and attendance on the great." His brother the Marquess of Havrech and his son the Prince of Chimay were also summoned to Namur. In the absence of the Duke the command at Antwerp usually devolved on his son.¹ In the absence of both father and son it fell to the lot of the Baron of Treslong,² a zealous partisan of the royal cause, and fully prepared to take permanent possession of the place. Aerschot and Havrech approved, or affected to approve, the seizure of Namur,³ and although that step might well have suggested a suspicion that Don John would ere long endeavour to possess himself of the great citadel of the Scheldt, they do not seem to have suspected the plot with Treslong. It was indeed intended that the seizure of Antwerp should be as nearly as possible simultaneous with that of Namur; but it was not found practicable to make the attempt on the greater fortress until some days after the capture of the other.

Finding himself master of Namur, Don John immediately addressed a letter to the Estates at Bruxelles, dated 24th of July, to announce and explain the step which he had taken. His life, he said, was not safe except in a fortress. Not only were numbers of disbanded soldiers and other desperadoes lying in wait for him in all parts of the country, but persons of high rank had taken part in plots for his assassination or capture. He called upon the Estates, therefore, to institute a rigorous search for these conspirators, and to bring their leaders to punishment; and also to disarm

¹ Antonio Carnero : *Historia de las Guerras Civiles de Flandes*, p. 118.

² Louis de Blois, Seigneur de Treslong. The name is also variously written Turlon, Turlon, and Terlon.

³ A. Carnero : *Guerras Civiles*, p. 117.

both the soldiers and the citizens of Brabant. Meanwhile he had taken the only measure in his power for his own protection, by providing himself with a safe home in the castle of Namur.

Rassenghien, the bearer of this letter, was likewise furnished with copies of two anonymous letters of recent date (19th and 21st of July), in which Don John had been warned of a plot to seize and slay him, and which were to be laid before the Estates in proof of the danger to which he was exposed.

That Don John firmly and justly believed in the existence of that danger there is no reason to doubt. His capture would have been an immense gain to the Prince of Orange, by whom it had been distinctly advised and probably planned; it had likewise been planned, as Don John believed, by the Count of Lalaing in the interest of that section of the Catholic party who wished for a French ruler. His assassination was an act in which many a "wild Beggar" of the Sea or the Land would have gloried. It was an act in accordance with the habits and policy of the master whom he served, who had plotted with the Pope for the murder of Queen Elizabeth, and with Alba for the murder of Orange. But however sound his plea for possessing himself of the castle of Namur, his demand that the Estates should disarm not only their troops but the population seems to have been made rather as a pretext for future grievance than as a proposal with which compliance was expected.

The reply to Don John's letter was carried to Namur by Marolles, the Archdeacon of Ypres, and the Baron of Bresse. These envoys expressed, on behalf of the Estates, the utmost devotion to the King and to Don John. They ventured, however, to doubt the existence of the alleged conspiracies; and while they vouched for the desire of the Estates to punish the authors of any such plots, they said that it would be necessary for Don John to specify the names of those whom he believed to be guilty. These remarks did not satisfy the Governor, nor was his rejoinder reassuring to the Estates. He resented, not unnaturally, both their doubts and their suggestions; and he hinted, most unwisely, that he might now assume a higher tone, being in possession, not only of Namur, but also of the citadel of Antwerp. After a somewhat angry conference the archdeacon and his companions returned to Bruxelles.

Don John at this important juncture seems to have been singularly irresolute. No sooner were the envoys gone than he sent Rassenghien and the royal treasurer, Schetz van Grobben-

donck, to Bruxelles with a letter to the Estates. Its tone and spirit were not likely to allay the irritation produced by his words. Repeating the allegations of conspiracies against his person, Don John complained, at great length and with great bitterness, of the proceedings of the Prince of Orange, who, he said, was endeavouring to obtain possession of Amsterdam and Utrecht by intrigue, and of the people of Holland and Zeland who were seeking to put down by extermination the Catholic religion in those Provinces, and who had openly declared that they would not obey the States-General should that body decree the maintenance of the ancient faith.

He now demanded that the States should cease to hold any communication with Orange, should he any longer delay to fulfil the Ghent Treaty; that they should provide himself with a suitable bodyguard; and that they should submit to him a list of persons qualified to sit in the States-General, in order that he might know whether any of them were too objectionable to be allowed to take their places in that body.

This letter, avowing an intention of interfering in an arbitrary and unconstitutional manner with the rights of popular representation, could hardly have been written in a more inopportune moment. It was dated the 27th of July. On the 28th of July Orange laid before the deputies of the Estates, who were in attendance upon him at Middelburg, a packet of secret despatches from Don John and his secretary Escovedo to the King and Antonio Perez. The bearer of this packet had fallen, as he rode through Gascony, into the hands of the Huguenots, and the precious documents were immediately forwarded by the King of Navarre to his friend and ally the Prince of Orange. Orange lost no time in making them known to the Estates, amongst whose representatives were many men of royalist predilections who still clung to the hope that a reconciliation might be effected between Spanish authority and the liberties of the Netherlands.

The letters were eight in number—four being addressed by Escovedo to the King, three by Don John to the King, and one by Don John to Antonio Perez. The dates ranged from the 27th of March to the 9th of April.¹ In these confidential communications, the writers, of course, spoke of the Estates in terms very different from those which would have been employed in papers intended or likely to be seen by the members or the public; but

¹ They are all printed in *Sommier Discours* amongst the *Lettres interceptées*, sheets A—F after p. 71.

the language was much less free and bitter than that which they frequently used in other despatches which time has since brought to light. The Estates and their supporters were spoken of as a party hostile to the King and faithless to all engagements, and the Spanish soldiery as the loyal servants of the Crown, whom it was necessary to treat with apparent coldness while they remained in the Low Countries, but who would be rewarded as they deserved when they reached Italy.¹ Orange and his friends must have read with satisfaction the warnings, addressed to the King by Don John and Escovedo, of the loss of influence in Germany which would result from the ill-humour of the German mercenaries, and their confessions of the low condition of their monetary and moral credit. "I cannot borrow a real," wrote Escovedo, "nor will any person connected with the merchants' house venture to trust your Majesty or treat with me, unless I can put the money down."² The Estates and State Council, he complained, would aid him in nothing, although he had made them a long speech, "but they love your Majesty so coldly that they will not move a step."³ "As for me," wrote Don John, "I know not what to say to people who are utterly weary of words."⁴

The evidence of dangerous designs afforded by these letters the Estates found corroborated by external facts. They were of course cognizant of the movements of bodies of German troops towards Antwerp; and it was hardly possible not to connect these suspicious movements with the language so lately held to their own deputies by Don John himself with regard to his possession of that citadel. Subsequent events indeed render it highly probable that some of the members of the Estates may have had information of the plans of Don John, and may have been in the secret as to the means by which these plans were about to be frustrated.

Meanwhile the letter of the Governor required an answer. The reply took the form of a series of resolutions. It embodied the usual professions of loyalty to the King and fidelity to the Catholic faith, and it granted to Don John a bodyguard of three hundred foot. They likewise promised to use every means to procure the fulfilment of the Ghent Treaty by the Prince of Orange. But they distinctly refused to furnish the Governor with the required lists of persons eligible for seats in the States-General, and denied his right to strike off names on the part of

¹ *Sommier Discours.* Don John to the King, April 7.

² *Sommier Discours.* A 3.

³ *Ibid.* B 2.

⁴ *Ibid.* D 3.

the Crown, or in any other way to interfere in the free election of their representatives by the nobles, the clergy, and the municipal corporations. With a plainness of speech upon which they had not hitherto ventured, they now signified their disapproval of the seizure of Namur Castle by requesting Don John to restore it to its former commander ; and they further informed him that a key to his policy had been found in a parcel of intercepted correspondence with Spain.

The bearers of this important communication were the Count of Bossu, De Bresse and Meetkercke. It was especially mortifying to Don John to find a distinguished royalist like Bossu coming before him to present a paper which might be considered as a declaration of war. The conference which ensued was long and, as might be expected, somewhat angry. Don John reiterated his complaints of conspiracies countenanced in high places, and of the intrigues of Orange, who, he said, had sowed broadcast over the whole country treasonable doctrines, which were ripening into a harvest of heresy and sedition. He asked the Estates if they would or would not rally round their King like loyal men. He had himself faithfully observed the Ghent Treaty ; he had done everything in his power to inspire confidence and deserve gratitude, but he had obtained neither from the turbulent thankless people whom he had been sent to rule. The envoys remarked in reply that the Ghent Treaty could not be said to have been fulfilled until the German mercenaries had been disbanded or removed, and until the States-General had been assembled and its opinion taken and carried into effect on many important public questions. These things had not been done, and for their delay or omission the Governor was mainly responsible. In the repetition, under various forms and with various degrees of warmth and bitterness, of these charges and counter-charges, an interview lasting several hours was passed, with no practical result except mutual exasperation and estrangement. The envoys then returned to Bruxelles to enjoy the news of events at Antwerp, which news soon arrived at Namur to increase the mortification and the embarrassment of Don John.

Treslong, the officer in charge of the castle of Antwerp in the absence of the Duke of Aerschot, entered upon his duties with a firm resolution and a sanguine hope to render his temporary command permanent by executing the design with which Don John had entrusted him. He was in close relations with the three colonels—Fugger, Polwiller, and Frondsberg—of the three

German regiments quartered in the city. These officers had also been prepared by Don John for the part which they had to play. A German regiment of cavalry, commanded by Van Ende, one of the most able and ferocious mercenaries of the day, occupied country quarters in Brabant. This officer, who with his soldiery had played an active part in the Fury of Antwerp of the preceding year, had received secret instructions to assemble his troops and move them towards the city. On a given day he presented himself at the gates and requested permission to quarter his men within the walls. The same request had likewise been made on his behalf to the municipal authorities by the Governor-General himself. But the burghers of Antwerp were of opinion that in the three regiments already stationed there they had a sufficient number of military guests; they demurred to Don John's reasoning that a regiment of cavalry was needed for their protection; and they told the colonel that he must seek quarters elsewhere. Unprepared to meet this refusal or to enforce his demand, Van Ende was still less prepared for an attack by a body of Estates troops, who drove his bewildered cavalry in confusion from the gate. Champagny was no longer governor of the city, but his successor, Liedekerke, was not only equally zealous for the rights of the Estates, but also a secret friend and partisan of Orange. He seems to have had information of the designs upon the citadel, and he was prepared to meet the plans of Treslong by a bold counter-movement of which the royalist party had no suspicion. A captain of the garrison of the citadel, named De Bours, secretly attached to the cause of liberty, had pointed out to him that the ill-paid mercenaries within the fortress were open to receive a bribe, and that the place might belong to either party who choose to buy it. Liedekerke and Martini, an Orangist town-clerk, at once applied to the chief merchants, who immediately furnished them with a large sum of money. This money, judiciously expended by De Bours, soon corrupted the garrison; and, at the moment when Treslong hoped to execute the project of Don John, he found that he had but a single company upon whom he could rely for support. He was therefore obliged to write to his chief, on the 1st of August, that he was not only quite unable to seize the citadel, but that his own soldiers were ready at any moment "to take him by the throat."¹

The despatch still lay on his table when the moment actually came. On the same day, the 1st of August, De Bours and his

¹ *Discours Sommaire*, Appendix, pp. 76, 77.

accomplices, acting on a plan concerted with their friends in the town, rose and overpowered their comrades who remained faithful to the Spanish King. Although the struggle was neither long nor severe, a trifling incident greatly alarmed the citizens as to its issue. The hat of De Bours fell into the ditch between the town and the castle, and was recognized by the scouts who had been posted to watch the progress of the affair. Liedekerke, awaiting the result in the house of Martini, was informed that De Bours was slain. Martini went towards the citadel to ascertain the truth of the report, and in the street leading to it was met by the joyful cry, "The Beggars have taken the castle." Returning with the good news to his chief, they immediately repaired to the fortress, summoning thither the magistrates and the leading citizens. Treslong was a prisoner, and his papers afforded abundant evidence of the existence of the plot which De Bours had anticipated and forestalled, and of the secret understanding which existed between Don John and the German regiments quartered in the town. The question now arose—"What was to be done "with these regiments?" which were sufficiently strong and always willing to pillage the city and renew the recent horrors of the Fury. It was agreed to address to them also the argument which had proved so powerful in the citadel. The merchants offered to advance three hundred thousand crowns, which it was hoped they might accept in discharge of their arrears, with the annexed condition of evacuating the place.

Meanwhile the three colonels, uneasy at the turn affairs were taking, and receiving no orders from Treslong, ordered their men under arms and mustered them in the beautiful Place de Meer, an oblong square bordered by the rich gables of mansions of the commercial magnates. There the officers held a council of war. Not approving of their position for purposes of defence, they moved the troops into the new town as the day wore on, and selecting more advantageous ground near the river, barricaded the approaches with gun-carriages and other hastily-collected materials. Before this rude camp there soon appeared from the fortress a deputation bearing a white flag. The envoys announced that they were prepared to treat for the immediate payment of a liberal portion of the arrears of pay due to the soldiers, on condition of the immediate evacuation of the city. Commissioners to conduct the negotiation were appointed on both sides. One hundred and fifty thousand crowns were offered on the part of the Estates; and the wealthy capitalists of the city, familiar

figures on the exchange and the quays, appeared on the bridge leading from the old town to the new with bags of money in proof of the sincerity of the proposal, and of the prompt payment which would follow the closing of the bargain. The unexpected offer struck the imagination of the soldiers, and they swore that they would take their officers' lives if they failed in securing an opportunity which might not again occur. A good deal of haggling took place between the commissioners, the military representatives wishing to increase the sum proposed and the merchants to save as much as possible of the still larger sum which they were ready at a pinch to produce. Soldierly greed did good and unforeseen service to mercantile thrift. The sun began to go down upon the unfinished bargain. A westerly breeze was curling the waters of the Scheldt, and a number of sails appeared on the distant waters. Ere long a considerable squadron of vessels of war, bearing the flag of the Prince of Orange, came abreast of the town. The admiral, Haultain, had been sent against the island of Tholen; but tidings of important events at Antwerp induced him to take advantage of the favourable wind to pay that port a visit. The German troops had reason to regret their retreat from the Place de Meer. Their flank lay exposed to the river, and a few shot from Haultain's guns soon came crashing through their hasty barricades. A panic seized them in the sudden presence of the redoubtable Beggars of the Sea. Forgetting both the hundred and fifty thousand crowns which the merchants were actually pressing upon their acceptance, and their private stores of plunder, they turned and fled for their lives through the gates into the open country, some of them in their terror even plunging into the Scheldt. Fugger rallied a part of his regiment, and retreated into Bergen-op-Zoom, where they were immediately besieged, and in a few days compelled to surrender by Champagny, the soldiers laying down their arms and giving up their colonel as a prisoner. The remainder of the fugitives from Antwerp retired under Polwiller to Ruremonde, and under Frondsberg to Breda. After two months Breda fell by a successful stratagem. A messenger from Don John, proceeding thither with a despatch which promised assistance and urged Frondsberg to hold out until it came, was taken prisoner, and was bribed by Orange to become the bearer of a skilfully-forged letter of a precisely opposite tenor. The traitorous agent, a captain in the royal army, entered so warmly into the scheme that he used all his personal influence in giving circulation and

credit to the false tidings that Don John, being besieged himself, was hopeless of succouring Breda. Discouraged by the news and weary of the leaguer, the German soldiery, like their comrades at Bergen-op-Zoom, seized their colonel and delivered him, the fortress, and their own arms, to the Estates. Van Ende and his cavalry, after their repulse from Antwerp, retired to Namur, where they clamorously demanded their pay. Don John's empty coffers being unable to satisfy this demand, the troopers disbanded themselves and returned to Germany.¹ The little band of gentlemen who adhered to the royal cause rendered some assistance to the Governor from their private funds, some of them giving him their plate and jewels. Barlaymont and his sons contributed twelve thousand florins. It was thought advisable to expend this money not in paying the soldiers of the King, but in corrupting those of the Estates. By these means the fortresses of Marienburg and Charlemont fell into the hands of Don John. An attempt to buy the garrison of Philippeville failed. Bovines might have been purchased, but a bargain could not be struck for lack of six hundred crowns.²

The abortive attempt on Antwerp was most disastrous to the interests of Don John and the King. Failure brought with it a loss greater than any advantage which could reasonably have been hoped for from success. The great citadel was no longer, as it had hitherto been, partly in his power, but wholly in the hands of the Estates, whose leaders, indignant at what they considered his treachery, were more than ever under the influence of Orange. The city of Antwerp, for the first time during twelve miserable years, was cleared of royal troops. The Germans, upon whom the royal cause for the present seemed wholly to lean, had proved a broken reed. Van Ende and his horse had suffered a defeat, and the three regiments of foot had suddenly disappeared from the scene, a part of the force having laid down their arms, and the rest being shut up in the swamps of Breda. The Prince of Orange had long been warning the Provinces that Don John was not to be trusted, and his warnings, which many Catholic ears had refused to entertain, had now been justified by events at Namur and Antwerp. Utrecht, which had demurred to accepting his authority, now received him with alacrity on the same terms as Haarlem and Amsterdam. It is no wonder that Don John looked around him with rage and disappointment approaching to

¹ Vanderhammen : *D. Juan de Austria*, f. 303.

² Carnero : *Guerras Civiles de Flandes*, p. 119.

despair, and that he redoubled his importunity with his brother for supplies of Spanish steel and Spanish gold. To his sister, the Empress-Dowager Maria, he wrote:—"These rebels think " that now fortune is all smiles for them and all ruin for " me. The wretches are growing proud, and forget that their " chastisement some fine morning will yet arrive."¹

The same letter affords a striking illustration of the condition of the average princely mind of that age, and of its inability to perceive the existence of any rights or any wrongs except those possessed or suffered by Princes. "Your Majesty will observe," he wrote, "how little advantage has resulted to these evil men " from all the good which has been done for them. After all, " they love and obey in all things the most perverse and " tyrannical heretic and rebel on earth, that convicted criminal " the Prince of Orange, and abhor and condemn the name and " orders of their Prince and natural lord, without fear of God or " respect to man." He devoutly believed that Philip II., by spending the blood and gold of one portion of his subjects in overthrowing the liberties and forcing the consciences of another, was establishing a new claim to the gratitude and reverence of the world. His own condition, shut up in the castle of Namur, he described as very forlorn. The Provinces being in open revolt, or full of conspirators ready to take his life, he could hardly venture beyond the walls; and he could rely on the loyalty of none except of the "little band" who had accompanied him, like gentlemen of honour, resolute in their duty to God and their King. "God knows," he added, "how much I desire to avoid " extremities, but I know what to do with men who show " themselves so obstinately rebellious." The Estates, having derived so much light from the letter-bag from Gascony and the portfolio of Treslong, were now diligent in intercepting the Governor's correspondence, and this letter fell into the hands of the rebels whom it menaced and denounced.

It must remain a matter of doubt and conjecture how far Don John entertained the wish or the hope to avoid the extremities to which affairs were evidently hastening, and to effect a peaceful solution of the ancient and embittered quarrel between King and people which had so long wasted the Netherlands and drenched them periodically with blood. It is certain that he foresaw the imminent necessity of exchanging the pen for the sword, and that he was earnestly preparing to meet it. He had not only written

¹ *Discours Sommer*, App. p. 82.

repeatedly and urgently to the King for troops and money, and sent Escovedo to Court to press his wants upon the royal attention, but he had also applied several weeks before the seizure of Namur to the Marquess of Ayamonte, Governor of Milan, and to Don Juan de Idiaquez, the Spanish agent at Genoa, entreating them to send back the Spanish troops whom he had so lately and so unwillingly dismissed from the Low Countries.

The party of the Estates, being divided in its views, had less of definite purpose than its antagonist. The influence of Orange was of course largely increased by the occurrence of events which he had predicted and the success of measures which he had counselled ; but, on the other hand, this increase quickened the activity of the great Catholic nobles who hated both Philip II. and Orange.

For the present neither Don John nor the Estates were prepared to take any decisive step. The loss of the German regiments had paralysed the one ; and this, together with the acquisition of the citadel of Antwerp, had placed the other in easy security.

The communications which passed between them during the months of August and September were so barren of results as to be now almost destitute of interest. Neither party seemed to have much hope of influencing the other by the elaborate papers which it exchanged, and each was busy with preparations and negotiations which these papers were intended not to discuss but to conceal. Demands and propositions were made on each side without any expectation that they would be conceded or accepted.

Don John endeavoured to supply his present want of material force by the use of language which implied that such force would not long be wanting. From his fastness of Namur, where he lay almost beleaguered by his angry and hostile subjects, he addressed the States on the 7th of August in terms which might have befitted a victorious general at the head of a great army blockading Bruxelles. The document was divided into twenty-three articles, each embodying a separate demand. Of these demands the chief were that all the forces of the country should be at once placed under his control ; that the laws against heretics and heretic preachers should be enforced in Brabant and Flanders ; that the citizens of Bruxelles who had taken arms should lay them down ; that Treslong should be released from prison and restored to the command of the citadel of Antwerp ; that Orange should be required to withdraw his fleet from its present stations, give up

Nieuport to the King, and suppress the reformed religion within his governments under pain of being immediately attacked by the troops of the Estates.

Six days later, on the 13th of August, and before the above remarkable despatch had been answered by the Estates, it was followed by a second, in which Don John treated another subject. The former despatch set forth what he conceived to be the rights of the King; he now entered into his own private views and feelings with regard to the duties which he had been sent to perform. Earnestly desiring peace, and detesting war, he wrote that he most sincerely wished to be relieved from his present painful position. If he were as distasteful to the Netherlanders as he appeared to be he would resign his office, and leave the country as soon as his successor should be named. The question of peace or war must be determined, he said, not by him, but by the Estates themselves, and he warned them of the responsibility before God and man which the decision would lay upon them. The letter ended with a piece of irony not in keeping with its previous tone,—a request that the Estates would oblige him by sending on to Namur, when they had finished reading them, his despatches from Spain, which had fallen into their hands, as he would be glad to read them himself.

The Estates replied to both these letters at once on the 15th August. Adhering to the customary expressions of attachment and loyalty towards the King with whom they had been so long at war, and their fidelity to the faith which so large a portion of the people had cast off, they disclaimed responsibility for the unsatisfactory relations which now existed between themselves and the King's representative. They had disbanded nearly all their troops, while Don John had been for long using every effort to strengthen the royal forces. They reminded him that the intercepted letters of himself and Escovedo had made them aware of the evil counsels to which he had unhappily listened, and of the intrigues which had been set on foot against them. Finally they appealed to his own candour whether, after these discoveries, they were not justified in distrusting his disposition to observe treaties, and in taking precautions for their own safety.

Don John soon afterwards issued a long address, a kind of manifesto, to the provincial Estates, Bishops, Councillors, and cities of the Netherlands, in which he announced the King's desire and his own for peace, defended his own intentions and acts, protested against the calumnies circulated against him, and

declared his readiness to resign his office if any other Prince or Princess more acceptable to the country could be found to take it. He also proposed to the States the cessation of hostilities and the appointment of a commission to consider the best means of fully executing the Ghent Treaty ; and, in a second edition of this proposal, he suggested the exchange of hostages as a measure preliminary to its adoption.

As the pretensions and the language of Don John became less haughty, those of the Estates rose from humility and moderation to arrogance and personal discourtesy. The Estates were daily becoming stronger in public support at home and in promised support from abroad. They knew that old soldiers were daily coming in in small parties from France and Germany to Namur, and they had besides intercepted Don John's letter to the Empress-Dowager, in which his real sentiments were so openly avowed. The exasperation of feeling produced by this discovery found vent in various expressions in replies to his papers, which the Governor must have felt to be insulting. For example, Don John's professions of his readiness to resign his viceregal office were met, in one letter, by the remark that his resignation would be borne with equanimity, and in another by the hope that his successor, if a member of the royal family, might at least be a legitimate son of the House.¹ At length, on the 26th of August, they replied to his various proposals and advances by a categorical statement of the terms upon which they were willing once more to repose confidence in his sincerity. This document, a fitting counterpart to the one addressed to them on the 7th of August, was drawn up under the advice of Orange. Don John was required to disband all his foreign soldiery, to send the Germans at once out of the country, to remove from all offices, civil or military, within the Netherlands, every foreigner, and to renounce his secret league with the Guise party in France. He was further to undertake to govern for the future by the advice of the State Council, and to be in all matters ruled by the majority of that body, which was to approve all decrees and despatches before they could be received as authentic. As if there were not enough of indignity in this proposal, that he should be the honorary and impotent chief of the Republican Government devised by Orange, Don John was finally requested to abstain for the future from writing such calumnies against the States, as had lately been found in his

¹ Meteren, vi. 119. Quoted by Motley, iii. 174, note.

letter to the Empress-Dowager, the fate of which was thus insultingly announced.

Don John's reply, dated on the 28th of August, was very long and argumentative, but temperate in tone. It was, in fact, a defence of his whole administration. He did not deny the intercepted letters sent from Gascony, but defended his portion of the correspondence on the ground that it had taken place before he had been recognized by the Estates as Governor. For the opinions and views of Escovedo he was not responsible. His negotiations with the German colonels had been necessitated by the open military preparations of Orange. When his enemies were openly arming, why should he not also take measures for his own safety and the protection of the King's rights? As to the seizure of Namur, he was compelled by plots against his life, of which he had received intelligence from persons of high rank, to provide himself with a fortress as a residence. He concluded by hoping that peace might be preserved, and by proposing a conference and previous exchange of hostages.

Pending these fruitless negotiations between Bruxelles and Namur, the Estates, on the 24th of August and 8th of September, addressed two long despatches to the King at Madrid. These papers recapitulated the misgovernment and consequent miseries of the country, matters which had been for years urged upon Philip's notice in every possible shape, and were now set forth with a plainness and boldness which gave some novelty to a trite subject. The King was asked to find a remedy for the ruin which his policy had wrought, and he was told that there was little hope of its being effectual if it were to be applied by a Governor whose insolence and double-dealing had given deep and general offence to the nation. Should he, however, prefer to continue Don John in office, they would endeavour to forget his past misdeeds in his personal good qualities; should he see fit to give him a successor, they hoped that that successor would be a legitimate member of the royal House!¹

An English envoy, William Davison, was sent over in August to represent to Don John the Queen's desire to aid in the pacification of the Netherlands, and to urge his adherence to the Treaty of Ghent.² Courteously received, and assured of the Governor's desire for peace in the usual vague terms, Davison

¹ Meteren, vii. 123. Quoted by Motley, iii. 179.

² State Paper office, Flanders, 1577. No. 30. August 2. Instructions to Mr. William Davison, upon his being sent as Her Majesty's agent into the Low Countries.

was struck with the preparations for war which everywhere met his eye. He informed his Government that Don John was levying men abroad, as far as his scanty funds permitted, and that if his treasury had been full he would by this time, by means of his connexions in Germany, France, and Savoy, have been at the head of a large force. By the Duke of Guise he was supposed to be promised twelve thousand men.¹ The English exiles had been feeding him with hopes of domestic troubles in England. Davison, being detained at Bruxelles, found it expedient to send the Queen's letter, with a letter from himself, to Don John by a gentleman attached to his mission. In remitting the replies to Walsingham, the envoy wrote:—"By them both you may see what fair weather he maketh, though I think your honour doth thoroughly understand what he pretendeth. . . . I would have sent the gent. himself over that he might have reported how he was sifted amongst them at Namur, but that I have otherwise specially to employ him. They examined him how we did yet in England, whether we were not together by the ears; how we did in Ireland; how the Scottish Queen fared, and whether she were not yet at liberty, shaking the head when he answered no, and concluding, with the finger before the mouth, in these terms, *Tout avec le temps*. This thing may suffice to give a taste of their hope."²

Possessed of the citadel of Antwerp, the Estates now exercised the rights of ownership in a very vigorous manner, with the full approval of the magistrates and people of that fortress-ridden city. Orange had long counselled the destruction of the strongholds of tyranny whenever an opportunity occurred, and those who had hitherto neglected his advice had had good reason to repent their neglect. It being determined to destroy the fortifications on the side of the town, on the 28th of August³ the demolition was mainly accomplished by the voluntary labour of the citizens. All ranks and sexes crowded to the crumbling walls, anxious to have some share in undoing the evil work of the hated Alba. His colossal and vainglorious statue, erected by himself, and prudently removed by Requesens, was found in an obscure corner of the place. Dragged from its concealment, it

¹ State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 30. W. Davison to Sir Francis Walsingham and to Lord Treasurer, 24th August and 9th September.

² State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 30. W. Davison to Sir F. Walsingham, 19th August.

³ *Histoire des troubles et guerres civiles des Pays-Bas. . . . Depuis l'an 1559 jusques à l'an 1581.* 1582, 8vo, p. 421.

was broken to shivers by the populace, and pieces of the bronze were carried off to be hung as trophies in private houses. The metal, which had once been cannon, was recast into its original shape, and the brazen image of the Duke, "who had been made " of menaces, was turned into machines which in his absence " would continue to terrify Flanders."¹ Valenciennes, Ghent, Utrecht, and other places also followed the advice of Orange, and improved on the example of Antwerp, by utterly destroying the citadels which had so often galled them.

¹ Strada : *De Bello Belgico*, lib. ix.



SOLDIERS PLAYING AT BACKGAMMON.



CHAPTER VIII.

AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS ; FROM THE MIDDLE OF
SEPTEMBER 1577 TO THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY 1578.



NLIKE Antwerp and other towns, the capital had no citadel to raze. But an event now occurred at Bruxelles which marked the temper of the time as strongly as the demolitionary enthusiasm of other cities. The Estates formally invited the Prince of Orange to visit the capital and assist them with his counsel. The man whom the Viceroy

called in his letters an arch-rebel and heretic was entreated by the representatives of the people of the Netherlands to aid them in their negotiations with the representative of the King. The invitation was conveyed to the Prince by four commissioners, of whom Champagny, a zealous Catholic and brother of Granvelle, was the chief. They were, it is true, bearers of a memorial which, however respectful and flattering in tone, nevertheless bore marks of the hand of that party which was the great stumbling-block and the final obstacle to the complete liberation of the Netherlands. The Prince was asked to repair at once to Bruxelles, to give the Estates the benefit of his singular prudence, experience, and patriotism. But as it was constantly and calumniously asserted that the nobles

and the Provinces were urged by the Prince to change both their sovereign and their religion, he was likewise asked to make some authoritative declaration of a contrary tendency, and to the effect that he and the Estates of Holland and Zeland would faithfully observe all their obligations; that these Estates and the places which had more recently joined the Prince would allow of the exercise of the Catholic religion within their territories; and that that religion should never be molested, nor any other worship introduced in the other Provinces of the Netherlands.

In the face of the cessation of persecution and the consequent spread of reformed doctrines and observances into almost all parts of the country, these were pledges which it was impossible and would have been absurd for the Prince to give. He therefore gave none, beyond a promise to abide by the Ghent Treaty—that Treaty to which all parties professed adherence and applied a different interpretation—and an assurance that neither he nor the Estates of Holland and Zeland would permit any violation of the rights of Catholic worship. For the invitation to Bruxelles he thanked the commissioners in the most courteous terms, and expressed his strong desire to meet his friends there once more. But he could not accept it, he declared, until he had received the permission of the Estates of Holland and Zeland, who had treated him with so much confidence and affection, and who were about to assemble at Gouda. This permission was granted, but not without some difficulty. The Hollanders placed unbounded confidence in their “father William,” but they greatly mistrusted the Catholic nobles and the Spanish partisans, open and secret, who frequented Bruxelles. During his absence, by the command of the Estates of Holland and Zeland, prayers were offered daily in the churches for his safe return. Antwerp received him with great enthusiasm on the 17th of September. His entry into Bruxelles on the afternoon of the 23d was a perfect triumph. It was eleven years since he had set foot in the city. That his influence there had not been impaired by absence he immediately proved, by breaking through the negotiations between the Estates and Don John, just as they appeared to be on the eve of a peaceful issue, and as men began to hope for a settlement of the troubles. William the Silent saw that these hopes of peace were illusory and dangerous, and to dissipate them was a chief object of his visit to Bruxelles.

Grobbendonck, Willerval, and the Bishop of Bruges, the last envoys to Namur, had succeeded beyond their utmost expectations.

As royal treasurer, an official servant of the King, Grobbendonck had acted, before the attempt on Antwerp, as one of the negotiators on the part of the Governor,¹ to whom it must have been a mortification to find him now representing the Estates. An acute and plausible man, Grobbendonck nevertheless continued to enjoy the personal regard of Don John, and appeared rather as a mediator between the two parties than as the advocate of the Estates. He remained for some time at Namur after his colleagues had departed, and the result of many conferences was a proposal on the part of the Governor conceding all the more important claims of the Estates,² and tacitly receding from all the more offensive and absurd of his own demands.³ With this document the treasurer returned to Bruxelles before the middle of September. After the usual solemn recognition of the Ghent Treaty and the Perpetual Edict, Don John proposed that both parties should bury the past in oblivion, discontinue hostilities, disband all troops actually in arms beyond what the ordinary garrison duty required, give notice of dismissal to mercenaries who had been retained, forbid the passage of armed bands into the Provinces from abroad, restore confiscated property, and liberate prisoners. As soon as the Estates should pay the German troops in the royal service they should be dismissed, and the fortresses of Namur, Charlemont, and Marienburg would be restored to their former governors. The magistrates of the towns were then to take oaths of fidelity to the King and the Catholic religion, and all men return to their peaceful avocations. For himself, Don John offered to retire to Luxemburg and perform his functions as Governor there, until the King's pleasure with regard to his successor should be known.

The Estates did not receive this proposal with the immediate acquiescence which might have been expected. They drew up a reply on the 15th of September in which they commented on its various provisions and demanded sundry alterations, such as that the cessation of hostilities should be held to commence when the castle of Namur was evacuated; that they should be permitted to retain, for the defence of the country against the German mercenaries and the French, seven regiments at their choice, six of foot and one of horse; and that a special stipulation should be made that no armed men should be permitted to come across the frontier of Luxemburg. Grobbendonck remonstrated strongly

¹ See p. 246.

On the 26th August; see p. 257.

³ On the 7th August; see p. 255.

against these demands, which could only prolong the negotiations and mortify and exasperate Don John. He reminded them of the many risks of war, of the difficulty of paying their soldiers, of the wasted country, and the fluctuations of popular sentiment. The fleet of the Indies had brought the King three millions of crowns, and he would now hear of the demolition of his Netherland fortresses, news of which the Spanish officers, who had been sent out of the Provinces in the spring, would not fail to use in order to enrage him against his Flemish subjects and procure their own return to their favourite field of plunder. Was not this a time rather for accepting fair terms than for disputing them, for driving a nail of good understanding into the whirling wheel of trouble and confusion? This reasoning, sound as it appears, was not listened to, and Grobbendonck and his former companions were directed to carry the answer of the Estates unmodified to Namur. Don John, being unwell, could not receive them in formal audience for two days, but he permitted Grobbendonck to visit him in private and give him an outline of the requirements of the Estates. After some amicable conferences and explanations on both sides the envoys returned with an answer from Don John conceding, with slight exceptions, all their demands.

On the basis thus obtained a convention between Don John and the Estates was prepared at Bruxelles, was submitted to the Estates, and received their approval. It was at this eleventh hour that Orange, now at Antwerp, intervened. He insisted on the insertion in the convention of certain new conditions which Don John had not seen, and to which it was impossible to suppose he could agree. These important conditions were that the Count of Buren, the son of Orange, should be sent back from Spain to his father within some short specified time; that the Queen of England should be made a party to the convention; that all public affairs should be conducted by the Governor under the advice of the majority of a Council of State to be nominated by the States-General, and that no public document should be valid until it had been signed by a member of this council.

Against these new conditions Grobbendonck protested with great energy, both publicly and in private conference with the leading men of the Estates. He well knew Don John's humour and temper, he said, and he was certain the convention so altered might as well not be sent to him at all. At this stage of the affair these new stipulations ought not to be made, and if peace was desired they must be withdrawn. But the treasurer argued

against one whose will was now paramount, and he argued in vain. He declined therefore to take any further share in the negotiations with Namur, partly on account of ill-health and partly because he despaired of any favourable result.¹

The convention as now modified might have well been condensed into a single article—that Don John should abdicate his delegated authority in favour of the Prince of Orange. The Bishop of Bruges and Willerval, who carried the instrument back to Namur, were hard put to it to give any plausible excuse for the violent changes which had been made in it, and which provoked the indignation of the Governor and the laughter of some of his Spanish attendants. They vainly endeavoured to prove that there was no necessary connexion between the presence of Orange at Bruxelles and the sudden importation of insulting conditions into a negotiation which had been just before his arrival conducted with an evident desire on both sides for conciliation and agreement. The truth was too apparent to Don John and the whole world that his great rival had now taken the management of affairs at Bruxelles, and that his voice was for war. After somewhat warmly expressing his displeasure at the manner in which he had been treated, the Governor desired to know for how many days hostilities might still be considered as suspended. The Estates would not accord a truce of more than three days. Don John endeavoured to lengthen the term, but in vain, and in a letter, temperate and dignified in tone, he intimated to the Estates that as it was obvious that in spite of their professions of attachment to the Church and to the King they were prepared to trample on both, he accepted the issue which they had raised. This letter was dated the 2d of October. On the same day, having placed the castle of Namur in the best state of defence that circumstances permitted, he took his departure for Marché-en-Famine. There he remained for a few days, and thence proceeded to Luxemburg, where the Spanish troops, now ordered from Italy and actually on their march, were soon expected to muster.

In reviewing these proceedings of the two parties it is impossible to deny that Don John had a right to complain of the shifting and tortuous policy of the Estates. He had submitted

¹ *Mémoire et recueil de ce qu'est passé entre le Seigneur Don Jan d'Autriche, etc. depuis sa retraite au chateau de Namur que fust le 24e de Juillet 1577, jusques a la rompüre de la paix entre son Altesse et les Estats de par de la, rédigé par escrit par le Sieur Grobbendonck comme y aiant esté entremis.* Printed in the *Compte-Rendu des Séances de la Commission Royale d' Histoire*, tom. x., Bruxelles, 8vo, pp. 172-223.

to them a proposal, which they had entertained on condition of certain suggested alterations, and he, having accepted these alterations, had a right to expect that no fresh demands would be put forward in the convention submitted for his signature. It is perhaps difficult to believe that he intended to abide by this convention, or that his fair promises were made for any other purpose than to gain time for fresh hordes of Spanish soldiery to march from the Milanese to the Netherlands. But it may be asked, Why did not the Estates, without relaxing their own preparations for the foreseen struggle, accept the offered terms, and leave with Don John and his master the responsibility of repudiating the bargain, instead of themselves resorting to unfair means of preventing a bargain from being concluded on their own terms? The truth seems to be that the demands of the Estates rose and fell, according as the influence of Orange or the Catholic lords preponderated in their counsels. The one party was for firmness tending to defiance,¹ the other for conciliation tending to submission, and the policy of the Estates took its tone from each by turns.

The crisis of affairs being now reached, the Estates put forth a "Summary discourse of the causes and reasons which constrained them to provide for their defence against Don John of Austria."² Besides the intercepted letters of Don John and Escovedo to the King and Perez, of March and April, already noticed, it contained a number of letters from Don John to the German colonels Frondsberg and Fugger, bearing date the 16th of July to the 8th of August; an important letter from Treslong to Don John, of 1st of August; and a letter dated the 14th of August from Don John to his sister the Empress-Dowager Maria, widow of Maximilian II. The letters to the colonels, though worded with great caution, and referring those officers to verbal messages, afforded strong presumptive evidence, when read by the light of recent events, of the plot to seize the citadel of Antwerp. In the letter to the Empress Don John informed her that affairs with the Estates had come to such a pass that his person would have been seized had he not secured himself in the castle of Namur, and that the Estates and people had ceased to recognize or obey either God or His Majesty, but had transferred their allegiance to the most perverse tyrant and heretic rebel in the

¹ See p. 257.

² *Sommier discours des justes causes et raisons qu'ont constraint les Estats Generaux des Pays-Bas de pourveoir à leur deffence contre le Seigneur Don Jehan d'Austrice.* Anvers, 1577, 4to, p. 22.

world, the damnable (*condeñado*) Prince of Orange. The volume, which was written with great dignity and moderation, was published in seven languages, and it was sent with an address to all the sovereigns of Europe.

A reply on the part of Don John, entitled "A true and simple " narrative," giving his account of the same transactions, soon afterwards appeared, and was widely circulated in a similar manner.¹ It was also a very skilful political pamphlet, written in a tone which princely readers may have regarded as singularly forbearing. Great stress was laid on the constant plots for Don John's capture and assassination, which were directly attributed to the Count of Lalaing and the Prince of Orange. The insults inflicted upon the followers and servants of the Governor were also set forth, without passion or minute detail ; and a full and not unfair account was given of the rupture of negotiations on account of the new and exorbitant articles thrust into the convention by the Estates at Bruxelles, after its terms had been finally adjusted between their envoys and Don John at Namur. The seizure of Namur castle was lightly touched upon as an unimportant event, in which only the Governor's personal attendants were concerned ; and the plot to seize Antwerp was altogether unnoticed, except perhaps in the admission that Treslong had been instructed to remind the garrison of the duty which they owed to His Majesty.

Meanwhile the prospect of a rupture between the Estates and the representatives of the Crown, and of the increasing disposition of the Provinces to place their confidence in the Prince of Orange, had awakened the fear of the Catholics and the jealousy of the great nobles. It was obvious that the commencement of war would make the influence of Orange paramount throughout the land. The ardent Catholics could not follow in the direction whither he was sure to lead them ; the great nobles would not be led by him in any direction at all. It occurred to some of them that they might transfer the government of the Provinces from Don John, who had broken faith with them, to another Prince of the House of Austria, with whom a more binding covenant might be made, whose near relationship to the King of Spain would exonerate them from the imputation of desiring a change of dynasty, and whose pre-eminent rank would at once extinguish the pretensions both of Orange and of Anjou. The Archduke

¹ *Vera et simplex narratio eorum quæ ab adventu D. Joannis Austriaci Supremi in Belgio . . . gesta sunt . . .* Luxemburg, 1578.

Matthias, brother of the Emperor Rudolph, a youth who was supposed to be at once amiable and ambitious, and who had just attained his twentieth year, was the Prince upon whom their choice fell.

Amongst the leaders in the movement were Aerschot and his brother Havrech, who, after the trick which Don John had



attempted to play them in the matter of the citadel of Antwerp, had not unnaturally resented the indignity by passing over to the ranks of his avowed opponents. Indeed, they found their position at Namur, where they had been invited to appear as guests, to be more like that of prisoners; their loyalty was greatly suspected because they had sent off the Prince of Chimay soon after the seizure of the castle; and they therefore went out one morning as if for a walk and never returned, their flight being so hastily determined on that the stately and sumptuous Duke was glad to ride off on

a horse without a saddle.¹ Champagne and even Lalaing, in spite of their engagements with Margaret of Navarre, De Heze, and some others, shared their counsels. A secret messenger, the Baron of Maalsteede, was despatched to Vienna at the end of August to confer with the young Archduke and invite him to Bruxelles.

A month later the same idea had suggested itself so forcibly to some of the inferior nobility that they too resolved upon the same step, and they were greatly surprised to learn that their chiefs were already in communication with Matthias. Some weeks after the negotiations were opened the matter was confided to Orange by Havrech. The Prince would not have advised the selection of an Archduke as a champion of popular rights, nor did he view his intervention for its own sake with any hope or favour. But as the choice had been made he assented to it. It was at least a fresh humiliation to his present antagonist Don John, and it might sow the seeds of distrust and dissension in the bosom of the House of Austria.

The Archduke, delighted with the invitation, displayed in his eager acceptance of it all the unscrupulous selfishness of his race, with none of its shrewdness. That it was dishonourable to avail himself of the difficulties of his Spanish kinsman in order to deprive him of a portion of his dominions, and that it was indecent for an Austrian Prince to accept a crown from the rebellious subjects of another member of the Imperial House, were thoughts which never appear to have suggested themselves to his mind. The emissaries who invited him flattered him with the hopes that if the enterprise were successful Philip would acquiesce in the arrangement, and save his own dignity by bestowing on his adventurous nephew the hand of an Infanta with the Netherlands

¹ Motley: *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, iii. 171. Quoting Gachard: *Bulletins de la Commission royale*, ii. 153. Vanderhammen, whose account of the capture of Namur castle differs in several respects from those written nearer the time and spot, says that the Duchess of Aerschot and the Marchioness of Havrech, on hearing that their husbands had fled, sent to Don John to say that they greatly regretted that they had taken that step, and that they themselves were ready to submit to detention as hostages. Don John, however, he adds, gallantly replied that he kissed their hands, and that his habit was not to imprison ladies, but do them all the service in his power; he begged therefore that they would follow their husbands if they chose to do so, and to enable them to do so he sent them five hundred crowns. Vanderhammen: *Don Juan de Austria*, fol. 305. A. Carnero (*Guerras Civiles en Flandes*, p. 117) represents the Marchioness of Havrech as a still warmer partisan of Don John, and as offering him her plate and jewels to assist him in the strait for money in which she knew him to be placed. But the Queen of Navarre, on the contrary, says (*Mémoires*, p. 118) that she was told by Madame de Havrech that she had been detained by Don John for some time as a hostage.

for her dowry. What his own powers and rights were to be, how they were to be guaranteed amongst a people who had been at war with his House for a quarter of a century, how they were to be conquered and maintained in the presence of a Spanish army commanded by the hero of Lepanto, were questions into which Matthias did not inquire. He had neither money, nor military nor political skill or experience, nor powerful allies; nothing but his Imperial name, and the promised support of a few nobles, whose fickleness and selfishness had been main causes of the protracted miseries of their country.

Thus provided he stole from his bed at Vienna on the night of the 3d of October, and in the disguise of a servant, and with his face blackened, and attended by a very small following, made his way to Cologne. His flight and the purpose of it were known in most of the northern Courts before he reached the Netherlands; and although the Emperor Rudolph protested ignorance and disapproval of the scheme, his connivance was suspected. To Don John Rudolph wrote, giving him early intimation that without his knowledge or consent the Archduke had left Vienna, and was supposed to have taken the road to Flanders. Communicating this fact in a letter to Alexander Farnese, Don John said that he exonerated the Empress-Dowager of all concurrence in the designs of her son, and commiserated her feelings of regret and displeasure, but of the Emperor's share in the business he was still uncertain what judgment to pronounce. He had reason to believe that Rudolph had been informed of the proposals made to Matthias; and he had certainly not been as vigilant as he might have been in guarding against their leading to any result, nor had he communicated them so directly as he ought to have done to the King. For his own part, he added, he should determine his course after the arrival of the Archduke in Flanders. He should first attempt to persuade him not to join himself to the party of the Estates; but if he found him resolved upon that line of conduct, he should then treat him as an enemy.¹

While the movement of the Archduke produced some of the effects upon which Orange had counted, it was also bringing about others still more favourable to his policy. Both the Prince and the Estates had been earnest in entreating the Queen of England for aid, which she was too wary either to grant or refuse without long deliberation. The coming of Matthias quickened her decision. As soon as it was known in London, Secretary

¹ Strada : *De Bello Belgico*, lib. ix.

Walsingham sent for Meetkercke, colleague of Havrech in a mission from the Estates, and told him that the intervention of an Archduke was a new element in the already complicated affairs of the Netherlands which Elizabeth could not view without great anxiety. It betokened a division in the councils of the Estates at a time when union was especially necessary. Don John was daily receiving fresh troops both from France and from Italy. The Duke of Anjou was at La Fère, where he too was collecting a force. In the Queen's opinion the Prince of Orange was the sole leader upon whom the Estates ought to rely, and it was only upon the faith of his leadership that she would contribute any aid either of troops or money. Meetkercke replied that Matthias had been invited by nearly all the great nobles, who hoped and believed that, with a strong Council of State, he would make an excellent Governor of the Provinces. If the Estates succeeded in placing him in that post, it was probable that the Emperor would withdraw his opposition and induce the King of Spain also to accept him as the successor of Don John. Orange, though he had no hand in bringing the Archduke to the Low Countries, was in favour of receiving him in an honourable manner, because any other course would be an insult to the whole Imperial family. To this defence of the supporters of Matthias, Walsingham merely replied that they could expect no assistance from the Queen unless they immediately appointed the Prince the lieutenant-general of the Archduke.

The first public recognition of Matthias in the Provinces which he aspired to govern took place at Antwerp. There he was met by the Prince of Orange at the head of two thousand horse and an immense concourse of people. Orange was about the same time elected to the post of Ruward of Brabant, an ancient office of great power and dignity, conferred very rarely, and only at times of extreme difficulty and danger. The functions were not very clearly defined, but they were practically those of a protector or dictator, and their exercise was not restricted to any specified limit of time. The place had generally been held by those who were the next heirs to the sovereignty, or who were powerful enough afterwards to usurp it. It was on this occasion revived in favour of Orange by the Estates of Brabant, moved thereto by the chief authorities of Bruxelles and Antwerp. The Prince would not accept it until after repeated solicitations, and after the election had been referred to and confirmed by the States-General. In that body the Catholic party had sufficient

influence to produce some little demur to the nomination, and to obtain the annexation of the condition that it might be cancelled when a Governor-General was appointed. The day on which the confirmation was announced—the 22d of October—was held as a holiday at Antwerp and Bruxelles. The Estates of Flanders at the same time once more elected Orange governor of that Province—an office which, however, he again as before steadily declined. The Catholic nobles had for the second time within a few weeks signally failed in their attempts to curtail his influence. Before his entry into Bruxelles they had endeavoured to extort from him a declaration which would have hampered his future policy. He refused to give it, and was brought in notwithstanding in a flood-tide of popular enthusiasm. They had given him a rival in the person of the Archduke, and it now appeared that that step had been the means of conferring upon him great direct powers which he might not otherwise have obtained, and that the rival himself was likely to prove a very useful and submissive tool.

The city of Ghent, ever foremost in the path of violent revolution, now distinguished itself by a manifestation that the popular will and not a Spanish garrison ruled there. The State Council at Bruxelles had obtained, not without some difficulty, the appointment of Governor of Flanders, refused by Orange, for the Duke of Aerschot. The Antwerp trick and his half imprisonment by Don John had once more turned the old courtier into a patriot, and had made him, in profession at least, a warm friend of Orange. The populace of Ghent, amongst whom were many adherents of the reformed sects, still looked upon him with great distrust and disfavour; and they were induced to receive him quietly only by the promises of revived privileges, studiously and lavishly circulated by his friends. These promises were as ill kept as if they had been made by and not for the Duke. Attention was soon called to them at the meetings of the Estates of Flanders, but in vain. At those meetings the representatives of the nobles and clergy were found greatly to outnumber those of the Third Estate, by whom alone the increase of popular privileges was regarded with favour. The Catholic and aristocratic majority, therefore, not only overbore the small plebeian minority, but abused its strength by the use of violent and exasperating language to opponents who had given no just cause of provocation. The concessions which had been promised, and the expectants who ventured to allude to them, were treated with

contumely, and the people were plainly told that instead of privileges they should have halters. The spirit of the Emperor, who had put ropes round the necks of their grandfathers, still lived, it was insultingly said, in his son, and Don John and the Duke of Aerschot would bring to their senses those who clamoured for inconvenient rights. Whether the old trimmer who had set up the Archduke to contest the viceroyalty with its present occupant had, in spite of all that had passed, returned to the party of Don John, was not known; but there was no sudden treachery of which he was not capable, and his desire to be well with the King was notorious. Copies of a letter, said to be written by Hessels, an old member of Alba's Blood Council, and now in office at Ghent, were in free circulation amongst the popular party. This letter, which was afterwards believed to be a forgery, confirmed the worst suspicions against the Duke. "We hope," said the writer, "that after the Duke of Aerschot is Governor, we shall fully carry out the intentions of His Majesty and the plans of His Highness. We shall also know how to circumvent the scandalous heretic, with all his adherents and followers."¹ Words thus spoken and written roused the populace of Ghent to the fiercest indignation, all the more fierce because the provincial Estates was found to be no arena for its expression. Weak in that assembly, they were strong out of doors, and twenty thousand of them were ready to rise at the bidding of certain nobles, who were warm partisans of Orange.

One of these leaders, Ryhove, made a nocturnal visit to the Prince at Antwerp, and informed him of the state of public feeling at Ghent, and also of a plan formed by himself and a few other hot-brained youths, to seize Aerschot and all the chief personages who shared his anti-national opinions. Orange thought the scheme desperate, and would give no open aid or encouragement; but from Sainte Aldegonde the bold conspirator received a hint that if it were successful their chief would be well pleased. On his return to Ghent, Ryhove found that further exasperation had been produced by a foolish speech made by Aerschot himself. Imbize, another young noble, who was also a popular leader, meeting him in the street, asked him when he was going to proclaim the restoration of the ancient and disused charters. "Charters! charters!" cried Aerschot angrily; "you howl for charters, and shall learn that we can make you dumb with ropes at your throats. I tell you this, however the Prince

¹ Motley, iii. 198; quoting Bor, 905.

"of Orange may hound you on."¹ Ryhove was for immediate action, and infused his own energy into his friends. They mustered their men after nightfall in a public square, and then with lighted torches surrounded the palace of the Governor. The guards closed the gates, the insurgents heaped combustibles before them, and the Duke capitulated. Ryhove had some difficulty in saving the old man's life from the fury of the people, and, barefoot and in his nightgown, the proud courtier was marched by those whom he had threatened with halters to the house of Ryhove. All the important members of the Catholic party then in Ghent were secured during the night, Champagny alone being allowed to escape. A provisional government was formed with Ryhove for its head, to whom oaths of allegiance were demanded and rendered, the arrangements being understood to be subject to the approval of Orange and the States-General. On the 9th of November the victorious party put forth an address defending the revolution, and declaring Aerschot and the Catholic lords to be secretly leagued with Don John for the purpose of bringing back the Spanish soldiery, depriving the Prince of Orange of the Ruwardship, annulling the Ghent Treaty, and suppressing the reformed religion.

Champagny at once wrote to the Prince of Orange to protest against these violent proceedings, and entreated him to use his influence to prevent their continuance. The Prince complied with his request, and urged upon Ryhove the propriety of liberating his prisoners, who had been arrested upon mere suspicion. His recommendation obtained the freedom of Aerschot, who was released on the 14th of November; but those of meaner rank continued to languish in prison for nearly a year, and two of them, the old Blood Councillor Hessels being one, were hanged without trial in the following autumn by Ryhove.² But although the advice of Orange was not followed by the revolutionary Government of Ghent, he consented to visit the city during the winter, at the invitation of the Estates of Flanders. His reception was cordial, and splendid with illuminations, banquets, poetical addresses, and allegorical entertainments.

Meanwhile, Don John of Austria had transmitted to the King an account of the menacing attitude of affairs, the increasing confidence of the Estates, their aggressive movements, and the absolute necessity in which he found himself of devoting all his

¹ Motley, iii. p. 201; quoting Meteren, vii. 127; Hoofd, xii. 534; Vander Vynekt, ii. 280.

² Motley: *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, iii. pp. 272, 273.

energy to preparing for the war which was now certain. If the royal authority were to be maintained in the Netherlands at all, money and troops must now be supplied to him. The King responded to these appeals by action somewhat more prompt than was usual with him. Orders were sent to Italy that all the troops that could be spared from the Spanish garrisons there should march to Flanders. Cardinal Granvelle, then at Rome, was directed to proceed to the Abruzzi, and endeavour to persuade the Duchess of Parma to quit her retreat at Aquila and resume the government of the Belgian Provinces. The King wrote to her of the wisdom and success of her previous administration, and of the love with which the Flemings regarded her; and he promised that if she would undertake the civil duties of his representative, the command of those military operations which were to reduce her loving subjects to obedience should be conferred on her son Prince Alexander. The wily Cardinal could produce no effect on the resolutions of the wary Princess. She was ten years older and more gouty than when she had so nearly died of her well-remembered humiliations at Bruxelles; and she justified her brother's praise of her sagacity by declining his offer. Alexander, however, was paying her a visit at the time of Granvelle's visit; he was delighted at the prospect of actual service, joyfully accepted the proposals of the King, and at once set out for Flanders.

To Don John the King addressed a despatch, which was really intended for the Estates, and which, although not a formal reply, was a tolerably conclusive answer to their complaints of grievances and their hints as to the Governor's recall. In this document the Estates were peremptorily required to lay down their arms, to dismiss the Prince of Orange, and to conform to the Perpetual Edict. Don John transmitted a copy of it to Bruxelles.¹

This paper and the tidings of preparations at Luxemburg led the Estates to take a step which put an end to all further compromise or parley with Don John. On the 7th of December they put forth, in the King's name, a proclamation in which Don John was declared to have ceased to be Stadtholder, Governor, and Captain-General, and was denounced as a breaker of the peace which he had sworn to keep, and an enemy to the commonwealth. All Netherlanders who should take part with him were declared rebels and traitors, and it was decreed that an inventory

¹ Strada : *De Bello Belgico*, lib. ix.

should be taken of the property of all such persons. Three days later, on the 10th of December, a new Act of Union was exposed for public signature, and signed by great multitudes of people of all ranks, including the Catholic nobles like Egmont and Lalaing. By this remarkable document Roman Catholics and those who had embraced the new forms of faith mutually bound themselves to respect each other's religious liberty and to defend it against all attacks. The Ghent Treaty had suppressed active persecution, but this new paper at last recognized the rights of freedom of opinion and the duty of toleration. It was the work of Orange, and seemed to be the crowning stone of the edifice of liberty which he had been so long laboriously rearing. It was the third, and, unhappily, the last deed of confederation between all the Provinces. The subsequent success of the Spanish arms tore it asunder, and religious dissensions riveted the chains of the larger portion of the Netherlands for several ages more.

While one Governor was thus deliberately dismissed by the States-General, another was kept waiting for induction into office with little regard to his dignity or his expectations. The Archduke, who had made such haste from Vienna, was allowed to remain for nearly two months in the country as a private individual before the Prince of Orange and the Estates had time to draw up and submit to him the conditions upon which they were willing to allow him to be their nominal ruler. His power was to be exercised in the King's name and subject to his approbation; but his oath of allegiance was to be taken both to the King and the States. All his acts were to be ratified by the approval of a majority of his State Council; and in the higher matters of legislation and policy—in making laws, alliances, peace or war, contracting loans, imposing taxes, levying troops, and establishing garrisons—neither he nor the State-Council could do anything without the approval of a majority of the States-General. Over taxation and expenditure the control of that powerful body was absolute. It was to assemble when, where, and as often, and sit as long, as it should deem expedient. It was to be bound to meet whenever any single Province should desire it. To the Governor and his Council patronage both civil and military was accorded, but it was to be exercised subject to the advice and review of the States-General. The Provincial Governors were to be appointed by the Governor and Council, but in each case with the consent of the Province. Although the office

of Ruward had been made voidable on the appointment of a Governor, it was stipulated that the Prince of Orange was to be continued in that office, and he was likewise nominated lieutenant-general for the Governor.

These terms made the post which Matthias had come so far to fill a mere honorary distinction. Not only was all definite power lodged in the hands of the Council and the States-General, but there was put over him a lieutenant of vast personal influence who was clothed with a dictatorial authority, sanctioned by usage, yet indefinite and extraordinary. The only consolation offered to the Archduke lay in the fact that the King, whom he represented, had no more power than himself, there being left to him the mere nominal prerogative of approving, if he pleased, proceedings which his disapproval would not invalidate. Nevertheless, hard as the terms were, Matthias eagerly accepted them.

The negotiations with the helpless Archduke were easier than those with the wary Queen of England. Elizabeth, however, was ultimately induced to sign on the 7th of January 1578 a treaty by which she engaged to become security for the Estates to the extent of one hundred thousand pounds for one year, and to send a force of five thousand foot and one thousand horse to the Provinces under the command of a distinguished leader, who was to enjoy a seat and vote in the Council of State. In case of an attack on herself, the Estates were to afford her equivalent aid, which was not to be less than forty ships, if naval assistance should be required. She accepted the appointment of Matthias, because it disconcerted the schemes of Anjou and the French party. She affected, however, to consider that aid lent to the Estates and the Archduke was by no means a declaration of war against Philip II. and Don John of Austria, and sent envoys to Madrid and Luxemburg for the purpose of explaining a policy which certainly required explanation. For while Havrech and Meetkercke were thus successfully pleading the cause of the Belgian rebellion in London, there was present there to watch and impede their proceedings not only the usual resident Spanish ambassador, but also a special agent of Don John in the person of the Viscount of Ghent. Don John was well informed as to the aid which Orange and the States desired to obtain from England, and Ghent was especially ordered to remonstrate against any loan or security being granted to them, and to tell the Queen plainly that any open or secret assistance would add one more to the many grievances of which the Crown of Spain had to complain,

and for which at some fitting time reckoning would be demanded.¹ On Ghent's fidelity and zeal in his mission his subsequent conduct threw some doubt. It is a singular proof of the levity with which in that unhappy time men of rank and character passed from party to party and from camp to camp, that in these English negotiations Havrech, the successful representative of the Estates, had very recently been a friend and companion of Don John, and that Ghent, the baffled envoy of Don John, was found, when the war began a few weeks afterwards, commanding the cavalry in the army of the Estates.

The Archduke Matthias having assented to all the conditions imposed upon him, there was no longer any pretence for keeping him from the coveted chair of State at Bruxelles. The inaugural ceremonies took place on the 18th of January 1578. The Prince of Orange, the Prince of Chimay, and other nobles, met him at Vilvorde with a splendid cavalcade, and conducted him in triumph to the capital. Within nine months Don John and Orange had entered its gates with similar honours. The gay city, however, on this occasion outdid itself in triumphal arches and other sumptuous decorations, and in dramatic and rhetorical and pyrotechnic exhibitions. The Archduke, who had never made a campaign or done anything worthy of remark until his midnight flight from Vienna, was symbolized and extolled under the various forms of Curtius leaping into the gulf, Scipio Africanus conquering Carthage, and David smiting Goliath, the closed chasm and the vanquished foes being the prototypes of Spain and Don John. Odes, banquets, and feasts followed hard on these mythological and historical honours, amidst which must not be omitted the name of clerk (*greffier*) to the Prince of Orange, bestowed on the Archduke by the populace. Next day he took the oaths to the King and the States-General, and Orange was also sworn in as his lieutenant-general and as Governor of Brabant, an office which he had at length agreed to accept. The events were celebrated by the usual flowery rhetoric and drunken revels.

The reception of the Archduke was followed by a change in the State Council, effected under the authority of the Estates. Those members of that small body who adhered to Don John were formally deposed from their functions and their places filled by adherents of the national policy. The new Council and the Estates then drew up a form of oath to be taken by all persons, lay and ecclesiastic, who by it engaged to obey and defend the

¹ Vanderhammen : *Don Juan de Austria*, t. 308.

Archduke Matthias as sovereign Governor of the Netherlands until the King and Estates should appoint another, and to treat Don John as an enemy of the commonwealth. At Antwerp, the Jesuits having refused through their provincial to take this oath, their house and church were sacked and pillaged by the mob, and they themselves were put on board some Dutch vessels and conveyed out of the city. At Bruges, Tournay, and Maestricht, the example was followed, and not only the Jesuits, but the Cordeliers and many priests were for the same reason expelled from these towns. These outrages were highly distasteful to the Archduke, although they professed to be committed in assertion of his dignity. They were followed by a petition to him and to the Estates from the Calvinists for liberty of conscience, which, in spite of the opposition of Matthias and the Catholic party, was for some time allowed and enjoyed.¹

It was now plain to all the world, as it had been for some time plain to Don John, that his kinsman the Archduke was not to be moved by his remonstrances and by his appeals to their common allegiance to the interest and glory of the House of Austria. Matthias had sworn allegiance to the Estates, and his cousin must now treat him as an enemy. A few days before the ceremonies at Bruxelles, on the 11th of January, Don John addressed a long letter to the Emperor, which bears in its tone strong evidence that the writer by no means acquitted Rudolph of participation in his brother's venture. He began by expressing his hope that the Imperial commissioners might possibly do something towards bringing about peace in the Netherlands, which had always been his own endeavour and desire. For peace, in so far as it was compatible with the safety of religion and the rights of the Crown, he had made many sacrifices. He had dismissed garrisons from places where he might have retained both the places and the troops, and the places were now in the hands of men who were in arms against their King. He reminded the Emperor that the quarrel between Philip and the Netherlands ought to interest all sovereigns ; that disobedience to one Prince was dangerous to all, even to those who were without troubles at home ; and that all ought to aid in finding a cure for it, lest their own subjects should one day do the like ; for, he wrote, " this liberty which they are seeking after is a contagious malady which goes on spreading its infections from neighbour to neighbour if it be not promptly checked in time." It was obvious

¹ Strada : *De Bello Belgico*, lib. ix.

that nothing would now have satisfied the rebels but the overthrow of the ancient constitution of the country and the establishment of unbridled license. So many indecent acts subversive of both religion and the royal authority had been committed that he could now hold no further communication with the Provinces or their States-General without fresh instructions from the King. He entreated the Emperor not to attend to the words of the States-General, but to watch its acts. Nor must he give ear to absurd stories of the King being in treaty with France for the transfer of the Netherlands, which were the inventions of traitors. The duty and necessity of a good understanding and common action between all the members of the Imperial house were urged on the Emperor's mind. The Archduke's visit had been well meant, no doubt, but it would have been better had it been omitted, and the Emperor would do well to recall him according to his promise. He would also be doing the King's cause great service if he could remove the difficulties which were thrown in the way of the royal officers when recruiting in Germany, or the facilities which were there given to the rebels.¹

The special envoy Leyton, whom Queen Elizabeth sent to Don John, did not succeed, and indeed can hardly have hoped to succeed, in calming the Governor's displeasure with the Treaty which had been concluded between England and the Estates. In vain Leyton endeavoured to dazzle him with hopes of the prize which had been so long held up before the eyes of the Princes of Europe—the Crown-matrimonial of England. He assured Don John that his mistress would not marry Anjou; that an Austrian husband would be much more agreeable to her; and that if he himself were to be named perpetual Governor of the Netherlands with the concurrence of the Estates, he might aspire to the hand of the English Queen.² Don John replied that he had now received his Sovereign's commands to make war on these rebel Provinces, and that he was about to obey the command with all his heart; of the policy of France, or England, or the Emperor, he knew nothing; but he knew that against the Emperor the Turks might be let loose to punish him for his perfidy, and that the burghers of Bruxelles should soon feel the weight of their master's vengeance.³

In France the whole power of the Catholic party under the

¹ This letter was first brought to light by Mr. Motley (*Rise of the Dutch Republic*, iii. pp. 213, 214).

² Vanderhaanmen: *Don Juan de Austria*, f. 311.

³ Motley, iii. p. 217.

House of Guise was thrown into the Spanish scale in the quarrel between Spain and the Netherlands. Geronimo de Curiel, an agent whom Don John had sent to Paris to endeavour to raise money and pick up men, returned thence with four hundred thousand ducats and four hundred Spanish soldiers who had taken service in France, and with promises of further recruits.¹ Henry III. was, however, very lukewarm, and was even suspected of being hostile. He had not yet openly abetted the intrigues of his brother Anjou, who was generally out of favour at Court, and who was now, moreover, in one of his periods of transition from the side of the Catholics to that of the Huguenots.

From Rome alone, of all foreign Courts, did Don John receive all the support that was possible. Gregory XIII. had already sent him a liberal donation in money. He now aided him with his spiritual thunder in the shape of a bull, framed on the model of those issued in favour of crusades against the Moslem, in which power was given him to levy contributions towards his war expenses on the property of the Church, and plenary absolution was promised to all who should enlist under the standard of the Cross now unfurled against heresy in the Netherlands.

During the autumn and winter the English envoy, Davison, continued to report to his Government the abortive negotiations for peace, and the preparations made by each party for war. In his opinion war was unavoidable. "I see not what is to be looked for but war," he wrote on the 8th of September, before the actual rupture of the negotiations for a convention. He put no faith in the professions of Don John, and even notices the copy of a letter from the King, sent by the Governor to the Estates, as "a letter which, as he said, he had received out of Spain, but no doubt came out of his closet, where he lacks no blanks, and can make the King write what he lists."² Nor did the other party escape the Englishman's scorn. "The younger Hamilton and one James Shaw, Scots," he wrote on the 15th of September, "arrived this last week at Namur out of Spain, by whose coming His Alteze [Highness] hath received such news as seemeth much to content him. In somme, here is nothing to be attended but troubles, whatsoever speech or countenance of peace there be; and if the Prince [of Orange] come not all the sooner, things will go hardly, for from a multitude so divided

¹ Camero : *Guerres Civiles en Flandes*, p. 124.

² State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 30. W. Davison to Sir F. Walsingham, 8th September.

“ there is no good government to be expected. Even though the King,” he continued, “ would put up with the expulsion of the Spaniards, the conspiracies against his brother and lieutenant, the taking arms against him, the imprisoning of his captains and colonels, the dismissing of his garrisons, the razing of the castles of Antwerp, Ghent, and Utrecht, without his assent, yea, directly contrary to his pleasure, the despoiling of officers, closing and assigning of offices at their pleasure, the confederacy with the Prince, the intelligence in France, England, and other places, with things that cannot sink into my belief; yet would Don John rather hazard and try his uttermost fortune, such is his cruel, revenging, and insolent nature, than depart with that note of dishonour, to be expelled and chased out of his government by a set of drunken Flemings; respecting the reputation he hath hitherto carried, and hoping as he doth by spoil and subduing of this country to make way to greater things which he hath already embraced in imagination.”¹

On the 17th of October, Davison reported that “ a gentleman arrived on Sunday last out of Italy, hath made a report unto the Estates that there lie about Turin above ten thousand men, what Spaniards, Italians, and Piedmontese, entertained and preparing to come down to His Alteze. Divers other Spaniards and Italians are said to arrive daily at Luxemburg by sundry troops, unarmed and disguised. His Alteze maketh great reckoning of the succour of the Pope and divers Princes of Italy, with the whole garrisons of Naples, Sicily, and other parts there. Above all the towns in this country he threateneth Bruxelles with a cruelty never heard of, where, he vaunteth, he would be sorry any man should mount the breach before himself. Before his return from Namur he wrote unto Burgundy to hasten the marching of the forces levied there with all diligence, giving out and assuring himself in the meanwhile that he could so enchant and entertain the Estates, as they should follow him to Luxemburg with hope of peace. Whereunto he would still make semblance to incline till he was thoroughly provided for a war, using it as a necessary stratagem to make them negligent with his advantage.”²

During the winter of 1577-8 the minds of men were much disturbed by the appearance of a comet, to which many of the

¹ State Paper Office, as above, 15th September.

² State Paper Office, Flanders, 1577. No. 31. Oct. 17. W. Davison to Sir F. Walsingham.

troubles and deaths which followed were popularly attributed. It was first observed in Flanders on the 14th November, and it remained visibly "perplexing monarchs" until the 18th January. On the 3d of December its tail assumed a triple form, dividing itself into three great rays, which were supposed to point towards Italy, Gibraltar, and the West.¹

¹ Carnero : *Guerras Civiles en Flandes*, p. 133.



KNIGHT ON HORSEBACK, WITH THE ARMS AND DEVICE OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA
ON THE HORSE-FURNITURE.



CHAPTER IX.

AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS ; FROM THE MIDDLE OF
JANUARY TO THE END OF APRIL 1578.



GAIN the dispute between Philip II. and the people of the Netherlands was about to be submitted to the arbitration of the sword. The war which had been waged with such bloody defeats and such invincible constancy by the Netherlanders against Alba was to be renewed against Don John. But the tremendous odds which were formerly on the side of Spain had now disappeared. Instead of an army of mercenaries raised mainly by the resources of a single family and a few towns, the liberties of the Netherlands were now defended by a large national force. At the head of this force appeared an Archduke of Austria—a puppet, it is true, but a puppet with a great name at home and abroad ; and around Orange, the real chief, had now rallied the best blood of the country. The cause of liberty was in the ascendant. In spite of the victories of Alba and Requesens, the royal cause had every year lost ground ; and the recall of the soldiers who had gained these victories had been at last wrested from the King. The Netherlanders were going to fight the battle over again, but at a time and on ground chosen by themselves.

Fair as were the prospects of the Estates, they would have been still fairer had it been possible for them to commence active warlike operations some months before. When Don John

retired from Namur to Luxemburg there were no more than four thousand troops who would obey his orders in the Netherlands. These were the three German regiments, a small body of Walloons, and a still smaller band of Spaniards who had returned to his standard from France. But the Germans were shut up in Bergen-op-Zoom and Breda, which places they eventually surrendered to the forces of Orange; and the handful of Walloons and Spaniards was, in truth, the only force on whose spirit Don John could rely, and whose services he could actually command. Orange and the Estates had in different parts of the country at this time troops amounting to about fifteen thousand men. Had the Governor therefore been followed and closely pressed at that critical juncture he might have been compelled to surrender himself a prisoner, or he might at least have been blockaded at Luxemburg by vastly superior numbers. From this humiliation he was saved by the slowness of a deliberative assembly to act in military affairs, by the jealousies of the various leaders of the national army, and, above all, by the uncertain and changeable policy of the Catholic party.

During the whole autumn of 1577 Don John had been sedulously preparing for war. In January 1578 he found himself at the head of about twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse. Of his infantry, four thousand were Spanish veterans; four thousand were Frenchmen, recruited from amongst the partisans of the House of Guise; five thousand were Germans; and the rest Walloons. The French were led by Peter Ernest, Count of Mansfeldt; the Spaniards by the Prince of Parma, Mendoza, Mondragone, Verdugo, and other old and tried commanders. The Spanish regiments had sustained a severe loss in the Colonel Julian Romero, who fell dead from his horse at Cremona at the commencement of their northern march. But both officers and men entered the Netherlands in high spirits—the recruits looking forward eagerly to the plunder of the richest country in Europe, and the veterans, whose hopes of pillage were moderated by the recollection of their recent operations in the same field, nevertheless delighted at being recalled so soon to the scenes of former victories, from which they had been ignominiously expelled in deference to the wishes of the vanquished.

After his wearisome and fruitless discussions with churchmen and jurists about constitutional privileges and other subtleties which he neither understood nor thought it worth his while to understand, it was a great relief to Don John to find himself once

more surrounded by his old companions-in-arms, and engaged in the congenial occupations of the garrison and the camp. His year in the Low Countries, with its humiliations and anxieties, had told severely on his health. The Prince of Parma, who arrived at Luxemburg on the 18th of December 1577, and who had come post in advance of the army, partly in consequence of the urgent letters of Don John, found him greatly changed. He was thinner, and had lost the brightness of his complexion and that air of self-confidence and majesty which had formerly been remarkable in his aspect and bearing. The friends met with great cordiality, and Don John showed his perfect confidence in Alexander by laying before him the letters of the King, desiring that he should be made acquainted with all the business of the government, civil as well as military, and that he should receive the monthly pay of one thousand golden crowns—an allowance made only to Viceroy and Generals holding an independent command.¹

While at Luxemburg Don John had been holding correspondence both with the King of Spain and the House of Guise, on the subject of the deliverance of Mary of Scotland from captivity, and of his marriage with that Princess, who would bring him as her dowry the Crown of England. The Guises had been desirous of marrying their unfortunate relative to the Duke of Norfolk; but as the active and earnest assistance of Spain was absolutely essential to any movement in her favour, they conceived that they could best secure that assistance by promising her hand to Don John of Austria. Gregory XIII. used all his influence with Philip II. in support of that scheme, and Philip had declared himself favourably disposed towards it. In the present state of Belgian affairs, however, Don John saw that any attempt towards its execution could lead only to disappointment and disaster, and he therefore sent Alonso de Sotomayor to Paris during this winter to explain his position and his views to the Princes of Lorraine. Sotomayor, who was a captain of horse, made the equipment of his troop the pretext of his visit to Paris, and he was also the bearer of letters from Don John to the Spanish minister, Juan de Vargas Mexia, as well as to the Dukes of Guise and Mayenne. The real object of his mission was to assure these great nobles, on the part of Don John, that although the war which was imminent in the Netherlands left him neither time nor resources for any other undertaking, he hoped ere long to see the

¹ Strada : *De Bello Belgico*, lib. ix.

royal cause triumphant, when the King's forces by sea and land would be at liberty to act in favour of the imprisoned Queen, and when he would gladly fulfil to the letter all the engagements which he had undertaken for her deliverance and for her restoration to her rights. The Princes of Lorraine saw the necessity of yielding to the force of events, and were satisfied with the explanations of Don John. All parties to the negotiation agreed to wait for those better times which never came.

In the marriage of Don John the Pope Gregory XIII. took a most paternal interest. He was at first greatly taken with the idea of matching him with Queen Elizabeth, an idea which appears to have originated in one of the personal and political coquetries of that Princess herself. In this connexion the Pope saw the restoration of England and her Queen to the Roman communion, and in the Papal balance that great advantage to the Church, of course, far outweighed the mere rights of the Catholic Mary Stuart, constantly asserted by the Roman Pontiffs against the pretensions of the Protestant bastard of Anne Boleyn. The Nuncio at Madrid was therefore ordered to urge upon the King the propriety of employing Don John as a missionary-husband for the conversion of Elizabeth and her realms.

Don John himself never gave any sanction to this preposterous scheme, but always alleged the difference of their religions as an insuperable bar to the marriage. He received the advances of the Queen with a cold and distant courtesy, which she did not approve and to which she was little accustomed in the Princes whom she encouraged to aspire to her hand. Although it is impossible to believe that she had ever seriously thought of marrying him, it is not the less probable that she was much displeased by his refusal even to woo her. She expressed, it is said, great indignation at the slight put upon her by a bastard, and the Spaniards believed that she set on foot plots for his assassination.¹

The idea of this English marriage for his brother does not appear to have been seriously entertained by Philip II. The Pope therefore returned his regards to the Scottish Queen; and in order to keep Don John in mind of her forlorn condition, and to authorize any descent upon England which he might find leisure to execute during the war in the Netherlands, he sent him, by the hands of Monsignor Zitolomini, the bulls and briefs necessary for his investiture in the royal rights of his destined

¹ Vanderhammen : *Don Juan de Austria*, f. 318.

bride.¹ For this favour Don John despatched to Rome a special and confidential messenger to offer his dutiful thanks.²

While his army was mustering Don John had carefully avoided any collision with the forces of the Estates. A few skirmishes took place between detached bodies, but there was no action of importance. The Estates gained possession of Bergen-op-Zoom and Breda, in the one case reducing Fugger by blockade, and in the other causing Frondsberg's men to mutiny and surrender the place and their commander. The Count of Hohenlohe, the leader into whose hands Breda fell, afterwards made an expedition against Ruremonde, which was still held by a body of Germans under Polwiller. The Baron of Hierges, however, moved with a considerable body of troops to the relief of the place. Assisted by a well-timed sally by Polwiller, he attacked Hohenlohe and routed him, with the loss of four officers and three hundred men. Ruremonde was therefore left unmolested.³

About the middle of January Don John concentrated his forces in and around Namur. He himself came thither on the 19th of that month. On the 25th he issued a proclamation which was probably intended and certainly was received as his declaration of war. In this document, which was published in French, Flemish, and German, he called upon all the citizens and soldiers of the Provinces to range themselves under his banner and support the royal authority and the Catholic faith against the rebels and heretics who were threatening to destroy both. To those who had unhappily been drawn aside into the paths of sedition and schism free pardon was offered, if they would now return to the right way. The safety of religion and the royal prerogative assured, the King would respect and protect the privileges of the Provinces, and would restore the system of government which had existed under the Emperor Charles. It was the old proposal, made by governor after governor, that the Netherlands should relinquish all that they had been so long arguing for and fighting for, and trust to the justice and mercy of a sovereign who for twenty years had been showing them that he was neither merciful nor just.

While the royal army was assembling at Namur the forces of the Estates mustered at Gemblours, a small walled town in a rich

¹ Vanderhammen : *Don Juan de Austria*, f. 318.

² Vanderhammen (*ibid.*) says Escovedo was sent, and that he went from Rome to Madrid. We have seen (*supra*, p. 233) that he was sent to Madrid the previous summer.

³ A. Carnero : *Guerres Civiles en Flandes*, p. 124.

country about nine miles to the north-west. They had considerably strengthened the defences of the place, and they had established there various magazines of ammunition and provisions which were already well filled. To meet the twenty-two thousand men under Don John the Estates had raised an army of nearly equal strength. Inferior in the quality of its troops, it was somewhat superior both in numbers and in cavalry. But from the moment when the sword was actually drawn the advantages of undivided power became abundantly obvious. Although Orange was lieutenant-general for the Archduke and possessed the confidence of a majority of his countrymen, the jealousy with which he felt himself regarded by the Catholic nobles who held important posts in the army of the Estates rendered it inexpedient for him to assume the chief command. He had even been desirous of declining the lieutenant-generalship, in order not to give offence to the Count of Lalaing; and as that noble was now at the head of the infantry Orange would not place himself in a position of authority over him. The command, therefore, was given to Anthony de Goignies, Baron of Vendege, an officer who, having served his apprenticeship in war under Charles V., led a troop in that famous cavalry charge by which Egmont won the battle of St. Quentin, and had since been employed in a military capacity in France. Soon after his appointment he had had a dispute with Orange as to the engaging of German mercenaries. These troops, the Catholic nobles asserted, were preferred in order to provide for the German relatives and friends of the Prince. De Goignies shared this opinion, and would rather have employed Netherlanders, saying that a man's house was safest in his own keeping. The views of Orange were, however, adopted by the States. De Goignies had been diligently engaged during the winter in fortifying Quesnoy and other places, and in casting ordnance.¹

The chief commands in the army were given to the Catholic nobles, less on account of their military experience or aptitude than from the hope of attaching them cordially to the national cause, and for the sake of bringing them and their personal following into the field against the King. Lalaing, the Viscount of Ghent, and Pardieu de la Motte, commanded respectively the infantry, the cavalry, and the artillery. The first intention of De Goignies was to advance towards Namur and attack Don John. He marched as far as St. Martin, a village about five miles from

¹ A. Carnero : *Guerras Civiles en Flandes*, p. 125.

the city. There, however, he saw reason to alter his plans. His scouts brought him intelligence that the royal army was stronger and better equipped than he had supposed, and that it seemed preparing to march out to meet him. His principal officers—Lalaing, Ghent, and La Motte—were opposed to his design of giving battle, and took the opportunity of the halt at St. Martin to return to Bruxelles, in order, as they alleged, to be present at the marriage of the niece and heiress of the unfortunate Marquess of Berghen. In their absence De Goignies shrank from the responsibility of making his intended attack upon Don John, and he determined, therefore, to fall back upon Gemblours. Some stragglers from his camp, being made prisoners by a party of Italian troopers who were exploring the ground between the two armies, apprised Don John of his plans. Don John immediately resolved to pursue him and compel an engagement during his retreat.

The 30th of January was spent by Don John and the Prince of Parma in riding over the ground which was to be the scene of operations, and examining the roads leading towards Gemblours. Before the dawn of the following day two Spanish officers, Acosta and Olivera, were sent forward with some cavalry and light infantry, with orders to move on the flank of the army of De Goignies, and explore the woods here and there bordering the road in which it was possible that ambuscades might be posted. At daybreak the royal army was in motion. Ottavio Gonzaga, at the head of the cavalry, and one thousand picked musketeers and pikemen under Christopher Mondragone, led the van; Peter Ernest, Count of Mansfeldt, the rear. Don John and the Prince of Parma marched in the centre of the main body, near the royal standard, upon which Don John had caused a cross to be emblazoned, with the words, *IN HOC SIGNO VICI TURCOS IN HOC SIGNO VINCAM HÆRETICOS*. The officers had received orders to march with the greatest circumspection and attention to discipline. The baggage followed in the rear, under the care of a regiment of Walloons. A force was left behind, on the banks of the Meuse, under the orders of Count Charles of Mansfeldt.

De Goignies and his troops were also early astir. As they left their encampment they set fire to the huts of which it was composed. The leading regiments were those of Montigny and De Heez. Count Bossu, who had but lately left the royal cause, and Champagny commanded the centre, consisting of two regiments of Walloons and Germans, three companies of Frenchmen, and

thirteen of English and Scotch auxiliaries. To their care were confided the artillery and the baggage. The rear-guard was composed of the cavalry, under the orders of the young Count of Egmont, the son of the unfortunate hero of St. Quentin, and Lunoy de la Marck. With this division De Goignies himself marched, attended by the Marquess of Havrech.

The road from Namur to Gemblours lies for the most part along the bottom of a winding valley, bordered by gentle heights, sometimes cultivated, sometimes clothed with wood, and watered by a sluggish and muddy stream. The valley is of very various width at different points; and its sides here close in upon the brook and the road, forcing them into close proximity, and there retire to a distance, leaving each free to choose its path over an expanse of rich meadow. The wintry rains had lately swollen the stream; and the road and great part of the adjacent pastures were still deep in mire and marsh.

Early in the morning the advanced party under Acosta and Olivera, hanging upon the skirts of the retiring enemy, picked up two prisoners, whom they sent back to the main body. The vanguard of the royal army soon came in sight of the rear of the enemy, when Gonzaga and his cavalry, pushing forward, engaged in frequent skirmishes with the horsemen of Egmont. Don John had given strict orders that his vanguard should be very cautious in its operations, and should on no account risk any considerable attack out of reach of support from the main body. An Italian officer named Perotti, a captain in the regiment of Camillo di Monte, as the day wore on, led his troop so far in advance of the rest as, in the opinion of Gonzaga, to disobey these orders. A message was therefore sent him by the General to return. The message appears to have been delivered in a manner somewhat irritating, for Perotti replied that he had never yet turned his back on the enemy, and even if he were willing to do so now, such a movement was impossible. By this time the Prince of Parma had ridden forward to the vanguard, and was now by the side of Gonzaga. The point at which Perotti and his men had arrived was one of those where the valley was much contracted, and where the road was rendered to all appearance impassable by the floods. The retiring enemy and the pursuers were therefore making their way with difficulty along the higher ground above the level of the inundation. The Prince noted the hesitation and confusion which marked their progress, and the disordered condition of their line as indicated by the lances of the horsemen. It occurred to him

that now was the time, by a rapid advance along the flooded road, to turn the enemy's retreat into a rout, and to deal an unexpected blow upon a portion of the army which, being at some distance from the rear files, considered itself in perfect security. The success of the movement of course depended upon the condition of the submerged track. If that were firm enough to bear cavalry, the rapid onslaught on an unforeseen point would probably be a decisive blow. If the floods had covered the road with mud, the horsemen who risked themselves upon it would infallibly fall an easy prey to the muskets of the enemy. The fact that the enemy, who had had leisure to pick and choose their way, had seen fit to deviate from this road and to struggle through the heavy soil of the slopes above afforded presumptive evidence that a passage through the water was extremely hazardous. Yet this hazard Parma at once determined to run. Taking a lance from the officer who attended him, and mounting a fresh and powerful horse furnished by Camillo di Monte, he said to his attendant: "Go to Don John and tell him that, like the ancient Roman, I am about to plunge into a gulf, by the aid of God" and under the auspices of the House of Austria, to win a great and memorable victory." His enthusiasm was immediately caught by old Mondragone, Bernardino de Mendoza, Fernando de Toledo, and many other officers. Pushing to the front of a squadron of the cavalry of Mucio Pagano, and followed by his band of gallant gentlemen and the most daring of the troopers, the Prince dashed into the water and successfully made his way through the miry flood. He paused for a few moments at the point where the road rose again to daylight and dry ground. The footing, though bad, was better than might have been expected, and the greater part of the adventurers formed behind him in battle order. With levelled lances they at once charged the astonished foes in a part of their line at some distance from the rear files, which, still skirmishing with Perotti, had perhaps not observed the masterly movement of Alexander. The troopers who received the shock of this unexpected attack at once put spurs to their horses, and the whole line was thrown into confusion. The cavalry of Gonzaga, followed by the musketeers of Mondragone, soon came up to support their comrades, and fresh troops were sent forward at intervals by Don John. De Goignies, Egmont, and the other officers of the Estates army, did all that personal valour could do to restore the confidence of their men and rally them against the royalists; but the panic was too

general and too well founded to be assuaged. The cavalry in their terror galloped into and over the foot, and the companies, thus broken and bewildered, threw away their arms and likewise took to headlong flight. Thirty-four banners, most of the artillery, and a great quantity of baggage and ammunition, fell into the hands of the conquerors. De Goignies and a few officers were taken prisoners, but the greater part of the nobles and gentlemen who were with the army escaped, having been in the van instead of the rear, a fact which says little for their earnestness in the cause which they had espoused. In the enormous number of the slain on the side of the vanquished, and the trifling loss of the victors, the battle of Gemblours resembled that of Jemmingem, where seven thousand Netherlanders fell and only seven Spaniards. The numbers were not on this occasion collected with any accuracy, but they have been stated at ten thousand,¹ eight thousand,² seven thousand,³ and three thousand,⁴ on one side, and at ten,⁵ nine,⁶ seven,⁷ and none at all,⁸ on the other. It is evident that the slaughter was great, and that the slain must be reckoned by thousands, while in the capture and destruction of its materials of war the army of the Estates may be said to have been annihilated. This severe blow was inflicted not in a general action, but in an affair in which the number of the royalists engaged has been stated as low as six hundred,⁹ and at the highest estimate does not exceed two thousand,¹⁰ and which lasted only for a few hours.

The broken remains of the army of the Estates fled to Gemblours, whither they were immediately followed by the victors. No sooner did the royal banner appear at the gate, than some of the beaten troops continued their flight further into Brabant. The rest sent a flag of truce to Don John, offering to surrender the town on certain conditions, which were refused, a refusal which was soon followed by an immediate and unconditional surrender. In the place were found provisions for several months, and a considerable supply of munitions of war. De Goignies, the captured leader of the routed army, was then brought to the presence of the victorious Governor. It was said that he had asked leave to kiss his hand, and that Don John, in receiving him, bade him "mark the hand of God in abasing those who revolted against religion and the King, and learn, by what had happened, in the rout of a great army by a handful of men, that God was

¹ Strada : *De Bello Belgico*, lib. ix.

² Haræus, iii. 274.

³ Cabrera : *Felipe II.*, lib. xii. 968.

⁴ Bentivoglio : *Guerra di Fiandra*, x. 206.

⁵ Hoofd, xiii. 550.

⁶ Strada, note I.

⁷ Cabrera, note 3.

⁸ Bentivoglio, note 4.

⁹ Strada, note I.

¹⁰ Haræus, note 2.

"ever on the side of Kings." In reply to this piece of royalist reasoning the prisoner contented himself with assuring Don John that he had never thought of taking up arms against religion. He was then sent with his companions in misfortune to Namur.¹

Don John afterwards held a levee of his officers, and once more had the satisfaction of thanking them, with his accustomed grace and dignity, for their conduct during the day, and of distinguishing by name those who had especially signalized themselves. In the affectionate greeting and thanks which he gave to Alexander Farnese was mingled a gentle rebuke for his excessive daring. He ought to remember, said his chief, that he had been sent to Flanders by the King, not as a private soldier, but as a captain, whose counsel and sagacity were ever to be available for His Majesty's service. Farnese replied that he was of opinion that no man could be a good captain until he had first proved himself to be a good soldier, especially when he fought under the eye of a great General, a reply for which Don John tenderly embraced him, and which produced new plaudits from the assembled officers for the hero of the day.²

The town of Gemblours was mercifully dealt with, and was, by the orders and precautions of Don John, saved from the pillage which was the usual fate of a place which admitted an enemy within its walls. The treatment of the six hundred prisoners, most of whom were Scotchmen, who were marched to Namur, was more in accordance with the savage practice of the time. Some were hanged, and the most of the rest drowned in the Meuse, into which they were thrown from the bridge.³

When the news of the defeat of the national army reached Bruxelles, the Archduke Matthias and his council were sitting in consultation as to the most advisable means of employing it. Should they attack Don John at once, or should they avoid a battle? should the army be kept together, or sent to act at different points? were the questions under discussion when the tidings arrived that already a battle had been fought and the army lost. The fugitives, whom every hour brought to the capital, soon furnished the Estates with sufficient evidence that their army had ceased to exist. The Prince of Orange, making

¹ Strada, lib. ix.

² *Ibid.*

³ Strada (*De Bello Belgico*, lib. ix.) says the prisoners were disarmed and released on condition of making a promise that they would not bear arms—the Flemings at any time, and the foreigners for a year—against the King. Cabrera (lib. xii. 968) relates that Don John set six hundred Scotch at liberty, "showing them his clemency." But Tassis (iv. 294), who was on the spot, and a councillor of Don John, states that most of them were put to death by drowning.

what dispositions he could for the defence of Bruxelles, retired with the Archduke and his Court and Council to Antwerp.

In the council of war which Don John held after the victory of Gemblours the design of marching upon the capital and besieging it was at first entertained. Upon looking more carefully into his resources, the number of his troops, and the balance in his military chest, the Governor decided that he was not sufficiently strong to take a step so important. He therefore sent out detachments to take possession of various towns of Brabant and Hainault. This was in most cases an easy service. In some of the places there was a party in favour of Don John, to which his recent victory had for the time given irresistible influence, and in but few of them was there an Estates garrison or a patriotic zeal sufficiently strong to enable or dispose the inhabitants to make a stand against the victors of Gemblours. Malines and Vilvorde, having lately received strong reinforcements from Bruxelles, refused to obey the summons of Gonzaga, and were left unmolested. But Joudvigne, Tillemont, and Louvain rose against their Scotch garrisons, expelled them before he appeared at the gate, and surrendered themselves with an appearance of loyal enthusiasm. Bovines, summoned by Hierges, capitulated upon certain conditions.

Alexander Farnese found Sichem more refractory. He was obliged to cannonade the walls for some hours, and in the assault which followed his troops were several times driven back with the loss of some of their officers. When the town was taken the two hundred soldiers who alone remained of the defenders retired into the citadel, from which they were not dislodged till next day. The governor, his officers, and some of the men, were hanged on the ramparts, and the rest of the unfortunate band were slain at night in prison, their bodies being thrown into the river Demer, which flowed beneath the walls of the fortress. The town was given up to pillage. Farnese justified his cruel treatment of the garrison on the plea that it was necessary to repress rebellion by a terrible example, and that many of those who fought against him at Sichem were prisoners who had been dismissed after Gemblours on pledging themselves not to serve against the King. Appalled by the fate of Sichem, the neighbouring town of Diest, which belonged to the Prince of Orange, after having at first refused submission, capitulated on favourable terms. The town was spared, and three hundred Walloons of the Estates army were permitted to march out with arms and baggage, giving up

only their banners. With these they must have parted with little regret, for the whole body as they filed out closed with an offer to take service in the royal army. Leuwe next opened its gates to Farnese, who had thus compelled or received the submission of three considerable towns within seven days. Chimay capitulated to Count Charles of Mansfeldt and his French regiment; but while the terms were being discussed a number of his soldiers stole into the citadel for the purpose of pillaging it, and accidentally exploded a powder magazine, by which two hundred of them perished. Nivelles offered so obstinate a resistance to the survivors under the same officer that Don John appeared before it in person with a strong force, which was further increased by the detachment of the Prince of Parma. Mansfeldt had been repulsed in two assaults, but the arrival of an overwhelming force made further defence hopeless. The inhabitants and the garrison made an ingenious excuse for their resistance. They had no animosity, they said, either to the King or his brother, but they nourished a hereditary hatred of Frenchmen, and to them they could not yield without dishonour. Now that the Spaniards had come they were quite willing to lay down their arms. The excuse was accepted, and easy conditions were granted by Don John. The lives and property of the inhabitants were respected, and the soldiers of the garrison were permitted to march out with their swords only, their other arms and their effects being made over to the Frenchmen whom they had baffled by way of compensation for the loss of the expected plunder. In a quarrel which ensued about the division of this booty another powder magazine was exploded by the unlucky Frenchmen. A quantity of loaded arquebuses at the same time poured their contents into the soldiery whom they were to have armed. More than a hundred and twenty were slain, and many more were wounded. The remainder of the regiment asked leave to retire from the army, which Don John easily accorded, very glad, says a Spanish historian, to "rid himself of their insolence and blasphemies."¹ Within two months most of these men were again in the field, but that time in the pay of the Estates.

While he lay before Nivelles, Don John was called upon to suppress a mutiny. It arose from the old cause, long-deferred pay, and broke out in one of the German regiments. The demand of the soldiers was, immediate payment of arrears or leave to pillage the town, and the alternative was proposed to

¹ Vanderhammen : *D. Juan de Austria*, fol. 318.

Don John by a deputation of the mutineers. He dismissed them with fair words, which gave them some hope of gaining one or other of their wishes, and then ordered the colonel, the Baron of Meghem, a courageous and trustworthy officer, to take the companies which had not joined the mutiny, and some other troops, and occupy certain points on the roads leading to Antwerp and Bruxelles. The malcontents, thus left isolated in their quarters, were soon after surrounded by an overwhelming force of other regiments, and ordered to give up their arms and the names of the ringleaders. The order was complied with, and twelve of the chief mutineers were arrested, of whom four, selected by lot, were condemned to death. Two of these were pardoned on the petition of the other regiments; and of the remaining two, one was also forgiven on account of his wounds and good service. The sedition was therefore quelled by the vigorous measures of the General at the expense of a single victim.

Binche, once famous for its beautiful palace and gardens, the creation and favourite residence of Queen Mary of Hungary, and destroyed by Henry II. of France in retaliation for similar havoc wrought by Mary at his castle of Folembray, soon afterwards opened its gates to a royal garrison. Malblod on the Sambre, Reulx, Belmont, Soigni, Barlemont, and several other towns, did the same. None of these places were in themselves of great importance, but the possession of them gave to Don John the command of the greater part of the frontier Province of Hainault. Philippeville, the chief fortress of the Province, threatened to offer some serious resistance. It was a place built only twenty-four years before, in 1554, to protect the frontier from the incursions of the French. Situated on a small hill rising out of a great plain, it was furnished with all the appliances of strength which the science of the engineer had yet devised. Five royal bastions of great size commanded the approaches, and were connected with massive earthen curtains faced with masonry. A broad and deep double ditch surrounded the whole. Against this formidable fortress Don John led the main body of his army. Having formed a blockade, he opened a trench, and having reached the outer ditch, began to undermine the wall. The besieged defended themselves for some days, and did some execution with their artillery. Communications were also opened by the Estates with some bands of French mercenaries, who were invited to cross the frontier to the relief of the place; the Estates promising to put into their hands some frontier-towns in pledge

for their pay. But the approach of these auxiliaries being notified to Don John, he sent against them a strong force, under Gonzaga, who slew two hundred of them and captured fifty, so that the number who reached the gates was inconsiderable. Many of the slain and taken were found to have belonged to Mansfeldt's unlucky battalion which had been dismissed at their own request after the fall of Nivelles.¹ Before the besiegers' mines were fit for offensive use, Philippeville succumbed to some still more secret operations within. The Estates had unwisely or unwittingly left in command of Philippeville a governor named Florigny, who was at heart a royalist. Just before the royal army appeared before the walls, his treason had been discovered, and he had been put under arrest by some of his officers. But by some of them, and by many of the soldiers, his sentiments appear to have been shared, for he was released from durance, and allowed to open negotiations with Don John. Irregularity in paying the troops, the great solvent of sixteenth-century discipline, cost the Estates both Philippeville and a part of its garrison. The terms of the surrender were that the town should be respected, and that the troops should be permitted to march out armed and with flags flying, drums beating, and "all the pomp with which soldiers "celebrate the obsequies of the fortress they have lost," and that those of them who preferred to enter the service of the King should receive the three months' wages due to them by the Estates. Upon this latter condition five hundred men transferred themselves and their venal valour to the ranks of the royal army; and Don John continued Florigny in the command of Philippeville.

These successes in the Southern Netherlands were not obtained without some countervailing loss in the North. In the opulent and flourishing city of Amsterdam there had hitherto been a Royalist and Catholic party sufficiently strong to maintain a formidable opposition to the policy of the Prince of Orange and the desires of the people of Holland. It was a city of rich ecclesiastic and monastic foundations, the wealth and influence of which disposed a considerable number of the burghers to take the side of the religion and the supremacy of Spain, hoping against hope for some satisfactory compromise between the rights of the country and the prerogative of the Crown. The great victory of Gemblours and the annihilation of the army of the Estates opened many eyes to the futility of such expectations. Men saw that the King would be satisfied with nothing less than the conquest

¹ Vanderhammen : *D. Juan de Austria*, f. 320-1.

of the country, an achievement which now seemed far from impossible. The arguments by which Amsterdam had been hitherto dissuaded from giving her full confidence to Orange lost the greater part of their force after the news of Gemblours. A deputation from Utrecht induced the burghers to give their allegiance to Orange on the same terms upon which Utrecht itself had joined him a few months before; and on the 8th of February the agreement, or, as it was called, the "Satisfaction," was finally concluded. The nominal supremacy of the Catholic religion, with perfect toleration for the reformed faith which was professed by the vast majority of the people; the free exercise of Protestant worship without the walls, and the right of Protestant burial within them, were the chief features of the long-desired Treaty, which put Holland and Orange in possession of the capital of the Province, and which deprived the royal cause of its last place of secure footing in the northern portion of the country.

While these events were taking place, the Baron de Selles, a royalist Netherlander, arrived from Spain with despatches from the King. He first waited upon Don John, although his ostensible business was to deliver to the Estates a reply to their remonstrances addressed to the King in the previous autumn.¹ The proclamations of Don John and the battle of Gemblours had already furnished unmistakable answers to these remonstrances. But Philip loved to do all things in correct official form, and the well-known unmeaning formula of a reply now arrived at a period when a frank offer to redress grievances would have been too late. The rebels who were in arms against him, and who were straining every nerve to retrieve their late discomfiture, were addressed in a calm and courteous document, which insisted upon the maintenance of the royal authority and the Catholic religion as both had existed under the Emperor Charles. In other words, the King was willing to arrange the quarrel if the Estates would concede all the points for which they were contending. The stand which they had made for liberty might be forgiven if they would consent to the quiet re-establishment of despotism.

The delivery of this solemn piece of trifling was, however, not the real business of De Selles. He was charged by Philip with secret orders to confer privately with the leading personages in the Estates, and to convey to them, with as much force as was consistent with a safe vagueness, the desire of the King for peace;

¹ See p. 258.

and to intimate that he would withdraw Don John and appoint as his successor either the Prince of Parma or the Archduke Ferdinand ; or even, upon certain conditions, confirm the Archduke Matthias in the place which he had so irregularly taken, if the Provinces would return to their allegiance to their sovereign and the Roman Catholic faith. Like most of the proposals of Philip, this offer, even if it had been more specific, came too late. A few weeks earlier the Catholic nobles might have been tempted by the prospect of the puppet Governor of their own choice being accepted by the King. But they had discovered that the Archduke, instead of being their instrument, had become the mere mouthpiece of Orange. They had therefore begun to renew their intrigues with the French party and the Duke of Anjou. Moreover, they had had so many memorable proofs of the King's inveracity that they were not to be induced to believe him sincere, merely because he showed that he could also be false to Don John ; nor were they disposed to put more confidence in the propositions of the King because the receipt of his letter was followed by a fresh proclamation from Don John, once more calling on the Provinces to return to their allegiance. It contained nothing to distinguish it from the many similar papers which had preceded it, except an assertion that the Estates had already sworn to maintain the supremacy of the King and the Catholic faith as it had existed under the rule of the Emperor. This statement was met by the Estates with an indignant protest, declaring it to be an infamous falsehood, and affirming that the Ghent Treaty, to which they had sworn obedience, and to which alone the offensive reasoning of the proclamation could apply, had been framed for the express purpose of abolishing for ever those illegal edicts and that hateful Inquisition which had been found intolerable in the last as well as in the present reign.

Out of this altercation there arose a war of words on which it is not easy to understand why those who had fought and were about again to fight with sterner weapons should have been disposed to waste time and thought. Probably the combatants who used the pen were not those who used the sword. Possibly each party, however hopeless or careless of convincing the other, conceived it important that its cause should be placed in the fairest light before that portion of the people of Europe which might find it necessary to intervene in the quarrel.

The Estates addressed a letter to the King, in their own name and that of the Archduke Matthias, insisting on the maintenance

of the Ghent Treaty and the recall of Don John. This paper was placed in the hands of De Selles, the royal envoy. By him it was communicated to Don John; and by him a reply from Don John was presented to the Estates along with a letter from himself. The envoy's letter acknowledged that that which it enclosed was somewhat harsh in tone. Don John's letter merely called upon the Estates to obey the King, and reflected severely on their audacity in soliciting aid from foreign powers, a step which neither Philip nor his Viceroy could be expected to regard as anything but treason. Some days later, on the 18th of February, De Selles propounded a scheme of his own for resolving all difficulties. He suggested that the Prince of Orange and the Prince of Parma should be exchanged as hostages; that the one should repair to the camp of Don John and the other to Bruxelles, alone and unarmed; and that to their hands the negotiations for a settlement should be confided. This absurd plan, which was received with no favour in any quarter, produced on the part of the Estates a reply in which they regretted that the son of the Duchess Margaret should take part with the enemy of the Netherlands, and expressed their resolve never more to submit to the edicts, the Inquisition, the executions, or the armies of Spain, or to the principles and practice of the Imperial reign. The correspondence was absolutely without result, except to produce a swarm of angry pamphlets with which the presses of Antwerp and Bruxelles continued to teem, until men's minds were again occupied with the interests and anxieties of real warfare. Prints of a scurrilous character were likewise publicly sold and eagerly circulated. The Pope and the Cardinals, the Inquisition, the Bishops, the King, the Duke of Alba, Requesens, and Don John, were the subjects chiefly satirized. One of the most daring of these publications represented a hand proceeding from heaven and transferring the Crown from the head of Philip II. to that of Orange. Those who could neither write nor draw expressed their hatred and contempt in simpler ways, like the Governor of Mechlin, who bestowed on a whelp which ran about his house the name of Don John.¹

Under the care of Orange the prospects of the Estates were gradually improving. Don John was not strong enough both to garrison the country and to threaten the greater cities. His successes had for the time united the Catholic and Protestant parties by the bonds of a common fear. Orange had therefore

¹ A. Camero : *Guerras Civiles en Flandes*, p. 142.

ample time for his financial arrangements and cordial co-operation in making them. His agents in Germany succeeded in negotiating the aid of twelve thousand men, to be led across the Rhine in the spring by the Duke John Casimir of the Pfalz, and to be paid



JOHN CASIMIR COUNT PALATINE, ETC.

MEDAL STRUCK ON OCCASION OF HIS EXPEDITION INTO BELGIUM.

with the subsidy which Queen Elizabeth had promised to his agents in England. The shattered ranks of the national army were rapidly filling. The great cities and the provincial Estates were munificent in advancing loans and in furnishing contributions. New taxes were cheerfully imposed upon themselves by citizens who knew that the Spanish soldiery were once more in possession of many of their southern fortresses, and who remembered the horrors of their former occupation of the land.

Sainte Aldegonde was sent by the Estates to attend the Imperial Diet of Germany, which met in the spring at Worms. He addressed the assembly in an oration, in which he set forth the wrongs and the dangers of his country with great eloquence, but with small effect on the unfavourable audience. At Worms, however, he learned that the King of Spain had been in negotiation with Sweden for some armed vessels to be employed against Amsterdam. He conveyed this information to his friends in Holland. The Protestants of Amsterdam, who had found many grounds of complaint in the operation of the compact with the Catholic aristocracy of their city, now determined to rid themselves of neighbours whom they believed to be plotting the restoration of Spanish dominion. The Catholics still enjoyed most of the higher municipal offices, and their rich monasteries were nests of Spanish intrigue. One Bardez organized a plot for the overthrow of the magistracy and the expulsion of the friars. A party of picked soldiers of Orange were introduced secretly into the town and lodged in various private houses, and many of

the citizens engaged themselves to rise in arms. The plan was carried into effect with perfect success on the 28th of May, and without a drop of blood being shed. The whole Catholic magistracy and all the friars were arrested at mid-day, placed on shipboard, and conducted out of the city, after which they were landed unharmed upon a dyke, with a warning not to be found again within the gates. A new magistracy was elected and new train-bands organized, and the churches were thrown open to Protestant worship, to the exclusion of that of the Catholics—an intolerant and illegal restriction which was soon afterwards removed. From that day Amsterdam became a principal stronghold of civil and religious liberty.

When Leyton, the English envoy to Don John, was returning to his own Court, he was requested by the Estates to convey to Queen Elizabeth a report of their recent correspondence with the Governor with whom they were at war, and especially of the language recently held by him towards them. He was also desired to express their hopes that the Queen's promises of aid, in money and men, might speedily be fulfilled.

During the spring of 1578 Elizabeth had sent another agent, Mr. Wilkes, to the Low Countries, no doubt to report on the state of affairs, though his ostensible instructions were "to urge " Don John to grant a surseance of arms, and to enter into a " treaty of peace."¹ Wilkes remained in the Netherlands during the greater part of the summer, offering ineffectual advice, and receiving evasive replies.

The preparations of Don John for the coming campaign were more satisfactory than those which he had been able to make in the previous autumn. At the end of April, Mr. Fenton, an English agent, made a very favourable report to his Government on the state of the royal camp, and the prospects of the Governor. " Don John," he wrote, "remaineth in that part of Hainault " that bordereth upon France, and commandeth sixteen walled " towns. . . . His whole camp containeth eighteen thousand men " for the fight, viz. three thousand horsemen, and the residue " footmen; of these he maketh special account of six thousand, " being Spaniards of the old bands; the residue are mercenaries " of sundry nations and customs, and of resolution and valour " doubtful. He lieth not encamped in any one place, but has " dispersed his companies into garrisons within the towns he hath

¹ State Paper Office, Flanders, 1578, No. 32, April 5. Instructions for Mr. Wilkes, sent to Don John from Queen Elizabeth.

“won, by which impediment he is not able to put an army to the field, nor advance any great exploit of war, having withal no store of great artilleries, field pieces, nor gunpowder. He expecteth a provision of these munitions from Luxemburg. He entertaineth great intelligence with certain particulars in the council of the Estates by whom joining the factions he hath in many of their principal towns, he pretendeth to prevail more than by his forces. He hath contracted with the Duke of Brunswick for four thousand *reitres* and two thousand lance-knights, who, as soon as they arrive, he meaneth to take the field and march, pretending to bestow in his towns the lance-knights, and revoke to the camp his own companies. [But] I hear that by the Diet of Worms the Duke of Brunswick is forbidden to make any levies against the Estates. Such places as Don John taketh by composition he observeth justly his covenants [with]; every particular in the country where he commandeth, liveth in no less freedom and security than if there were no war at all. The husbandman under his protection laboureth the ground in safety; and, bringing victuals to his camp, he receiveth his money in quietness, and returneth without fear of violence. He punisheth with death all sorts of pillage and insolency, not sparing in that crime any nation or nature of soldiers of what merit soever. By these humanities he maketh deep impression in the hearts of the people, and so changeth the course of the war that he beginneth to make less in the popular sort the hatred universally borne to the nature of the Spaniards. He is environed with a grave council, with whom he useth to counsel touching all expeditions and directions of the war. These are of his Privy Council; the Prince of Parma, Ottavio Gonzaga (he governeth him most), Don Gabriel Niño, Doctor Del Rio, Count Barlaymont, Count Charles of Mansfeldt, Don Lopus [Lope de Figueroa?], Don Pe. de Taxis [J. B. de Tassis?], Monsieur de Billi, and Mondragone. These in all their behaviour do wonderfully reverence him, and by their example he is honoured with a wonderful obedience of the inferiors.”¹

The successes of Don John's arms had brought both soldiers to his standard and money to his coffers. The King had at last listened to his entreaties, and sent him one million nine hundred crowns, and he promised a further monthly remittance

¹ State Paper Office, Flanders, 1578, No. 32, April 29. Mr. Fenton's declaration of Don John's estate.

of two hundred thousand more. This long-deferred supply was the fruits of many an anxious despatch, written during the autumn and winter, when everything seemed wanting to the royal cause, from Namur and Luxemburg. It was in some measure also elicited by the earnest representations of Escovedo, whom Don John had sent to Madrid for the purpose of making them, and whose strange and tragical story it is now time to relate.¹

Escovedo had been appointed private secretary to Don John by the King in the room of Juan de Soto, who had been removed from the post because he was supposed to have identified himself too thoroughly with his master's schemes for obtaining a Crown. The new secretary therefore entered his cabinet under the disadvantage of being the undesired successor of a favourite servant. The King and Perez no doubt expected that he would be subservient to their policy ; but there is no proof that he received or disobeyed any instructions for his conduct which were inconsistent with his fidelity to Don John. It is plain, however, that he soon became as devoted as his predecessor had been to his master, and entered as warmly into all his interests and hopes. Don John repaid, and perhaps inspired, his attachment by giving him his full confidence. His early letters from the Netherlands, whither Escovedo did not at first accompany him, contained frequent complaints that he had no one about him whom he could trust to aid him in his daily work, and expressions of the most eager desire for the presence of his secretary. At the time of Don John's hurried departure for the Netherlands Escovedo had been left at Madrid to watch over the interests of his master and urge his views and wishes upon the King. This trust the secretary fulfilled with more zeal than knowledge ; and he even ventured to present a paper to Philip in which he had characterized the royal policy as weak and purposeless, a remark which Philip resented as an insult, and which, although Perez induced him to overlook it at the time, he apparently never forgave.² It was with great reluctance, and only on account of the importance of his mission, that Don John again parted with his secretary. Had he known that Escovedo would have been indefinitely detained at Madrid he would doubtless have selected another envoy. He soon became extremely anxious and

¹ It is very minutely and agreeably related by M. Mignet, in his *Antonio Perez et Philippe II.*, Paris, 1846, 8vo, ch. ii. pp. 65-103. Perez's version of the story will be found in *Las Obras y Relaciones de Antonio Perez*, [Paris] 1654, 8vo, pp. 294-317.

² The word used by Escovedo was "descosido," unstitched. Mignet : *Antonio Perez et Philippe II.*, Paris, 1846, 8vo, p. 35.

impatient for his return, and every letter to Perez or to the King repeated as the burthen of his melancholy strain, "Money and "Escovedo!"

We have already seen the bitter disappointment of Don John's hopes of an English throne, and his despondency on finding himself obliged to abandon the cherished dream of his life and to dismiss his Spanish legions as a condition of entering upon the nominal government of the Belgian Provinces. We have seen the urgency with which he implored his recall, and the frankness with which he confessed his inability to cope with the difficulties around him, his hatred of the Netherlands, their hatred of him, and his belief that a lady of the royal house would be a more fitting ruler for them than a Prince. From the day of his arrival at Luxemburg to the day when he installed himself at Namur and began to prepare for war, he would gladly have accepted any change that the King could have proposed. In his more sombre moments he was for retiring to some wild hermitage amongst the Sierras of Spain. At other times he thought of leading his Spanish regiments into France and attacking heresy in the interest of Church and King, or of devoting himself to home politics, and sharing with Sesa, Los Velez, and Perez, the administration of the Spanish empire.

All these feelings and thoughts were freely poured out by his own pen or by that of Escovedo into the bosom of Antonio Perez, whom both of them believed to be their firm and faithful friend. Don John did not at first wish or intend that his letters to Perez should be considered as private between themselves. On the contrary, he told him that he might show them to the King or read them in the Council, as they would never contain anything but the exact truth; and he afterwards asked if they had been read in the Council and what the King thought of them. It was by Perez that the necessity of keeping the correspondence secret was suggested and insisted upon. The tone of Perez was, as we have seen, most friendly and confidential. He led Don John and his secretary to believe that their letters were seen by no one but himself, and that he lost no opportunity of endeavouring to lead the King into compliance with his brother's wishes. He warned them, however, to remember that the King, or "our man," as he often called him, was "a terrible man," the most suspicious and the most exacting of human beings; and that if he were to discover or to imagine that Don John or any other person in the royal service had any secret object or purpose

which he pursued instead of or even along with the interest of his master, his ruin would be certain. In dealing with such a Prince it was most necessary to be cautious and patient ; to neglect nothing that might tend to secure his confidence : and, above all things, to avoid "striking a blow without hitting the mark." Don John must therefore wait until some fortunate moment for the fulfilment of his desires. Meanwhile he lost no occasion of putting in a word to his advantage ; and he "sold as dearly as" he could Don John's magnanimity in sacrificing every personal "ambition to the King's service."

While thus affecting to be the devoted friend of Don John and the guardian of his interests at Court, Perez was in truth his most bitter and vigilant enemy. Instead of devising harmless schemes to strengthen his favour at Court, he was weaving nets and digging pitfalls for his destruction, with the King himself for his accomplice. All his private and confidential letters to Don John or to Escovedo were submitted to Philip before being despatched, and the original drafts which still exist show marginal notes and suggested alterations in Philip's handwriting. They were, in fact, written to the order, and sometimes in the very words, of that "terrible man" from whom Perez warned Don John that it was so essential to keep the whole correspondence secret.

The ruin of Don John was plainly the object which Perez had in view when he invited the correspondence and insisted on secrecy. It is not so plain why he desired to ruin him. Don John's birth and distinguished career, the scarcity of Princes of the elder branch of the House of Austria, and the favour with which the King had hitherto regarded him, seemed to mark out the Emperor's younger son for the highest places in the service of the Crown. Perez had evidently obtained his entire confidence, and might not unreasonably hope long to share his prosperity and power. The cause of his endeavour to destroy a powerful friend who might make or mar him, and whom he might bend to his will, is not to be traced in his writings. All that is certain is that Don John had hardly set out for Flanders before the secretary began to poison the King's suspicious mind against him by means of stories which it is wonderful that Philip should have swallowed, and which it is impossible that Perez himself can have believed. Don John, he said, was bent on being King not only of England but of Spain, and no sooner should he have conquered the one country, but he would turn its forces against the other.

Escovedo, he averred, had talked before leaving Madrid of the intention of Don John and himself to obtain possession of the Biscayan rock of Mogro, and the city of Santander, to fortify them, and by their means make the gold and steel of England available for the subjugation of Spain. If Philip believed in the existence of a scheme so preposterous, it is strange that he should have left the man who had conceived it in the post of Governor of Flanders, and in command of a strong force of Spanish veterans. If he did not believe in it, it is strange that he should not have expressed his disbelief in terms which would have prevented his malignant secretary from continuing to blacken his brother's character. Perhaps he neither believed nor disbelieved it, but suspended his judgment; and meanwhile indulged the instincts of his suspicious nature by superintending a sham secret correspondence by which Perez proposed to elicit from Don John and Escovedo the inmost hopes and feelings of their hearts. "It was "the only way," said the unscrupulous secretary, "to make them "put themselves within reach of the sword." "According to my "theology," said the cold ungenerous master, "I think so too, and "I think also that you would stand right neither with God nor "with the world if you did not take that course."¹

The subjects of this cold-blooded plot, being wholly innocent of the intentions imputed to them, disappointed the malice of the chief conspirator. Their letters must have considerably bewildered the credulous King. Escovedo displayed very clearly his devotion to Don John, but he wrote not a word that could be twisted into disloyalty or disrespect to his Sovereign. Not even the devilish ingenuity of Perez, and his treacherous frankness as to the character of the "man" at whose dictation he was writing, could give to any fragment of Don John's hasty and passionate complaints the appearance of treasonable intent, or elicit from him a single word of that free or irreverent criticism of which his correspondent had set the example.

When Escovedo arrived in Spain, probably in August 1577, he was well received both by Perez and the King, and encouraged to state the views and wishes of Don John, and his own impressions of the position of affairs in Flanders. Yet the poor man's destruction was already resolved upon, and by the King himself. The letter which Escovedo, on arriving at Santander, addressed to Philip, after being read, received this annotation in the King's own hand: "The *avant-courier* has arrived; it is necessary to make

¹ *Memorias de Antonio Perez*, pp. 310, 311.

“great haste and despatch him before he murders us.”¹ But even in a matter where innocent blood was to be shed Philip could not make haste. Escovedo remained alive, honoured and caressed, while he pleaded the cause of his master, urging the necessity of furnishing him with those supplies of men and money which his own despatches continued to implore. After a while Don John’s letters began to press a new petition, the speedy return of his secretary. Of course plausible reasons were found to justify the detention of Escovedo. It was proposed to send to Flanders instead of him Antonio de Erasso, but Don John declined the offer, saying that in the meanwhile he was satisfied with the services of Andres de Prada.² That with war declared against him by the Estates he should ask for the sinews of war, and that at a time of extreme difficulty, and in the midst of men whose fidelity was doubtful, he should desire the presence and aid of a confidential servant, were considered by the King as proofs of that treason in which Perez had taught him to believe. “Money, more money, and Escovedo,” says Perez, “was again “the burden of Don John’s letters.” The money was to be spent, as he persuaded the King, in preparations for Don John’s personal schemes, and Escovedo was wanted to aid them. It is strange that a man of Philip’s experience should have allowed himself to be persuaded by a fiction so improbable and so unsupported. It is stranger still that while he withheld and punished the unfortunate secretary, he should have at last risked the money in the hands of the traitorous chief.

The fate of Escovedo was eventually sealed by a circumstance which was wholly unconnected with political affairs, and which, if it had been known to the despot who condemned him to die, would probably have saved his life. It throws a strong light on the simple and loyal character of the man, and on the process by which, in matters of morality, gnats are strained at and camels are swallowed. The intimacy with which Escovedo lived with Perez gave him an occasion of discovering his amours with the Princess of Eboli,³ who was at this time almost the acknowledged mistress of the King. By birth a retainer of the House of Silva, Escovedo

¹ Mignet : *Antonio Perez*, p. 74. Quoting *Cartas del Sr. Don Juan de Austria y del Secretario Escovedo*. MS. in Royal Library at the Hague.

² Camero : *Guerras Civiles en Flandes*, p. 115.

³ Ana de Mendoza y de la Cerda, only daughter and heiress of the Count of Melito, and one of the greatest matches of her time, born 1540, was married, in 1553, to Ruy Gomez de Silva, who assumed the title of Count of Melito, and was afterwards created Prince of Eboli. He died in high favour with the King in 1573. Salazar y Castro: *Hist. de la casa de Silva*, Madrid, 1685, 2 vols., 4to, ii. p. 465.


was much shocked at the discovery. He could approve of the violation of any contract with the Netherlands, and he was ready to be the instrument of any fraud profitable to the royal cause in dealing with them ; but his conscience revolted from the treachery of Perez in seducing the King's paramour, and his presumption in raising his eyes to the widow of the Prince of Eboli. So strong was this feeling within him that he had the boldness to remonstrate with Perez, and to threaten that he would denounce him to the King. The minister and the Princess were, of course, greatly amazed and incensed at his insolence ; but they were also considerably alarmed by his menaces, for their intrigue was already notorious and known to every one at Court but the King himself. They therefore resolved on the destruction of an inconvenient spy with the King's connivance and by his order. Perez drew up a paper setting forth the grounds of suspicion against Escovedo, and the expediency of taking him off speedily and by poison. This paper was submitted to Philip and approved by him, and it likewise was seen and approved by the Marquess of Los Velez. Perez received full power to effect the assassination in the way that seemed most likely to escape detection ; and he was furnished, as he avers, with the death-warrant of Escovedo, or he furnished himself with it, as the apologists of Philip hint, by making it out on a blank form to which the King's name was already signed.

The measures taken by Perez for despatching his victim were very ill contrived, and repeatedly failed. Twice it was attempted to poison him at Perez's own table, and once at home. All three attempts were unsuccessful, and for the last of them a female slave of Escovedo was hanged. A few days after the third, on the night of 31st of March 1578, the deed was accomplished. Returning to his house, Escovedo was waylaid by six conspirators and stabbed to the heart. The chief of the band was Diego Martinez, the steward of Perez ; three of them were his servants or dependants ; and two were professional ruffians, by one of whom, Insausti, the blow was struck. The murderers escaped ; Perez was purposely absent from Madrid, performing his Easter devotions at Alcalá ; and the King affected great regret for the death of a faithful and favourite servant.¹ Suspicion, nevertheless,

¹ On the 12th of April 1578 Baccio Orlandini, ambassador of the Grand Duke of Tuscany at Madrid, informed his master of the event. "On Monday evening," he wrote, "the secretary Escovedo, returning to his house on horseback between eight and nine o'clock, was suddenly attacked by six persons unknown, and received a single thrust which passed through and through him, of which he died within half an hour. He was much regretted by the King, and all means are being taken to discover the

soon fell on the real author of the crime. The widow and family of Escovedo became clamorous for justice ; powerful persons were interested in the discovery of the truth ; the widow's petition was carried to the foot of the throne ; and Philip, in due time discovering the infidelity of his mistress and his secretary, seized, with characteristic baseness, the crime which he had himself ordered as the pretext for Perez's disgrace and celebrated imprisonment.

“ assassins. Only a few days before the unfortunate man had received a blow on the head ; and a Morisco slave of his own had lately tried to poison him, for which she was hanged, having confessed the crime she committed, as she said, in order to poison her mistress [Escovedo's wife], who had beaten her. But it was generally supposed that there was some more powerful cause than this ; and many suspect that the blow comes from Flanders, or at least from some soldier of importance who had been offended by the secretary. The event has happened just as he was about to return to Flanders to quiet Don Jolin with good hopes and to arrange many things ; and it is supposed his death will make a great disturbance, on account of his skill in business and his knowledge of the most secret affairs of the government.” Extracted by me, in October 1861, from the original in the royal archives at Florence.





CHAPTER X.

AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS ; FROM THE END OF APRIL TO
THE DEATH OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA ON THE 1ST OF
OCTOBER 1578.



WHILE Don John was securing his possession of the fortresses which he had occupied in the Southern Netherlands, he was attacked by illness, which compelled him to retire to Namur for rest and medical treatment. Constant anxiety and fatigue had told severely upon his frame, and thrown him into a state of great weakness and languor. During this period of repose he transferred the active duties of his military command to the Prince of Parma, and sent him with the bulk of his disposable force to attack the strong town of Limburg.

Seated on a high rock overhanging the river West, this important place gave the Estates a secure footing on the frontiers of Luxemburg, in the rear of the royal army. The garrison was too weak to effect much in support of the national cause ; but in the event of a disaster to the King's troops, the place might prove a very formidable centre of further annoyance. Defended on three sides by its precipitous crags, the town had suburbs which stretched into the country on the southern side, on which alone it was accessible and assailable. Marching rapidly and by night, Parma occupied these suburbs, not without some resistance and loss, and seized a quantity of cattle and provisions which had been collected there. He then posted his

artillery on an adjacent height, and proceeded to work a covered way towards a bastion which protected the gate of the town. While his works were in progress he sent a trumpeter to the place with a letter written in the name of Don John, in which the townsmen were advised to receive the King's troops peaceably, and not to compel them to destroy a city once so distinguished for its loyalty. The letter was read, and the messenger was requested to return the next day at the same hour for a reply, certain questions which were in dispute between the inhabitants and the garrison not admitting of its being given at once. On the morrow the same plea was urged for a similar delay. The Prince of Parma would not permit his messenger to return a second time, and pushed on his works without further communication. In spite of the obstructions of a rocky soil and heavy rain, and a constant fire from the place, in two nights more his battery on the hill-top and his covered way towards the gate were completed, and well protected with gabions and stockades. When his nine pieces of cannon had played on the town for four hours, and had opened a breach in the wall fourteen yards wide, the inhabitants sent out a flag of truce to ask for an hour's respite, in which time they promised to come to some resolution about a capitulation. Parma granted their petition, and the firing had hardly ceased when deputies arrived at the camp offering the immediate surrender of the place on condition of safety for life and property, and permission being granted to the troops to march out with arms and baggage. The terms asked for being accorded, it turned out that the only person who had been zealous for the cause of the Estates was the Governor himself. He was suffered to depart, and furnished with a Spanish escort for a part of his way to Aix-la-Chapelle. His soldiers, to the number of a thousand, immediately enlisted in the royal army. When the Prince entered Limburg he found the fortifications so skilfully strengthened, the artillery so good and plentiful, and the magazines so well replenished, that he considered himself fortunate in having so quickly and easily obtained a place, which in the hands of determined enemies might have made a very long and perhaps successful resistance.¹

Several small places in the neighbourhood which were held for the Estates surrendered within a few days. Dalem was the only exception. The citadel there was garrisoned by two hundred and fifty men of Holland and Guelderland, who would not permit

¹ Strada : *De Bello Belgico*, lib. ix.

the trumpeter sent by Parma to enter the gate or even to deliver his letter. The Prince sent thither the Baron of Cevray with a detachment and six pieces of ordnance, with which he ordered him to throw his summons into the place. It was finally carried by assault, and the defenders and the inhabitants butchered with the fury and cruelty of the days of Alba. The night after the capture the explosion of a powder magazine in a bastion destroyed the greater part of the citadel, which had been committed to the charge of Mondragone and a hundred of his Spaniards. Only four of these soldiers were killed and six or seven wounded. The room in which Mondragone lay, being close to the bastion, was crushed and almost carried away by the fall of masses of masonry which had been hurled into the air. Only so much of the flooring remained as supported his bed and a box near it, but he was found in the morning unhurt. The escape, marvellous in itself, was pronounced miraculous when it was discovered that the box contained some relics of saints and pieces of church plate, probably a portion of the veteran's plunder. In twenty days Farnese had thus reduced to obedience the whole Province of Limburg with the loss of hardly twenty of his soldiers. He had the satisfaction of receiving messages of compliment from the Bishop of Liege and the Duke of Juliers, and of learning that the fall of Limburg had produced no little gloom at Antwerp.

While Don John was at Namur he had to lament the death of his trusty counsellor the Count of Barlaymont, Governor of the Province, a man who might lay claim to the merit, rare in those days, of unshaken fidelity to the cause which he had espoused and the engagements which he had undertaken. He left behind him four sons, all in high posts in the army, the eldest succeeding him as Governor of the Province of Namur.

The summer of 1578 produced a new pretender to the government of the Netherlands in Francis, Duke of Anjou, brother of the French King, in whose favour we have already seen the Queen of Navarre weaving during the previous summer her nets of secret intrigue round the hearts of the Catholic nobles. At that time Anjou was an ardent Catholic, and General-in-Chief of the royal army, and had very lately sacked the Huguenot town of Issoire and butchered its inhabitants with the zeal of an Alba.¹

¹ "He was an adventurer, uneasy at home and anxious only for an independent position of some kind. He had been Huguenot after the massacre. He afterwards made his peace with the Court, and, on the re-creation of the Edict, he had shown his penitence by presiding over the destruction of a Catholic town. He had planned with Guise an invasion of Scotland. He had been a suitor, since his last rejection by

The Peace of Bergerac, concluded in the autumn of 1577 between the Catholics and the Huguenots, left him at leisure to examine the advantages promised by the process, which he had already found to be easy, of changing his religion. He resumed his amorous correspondence with Queen Elizabeth, which, during his fit of extreme Catholicism, that Princess had thought it decent to break off, and entered into political negotiations with the Prince of Orange and the Estates of the Netherlands. The battle of Gemblours rendered his offers of aid very welcome, and these offers were also useful as stimulating the lagging generosity of Elizabeth. For, although the English Queen was proud of having the dull and base Anjou for a suitor, she was by no means disposed to assist in making the heir-presumptive of the French throne her near and powerful neighbour; and her only effectual means of thwarting his ambition was by promising such help to the Netherlands as would render unnecessary the assistance of those French troops whom Anjou was known to be assembling on the frontier of Hainault.

Henry III. was naturally supposed to be friendly to his brother's pretensions, which, if successful, would probably annex the Netherlands to France. Expostulations were addressed by Philip II. to the French King, who denied all complicity in the schemes of Anjou, and whose well-known hatred of his presumptive heir forbade any personal interest in his aggrandizement. The Queen-Mother, however, warmly espoused the cause of her

"Elizabeth, for a Spanish Princess; and the Pope, to further so useful an alliance, had offered him a pension of forty thousand crowns, and had suggested that he should succeed Don John in the Low Countries as Philip's representative (Sir Amyas Paulet to Elizabeth; Oct. 7, 1578). He had been trained by his mother in the art of lying (Sir Amyas Paulet to Elizabeth; Oct. 7, 1578); and there was cause to believe that even now, in his negotiations with the Prince of Orange, he had been playing false, that he might after all carry his twelve thousand men to Don John, assist him in the overthrow of the Provinces, and then perhaps resume his earlier project and go to Scotland with Guise (Mary Stuart expected this. See her letter to the Archbishop of Glasgow; Sept. 15, 1578, Labanoff). He was a small brown creature, deeply pock-marked, with a large head, a knobbed nose, and a hoarse croaking voice; but, whether in contradiction or from whatever cause, she (Queen Elizabeth) professed to be enchanted with him. He became her 'grenouille,' her 'frog-prince,' used as a name of endearment, beneath whose hideousness lay enchanted, visible only to a lover's eye, a form of preternatural beauty. Alençon (Anjou) accepted the name, and, in the long love correspondence preserved at Hatfield, thus pathetically signed himself." Froude: *Hist.*, xi. pp. 132, 154, 155.

There is a spirited letter by Sir Philip Sidney, printed in the *Cabala*, in which he denounced the match between Elizabeth and Anjou, and "the falsehood of Catherine de Medici."

A Protestant pamphlet, by John Stubbs, well expressed the rage of the English people. Anjou was called the "old serpent in the form of a man," etc. Froude: *Hist.*, xi. 156.

younger son ; and to her Italian cunning probably might be traced the rumour, diligently circulated and widely believed amongst the Catholic party in the Netherlands, that the Spanish King viewed the designs of the French Prince for the dismemberment of his dominions with secret favour, and that he would even give the hand of an Infanta to the enterprising adventurer who might relieve him of his refractory subjects. Catherine, of course, publicly repudiated all interference in the affairs of the Netherlands, and, when she received the envoys of the Estates, pretended then and there to rebuke them for disobedience to their lawful Prince. But, as the levies of Anjou were mainly composed of royal troops, her excuses were believed even less than those of the King ; and, as the breach widened between the royal houses, the bonds were strengthened which united the Spanish sovereign to the powerful and malcontent House of Lorraine.

Anjou arrived at Mons at the beginning of July. His reception proved that the seeds sown by his fair sister had fallen upon good ground. Lalaing and the nobility were his fast friends. He immediately announced his arrival by sending two envoys to Antwerp to the Prince of Orange and the Estates, giving them positive orders to negotiate with them only, and not with the Archduke. When Matthias was informed of this personal insult he burst into tears, saying he hoped that means would be found in Germany to render the Estates independent of French aid. The Estates nevertheless sent a commissioner to bid Anjou welcome, the task being most appropriately devolved on one who was almost as great a renegade as himself, the old courtier Aerschot.

The Queen of England received the news of Anjou's appearance in the Provinces in a very different manner. She informed the Estates that she would not permit of their entering into a French alliance, and threatened that if it were persisted in she would withdraw her friendship and even take up arms against them. The loan of one hundred thousand pounds which she had in the last year agreed to advance had been afterwards commuted into a sum sufficient to raise three thousand foot and two thousand horse. But as this sum had been paid and the troops enrolled, Elizabeth could evince her ill-humour only by withholding future favours, and the mere hope of these hardly justified Orange in declining the aid of Anjou and his twelve thousand Frenchmen.

The royal army was about the same time recruited with some important accessions. Gabriel Serbellone, the engineer, arrived

from Italy, having been ransomed by the Pope from his prison at Constantinople. Alonso and Sancho de Leyva came at the head



DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA.

of a gallant company of Spanish gentlemen as volunteers. Lope de Figuerroa, Don John's old comrade in the Alpuxarras, at Lepanto, and at Naples, brought his veteran regiment from Italy

to the Netherlands. Billi, the officer whom Don John had sent to carry to the King the news of the victory at Gemblours, and also a request for further supplies of money, returned with a promise from Philip to allow three hundred thousand crowns a month for the use of the army instead of two hundred thousand, but with an intimation that that was the very highest amount that could or would be granted.¹ Various pensions and gifts in money were likewise bestowed on some of the more distinguished officers—Mansfeldt, Gonzaga, Verdugo, and Mondragone. Further levies from Italy were also announced as being about to be raised; but the services of these Don John declined, alleging that he expected from Germany a body of mercenaries, and that he should be unable to maintain and pay more troops. In this resolution he was partly influenced by a dislike to the right claimed and exercised by the Italian Viceroy of naming the officers of the forces which they levied for service in the Netherlands.²

Meanwhile the army of the Estates lay near Mechlin, on the plain between Herenthal and Lier. It consisted of about twenty thousand men, of whom two thousand were cavalry. Count Bossu was Commander-in-Chief, as lieutenant of Orange. He had lately been a royalist, and his attachment to the popular cause was therefore suspected, but apparently without just reason, as his character both for ability and integrity had always stood high. The cavalry was led by François de la Noue, the famous Huguenot leader, surnamed *Bras de Fer*, from the iron hand which supplied a limb lost in battle. Aerschot, Lalaing, Egmont, Havrech, and other great nobles, held various subordinate but important commands. The eldest sons of the Electors of Saxony and Hesse were amongst the volunteers who had come to learn the art of war on the side of the Netherlanders. The Estates also expected the aid of twelve thousand Germans who had been raised by Duke John Casimir³ of the Pfalz, and who had been for some time encamped on the plains of Zutphen, waiting for a sum of money which it was stipulated they were to receive before they actually took the field. This sum was to be paid out of a further English subsidy, which Queen Elizabeth, however, had not yet found it convenient to remit.

When Don John was again able to mount his horse he moved his available forces in the direction of the enemy. Of his army

¹ Strada: *De Bello Belgico*, lib. ix.

² *Ibid.*

³ John Casimir, born 1543, died 1592, brother of Louis VI., Elector Palatine. He married in 1570 Elizabeth, daughter of Augustus, Elector of Saxony, cousin of the first wife of William, Prince of Orange.

of thirty thousand men a large portion was required for garrison duty, although he had dismantled several of the fortresses taken from the enemy. He was also obliged to keep a body of troops on the French frontier to observe the proceedings of Anjou. He was therefore able to bring into the field only twelve thousand foot and five thousand horse. This force he proposed to lead against the enemy. A council of war was called to consider the plan of the campaign. Don John declared himself for attacking the rebels. The Prince of Parma was for once against fighting. He said that the enemy was not only stronger than themselves, but was so strongly posted that he could not be compelled to give battle; that a retreat from before his intrenchments would be humiliating; that even if a victory were obtained, it might be dearly bought if it exposed the royal troops in a weakened condition to an attack by Duke John Casimir or by Anjou; and that defeat would be the destruction of the royal cause in the Netherlands, because the raising of another army was out of the question. Serbellone alone supported the opinion of Farnese. All the rest of the superior officers were eager to fight. Some were confident in the experience and spirit of their troops. Others built on the dissensions which were supposed to exist in the enemy's ranks, and on the exasperation with which the Catholic lords were sure to regard the treatment of Champagny, who had been arrested by Orange's order on suspicion of treasonable correspondence with his brother Cardinal Granvelle, and whose house had been sacked by the mob at Bruxelles. It was resolved therefore to offer battle, and the royal army moved to Tirlemont. Next day by the bridge of Aerschot it crossed the Demer, and passed the night in front of the enemy's position.

Bossu's camp appeared to be covered in the rear by the village of Rijnemants, on the right and left by large woods, and in front by a strong intrenchment. At Demer, on the 31st of July, Don John drew out his forces in order of battle, and approaching the intrenchment, endeavoured by sound of drum and trumpet to provoke the enemy to emerge from behind his earthworks. Bossu, however, obstinately refused the challenge. After three hours' expectation Don John ordered Alonso de Leyva to lead his company of musketeers along a narrow road which passed between the end of the intrenchment and the wood to the village of Rijnemants in the rear. He was to advance along this road slowly and warily, as if to attack the village; and if he himself were attacked he was to retire, drawing if possible the enemy after

him. The Marquess of Monte, with three troops of cuirassiers and lancers, followed to render assistance if required. When Leyva had gained the rear of the intrenchment Bossu ordered Sir John Norris, at the head of a body of English foot, to oppose his progress. A slight skirmish took place, but it soon ceased, for Leyva did not venture to advance further, nor did Norris attempt to follow him as he retired. But a few of the English having fallen, and Egmont coming up to their assistance with some horse, a cavalry encounter took place between him and Monte. Norris being also reinforced by some Scotch troops under Robert Stuart, Don John sent forward Fernando de Toledo with a fresh party of infantry. The whole royal line was at the same time ordered to move nearer to the intrenchment. The Prince of Parma now leaped from his horse, and claiming the leave which he had obtained from Don John in the morning, placed himself, pike in hand, at the head of the Spanish infantry. While this movement was being made the skirmishing within the intrenchment was renewed, and Leyva succeeded in occupying the wood on the left of the enemy's position. Toledo and some of the cavalry pushed on along the road towards Rijnemants, Norris and his men here and there making a stand, but by degrees falling back upon that village. Nor did the English leader long halt there, as the royalists expected, but after a brief pause again retired, leaving some of the houses in flames behind him. Leyva and Monte now rashly supposed that Bossu had determined to abandon his position, and that the time was come for striking a decisive blow. They therefore sent a message to Don John to that effect by the Count of Cesi, who reported that the enemy was in full retreat, and that the victory was in the Governor's hands. Don John, knowing the strength of the enemy, received this flattering tale with some incredulity, and was confirmed in his doubts by Parma, who had also been narrowly watching the skirmish, and who had conceived a suspicion of the designs of Bossu from observing that the intrenchment, the flank of which had been so easily turned, was not defended by a single gun. Cesi was therefore sent back to the troops in front with orders to halt. But it was too late. They had already pushed on through the village in pursuit of the foe. On emerging from the street and gardens Leyva and Monte perceived that they had themselves fallen into the snare which they had been instructed to spread for their opponents.

Bossu had very successfully prepared for them an elaborate deception. The entire position in front of the village had been

but slenderly occupied, and was a mere feint to deceive the enemy. His real camp lay behind Rijnemants, on an eminence rising out of a plain between the Demer and a thick forest. It was surrounded by a strong intrenchment, and defended by cannon. The situation of the royalists was perilous. Five hundred musketeers and six hundred horse found themselves in front of the whole rebel army. They were immediately attacked by Norris and Stuart, the Scotchmen first singing a psalm¹ and then astonishing their antagonists by throwing away their clothes and rushing to the fight nearly naked. The guns of the camp also opened fire and galled them severely. A message asking for reinforcements was sent back to Don John, who, having so lately despatched orders for a halt, at first hesitated to comply with the request. He eventually, however, entrusted Parma with the task of relieving the engaged troops from their dangerous position. The Prince acquitted himself of the difficult duty with consummate skill. He had the good fortune to discover a narrow path, which wound its secluded way between high banks and hedges through the gardens that skirted the village. Posting a strong body of fresh troops at the point where this path emerged into the plain, occupying the adjacent banks and hedges with sharpshooters, and dexterously manœuvring the cavalry, he enabled Leyva to draw off the weary survivors of his force without much molestation or disorder. The cavalry, after sustaining the shock of the enemy for some time, retired through the village and along the woodside by the way they had advanced. Meanwhile, Don John kept the rest of his force under arms, ready to cover the retreat of their comrades, but in such a position as not to be thrown into disorder if the retreat should become a flight. Bossu did not, however, venture to pursue. The battle was sufficiently fruitless to be claimed as a victory on both sides. The loss of the royalists was the more considerable, being stated by themselves at two hundred slain, and by their enemies at a thousand.² But for this loss the new proofs of heroism which had been given by the famous Spanish infantry, and the singular skill of their cavalry officers and the valour of their men, afforded some consolation. The Estates, however, were not a little elated with their victory, and the valour of her subjects seems for a moment to have encouraged Queen Elizabeth

¹ *Discours de la Pacification de Gand*, 1579, 8vo, p. 114.

² Motley (*Dutch Republic*, iii. p. 236, note), on the authority of Bor, Meteren, and Hoofd, states the loss of the royalists at one thousand slain. Strada (*De Bello Belgico*, lib. ix.) says that the slain on both sides amounted to only four hundred, but that the royal army had more men wounded and taken prisoners than the enemy.

to assist the Netherlanders. "Her Majesty," Knollys wrote to Walsingham, "became suddenly minded without all scruple to offer aid. So long as the Spaniards were victors and were not confronted with so orderly a skirmish as now they have been by Colonel Norris [he had three horses killed under him], neither could her Majesty be drawn nor wholly counselled to offer such aid, but now it was somewhat apparent that the Spaniards were no such devils."¹

After the battle of Rijnemants Don John retired upon Aerschot and Tirlemont. During his halt at Tirlemont an event occurred which showed that his life was still menaced by assassins. The Spanish ambassador in England, Don Bernardino de Mendoza, had some time before warned him by letter that two Englishmen had lately set out from London on their way to Namur, where it was believed his murder was their business. The principal of these men was named Ratcliffe; he was said to be an Earl's bastard, and was known to be a man of desperate character. The better to mask his design he was accompanied by his wife and children, and pretended to be a Roman Catholic. Besides this information respecting him, the letter also contained a portrait of Ratcliffe. His passage through Paris was afterwards notified to Don John by the Spanish minister in that capital. The Governor of Namur was therefore ordered to be on the watch for the two men, and to arrest them if they should make their appearance there. Don John's personal attendants and guards were also warned of the expected attempt, and directed to be vigilant and observing. Ratcliffe and his companion did not go to Namur but took the road to Liege, and thence went towards the army, which they came up with at Tirlemont. There, without being discovered or challenged, they made their way into the room where Don John was giving public audience. He was the first person who recognized the original of Ratcliffe's portrait, and he immediately but privately pointed him out to the captain of the guard, telling him to watch him and his companion, and arrest them as they retired. Ratcliffe, when his turn came, presented himself before Don John, saying that he was a man of quality and a Catholic, and that he desired to enter the service of the King of Spain, to which he had been attracted by the great reputation of His Highness; and he further begged that such pay might be assigned him as might enable him to support his wife and young

¹ Knollys to Walsingham, 10th August 1577, MSS., Holland, State Paper Office. Froude: *Hist.*, xi, 128.

children, by whom he was accompanied. Don John replied courteously, thanking him for his zeal in the royal cause, and promising to attend to his wishes and claims. Both men were soon after in the custody of the provost-marshal. On being submitted to the usual torture, Ratcliffe confessed the object of his journey to have been such as Mendoça had represented it to be. He and his follower were to watch for an opportunity when Don John was at some distance from his staff, and were then to despatch him with a poisoned dagger. They had brought with them two fine Hungarian horses, upon which they expected to make their escape.¹ It was said also that Ratcliffe declared that the instigator of the deed was Sir Francis Walsingham, who, finding him a prisoner in the Tower of London, had obtained his release on condition of his undertaking this new crime. In spite of their confession Don John would not permit the men to be executed, and they were still in durance when his death took place.² A few days after that event they were beheaded and quartered by order of the Prince of Parma, and their remains hung up by the wayside near Namur.³

Don John soon thought it advisable to retire from Tirlemont and concentrate his army in and around Namur. This movement was a great encouragement to the Estates, and to their adherents in the places still occupied by the royal troops. Very soon after the retreat of the army the people of Aerschot rose against the Spanish garrison. Mucio Pagano, the Italian officer in command, was slain, and his lieutenant and the remains of his force driven from the town. Louvain was attacked by Bossu, who endeavoured to carry it by a sudden onslaught. He was, however, repulsed with severe loss, and Bossu himself was wounded in the thigh. Deventer, however, where Polwiller had for some time maintained himself almost in the country of Orange, was forced to surrender; and Nivelles, which had so lately been taken by the royalists, was conquered for the Estates.

These disasters induced Don John to dismantle several of the places which he had garrisoned, and to recall his troops to the main body of the army. On the abandonment of Tirlemont, it was immediately sacked by the national force, who plundered the nunneries and maltreated the nuns.⁴

The Prince of Orange was meanwhile engaged in negotiations

¹ Vanderhammen : *D. Juan de Austria*, f. 322.

² A. Carnero : *Historia de las Guerras Civiles en Flandes*, p. 145.

³ Vanderhammen : *D. Juan de Austria*, f. 326.

⁴ A. Carnero : *Guerras Civiles en Flandes*, p. 147.

of a very difficult nature with Duke John Casimir, who still lay inactive at Zutphen, and with the Duke of Anjou, who remained at Mons. The one would not advance without pay, or its equivalent. The other aspired to the sovereignty of the Netherlands, a price which neither Orange nor the Estates were willing to pay for his aid, and which they could not pay without forfeiting the aid and good-will of Queen Elizabeth. The terms which the Estates offered, and which Anjou accepted, were a compromise between the exigencies of the Provinces and the pretensions of the Duke. He was to have a high-sounding title, but very little power. He was to be called Defender of the liberties of the Netherlands against the tyranny of the Spaniards and their adherents. In all matters relating to the internal affairs of the country, he was to submit to the civil Government; and he was to make no contracts or treaties with individual provinces or cities. If the Estates determined to choose a new sovereign, the Duke was to be preferred to all others, on conditions to be afterwards agreed upon. He was to undertake nothing against the Queen of England. For three months he was to keep ten thousand foot and two thousand horse in the field, and after that time he might reduce his force to three thousand foot and five hundred horse; but his soldiers were all to be Frenchmen. The Estates undertook to aid him with the same amount of troops as that which he himself furnished. All cities conquered within the Provinces were to belong to the Estates, and conquests beyond their territory were to be divided equally between them and the Duke. It was finally stipulated that the month of August was to be allowed to the Estates for the purpose of making a last attempt at an arrangement with Don John.

Anjou had been invited to the Netherlands by the Catholic nobles for the same reason which had suggested their invitation to the Archduke Matthias, jealousy, namely, of the power of Orange. They saw that the harmless Austrian Prince had become a passive and helpless tool in the hands of the great statesman, and they had the mortification of seeing that the unprincipled Frenchman was likely to become the same. Whatever might be the secret hopes and designs of Anjou, he could obtain a footing in the country only through the co-operation of Orange, and he was therefore compelled to accept the conditions which the Estates, by the advice of Orange, imposed.

When the Estates had come to an understanding with their French ally, they proceeded to treat with their Spanish Governor.

Don John entered upon the negotiations with manifest reluctance, and with no expectation that they could settle a dispute which had been already referred to the arbitration of the sword. It would have been more consistent with his feelings, and with sound policy, to employ the month of August in acting against either Bossu or the Duke John Casimir, or at least in preventing the junction of their forces. But the last despatches from Madrid did not leave him the option of declining to listen to the proposals of the Estates. After supplying him with men and money for carrying on the war, the King, with his usual vacillation, sent him orders to lose no opportunity of endeavouring to make peace. Having for a few weeks or days blown hot, he was again blowing cold. These orders served to indicate the increase of those suspicions and those intrigues, the existence of which was first revealed to Don John by the murder of Escovedo. If the mistrust of the King and the hostility of his advisers could be removed, they could be removed only by the exact fulfilment of orders. Sick in body and soul, anxious and yet hopeless, Don John therefore consented to receive the envoys of the Estates.

Commissioners on both sides first met at Louvain. The Estates were represented by M. de Beaurepaire, Adolf de Meetkercke, and Dr. Leoninus; the King by M. de Vaux, Juan Bautista de Tassis, Dr. John Fonck, and M. de Vasseur. Count Schwartzenburg, the envoy of the Emperor, assisted at their deliberations, and used all his influence to promote pacific counsels. Lord Cobham and Sir Francis Walsingham, who represented the Queen of England, also took a similar course in this fruitless conclave. The intervention of a French Prince with French troops in the affairs of the Netherlands had alarmed Elizabeth and had disconcerted her policy of procrastination. She desired to weaken the Spanish monarch by making the Low Countries a perpetual thorn in his side and a chronic drain upon his resources. But she did not desire to strengthen the French king, and was determined, at whatever cost, to prevent him from rounding and securing his exposed northern frontier by the acquisition of the rich territories watered by the Scheldt and the Meuse. She saw an escape from her difficulty in helping to patch up a peace between the Estates and Spain.

But in spite of the advice of Austrian and English mediators, the Estates would offer Don John no conditions which it was possible for him to accept. Orange saw that the battle must be fought out to the end, and he thought the present time the best

time for fighting it. The articles submitted to Don John therefore were, in substance, only the old proposal that the King of Spain should retain a mere titular sovereignty over the Netherlands, of which the government was to be vested in the representatives of the nation. The Archduke Matthias was to be confirmed in the post of Governor-General, under the conditions on which he had accepted his election to the office ; and, in case of his death or resignation, the consent of the Estates-General was to be necessary to give validity to the appointment of his successor. All prisoners were to be released, all exiles were to be allowed to return home, and all confiscated property was to be restored. Queen Elizabeth, Duke John Casimir, and the Duke of Anjou, were to be included as parties to the treaty of peace. Don John and his troops and adherents were forthwith to give up all their strongholds and to take their departure from the country. In a word, Don John, in the midst of a gallant army which had recently won some considerable victories, was asked to withdraw, in the King's name, all those royal pretensions for which he had been fighting, and to concede by treaty all that the Estates could hope to wrest from him by force of arms.

This proposal was formally made to Don John on the 24th of August by the commissioners of the Estates, who were accompanied by the English and Imperial ambassadors. The meeting took place on a plain about a mile and a half on the western side of the royal camp, from which Don John came with an escort of two thousand horse. The conference was held beneath a great oak-tree.¹

A year ago, such propositions as were now submitted to him would have been received by Don John with haughty wonder, and perhaps with an outburst of indignation. But experience and physical feebleness now rendered him incapable of these emotions. He read the articles almost without comment, said that they were iniquitous, and declined to enter into any argument as to their details. The Imperial and English envoys, urging the policy of making peace, elicited little from him in the way of reply. He told Schwartzenburg that it was useless to discuss proposals which could not be accepted ; that the King had resolved to lay the affairs of the Netherlands before the Emperor as an arbiter ; and that meanwhile he himself was anxiously expecting his recall. After hearing the palpably mendacious

¹ State Paper Office, Flanders, 1578, No. 32. Account of an interview between the English ambassadors and Don John, without signature, but dated 27th August.

excuse which the Englishmen made for the assistance given by their Queen to the rebel Estates—that it was given for the purpose and as the sole means of preventing a French invasion—he maintained an absolute and very expressive silence. Nor did he give any encouragement to a plan, suggested by Cobham and Walsingham, of meeting the difficulties of the country by some temporary compromise, somewhat like the famous Interim, devised with eminent ill success by the Emperor Charles V. before the Peace of Passau, whereby the Roman Catholic and reformed religions were to retain the precise rights and immunities which up to that time each had conquered or preserved. He contented himself with asserting the pacific intentions and desires of himself and the King, and throwing the blame of the war, past and future, on the refractory and unreasonable people of the Netherlands. Finally, he asked the two English statesmen what they themselves thought of the terms which they so eagerly pressed upon his acceptance. “Indeed,” replied Walsingham, “they are too hard;” “but, bad as they seem, it is only by pure menace that we have extorted them from the Estates.” “Then,” said Don John, “you may tell them to keep their offers to themselves. Such terms will not do for me.”¹

Such inadmissible conditions being propounded and insisted on, he hoped it would appear to the Queen of England “that he had reason to refuse the same.”² He nevertheless would be glad to have the opinion and advice of her two ministers, saying that these might help him to a satisfactory conclusion. The envoys shrank from the responsibility, and after a long pause Walsingham replied that they were like “the physician who declined to prescribe medicine until he was quite sure that the patient would swallow it. ’Tis no use wasting counsel or drugs.”³

¹ Walsingham was much struck with Don John. “In conference with him,” he said, “I might easily discern a great conflict in himself between honour and necessity. Surely I never saw a gentleman for personage, speech, wit, and entertainment comparable to him. If pride do not overthrow him, he is like to become a great personage.” Walsingham to Lord Burghley, August 27. MSS., Holland, Record Office.

² State Paper Office, Flanders, 1578, No. 32. Account of an interview between the English ambassadors and Don John, without signature, but dated 27th August.

³ Motley: *Dutch Republic*, iii. pp. 244, 245. Froude notices their interview: *Hist. Eng.*, xi. 128. “The States . . . refused to listen to terms which did not include liberty of worship. The English ambassadors, taking advantage of the defeat of Rymenant, went to Don John to try to persuade him to acquiesce. . . . The conditions were hard. Walsingham reminded Don John of the Peace of Passau. But Don John was at no such extremity as Charles had been at his flight from Innspruck. No one, he said, could desire peace more than he desired it, but if he was a prisoner at Brussels he would refuse stipulations so disgraceful. The interview failed.”

Next day, the 25th of August, Don John addressed a letter to Queen Elizabeth, thanking her in his own behalf and the King's for the trouble she had taken in suggesting some terms of agreement between His Majesty and his subjects. The articles proposed by the latter, he said, were repugnant to all honesty, and were too hard to be admitted, but he had no other intention than to restore the country to repose and quietness.¹

The conference of the commissioners of the Estates and the foreign ministers with Don John extinguished the last gleam of hope that any compromise could be effected between the Estates and the Crown. One at least of the representatives of England viewed the renewal of the war with great satisfaction as favourable to English interests. Of the long struggle between Spain and the Netherlands Walsingham afterwards remarked to Queen Elizabeth: "The Spaniard has a great appetite and an excellent "digestion, but I have fitted him with a bone for these twenty "years that your Majesty should have no cause to doubt him."² Probably few of the statesmen engaged were disappointed by the failure of the negotiations. Four days before the conference, on the 20th of August, Anjou had signed at Mons the convention,³ already sketched,⁴ with the Estates, so that the Estates had given up all expectation of peace, if indeed they ever entertained any, before their commissioners had formally laid their proposals before Don John. On the 26th of August Duke John Casimir, to whom Deventer and Campen had been given in pledge for the pay of his troops,⁵ led his twelve thousand Germans into the plains of Mechlin, where the army of Bossu was still encamped.

In announcing to the King the propositions which had been made by the Estates and his rejection of them, Don John earnestly called his attention to the painful and precarious position of his officers, army, and adherents. The forces of Bossu and the Palatine, now combined at Mechlin, greatly outnumbered his own. Anjou, having made his bargain with the Estates, had issued from His Majesty's town of Mons a proclamation of war against the King's representative. He had not yet taken the field; but his army was mustering, and it was understood that recruits were pouring in. There was reason to believe that the King of France, in spite of his professions of neutrality, was preparing to invade

¹ State Paper Office, Flanders, 1578, No. 32. Don John of Austria to Queen Elizabeth, 25th August.

² *Fragmenta Regalia*. *Memoirs of Queen Elizabeth*, by Sir Robert Nameten, London, 1814, in 8vo, p. 72.

³ Motley: *Dutch Republic*, iii. p. 243.

⁴ See p. 324.

⁵ A. Carnero: *Guerras Civiles en Flandes*, p. 144.

Spanish Burgundy in case his brother's operations in Hainault prospered. In the presence of so many enemies the royal army was outnumbered and powerless. As its General, all that Don John could hope to do was to maintain his position at Namur, which he had taken every means of strengthening, and to keep open his communications with that Luxemburg frontier by which any aid from the south must come. Now more urgently than ever he entreated to be furnished with money to pay his troops, and with instructions and orders from the King.

But for the want, which was ever crippling the military enterprises of the sixteenth century, and which was felt in the camp of the Estates as well as in his own, Don John would have been reduced to the direst extremities. For him, under the present circumstances, aggression was impossible. To have advanced against Bossu and the Duke Palatine would have been to have left Namur and Luxemburg a prey to Anjou. The army of the Estates, having no enemy in its rear, might have been expected to move southwards to blockade the royal troops in their quarters and recover the castle of Namur. But the step was forbidden by an empty military chest, by troops clamorous for pay, and by jealousies between the German Prince and the national commander. Both armies therefore lay inactive during the fine autumnal weather generally preferred for fighting.

Don John improved the time by constructing an intrenched camp on the heights of Bouges, about a mile from Namur. Rising gently from the banks of the Meuse, this hill of corn and vines commanded a long reach of that river, and the confluence of the Meuse and Sambre which mingle their waters within the walls of Namur and beneath the white limestone rocks crowned by its castle. That fortress and the hill together made those who held both masters of the navigation of the Meuse. Bouges had been chosen for an intrenched camp by Charles V. when hard pressed by the superior forces of Henry II. The new camp was undertaken by Don John as a sanitary measure as well as a strategic precaution, pestilence having appeared amongst his soldiers, who had been crowded into insufficient quarters in and around the town. The plans were drawn by Gabriel Serbellone, and the works were carried on under his inspection, assisted by Scipio Campi. The rampart and ditch were completed, and a considerable portion of the troops moved to the spot, when Don John took up his quarters there towards the middle of September.

He had been again attacked by the fever, which, indeed, had been for weeks lingering in his system. His last illness was reckoned by those about him to have commenced on the 17th of September.¹ He thought the change of air might do him good ; and besides, at the camp, he was nearer his works and his daily duty. So great was his weakness that he was carried up the hill from Namur on a camp-bed borne on men's shoulders. His arrival, being unexpected, had not been prepared for. Refusing to allow any of the superior officers to be disturbed on his account, he desired to be carried to the quarters of the regiment of Figueroa, one of whose captains, Bernardino de Zuñiga, was attached to his household. Zuñiga had established himself in a ruined grange, and an old pigeon-house attached thereto was selected as the only apartment available for Don John. The place was hastily cleaned, its rough walls and roof were clothed with some rich armorially-embazoned hangings, and damask curtains were placed over the holes which served as windows. A wooden staircase was constructed in place of the ladder by means of which it had been formerly reached. In this forlorn loft he continued for some days to write his despatches and transact the business of the army from his sick-bed. By a curious coincidence, on the same day when his disorder returned, his old friend and comrade Serbellone, the engineer, was prostrated by a similar ailment. The attacks of the disease were in both cases intermittent, and recurring, as it happened, at coincident intervals of time. The engineer's fever appeared to be the more severe, and he was, besides, upwards of seventy, and broken with campaigning and captivity. The doctors thought ill of the old soldier's chances of recovery, but for the young General they did not at first feel any apprehension.

During the intervals between his attacks Don John continued his usual correspondence. The letters written from Bouges give a very gloomy picture of his feelings and his life. In his mind diseased he suffered more than in his fevered frame. Hopes long deferred now seemed to his excited imagination utterly destroyed. He felt himself forsaken and betrayed by the King whom he had so ardently and unscrupulously served.

"His Majesty," thus he wrote to his friend Don Pedro de Mendoza, the Spanish agent at Genoa, on the 16th of September,—
"His Majesty is resolved upon nothing ; at least, I am kept in

¹ G. Niño de Zuñiga says he died on the fifteenth day of his illness ; see his letters to King, etc.

"ignorance of his intentions. Our life is doled out to us here by moments. I cry aloud, but it profits me little. Matters will soon be disposed, through over-negligence, exactly as the devil would most wish them. It is plain we are left here to pine away to our last breath. God direct us all as he may see fit; in his hands are all things."¹

On the same day he wrote also to his old naval companion Giovanni Andrea Doria, at Genoa:—"I rejoice to see by your letter," he said, "that your life is flowing on with such calmness, while the world around me is so tumultuously agitated. I consider you most fortunate that you are passing the remainder of your days for God and yourself; that you are not forced to put yourself perpetually in the scales of the world's events, nor to venture yourself daily in its hazardous game." Himself he described as surrounded with countless enemies, who were now pressing upon him within half a mile of the spot which he had selected for his final stand, and which he looked upon as his last refuge. Fighting a battle was for him out of the question; he did not believe he could hold out for above three months; and he received no aid from the Government at home, who could not or would not see that in the loss of the present chance all would be lost. The Duke of Anjou was strengthening himself in Hainault, and in the background was the French King, professing amity but preparing to invade Burgundy, if fortune favoured his brother. "Again and again have I besought His Majesty," he added, "to send me his orders, which shall be executed if they do not come too late. They have cut off our hands; nothing now remains but to stretch forth our heads also to the axe. I grieve to trouble you with my sorrows, but I trust to your sympathy as a man and as a friend. I hope that you will remember me in your prayers, for you can put your trust where, in former days, I could never put mine."²

Four days later, on the 20th of September, he wrote his last letter to the gloomy, obdurate, silent King. He informed him that he was confined to his chamber with fever, and that he was as much reduced as if he had been ill a month. "I assure your Majesty," he said, "that the work here is enough to destroy any constitution and any life." He had often warned the King that the French were busy in tampering with what remained of loyalty in the Provinces. The success of these secret practices

¹ Motley, iii. p. 254. Quoting Bor, xii. 1005.

² Motley, iii. p. 253. Quoting Bor, xii. 1004-5, and Hoofd, xiv. 589, 590.

was now apparent, and Anjou, at the head of an increasing force, was fairly established in the country. The inhabitants were everywhere alarmed and many disaffected. With his small and dwindling force it was impossible for him to hazard any important attack on the enemy, and even remaining stationary he could hardly hope long to keep open the communications by which alone money and supplies could reach him. The pest was consuming his army. He had twelve hundred men in hospital besides those who were laid up in private houses; and he had neither proper means of meeting the emergency nor money to obtain them. The enemy, finding his operations in the field suspended, had cut off his water-way by the Meuse to Liege, and had advanced to Nivelles and Chimay on the same stream. He would give his blood rather than annoy the King with such tidings; but he felt it to be his duty to tell the plain truth. He suggested that special envoys should be sent to Paris to remonstrate against the proceedings of Anjou, and to the Pope to ask for the Duke's excommunication. "Thus I remain," he said, "perplexed and confused, desiring more than life some decision on your Majesty's part, for which I have begged so many times." "Orders for the conduct of affairs," that was his first wish, and it wounded him to the soul to find them so long delayed. Was he to attack the enemy in Burgundy, or on some other side; or was he to remain where he was, awaiting reinforcements? Losing or winning, he would in all cases fulfil His Majesty's orders, and he was deeply pained at being disgraced and abandoned by the King, whom he had served as a man and as a brother, with all love and fidelity and heartiness. "Our lives are at issue on this stake," he said, "and all we desire is to lose them with honour."¹

When Philip received this pathetic letter he drew his pen beneath the words entreating for "orders for the conduct of affairs," and wrote on the margin "The underlined question I will not answer."² When he made this cruel annotation it was already decreed that he was to be troubled no more with such passionate appeals. The hand which had penned the passage was cold in death.

Letters written from the royal camp a few days later, on the 29th of September, giving a still more gloomy picture of the state

¹ MS. Royal Library, Hague.

² Motley, iii. 254. "La orden de como tengo de gobernar," were the words of Don John; "Lo rayado no yo le diré," was the marginal note of the King.

of affairs, fell into the hands of the Estates. "In some of these," says the English envoy Davison, "Don John confesseth that his army being wasted with pestilence and famine is not now full twelve thousand men; that he hath buried lately out of the only hospital of Namur about two thousand natural Spaniards; what of plague and penury, that he hath begun to make a hole in the store which he reserved for an extreme necessity. . . . In somme, that his extremity is such as he must either hazard his own fortune and the State of the King his master by battle, whereof he can expect no good issue, considering the advantage of his enemies and his own weakness, or else seek a hole where-through to escape with his utter dishonour. This in effect is the contents of the letters. The like whereof the Prince of Parma, Gonzaga, and divers others of quality about him do write unto their friends, making it apparent that their case is so desperate as they wote not on which side to turn themselves. So as hereby it seemeth that if the Estates entering their army in the field yet two months they shall reduce their enemy to reason against his will. In the midst of this news the Prince [of Orange] had advice by his spies that Don John was extreme sick of the plague, and now the news is come from the camp that he should be dead, an accident, if it be true, that will not a little alter the state of things here."¹

From the commencement of his final illness Don John despaired of his recovery. On the second day of it he told his confessor, Fray Francisco Orantes, that he was sure it was more serious than the physicians believed or allowed, for he not only suffered great pain in all his limbs, but he felt his strength failing. He said also that there was some relief in the prospect of dying poor, which saved him the trouble of making any will, and left him the more free to think of the concerns of his soul. He added that he hoped God would forgive his sins, of which he sincerely repented, especially his shortcomings in defending His holy cause and that of the King. The doctors, however, continued to maintain that the patient was in no danger, except Hippolito Pennoni, an Italian attached to the household of Parma, who early conceived a contrary opinion, and expressed his belief that Serbellone would recover and Don John would die, a prognostication which was at first laughed at, and afterwards greatly helped to establish his professional reputation.

¹ State Paper Office, Holland, 1578, No. 6. Mr. W. Davison to Sir Francis Walsingham, Antwerp, 4th October.

On Thursday, the 25th of September, Don John confessed and appointed the next day for receiving the communion. A draught which the doctors prescribed for him, and which he took very reluctantly, was, however, a reason for postponing the ceremony until Sunday the 28th.

On that Sunday mass was said by his confessor by the side of his bed, and he partook of the mysterious wafer with all the evidence of devotion. Later in the day he found himself so much worse that he sent for the Prince of Parma, and formally transferred to him his civil and military authority, appointing him, in case of his own death, Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands until the pleasure of the King should be known. The deplorable state of affairs rendered Alexander at first doubtful whether he should accept the dangerous and anxious responsibilities; but he finally determined not to shrink from a post for which his rank and military reputation and the exigencies of the case clearly indicated him. He had been in constant attendance on his uncle's sick-bed, and remained with him till the last, performing all the offices of friendship and affection.

Don John then made to his confessor a brief statement of his last personal wishes. He said that as he had not fulfilled his father's desire by becoming a member of a religious order, he wished to repair the neglect by resigning all that he possessed, as he would have done if he had assumed the robe, into the hands of the King, to whom he very humbly recommended all his servants for the payment of the wages now long due to them, and for some reward for their good and loyal service. He likewise asked for His Majesty's continued protection for his mother and her son, who would be left friendless by his death. His body was to be delivered into the care of Ottavio Gonzaga and his confessor Orantes, until the King's pleasure with regard to a place of interment was known. They were to petition His Majesty that it might be laid in the Escorial, near the remains of his father, an honour which he had always much desired; but if that request could not be granted, he desired that his bones might be carried to the Church of Our Lady of Monserrat, a shrine for which he had always cherished a peculiar devotion. "And now, father," he said, in concluding these directions, "is it not just that I, who "have not a hand's breadth of earth that I can call my own in "this world, should desire to be at large in heaven."¹

¹ "Concluyó S. A. diciendo que pues en la tierra no tenia un palmo de tierra que "sea suyo, ¿no es justo, padre mio, que desee anchuras en el cielo?" *Documentos Ineditos*, vii. p. 251.

During Monday the 29th and Tuesday the 30th of September, he appeared to suffer great pain, and was for the greater part of the time delirious. His ravings were of battlefields, on which he imagined himself to be playing his familiar part—sometimes calling for his captains or despatching couriers; sometimes finding fault with his men, or encouraging them, or shouting victory. During these paroxysms, if it were necessary to perform any of the services of the sick-room, it was said that the only words which recalled him for a moment to reason and sobriety were the names “Jesus” and “Maria.”

On the night of the 30th his senses returned, and, his condition being now hopeless, the confessor asked him if he desired to receive the rite of extreme unction. “Yes, father (*Si, padre*),” he replied, with all the animation of health, “now, directly (*luego, Iesus, padre mio*).” It was accordingly administered, the patient appearing to be engaged in indistinct prayer.

On Wednesday, the 1st of October, he was again calm and collected. A little before noon the confessor inquired if he desired to hear mass. He replied by a motion of his hand which seemed to signify assent. His sight had now entirely failed, and he was not conscious of the elevation of the Host until reminded of it by some of the gentlemen who stood by. With his eyes still closed he partially raised himself by an effort, and in token of adoration pulled off his nightcap and some plasters which were bound upon his head. From that time he continued murmuring the names of Jesus and Mary until about one in the afternoon, when he expired, “passing,” as his confessor said, “out of our hands like a “bird of the sky, with almost imperceptible motion.”¹

It was the duty of Don John’s confessor to make a report of his last moments to the King, and it is from that report² that the above account has been in a great measure derived. Beginning his narrative some time before the fatal illness, Orantes assures us that Don John had for some time been more addicted than usual to religious exercises, as if under an impression that his end was approaching. Two days after the battle of Gemblours he had sent for him and said that the chances of war were so various that he desired now to acquaint him with his last wishes. His

¹ “Ansi como un ave del cielo se nos fué entre manos sin el menor movimiento de la vida.” *Documentos Ineditos*, vii. p. 253.

² *Trasumpto de una carta que envió á S. M. el confesor del Señor D. Juan de Austria y de los casos que pasaron al tiempo de su fallecimiento*; which forms part of the *Memorias de Fray Juan de San Geronimo, monge del Escorial, sobre varios sucesos de reinado de Felipe II.*, printed in *Col. de Documentos Ineditos*, vii. p. 247.

soul he commended to God and his fathers. For his body, although it mattered little where it was laid, he charged him to entreat the King to allow it to be interred somewhere near that of the Emperor, which he would consider a sufficient reward for his services. His debts were few and simple, chiefly the pay due to his followers; his property, which was little more than old rags,¹ he made over, as in duty bound, to His Majesty, to whom his father had bequeathed him as a son; and he specially desired the confessor to ask the King to discharge the aforesaid obligations, and to pardon him if he had in Italy or elsewhere spent His Majesty's money too freely. To these three commissions, as regards his soul, his body, and his worldly affairs, he subsequently often alluded as "the three things" which the confessor was to bear in mind. About the same time he also began to pay great attention to the morals of his army, repressing as far as he could vice and blasphemy; and with so much success that, in the opinion of the confessor, after three months' campaigning and some weeks of pestilence such a reformation had been effected that the camp of the Spanish soldiers seemed to have been changed into a convent of friars.

The body was opened for the purpose of being embalmed, when the state of the intestines exhibited appearances which some of the attendants supposed, and the camp rumour asserted, to be the effects of poison. The contents of the stomach were dry; and one side of the heart was yellow and black as if burnt, and crumbled at the touch.² It was whispered in the army that Doctor Ramirez had put some deadly drug into the broth given to the patient,³ and that the deed had been done by the orders of the King.⁴

The news of his death was thus reported by Davison on the 12th of October:—"We have, since my last, undoubted confirmation of the death of Don John, who departed this life on Thursday, the 2d of this month, having been sick twenty-four or twenty-six days, partly, as some think, of very grief and melancholy, partly of a disease they call *les trogues*, wherewith he was extremely tormented; but chiefly it is given forth of the French sickness, whereof in the opening he was found to be

¹ Esos trapos viejos que ahí quedan, p. 249.

² Cabrera: *D. Felipe Segundo*, lib. xii. 1009. Strada: lib. x.

³ Vanderhammen: *D. Juan de Austria*, fol. 324.

⁴ Motley, iii. 256. Brantôme, in the *Discours* on Don John already quoted, attributes his death to poison administered by order of the King at the instigation of Perez. Don John's illness he calls the "*peste*," and says he caught it from the Marchioness of Havrech, of whom he was enamoured.

"inwardly wasted and consumed."¹ Dr. Wylson, replying on the 19th from England, wrote :—"Your letters were very welcome touching the certain report of Don John's death, for that divers speeches were given out to the contrary, as that under colour of his feigned death he should be gone out of the country to declare unto King Philip, his brother, the state of things in the Low Countries, and so to save his honour."²

The funeral took place the day after the death,³ so there was scanty time for preparation or for pomp. The regiments of the various nations which furnished the army contested with each other the honour of carrying the body of their General to Namur. The Spaniards claimed it as a right, because he was brother of their King ; the Germans, because he was by birthplace their countryman ; the Flemings because he was their Governor. The Prince of Parma settled the dispute by giving orders that it should be borne by men from the different regiments, in turn, and according to the order of their cantonments. The body was laid out arrayed in armour, embroidered breeches, and boots ; the Golden Fleece was displayed on the breast, and the head was encircled with a jewelled coronet. Carried down from the chamber of death by the household, it was laid out on a bier placed on a stage covered with brocade, which had been erected at the foot of the staircase leading from the dovecot. It was then borne out of the grange and to the gate of the camp by the members of the State Council, and by the gentlemen and household of the deceased, relieving each other at intervals. From the camp to Namur the various regiments were mustered along the road at equal distances, soldiers lining the way on each side. At the camp gate the procession formed. Lope de Figueroa, who had followed Don John's standard in the Alpuxarras, and had commanded on his forecastle at Lepanto, rode in the van of the melancholy pageant at the head of six companies of his regiment marching with trailing banners, and pikes and arquebuses reversed. Then came the colonels and majors of the army in a body. The corpse was borne by the six senior captains of the regiment which lined the first part of the road, who were relieved by others on arriving at the next regiment. Beside the bier walked four principal officers

¹ State Paper Office, Holland, 1578. No. 6. Letter from Mr. Davison to Lord Burghley ; Antwerp, 12th October.

² *Ibid.* Dr. Wylson to Mr. Davison, 19th October.

³ Motley (iii. 257) says the funeral took place on the third day after the decease. Strada (lib. x.) says the day after, in which he is confirmed by Davison, in the despatch of 12th of October already quoted.

in deep mourning, long black robes with peaked friar-like hoods—Peter Ernest, Count of Mansfeldt ; Ottavio Gonzaga ; Pedro de Toledo, Marquess of Villafranca ; and Jean de Croy, Count of Reulx. Immediately behind them rode Don Carlos de Meneses, page of Don John, bearing his banner. The Prince of Parma came next as chief mourner, followed by the half brother of Don John, his mother's son ; and the rear was brought up by a long train of the household and of the nobles of the royalist party. Few of the officers or attendants wore mourning, so brief had been the time allowed for preparation. At the gate of Namur the bier was transferred to the shoulders of State Councillors and gentlemen of the chamber, who bore it into the great aisle of the cathedral of St. Aubain, and placed it beneath the catafalque of honour, hung with sombre draperies, and lit up by a multitude of tapers. After the celebration of the usual funeral rites the body was laid on the gospel or right side of the high altar. Over the tomb a plain large slab was soon afterwards placed by the Prince of Parma, bearing the following inscription :—

D · O · M · S ·

SER^{MO} PRIN. JOANNI AVSTRIACO
D. CAROLI AUG. IMP. FILIO POST MAVROS IN
BETICA REBELLANTES SVBJVGATOS
TVRCARVMQVE MAX. CLASSEM APVD
PATRAS EO DVCE FVNDITVS FVGA-
TAM DELETAMQVE. CVM IN BELGIO
PRO REGE AGERET. IN CASTRIS
BOVGIANIS CONTINVO FEBRE IN
IPSO IVVENTVTIS FLORE SVBLATO
AVVNCVLO AMATISS : ALEXANDER
FARNESIVS PARMÆ PLACENTIÆQVE
PRINCEPS IN IMPERIO SUCCESSOR
EX MANDATO D. PHILIPPI HISP : AC
INDIAR : REGIS POTENTISS : HANC
ALTARIS TABVLAM CENOTAPHII
LOCO PONI CVRAVIT

1578.

In the grave beneath this slab only the intestines of Don John were left to repose.¹ In the following spring the body was disinterred by the desire of Philip II. for removal to Spain. It was determined that the removal should be effected secretly, to avoid expense and the troublesome questions which were in those

¹ Davison in his despatch of 12th October (quoted above, p. 290) says the bowels were burned in the chapel of the castle of Namur.

days likely to arise between the clergy and magistracy of the towns through which a royal corpse was publicly carried. Leave was therefore obtained from Paris for the free passage through France of certain members of Don John's household returning to Spain, the object of this journey not being mentioned. The body was cut in pieces at the joints and placed in three leathern bags, which were carried on the pack-saddle of a horse like other baggage. Gabriel Niño de Zuñiga, late grand equerry of Don John, was the leader of the party, which consisted of some eighty persons.

They arrived in safety at the monastery of Parrazes, near the Escorial, where they delivered up their deposit. The severed portions of the body were then put together,¹ and laid on a fitting bier, which was conducted with great pomp and a considerable concourse of nobles and ecclesiastics, headed by the Bishop of Avila, to the Escorial. It reached its final resting-place on the 24th of May 1579. The interment was solemnized, by the King's order, with all the ceremonies customary at royal funerals. After the due masses and anthems the coffin was carried from the church down into the vaults below by the noble guard of Espinosa, and laid in a sepulchral chamber, adjacent to that reserved for the remains of the sovereigns of the Spains and Indies, to which, four years before, the bones of Charles the Fifth had been brought from the convent chapel of Yuste.²

¹ Strada (lib. x.) relates the improbable story that the body having been stuffed and the joints of its limbs attached to each other by wire, was dressed as in life, and placed erect, leaning on a general's staff, to be seen by the King. Fray Juan de San Geronimo, the monk already quoted (p. 335), makes no mention of any such melodramatic arrangement, but informs us that the corpse, wrapped in fine Holland linen, was placed in a coffin lined and covered with black velvet. *Documentes Ineditos*, vii. pp. 443-8.

² *Cloister Life of the Emperor Charles V.*, London, 1853, 8vo, p. 277.



DEVICE ON THE BANNER OF DON JOHN.



DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA. HEAD FROM THE STATUE AT MESSINA.

CHAPTER XI.

FINAL NOTICES OF MATTERS CONNECTED WITH DON JOHN.



ON JOHN OF AUSTRIA left behind him two natural daughters — Juana, by Diana di Falanga, a lady of condition at Sorrento ; and Anna, by Maria de Mendoza, a lady of noble family in Spain. Juana was brought up by her aunt Margaret, Duchess of Parma, and some time after her father's death was sent for education to the nunnery of S^{ta} Clara at Naples. She remained in that convent for about twenty years, until she became the wife of a Sicilian nobleman, Prince Butera,¹ of the House of Carafa. Anna was left in the kindly care of her father's foster-mother, the good Doña Magdalena de Ulloa, with whom she

¹ Strada : *De Bello Belgico*, lib. ix.

remained for seven years. She was then placed in a convent of Augustinian sisters at Madrigal,¹ whence she was afterwards removed by the King's order to the great Benedictine nunnery of Las Huelgas near Burgos. Of that royal convent she became perpetual Abbess, and there she passed the remainder of her life. Neither of these children was mentioned by Don John on his deathbed, and it was not until after his death that the existence of Anna was known to the Prince of Parma.²

In some letters written by Don John from Flanders to his friend Rodrigo de Mendoza there are frequent messages and allusions to "my lady," which appear to refer to a mistress at Madrid. It is possible this lady may have been Maria de Mendoza, the mother of his daughter Anna.

The mother of Don John received the news of his death at San Cebrian de Amagote. "Her grief," says the historian who records the circumstance, "was equal to her loss"—an expression which indicates with decorous ambiguity the possibility that neither was considerable. She afterwards obtained the leave of the King to remove to Colindres, near Laredo, where a house which had formerly belonged to the unfortunate secretary Escovedo was assigned to her as a residence. One of her latest extravagances was building a country house on a wild piece of land near Ambrusela belonging to her steward, who was supposed to have suggested this improvement of his property. According to one account she died there, and was buried at the Franciscan convent of Illana, perched on a rock overhanging the sea;³ but another places the scene of her decease at Aronjo de Molina, near Madrid.⁴

Pyramus Kegel, her surviving son by her husband, having married the Baroness of Saint Martin, a lady of some fortune in Hainault, attained the rank of colonel of a regiment of Germans. On his death his widow with her children went to Spain, lived with his mother during her life, and afterwards removed to Valladolid, where she obtained a grant of half of the pension of three thousand ducats enjoyed by Barbara Blomberg, and, like other pensioners of the Spanish Crown, found the payment irregular and precarious.⁵

The grace of Don John's person and the charm of his countenance and manner were highly praised by his friends and

¹ Strada (*De Bello Belgico*, lib. ix.) says Madrid, but I have followed the authority of P. Juan de Villafañe, *Vida de Doña Magdalena de Ulloa*, Salamanca, 1723, 4to, p. 240.

² Strada : *De Bello Belgico*, lib. ix.

³ Vanderhammen, f. 325.

⁴ Cabrera : *D. Filipe II.*, lib. xii. 1009.

⁵ Vanderhammen, f. 326.

not denied by his foes. Those coveted gifts, so important to a ruler, were noted in him when he rode in his boyhood to swear allegiance to Don Carlos in the Cathedral of Toledo; and Belgian patriots were still warning their countrymen not to be taken in by them as he lay dying on the heights of Bouges. The Venetian envoy Lippomano described him, as we have already seen, in 1575, as of "middle stature, well made, of a most beautiful "countenance, and of admirable grace," as "wearing little beard, "large pale moustaches, and his hair long and turned upwards, "which becomes him greatly," and as "dressing so sumptuously "and delicately that it is a marvel to see."¹ De Tassis, one of his State Council, records that "nature had endowed him with a "cast of countenance so gay and pleasing that there was hardly "any one whose good-will and love he did not immediately "win."²

Of the existing portraits of Don John, I am disposed to consider as the most interesting and important³ the bronze statue by Andrea Calamech⁴ which the city of Messina erected in honour of the victory of Lepanto. The figure is colossal, and stands on a lofty pedestal of white marble, adorned with a fine frieze, and bas-reliefs and inscriptions, and placed on three steps. In his right hand, with extended arm, the young commander holds a truncheon of three staves bound together to denote his triple command. The head, which was considered an excellent likeness, is very noble and graceful; and the figure, clad in elaborately-chased armour, is full of the energy of success. The statue is one of the masterpieces of a sculptor trained in the fine school of Bartolomeo Ammanati; and, although the gilding with which it once shone resplendent has disappeared, it is still one of the most effective monuments of sixteenth-century art. The front of the pedestal is adorned with a bronze bas-relief, displaying a figure of

¹ See p. 92.

² "Dotaveratque eum natura tam hilari ac leni vultus formâ, ut vix quisquam fuerit, "cujus voluntatem et amorem statim sibi non conciliaret." J. B. de Tassis: *Comment. de Tumultibus Belgicis sui temporis*, lib. iv. in the *Analecta Belgica*, Hagæ Comitum, 1743, 3 vols. 4to, ii. p. ii. p. 326.

³ See Vol. I. pp. 458, 459, 460.

⁴ See Vol. I. p. 459. Andrea Calamech is said by Vasari (*Vite*, Firenze, 1568, 3 vols. 4to, iii. p. 872) to have been a native of Carrara, and member of the Academy at Florence, and a very able sculptor. Invited to Messina to fill the place of Fra Giovanni Agnolo, the deceased sculptor of the municipality, he removed thither, and died there; and Vasari speaks of him, in that edition of 1568, as already dead, which is probably an error. Vanderhammen (p. 149) asserts the statue of Don John to have been the work of Andrea Calamech: "insigne escultor y arquitecto Messines." A nephew of Andrea, named Lazaro Calamech, was also a painter and sculptor living at Messina; and, if Andrea died before 1572, Lazaro may have been the artist employed.

Victory, and a shield bearing the inscription subjoined ;¹ and the other sides exhibit in a similar manner and material the fleets drawn up in battle array, the engagement, and a plan of Messina as it was in 1572. The statue stood in the small Piazza between the palace and the Church of Our Lady of the Pillar until 1853, when it was removed to the Piazza of the Annunziata.

The medals of Lepanto and Tunis, with their spirited busts in profile, are also a valuable contemporary record of Don John's physiognomy² as it appeared soon after the victory in virtue of which he became an historical personage of the first rank.

Pictures of Don John are not to be found in those royal and public galleries where they might most naturally be sought for—at Madrid, at Bruxelles, or at Vienna. Five painted portraits only have fallen under my notice :—

I. A portrait, half length, life size, by Alonso Sanchez Coello.

¹ Philippus Hispaniarum et Siciliæ Rex invictus juxta ac catholicus, Pio V. Pont. Max. S.Q. Venet, in Selimum Turcarum Princ. orientis tyrannum Christiani nominis hostem immanissimum foedus componit.

Joannes Augustus Caroli V. imp. filius, Philippi regis frater totius classis imperator, summa omnium consensione declaratur, is in hoc portu Mamertino ducentarum septem longarum navium, sexque majorum totius foederis classe coacta ad XVI. cal. Octobr. e freto solvit ad Echinadas insulas, hostium Turcarum naves longas CCXC. animo invicto non. Octobr. aggreditur inaudita celeritate, incredibili virtute triremes CCXXX. capit, viginti partim flammis assumit, partim mergit, reliquæ vix evadere potuerunt, hostium ad XV. millia cædit, totidem capit, Christianorum captivor. ad XV. millia in libertatem asserit, et metu quem hostibus immisit Christo semper auspice remp. Christ. liberavit ann. MDLXXI.

Messanam IIII. non. Novemb. victor revertitur ingentique omnium lætitia triumphans excipitur, ad gloriam ergo et æterni nomin. Philippi regis, tantæque victoriæ memoriam sempiternam Joanni Austrio fratri B.M. fort. felicissimoque princ.

S. H. Æ.

S. P. Q. Messanensis P.

Patribus Conscriptis

Christophoro Pesci, Jo. Francisco Balsamo, D. Gaspare

Lucanio, Antonio Acciarello, D. Thoma Marchetto,

Francisco Regitano, MDLXXII.

On the four sides of the base of the pedestal are these couplets :—

I.

Gesta fidem superant. Zancle, ne longa vetustas
Deleat, hic vultus finxit in ære tuos.

II.

Hostem horis binis superas, datur ære colossus,
Nunc eat, et factis obstrepet invidia.

III.

Jam satis ostensum est quo sis genitore creatus,
Africa regna parens, ipse Asiana domas.

IV.

Non satis unus erat, victo tanto hoste, triumphus,
Esse triumphator semper in ære potes.

² See Vol. I. p. 2, and Vol. II. p. 15. These medals are by the same artist, J. V. Milon, and the head of Don John is nearly the same in both.

Don John wears a buff jerkin without sleeves over a crimson tunic, of which the sleeves are thus shown, and crimson trunk hose; his right hand rests on his hip, his left on the hilt of his sword. His face, nearly full, is slightly turned towards his left shoulder. Formerly in the Spanish gallery of the Louvre, this portrait was purchased by me at the sale of the pictures of the ex-King Louis Philippe in 1855, and is now in my possession.¹

II. A portrait, full length, life size, artist unknown. Don John wears a steel cuirass, with the Order of the Golden Fleece, breeches of green and gold striped stuff, white hose, and brown shoes with white rosettes. He holds in his right hand a white truncheon. Behind is the corner of a red-covered table, on which is placed a helmet with a red plume. This picture forms part of the rich collection of Don Jose de Salamanca, Marques de los Llanos de Albacete, at Madrid. It possesses no great artistic merit, but it appears to be a work of the time.

III. A portrait, full length, life size, artist unknown, but attributed in the Catalogue of the Royal Museum of Madrid, in which it hangs, to the Flemish school.² Don John is represented standing, and bare-headed, his head relieved by a dark olive curtain fringed with gold extending more than half across the canvas to an adjacent pillar. He wears a small rapier, the Order of the Fleece, and a steel cuirass slightly enriched with gold, with sleeves of chain armour, a band of red velvet being on the right arm, and a pair of trunk breeches of some dark parti-coloured stuff, over which is a casing of crimson perpendicular bars (resembling velvet). That this outer covering or cage is detached from the lining is made evident by his dagger hanging between the lining and the cage. His hose and shoes are of light crimson, approaching to pink. In his right hand he holds a long truncheon, which is placed on the head of a lion crouching at his side, the body being seen behind him. His left hand plays with the gilded hilt of a sword of which the cross is of portentous length. The floor is of brown and white marble. On a table covered with a red cloth with a gold border are a helmet with a blue plume and a pair of gauntlets. A steel shield, with a spike in the centre, and a gold border and fringe, leans against the table. Behind there is a view of what appears to be the sea and the

¹ See Vol. I. p. 3.

² It is No. 1737 of the Catalogue. There is an old number on the picture, 996 or 926, I am not sure which. The dimensions of the canvas given in the catalogue are 8 feet high by 4 feet 2 inches 6 lines wide. See p. 317.

castle beyond. The attitude and figure of Don John are easy and spirited, and the picture is perhaps the most satisfactory existing portrait on canvas as he appeared in his prime. It is not impossible that it may be the work of Stradanus.

IV. A portrait, half length, life size, artist unknown. Don John wears a steel cuirass, with sleeves of chain mail, and richly embroidered trunk breeches; a ruff, with lace edges, of the same character as that on the statue, surrounds his neck; and on his breast the Badge of the Golden Fleece hangs from its collar of steel and flame; the hilt of his sword is seen on his left side and that of his dagger on the right. His trunk breeches are of a yellow stuff embroidered with pearls. He grasps with both hands a small battle-axe. The face is very slightly turned towards the right shoulder. By his right side and close to the bottom of the canvas is seen the head of his favourite tame lion, one of the trophies from Tunis.¹ This picture (41 inches high by $32\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide) is in the possession of Don Valentin Carderera, the accomplished artist and archæologist at Madrid, for whose learned and interesting work the *Iconografía Española* it was lithographed in 1858 by Le Grand.²

V. A portrait, three-quarters length, life size, artist unknown, 41 inches high by 30 inches wide. In ruff and steel cuirass, Collar and Badge of Golden Fleece, red trunk breeches em-

¹ Argote de Molina, in his *Discurso de la Monteria*, fol. 10, prefixed to *Libro de Monteria que mandó escribir el . . . Rey Don Alonso . . . ultimo deste nombre*, Sevilla, 1582, fol., notices "el leon del invictissimo el Señor Don Juan, llamado Austria, tan "manso, que residia y dormia en su aposento, que fue hallado dentro el Alcaçava de "Tunez quando el Señor Don Juan entro en ella, todos le conocimos." He adds also that while at Tunis with Don John, Don Garcia de Toledo, afterwards keeper of the castle of San Elmo at Naples, went out to hunt, when a very strong lion attacked one of the mounted Moors and tore him and his horse to pieces. Don Rodrigo de Benavides in the same campaign attacked a lion. He had given the lion one thrust when his horse, a very good one, dropped down dead, "sin herida, de solo temor;" and on the animal being opened he was found to have burst his spleen.

² See p. 5. I may as well notice the portrait in the Royal Museum at Naples, which has long been called in the catalogues Don John of Austria. It is a portrait three-quarters length, and somewhat larger than life size, ascribed to Tintoretto. The figure is in armour with thigh pieces, the right hand rests on a staff, and on a table behind that hand is a plumed helmet. The face bears no resemblance to that of Don John, and the Golden Fleece is wanting, a decoration which would never have been omitted in a genuine portrait. It has been poorly engraved by Pisanti for the *Rimembranze Napolitane; album per l'anno 1850*, where it is prefixed to a notice of the life of Don John. Except the entry in the Neapolitan catalogues I know of no record that renders it probable that Giacomo Robusti ever painted or even saw Don John. His son Domenico introduced Don John's portrait into his picture commemorating the victory of Lepanto in the Dominican church of San Giovanni e Paolo at Venice. See Vol. I. p. 445.

broidered with pearls, a long staff in his right hand. This picture is in a very dilapidated state, but the character of the head is fine, and somewhat melancholy. The canvas has a gilt border about two inches wide (gilt on the canvas), and on it at the bottom in black letters, D. IVAN DE AVSTRIA. It was from the head of this picture that the lithograph in the *Iconografia Española* was made, the rest being taken from No. IV. This picture also is in the possession of Don Valentin Carderera.

The royal palaces of Spain were not always deficient in portraits of one of the most eminent members of the royal race. The hall of portraits at the Pardo, of which Argote de Molina has left a full and pleasant description,¹ was filled with a collection of the Princes and Princesses of the House of Austria and their relations and friends, by Titian, Antonio Moro, and Alonso Sanchez Coello. These pictures were forty-five in number, and they were all about four feet high, representing their subjects of life size and nearly to the knees. That of Don John of Austria by Sanchez Coello formed No. 23 of the series, which unfortunately perished in the fire of 1604.

In an existing MS. "Inventory of Household Furniture "and Valuables of Philip II.," four portraits of Don John of Austria are enumerated and described with minuteness sufficient to render their recognition easy. All are apparently of life size, and on canvas, two being half length and two full length. In one of the half lengths Don John is depicted as a boy, in crimson doublet and hose; in the other he wears armour and a crimson scarf, and holds a truncheon in his hand. In both the full-length pictures he is painted in armour, in the one with red breeches and in the other with white. In the first of these a lion lies at his feet. In the second he stands with one hand on the shoulder of one of the captive sons of Ali Pasha, the Turkish Admiral slain at Lepanto.² If these portraits escaped the fatal fire which con-

¹ *Libro de la Monteria que mandó escribir . . . el Rey Don Alonso de Castilla; Acrecentado por Gonçalo Argote de Molina.* Sevilla, 1582, fol., *Discurso*, ff. 20-22.

² For the following extracts from the second volume of "*El Inventario general de bienes y alhajas del enarto de S. S. M. M. de Felipe II.*," I am indebted to my friend Don Valentin Carderera:—

Un retrato entero en lienço al oleo del Sr Don Juan de Austria, armado, con calças encarnadas y collar del tuson sobre las armas y un leon hechado a los pies; tiene de alto dos varas y dos tercias y de ancho vara y media. Tassado en cinquenta ducados, fol. 793.

Otro retrato del Señor Don Juan de Austria, entero, al ollio (*sic*) sobre lienço, con calças blancas, puesta la mano sobre el hombro de un hijo de los del baxa que fueron cautivos en la batalla naval; armado con su tuson; tiene de alto dos varas y dos tercios y de ancho vara y media; en marco sin molidura; tassado en sessenta ducados, fol. 796, 797.

sumed the old palace of the Austrian Kings at Madrid in 1734, some of them may still exist, unknown and unnamed, in some of the royal residences in Spain.

Of the engraved portraits of Don John there are many, of various degrees of merit. Amongst the best of the contemporary prints which I have seen is that designed by Francesco Terzi, of Bergamo, and engraved by Gaspar Padovano, which forms one of a series of portraits of the House of Austria published between 1558 and 1573.¹ Don John is in armour and standing, with his truncheon in his hand, and the plate is profusely adorned with warlike trophies and emblems, and illustrated with four Latin verses and a brief narrative of his achievements against the Moriscos and the Turks. The size is 20 inches high by 14 inches wide, and the plate is dated 1571.²

Another plate, apparently of the same time, represents Don John in armour, with a helmet on his head, standing by the sea-shore, near the headless body of a Turk. He points with his left hand towards a castle in the distance, probably that of Lepanto. It is inscribed "*Whare Contrafactur des Vberisten Capitan des konigs aus Hispania, gnant Don John D'Austria, vnd daneben, Wie er des Turkischen General gnant Ali bassa nach dem er gefencklich eingezogen; den kopff abzuhausen befolen hat.*" It is 13 inches high by 8 $\frac{3}{4}$ wide.

A beautiful print, probably by a Venetian artist, represents Don John's bust in profile, armed and wearing a cap, placed within a border surrounded by a rich architectural design. Within the border is the name DON GIO. D'AUSTRIA, and above it "General della S^{ta} Legha;" on the pediment are the royal arms of Spain surmounted by those of Pius V., and female figures seated on each side wave the banners of Philip II. and

Otro retrato de medio cuerpo del sermo Don Jn^o de Austria; armado con un baston en la mano y banda roja (*sic*). No. 17, fol. 822.

N.B.—Colocado este retrato entre los "de pincel all ollio (*sic*) que tiene prestados la serma emperatriz doña Maria."

Otro retrato de medio cuerpo de pincel en lienço del sermo Principe (*sic*) Don Juan de Austria siendo muchacho, con calças y jubon carmesi y cuera adobada. Colocado en un marco de madera dorado con otros 4 retratos. No. 33, fol. 823.

The last of these pictures bears a strong resemblance to the portrait in my possession (described p. 345) if I am right in believing *cuera adobada* to mean a buff or dressed leather jerkin.

¹ Francisci Tertii, Bergomatis, pictoris aulici *Austriacæ gentis imagines*, Gaspar. Patavinus incisor. Cēniponti, 1558. There are other editions of 1569 and 1573. My copy bears on the first plate the date 1569, but the portrait of Don John, No. 42, is also dated 1571. It is a very beautiful series of portraits, with exquisite architectural ornaments, and the emblems or devices of each of the personages represented; and it is now very rare.

² See Vol. I. p. 107.

the Republic. On an oval panel below the portrait the hostile fleets are seen about to engage, and on each side of the architecture they are also represented advancing against each other. The size of this fine work is $10\frac{1}{2}$ inches by $7\frac{1}{8}$ inches.¹

From this Italian head a German half-length profile portrait of Don John appears to have been copied. It is inscribed in the German character at the top "*Warhafftige contrafactür des tewren Ritterlichē jungen Helden, Don Joann de Austria, welcher sich aüf weittem Mor, wider den Türckischen Blüetthund, manlich erzaigt und gesiget hat im 1571 jar den sibenden tag Octobris,*" and there are also twenty-four verses beneath. The size is $10\frac{3}{4}$ inches high by $9\frac{1}{8}$ inches wide.²

Another print, probably Venetian, and also dated 1571, represents Don John in bust profile, with cap tied round the head with a cord. On the oval border is the inscription, JOHANNES DE AUSTRIAE, CAROLI V. IMPERATORI (*sic*) FILIVS. Above are the royal arms of Spain, and on the right and left the banners of Venice and Pius V., and the rest of the plate is filled with warlike weapons, emblems, and devices. The size is $8\frac{1}{4}$ inches high by 6 inches wide.³

A portrait, apparently Italian, within an oval surrounded with elaborate pierce scroll-work, bears on the oval the inscription JOANNES AVSTRIACVS CAROLI V. FILIVS. Don John is represented in armour with the insignia of the Golden Fleece and a mantle, holding his truncheon in his gauntleted left hand, the elbow of that arm resting on the ledge which crosses the oval just above his waist. His head is bare and slightly turned to his left side; the expression of the face is careworn and anxious. This print, although unsigned, appears to me to be the work of Nic. Nelli; and I believe it to be of very great rarity. The size is $7\frac{1}{4}$ inches by $5\frac{3}{4}$.

The spirited profile bust by Jean Rabel is very delicately executed, and has been the parent of many copies. Although Don John's neck is encirled with lace-edged ruff, the scale armour and the shoulder ornament, as well as the arrangement of the scarf, are somewhat in the classical style. The head is turned towards the left shoulder; the size is $3\frac{5}{8}$ inches high by $2\frac{7}{8}$ inches wide.⁴

There is a curious small etching which seems to be a contemporary or a nearly contemporary caricature of the statue

¹ See Vol. I. p. 401.

³ *Ibid.* p. xii.

² *Ibid.* p. 452.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. xx.

at Messina. Don John holds in his right hand, instead of his triple truncheon, a short rough stick, with stumps of three branches, and his sword is of a preposterous length. The top of the pedestal, forming the base of the figure, is inscribed MDLXXII. DONN: IANN DE AVSTRIA. To the left of the figure is No. 19. The size of the plate is $4\frac{3}{8}$ inches high by $3\frac{1}{8}$ inches wide.

A bust profile within an oval, surrounded by elaborate carved work, festoons and fruit on a shaded background, is ascribed to Martin de Rota. The oval border is inscribed DON JOHAN D'AUSTRIA, 1578. The execution is fine, but the expression is disagreeable. The size is $8\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by 7 inches wide.¹

Of the portraits of Don John of Austria engraved after his death, that in Schrenck's series of effigies of personages whose armour formed part of the famous collection of the Archduke Ferdinand in the castle of Ambras,² is the most important. These portraits were engraved by Dominic Custos, from designs by J. A. Fontana, and are illustrated by brief notices by Schrenck. Like the other personages, Don John stands within a niche between richly-sculptured columns. He is in armour, with his plumed helmet on the ground beside him. In his left hand he holds his truncheon, and beneath his right foot are a turban, scimitar, and bow. The plate measures $16\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by $11\frac{1}{8}$ wide.³

The portraits by C. Van Sichem, full length in profile, have served as an illustration for various books. There are two plates, nearly of the same size ($7\frac{3}{4}$ inches high by $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide), both signed by this artist. In both the figure is in the same attitude—holding in the right hand a truncheon, of which the end rests on the right hip. But in one the body is in a cuirass, and the legs are in boots and spurs; while in the other the dress consists of a doublet and long hose.⁴ In the former there is a table with

¹ It will be found in Adrian Van Meerbeeck: *Chroniecke van de gantsche Vuerelt ende sonderlinghe van de Seventhien Nederlanden*, T' Antwerpen (H. Verdussen), 1620, fol. facing p. 425,—a book which contains several other fine portraits within similar rich borders, and apparently by the same hand.

² I. Schrenck: *Augustissimorum Imperatorum regum atque archiducum, etc., imagines . . . quorum arma in Ambrasianæ arcis armentario conspiciuntur*. Cēniponti, 1601, fol.

There is a poor reprint of this fine book called *Armamentarium Heroicum Ambrasianum nunc nova editione instauratum* a Io. David Koelero, Norimbergæ, 1735, 4to, in which Don John of Austria's portrait is plate lvi. p. 204. The plates are indifferent copies on a small scale.

³ See Vol. I. p. 197.

⁴ This portrait occurs in Grimeston's (Edw.) *History of the Netherlands*, London, 1612, fol., p. 599.

a plumed helmet upon it, and a spiked shield leaning against it; on the other side there is a smaller coroneted shield, bearing the Austrian eagle impaled with an escutcheon charged with a fesse; and in the distance is seen the sea with shipping.¹

A bust in profile, with the inscription on the circular border, JOANNES AUSTRIACUS CAROLI V. F. PHILIPPI REGIS CATHOLICI NOMINE APUD BELGAS GUBERNATOR ET CAPITANEUS GENERAL, size $7\frac{1}{4}$ inches high by $7\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide, is also a frequent book illustration.²

The other portraits of Don John, engraved during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, seem to be for the most part copies of the above, with slight modifications in the costume and great diversities of border. The bust profile by the younger Peter de Jode, within a plain architectural frame, arched at the top ($6\frac{3}{4}$ inches high by $5\frac{1}{8}$ inches wide), is the best of these prints.³

¹ It will be found in Em. v. Meteren: *Niederländsche Historien*, s. l. 1611, fol. 239. The plate is marked fol. 339.

² It occurs in Meteranus (E.): *Historia Belgica sine loco et anno*, probably Antwerp, 1598 or 1599, p. 183.

³ I subjoin a list of miscellaneous portraits which have fallen in my way:—

Bust profile; within oval, on which is inscribed IOANNES . AVSTRI . CAR . V . FILI . PHI . RE . HISP . GVB . ET . CAP . GEN . BEL . in armour, with Sash and Fleece; the whole within an architectural frame, 1577-1578; oval, 2 inches high by $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide. *Corte Historische Beschryvinghe der Nederlandscher Oorlogen* . . . D. I. 1. D. Tot Arnhem. By J. Jansson, 1612, 8vo, p. 50. British Museum, 1436. It is continued under the name of Peter Schrijver.

Bust profile, looking to right shoulder; in armour; within an oval border, which disappears behind the shoulders of the figure, and bears the inscription, JOANNES AUSTRIACUS PRINC. FRANCÆ-VILLÆ GUB. GENERALIS IN BELGIO; $4\frac{1}{8}$ inches high by $3\frac{1}{8}$ inches wide. In *Origo et Historia Belgarum Tumultuum* . . . Auctore Ernesto Eremundo Frisio, Lugduni Batav., 1619, 8vo, p. 261.

Bust profile, looking to left shoulder; an oval within a large and elaborate border; 10 inches high by $6\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide. In E. de Meteren: *Histoire des Pays-Bas*, La Haye, 1618, fol., p. 135.

Bust profile, looking to right shoulder; an oval within a large ornamental border; 10 inches high by $7\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide. In E. V. Meteren: *Beschreibung dess Niederländsche Kriegs*, Amsterdam, 1627, 2 vols. fol., vol. i. p. 250.

Bust profile, looking to right shoulder; an oval on a dark background; $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide. In G. Baudartius: *Polemographia Ariaciæ Belgicæ*, Amsterdam, 1622, oblong 4to, p. 233.

Bust, nearly full-faced; in armour, with full ruff; with an oval inscribed *Johannes de Austria Caroli V. F.*, and with four Latin verses below; $7\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide. In the *Serenissimorum Austriæ ducum archiducum regum imperatorum Genealogia; ævi incisa à Wolfgango Kiliano*, Augustæ Vindcl., 1622, fol., sheet d 2.

Bust profile, looking to left shoulder, with an oval; 4 inches high by $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide. In Fam.

Strada: *De Bello Belgico*, Romæ, 1637-1650, 2 vols. sm. 8vo, vol. i. from p. 590. Copied ($4\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide) in the *Translation* by Du Ryer, Paris, 1645-1652, 2 vols. 8vo, vol. i. p. 747; and again, the head turned the other way ($4\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide), in the Latin edition of Leyden, 1645, sm. 8vo.

Bust profile, looking to right shoulder; within decorated frame, at the bottom of which is a winged death's head; 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by $6\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide. In Khevenhüller: *Contröflet Kupfferstiche regierender grosser Herren*, Leipzig, 1721-2, 2 vols. fol., vol. i. p. 141. The work was first printed, with the author's *Annales Ferdinandei*, in 1640-46, to which dates the plates therefore belong.

Bust profile, looking to left shoulder, within an oval; on shaded ground; $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide; *Jac. Nceffs, fecit*. In Fam. Strada: *De Bello Belgico*, Antwerp, 1640-41, 2 vols. sm. 8vo, vol. i. p. 550.

Bust profile, copied from above; $6\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide. In Strada's *History of the Low Country Wars*; in *English*, by Sir R. Stapylton, London, 1650, 1658, 1665, 1667, fol., lib. ix. p. 26; and again used in *The History of the Wars of Flanders*; *Written in Italian* by Cardinal Bentivoglio; *Englished* by Henry, Earl of Monmouth, London, 1654, and again London, 1678, sm. fol., book x. p. 150 (edition 1654).

Bust profile to the waist, looking to left shoulder; in cuirass and plumed helmet; in the right hand a banner emblazoned with the Crucifixion; the left hand rests on the hip; $6\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide. In type below, DON JEAN D'AUSTRIE.

Bust to the waist, copy of the above; on tablet below the figure, DON JEAN D'AUSTRIE; 5 inches high by $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide.

Three-quarters length profile, looking towards left shoulder; in cuirass and plumed helmet; truncheon in right hand and supported on hip; on the breast a shield, with a crucifix in centre; the left hand grasping the hilt of sword; $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches high

The only other engraved portrait which seems to deserve special notice is that by B. Vazquez in the fine and esteemed volume entitled *Portraits of Illustrious Spaniards*,¹ published at Madrid in 1791, in folio, under the patronage of the Count of Floridablanca and at the expense of the Spanish Government. Don John is represented at three-quarters length, in complete armour, but with his head bare; his right hand is supported by his truncheon resting on a table, and the left is placed on his hip. The face is seen nearly in front. The size of the plate is $15\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by $10\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide, leaving a white margin of about $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches at the sides and 2 inches at the top and bottom. These portraits profess to have been copied from carefully selected originals, and some of them are unquestionably authentic representations of the personages whose names they bear. It is probable that that of Don John may have been taken from some picture in one of the royal collections; but no information is given on this point in the brief notice of his life which accompanies the print.

The training of Honorato Juan and the professors of Alcalá does not seem to have imbued Don John with any abiding love of letters. No trace of such tastes is to be found in the remains of his familiar correspondence. To his friend Rodrigo de

by $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide. G. Leti: *Historia . . . di Elisabetta Regina d'Inghilterra*, Amsterdam, 1703, 2 vols. sm. 8vo, ii. facing p. 40.

Bust profile, looking to right shoulder; within a light wreathed oval border, with arms in one corner and a chaplet in the other; 7 inches high by $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide; by Balthazar Moncornet.

Bust profile, looking to left shoulder; within an oval border; $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by 3 inches wide. The oval border is inscribed JOANNES AUSTRIACUS CAROLI V. F. PHILIPPI REGIS CATHOLICI NOMINE APUD BELGAS GUBERNATOR; and on the lower part of the bust is the figure 5.

Bust profile, looking to left shoulder; within a plain oval border within a square; $6\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide. At the bottom of the plate JEHAN D'AUTRICHE FILS DE L'EMPEREUR CHARLES V. GOUVERNEUR DES PAYS BAS.

Bust profile, looking to right shoulder; within an oval; on shaded background; and placed over a pedestal, on which DON JOHAN VAN OOSTENRYK, GOUVERNEUR-GENERAL DER NEDERLANDEN.

Bust profile, looking to right shoulder; within an oval frame and an elaborate outer border of arms and instruments of war; the portrait, which is on a separate plate from the outer border, is $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide; on a tablet below it JOANNES AUSTRIACUS CAROLI V. F. BELGII GUBERNATOR, FOL. 402. The outer border is inscribed A. Loemans, sculp.

Bust profile, looking to right shoulder; within a circle, inscribed DON JAN VAN OOSTENRYK; and below, a bas-relief representing Don John standing at a table with his hand on a paper and figures round him; at left top corner of the portrait V. D. II.; at the bottom J. Buys inv. et delin.

Reinr Vinckles et C. Bogert, sculp. The plate is $6\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide; the engraved portion $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches by $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches.

Bust to waist, nearly full face; in armour, with ruff; part of left arm cut off as if extended beyond the plate; on tablet below, DON JUAN D'AUSTRIA; 6 inches high by $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide. Apparently copied from the portrait by D. Custos in the work of Schrenckius.

Bust to waist, front view of the figure, but the head turned towards right shoulder so as to present the profile; in armour, the gauntleted hands holding a truncheon; curtain behind the head; within an oval border partly cut away at the sides, under which the name DON JEAN D'AUTRICHE; 10 inches high by 6 inches wide.

Bust to waist, reduced copy of the above, with the head turned towards left shoulder; name DON JEAN D'AUTRICHE FILS DE L'EMPEREUR CHARLES QUINT; $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide. Frontispiece to *L'Histoire de Don Jean d'Autriche* (par Brulé de Montpleinchamp), Amsterdam, 1690. There is a similar print, apparently from the same plate re-touched, with the name in Dutch, for the Dutch version of the same book—HET LEVEN VAN DON JAN VAN OOSTENRYK—Te Leyden, 1737; and inscribed below, J. v. d. Spyk, sculp.

Full length, on a prancing horse; head bare and turned towards the right shoulder; view of Namur in the background; name, JOANNES AUSTRIACUS CAROLI V. IMPERATORIS FILIUS, *Quartus regius Gubernator ab anno 1577 ad cal. Octobris anni 1578 imperavit*; 10 inches high by $6\frac{1}{2}$ inches wide. From *Historiën der Nederlanden tot het jaar 1612* Don Emanuel von Meteren s. l. n. d. fol. 119, *Biblioth. Halthemia*, No. 26,376.

¹ *Retratos de los Españoles ilustres*, Madrid, 1791, fol.

Mendoza, to whom he unbosomed his inmost thoughts and hopes, he wrote about his mode of conducting political affairs, his prospects, his mistress, his horses and his horse-furniture; but the existing letters do not contain a single allusion to books. The sole evidence that he ever opened one, that has met my eye, is a passage in a letter to Secretary Sayas, in which he desires that a copy of Fray Luis de Granada¹ in Spanish may be sent to him. But as the request is coupled with a desire that a confessor should also come to him, "if possible by Christmas," it is probable that the volume required was rather for devotional purposes than for literary recreation.²

In those days of dedications, when a patron was considered as necessary to a book as a printer or an author, and when his name occupied a more prominent place on the title-page than that of either of the other two, Don John could hardly, if he had evinced any predilection for literature, have escaped from much of this kind of literary homage. His intimate relations with Venice and Antwerp, the chief seats of publishing enterprise, would have rendered him the natural prey of the makers and sellers of books. Yet I have met with only three books given to the world under the protection of his name.

Francisco Balbi de Correggio dedicated to him in 1568 his Relation of the great Siege of Malta by the Turks, and the relief of the island by the King of Spain.³ The historian does not appear to have known that it was in the hope of joining this expedition that Don John ran away from Court, else he would hardly have failed to notice so remarkable and pertinent a fact in his complimentary epistle. He asks leave to place his book under his Serene patronage as a record of the "proud fleet and "army of Soliman," of the method and pertinacity of both parties in the combat, and of the magnanimity and promptitude with which the King his brother opposed himself to the onset of the

¹ Amongst the popular devotional works of this voluminous writer (1505-1588) which were already published, and one or other of which may have been the book wanted, were—*Guia de Pecadores*, Salamanca, 1570, sm. 8vo; *Libro de la Oracion y Meditacion*, Salamanca, 1567, 8vo; *Memorial de la vida Christiana*, Salamanca and Alcalá, 1566, 8vo.

² Mais je veulx que en payement de ceste bonne nouvelle il m'envoye un Frere Louys de Granada en romancee et qu'il ayt soing de m'admenier le confesseur que s'il pouvoit estre, je seraye fort aise qu'il fut icy pour le nouel. Don John of Austria to Secretary Sayas. Bastogne, December 17, 1576. State Paper Office, Flanders, 1576. No. 27. Probably a copy of a translation of an intercepted letter. Was Sayas at Bruxelles, or is the letter misdated?

³ *La verdadera Relacion de todo lo que el anno de M.D.LXV. ha succedido en la isla de Malta. Recogida por Francisco Balbi de Correggio, en todo el sitio soldado; y en esta segunda impresion emendada.* Barcelona en casa de Pedro Reigner, 1568, 4to.

furious Turk ; and also because " His Excellency " himself is a " sprig of most lofty valour." ¹

Francesco Serdonati, a Florentine and voluminous author, of whom nothing is known except his forgotten books, dedicated to him his volume on the Deeds of Arms of the Romans,² published at Venice in 1572. The dedication is dated on the 15th of September 1571, three weeks before the day of Lepanto, and it seems somewhat remarkable that the author did not think it necessary to substitute another, or even add a postscript in honour of that famous victory. It begins with the remark that of all arts and studies the art of war is the most worthy and delightful, because from it come all the benefits of peace. Don John is then exhorted in the course of a somewhat tedious address to follow the example of his " unconquered sire, the greatest King, " Emperor, and Captain that had been seen for many and " many ages," his brother " the great Catholic King, the true base " and bulwark of the Christian faith," and his other relatives of the House of Austria, and excel the deeds of the Roman against their barbarian foes by his achievements against the Turks and " their false lying Mahomet." ³

The bookseller Simon Galignani, of Venice, selected the victor of Lepanto as the natural patron of his pretty volume of maps and descriptions of the most famous islands of the world ; the maps engraved by Girolamo Porro, and the descriptions written by Tomaso Porcacchi.⁴ The occasion appeared to justify any flight of flattery and exultation. " Behold," said the publisher in his opening sentence, " now the time has come, Most Serene " Prince, so waited and longed for by the Faithful, when the " prophecies of many learned writers are beginning to fulfil themselves, that from the most glorious blood of Austria should " spring a captain of war, by the valour of whose sword the " Beast of the Orient should be overthrown, and the most holy " faith of Jesus Christ anew should spread its greatness over the " whole world." In similar jubilant strains Don John is exhorted to lead on Christendom, which is only waiting for the signal to follow him, under the banner of Christ, to the conquest of the Holy Land, " an enterprise desired by the Pope, due to the King

¹ Como un pimpollo de altissimo valor. P. 5.

² Serdonati (Fran^{co}) *De' Fatti d' Arme de' Romani, Libri III.* : raccolte da Tito Livio Plutarco . . . ed altre Historici. Vinetia, Ziletti e Comp., 1572, 4to.

³ " Lor falso e bugiardo Machone." Fol. 4 of dedication.

⁴ *L'Isole piu famose del mondo descritte da* Thomaso Porcacchi da Castiglione, *et intagliate da* Girolamo Porro, Venetia, 1572, fol.

"of Spain, and most convenient to the most wise lords" of the Signiory of Venice, of which enterprise an obvious part will be to drive the Turks from many of the fair islands described in the volume. These hopes and expectations in some degree illustrate the state of feeling at Venice in the month of January after the battle of Lapanto.¹

Melchior de Santa Cruz inscribed to Don John, in 1574, his *Spanish Gems of Apophthegms*, which was long the most popular jest-book in Spain.² The dedication is remarkable as being full of the praise of the author's native city of Toledo, "where the "firstfruits and elegance of witty speech flourish," and where Castillian is spoken in its highest perfection, because the ancient capital is the centre and heart of all Spain, and free of any flattery of the personage whose patronage is invoked. Santa Cruz claims Don John's protection as being "so much his servant," and the only approach to the conventional style of adulation is in the remark that he is following the example of Plutarch, who inscribed his history to Trajan.

Don John does not appear to have inherited the taste for art to which the historical halo surrounding the name of his sire owes so much of its lustre. At least no evidence of such taste is to be found in what remains of his correspondence, not even in the letters to his most intimate friend Rodrigo de Mendoza. It must be remembered that Don John was always very poor, and seldom able to meet the expenses belonging to his position, and that he might perhaps have acquired and displayed the refined tastes of his father and brother had he possessed the same royal means of indulging them. He is, however, said to have employed a Fleming from Bruges, John Van der Straet or Stradanus, who had worked with good reputation at Florence with Vasari, to paint some of his martial achievements in the palace at Naples. Stradanus found his patronage sufficiently profitable to follow him to the Netherlands.³ Skilful and famous as a designer of tapestry, the painter may perhaps have been employed by Don John in

¹ The dedication is dated 15th January 1571, the year 1572 not commencing, according to the method of counting then in use, till March.

² *Floresta Española de Apothegmas y Sentencias sabia y graciosamente dichos de algunos Españoles*. Colegidos por Melchior de Santa Cruz, de Dueñas, vigino de la ciudad ae Toledo. Ed. Toledo, 1574, 12mo.

³ Baldinucci (*Notizie de' Professori del Disegno*, Firenze, 1681-1728, 4 vols. 4to, ii. p. 141) relates that Giovanni Stradano, painter of Bruges (born 1536, died 1605) after painting at Florence for the Grand Duke Cosimo with Giorgio Vasari, "fu poi chiamato "a Napoli da D. Gio. d'Austria per dipignere i suoi fatti militari, e seguitolo in Fiandra "finché quel principe venne a morte."

the way in which he had already distinguished himself at Florence, where he made cartoons of a series of historical figures to be wrought in arras for the lower portion of the walls of the great hall in the Ducal palace, of which Vasari had covered the upper part with frescoes.¹ The nature of his later commissions, perhaps, is indicated in a book of sketches of horses by Stradanus, which Philip Galle published some time after Don John's death, entitled the *Stable of Don John of Austria*.² The title-page is an elaborate composition of horses, horse-furniture, and the implements of the stable; and the spirited representations of the studs of all parts of the world at that time famous for their breeds, with appropriate landscape backgrounds, are finely engraved by Henry Goltzius, Jerome Wiercx, and Galle himself.

In the record of a man's actions his character ought to have made itself sufficiently plain. If it has done this, any elaborate analysis of it is superfluous; if it has not, there is nothing tangible to analyse. I may, however, here bring together some of the opinions expressed upon Don John of Austria by some of his contemporaries who knew him well, or who had at least observed

¹ Vasari speaks very handsomely of Giovanni Stradano, and the assistance which he gave in these same frescoes, and especially records his skill and success as a designer of tapestry. He also records his cartoons of hunting-pieces made for the ducal villa of Poggio-a-Cajano, "after the invention of the Duke." *Vite*, ii. 871-2; 2d ed. Firenze, 1568, 4to. His book being published before Don John of Austria appeared in Italy, Vasari of course throws no light on the works executed for him at Naples by Stradanus; nor do I find these mentioned by Van Mander: *Het Levender Schilders*, Amsterdam, 1617, 4to. Even Bern. Dominici, from whom more information might be expected, says nothing of Stradanus in his *Vite de' Pittori Napoletani*, Napoli, 1742, 3 vols. 4to.

² *Equile Joannis Austriaci Caroli V. Imp. F. in quo omnis generis generosissimorum equorum ex variis orbis partibus insignis delectus. Ad vivum omnes delineati à celeberrimo pictore, Johanne Stradano Belga Brugensi. Et à Philippo Galleo editi.* [At the foot of the plate] *Ill^{mo}, et Excell^{mo} D. Alphonso Felici d'Avalos et Aragona, Marchioni del Vasto et Pescara, duci Montis D. Joannis, Principi Franca-Ville, equiti Auvai Velleris, Majestatis Catholicæ à consiliis, equitumque pro eadem in Belgio magistro observantie monumentum Philippus Gallæus D.D.* According to Brunet it ought to contain forty-one plates, but he cites a copy which had forty-four. The plates not being numbered, and the book not having an index, it is difficult to determine the exact number of plates of which it ought to consist. There is a later edition with the title altered and the plates copied and reversed, called *Equile in quo omnis generis . . . equorum . . . delectus ad vivum delineati à . . . Joh. Stradano, et expensis de studio Marci Sadeleri in lucem editi*. The name and arms of Don John of Austria are suppressed, and the place of his arms occupied by a shield charged with three crescents. The plates, which are very inferior in execution to the originals, bear the name *Joan. Strada inventor*, but no name of engraver, and they are not numbered. My copy has forty-one plates. In the library of the British Museum there is a copy of the book with the original title-page and fifteen of the original plates, which are numbered from two to sixteen. The book in any state is, I believe, very scarce. Baldinucci (*Notizie de' Professori del Disegno*, Firenze, 1681-1728, 4 vols. 4to, ii. p. 142) calls it "un bellissimo libro de cavalli 'd' ogni provincia tanto ben' osservati che veramente è un maraviglia, scorgendosi tra 'l' uno altro minutissime difference."

his career with good opportunities of learning the impressions of those who could speak from personal knowledge.

Antonio Perez, who had seen Don John grow up, and who having been his intimate friend became his enemy, nevertheless described him as "of a noble nature and spirit, of whom great hopes were conceived for the service and repose of His Majesty and the benefit of his kingdom,"¹ and in so doing he no doubt wrote as most intelligent men thought at the Court of Spain.

The great Prince of Orange, in his famous *Apology*, spoke of Don John after his death in language which implied contempt, saying that the "only difference between him and his predecessors in the government of the Netherlands was, that he was younger and more foolish, less capable of concealing his spite and his plans, and more impatient to imbrue his hands in our blood." But this contemptuous estimate was hardly confirmed by the policy of Orange during the two years when Don John was his foremost antagonist, by his repeated advice to his partisans not to be taken in by the plausible governor, and by his various attempts to seize his person, which, had any of them been successful, would have enabled the King of Spain to appoint an abler representative²

The *Apology* of Orange was addressed under his name to the sovereigns and the people of Europe, and doubtless accurately expressed his feelings and opinions. It was, however, not composed by himself, but by his faithful friend Hubert Languet,³ the friend and correspondent of Sir Philip Sidney, and one of the ablest political writers of the age. It is curious to contrast the words of Languet, writing under the directions of William the Silent, in 1581, with his own remarks on the death of Don John

¹ "Por el señor Don Juan hermano de S^a Magestad de tan gentil natural y espíritu, y de tan grandes esperanças para el servicio y descanso de S. M. y beneficio de sus reynos."—*Memorial de Ant. Perez*. Segunda Parte.

² In the *Apologie*, Leyden, 1581, 4to, p. 97, Orange, speaking of the famous intercepted letters of Don John and Escovedo, published by the Estates in 1577, says: "Paciell'es nous avons cogneu que toute la difference entre Don Jean, le Duc d'Albe et Louys de Requesens estoit, qu'il estoit plus jeune et plus sot que les aultres, et qu'il ne pouvoit pas si longtemps cacher son venin, dissimuler ses charges, et retenir ses mains brillantes du désir de les tremper en nostre sang."

³ The authorship of the *Apology* has been also ascribed to Pierre Loyseleur de Villiers, secretary to William of Orange. Duplessis-Mornay says it was read to him and Languet by Villiers, "Qui en étoit l'auteur," in the presence of Orange; and that they advised him to moderate some passages, "Et de fait encore en ôta-t-on beaucoup d'aigreur." (De Thou: *Hist. univ.*, La Haye, 1740, 4to, tom. v. p. 819, Note de Duplessis-Mornay.) Groen van Prinsterer (*Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, I. p. 9) says the "Apologie de 1580 est de Villiers," and M. H. Chevreul (*Hubert Languet*, Paris, 1856, 8vo, p. 162) seems to hold that it was by Villiers, and that "Languet n'en a rédigé ou modifié que quelques parties."

of Austria, in his private letters written from Cologne a few days after that event. To the Elector of Saxony,¹ he says:—"The death of Don John will inflict no slight blow on Spanish interests, of themselves sufficiently shaken, for another person will not easily be found in Spain able to command the army with the authority which he possessed, which was derived from the memory of his father, his own easy and graceful manners, and the happy achievements of his early youth, and which his valour and application would have increased had he survived. From several persons who have served with the army this year I have heard that, leaving those vain amours to which at first he was wholly addicted, he had begun to show himself to his soldiers in such fashion that he was becoming dearer to them every day. His powers might one day have been of great service to Christendom against the Turks and Moors, who threaten us on all sides, and have now become fiercer on account of their recent victory over the Portuguese."² In a later letter Languet expressed the same opinion to Sir Philip Sidney, nearly in the same words, and remarked, that in spite of very severe privations suffered during the past summer Don John's troops had never mutinied. "Though I," he adds, "have never been able to wish that the affairs he was conducting in Belgium might prosper, natural feeling compels me to lament his death, thinking to myself how he might have done deeds useful to the Christian world; how he has been cut off in the flower of his age; and how he was not the author of the calamities with which the Belgic Provinces are struggling, but, in anything he may have done amiss, acted merely in obedience to the commands of another."³

¹ Augustus, brother of the celebrated Maurice, whom he succeeded.

² Huberti Langueti *Epistolæ Secretæ ad principem suum*, Halæ, 1699; part ii. p. 597, Epist. dated 12th Oct. 1578. Ejus mors non leve vulnus infligit rebus Hispanicis, quæ per se sunt satis perturbatæ; nam non facile poterit alius in Hispania reperiri, qui præsit exercitibus cum tanta autoritate, cum quanta ipse præfuit, quam parentis memoria, facilitas et elegantia morum, et felices successus ei adolescentiæ annos vix egresso pesserant (*sic*), quamque virtute et industria aucturus videbatur, si fuisset diutius superstes. Cooperat, ut ex quibusdam audiui qui ipsi hoc anno militaverunt, relictis illis vanis amoribus quibus initio se totum addixerat, exhibere se talem militibus, ut fieret ipsis indies charior. Potuisset ejus virtus aliquando esse usui orbi Christiano adversus Turcas et Mauros, qui undique nobis imminet, et jam sunt facti ferociores illa victoria quam de Portugallensibus nuper reportarunt. The victory here alluded to was that of Alcazarquivir, at which Don Sebastian, King of Portugal, was slain on the 4th of August 1578.

³ Huberti Langueti *Epistolæ scriptæ ad Phil. Sydnaum, Eq. Anglum*, Francoforti, 1633, 12mo, pp. 262-3, Epist. dated 22d Sept. 1578:—"Etiamsi optaverim, ut nihil eorum quæ in Belgio moliebatur ipsi succederet, tamen imperio naturæ dolui audita ejus morte, perpendens mecum cum res gessisse utiles orbi Christiano, et in ipso ætatis flore

De Thou passes Don John over with a few words, describing him as "haughty, yet in the main easy and negligent,"¹ and "neither by age nor experience fitted to conduct public affairs "on a policy of his own, and therefore commonly compared "by the veterans in statecraft to a lanthorn without any light "in it."²

Brantôme, easily captivated by brilliant exterior, admired Don John as an almost perfect Prince, yet his admiration was qualified by an opinion partly coinciding with that of the graver De Thou. "Don John of Austria," he says, "was a fair and "accomplished Prince; I have never seen a man so nearly and "generally approaching the qualities of M. de Nemours," one of Brantôme's prime favourites, whom he elsewhere describes as the model of the men, the darling of the women, and the flower of all chivalry.³ "He was, as I have said, very handsome, of a "good grace, gentle in all his actions, and courteous, affable, and "of a high spirit, and above all, brave and valiant; and he was "one who believed in counsel and obeyed it closely in order to "make himself great, as he would have been had death not cut "him off."⁴

De Tassis, a member of Don John's Belgian Council of State, and therefore enjoying the best opportunities of knowing him

"raptum esse, nec esse authorem earum calamitatum, cum quibus Belgicæ provinciæ "conflictantur, et si quid fecit incommode id eum fecisse alieno imperio obsequentem."

¹ De Thou, *Historia sui temporis*. Lib. LXIV. cap. viii., Londini, 1733, six vols. folio, iii. p. 550. In narrating the secret negotiations of Don John with the Duke of Guise, he ascribes them to the influence of Escovedo, who "ad nova consilia Austrii, "hominis elati, de cetero securi ac negligentis, animum inelinat."

² *Ibid.* cap. vi. p. 546. Neque tamen ea ætate et usu rerum esset ut ipse per se proprio ingenio republicam gereret. Itaque laterne absque lumine a rerum peritis vulgo comparabatur.

³ Jacques de Savoie, Duc de Nemours (son or grandson of Philippe de Savoie, upon whom Francis I. conferred the title, and who was brother of Louise de Savoie, mother of Francis I.)—"un des plus parfaits et accomplis princes, seigneurs, et gentils-hommes, "qui fut jamais . . . très-beau et de très-bonne grace, brave et vaillant, agréable, "aymable et accostable, bien disant, bien escrivant, autant en rime qu'en prose, s'habill- "lant des mieux. . . . Il aymoît toutes sortes d'exercices, et si y estoit si universel qu'il "estoit parfait en tous . . . qui n'a veu M. de Nemours en ses années gayer, il n'a rien "veu; et qui l'a veu, le peut baptiser par tout le monde la fleur de toute chevalerie, et "pour ce, fort aymé de toute le monde, et principalement des dames, desquelles (au "moins d'aucunes), il en a tiré des faveurs, et bonnes fortunes, plus qu'il n'en vouloit, "et plusieurs en a-t-il refusé qui luy en eussent bien voulu despartir." Brantôme : *Œuvres*, Paris, 1787, 8 vols., vi. pp. 177-8.

⁴ Brantôme : *Grands Capitaines estrangers, Discours* xli. Article iii. *Œuvres*, vol. iv. 330. "Don Juan d'Austriche . . . estoit un beau et très accomply prince; et n'ay "jamais veu homme approchant ses vertus bien universellement a feu M. de Nemours, "que luy. Il'estoit fort beau, comme j'ay dit, et de bonne grace, gentil en toutes ses "actions et courtois, affable, d'un grand esprit, et surtout très brave et vaillant, et qui "croyoit le conseil et luy obéyssoit fort pour se faire grand; comme il eust esté si la "mort ne l'eust prévenu."

thoroughly, takes leave of him, in his *Commentaries*, in these terms of affectionate esteem:—"He died in the thirty-second year of his age, just as some experience of affairs had given keenness to those remarkable mental gifts with which nature had adorned him. Of a clearly royal nature, he was a man altogether brave and full of energy, as he showed in the great naval defeat inflicted on the Turks at Lepanto; he was the friend and companion of the bravest and the best; he hated nothing so much as malevolence; splendid, full of piety, very observant of religious duty and of faith, nature had endowed him with so gay and pleasing a cast of countenance that there was hardly a creature whose good-will and love he did not win, and he was in all things worthy of a longer life."¹

The Venetian Lippomano, accredited by his Republic to Don John in 1574, and living in frequent intercourse with him during nine months, reported of him in an elaborate *Relation* already largely quoted,² and in a spirit equally removed from the contempt of Orange and the admiration of Tassis. His estimate, supported as it is by interesting biographical incidents, is one which history may reasonably adopt as her own. As painted by Lippomano, Don John was high-spirited, ambitious, and impulsive, with occasional outbursts of arrogance and vanity, yet in the main wary, dexterous, and painstaking. Morbidly anxious to attain that sovereign rank which in his opinion naturally belonged to his father's son, he was also a loyal and zealous servant of the Spanish Crown. Fond of the pomps of life and the pleasures of youth, he had nevertheless carefully cultivated those branches of knowledge which, according to the ideas of his age, became a soldier. The energy and activity which he displayed in the tennis-court he evinced also in the cabinet; and he plied the pen as indefatigably as the racket in which he so delighted. His manner of transacting business was gracious and winning. His views of the proper policy of the King of Spain in the question so interesting to all Christendom, and to which his own thoughts had been so much devoted, the defence

¹ Obiit trigesimo secundo ætatis suæ anno, cum præclaras animi dotes, quibus eum natura ornaverât, nonnulla rerum experientia acuerat. Regiæ plane indolis, vir omnino fortis, ac strenuus, ut navali clade Turcæ illata ad Lepantum satis apparuit; fortissimi ac optimi cujusque amicus et sodalis; nihil tam exosum habens quam malevolos homines; splendidus, omnino pietatis plenus; religionis fideique observantissimus; dotaveratque eum natura tam hilari ac leni vultus forma, ut vix quisquam fuerit cujus voluntatem et amorem statim sibi non conciliarit; eratque procul dubio dignus longiore vitâ. J. B. de Tassis: *Commentaria de Tumultibus Belgicis*; in the *Analecta Belgica*, Hagæ Comitum, 1743, vol. ii. part ii. p. 326.

² See pp. 92-101.

of Europe against the Turk, were broad and statesmanlike. On the whole he presented himself to the cool clear-sighted envoy by no means as a heaven-born genius, but as a young man of high ambition, and of good abilities and still better opportunities ; “ of a quality such as might make his will an element for good and evil in the affairs of Christendom,” and one “ whose friendship ought to be carefully cultivated by the Serene Republic.”

Of the events in which Don John was an actor it would be idle to say that their character was due in any appreciable degree to his presence on the world's stage. In other hands the work which he had to do would have probably presented the same historical aspect. The war in the Alpuxarras owes its interest rather to the courage of a fallen but gallant people than to the ultimate success of the overwhelming forces of the Castillian. As Don John deserves great part of the merit of fighting the battle of Lepanto, to him is also justly due a great part of the glory of the victory which first taught Christendom that the Turk was not invincible. The easy conquest of Tunis afforded no laurels capable of surviving its ignominious loss. In the Netherlands Don John reluctantly undertook the impossible task of maintaining by fraud alone royal usurpations which fraud and force together had failed to establish. In this enterprise he failed, and confessed his failure ; and he died just as he had commenced, with fair prospects, the military subjugation of the revolted Provinces. Whether he would have carried on that miserable contest with the heroic patience and energy, and the wonderful fertility of expedients for dispensing with the aid of the hesitating King and his beggared treasury, by which Alexander Farnese proved himself one of the greatest of captains ; or whether that contest would have led him into humiliations deeper than any which he had yet undergone, are questions to which De Thou and De Tassis would assuredly have given different answers.

In spite of the hateful policy of which Don John was the willing instrument in the Netherlands, it is impossible not to look upon his forlorn position there without some feelings of interest and compassion. In failing health, and with blighted hope, he was labouring day and night in the cause in which he was a devout believer, the right of God's anointed Kings to misgovern their subjects, and for the brother whom through life he had most loyally served. Meanwhile, that brother was deep in plans for the murder of one of Don John's most intimate friends, and for drawing from his own pen expressions of discontent which might

be twisted into reasons for sending him to die by the axe on the scaffold or by poison in the prison cell.

In acting as the instrument of Philip II. Don John was following the traditions of his House and the instincts of his class, influences which few minds are strong enough to resist. Although not more scrupulous about truth than the ministers of despots commonly are, he was not personally concerned in any of those dark deeds which revolt the consciences of all ages, and stamp Philip II. with a peculiar infamy.¹ Nor is the theory of feudal despotism, as it existed when he upheld it by his sword, more difficult to maintain by plausible argument than other theories which are now defended without shame by men of higher and more trained intelligence. That theory, reduced to its simplest form, was, that Providence had set apart certain men to be rulers over the rest, and that opposition to their will was disobedience to the divine law. The Catholic Church, claiming for its priesthood authority over men's thoughts similar to that which Kings claimed over their actions, usually supported this theory so far as it did not clash with her own pretensions. It has even been carried to a still more extravagant height by one of the reformed sects; and for a very long space of time it had, and perhaps for many minds it still has on its side, all the subtle influences of religion and all the associations of romance. The theory of the existing despotism² of France is that the Frenchmen of 1852, acting under a panic carefully fostered and mainly created by their ruler, overawed by an army which he had spent his three years of constitutional power in corrupting, and voting by a machinery of which he had the sole control, had the right to give, and actually gave, to Louis Napoleon and his family an indefeasible title to govern France according to the will and pleasure of the head of that race for all future time. This theory,

¹ In one of the calendars of the papers in the royal archives at Florence, referring to the *Legazione di Spagna*, vol. xvii., describing the despatches of Baccio Orlandini, I found the only imputation of this kind against him which I have ever met with. One of the letters of which that calendar contains an abstract, is there said to relate that Don Pietro de' Medici, who had lately murdered his wife Eleonora di Toledo, was at Genoa on his way to Spain, in January 1578; and to mention amongst other incidents of the visit to that city, that "se dice che a Genova par parte di Gio. Andrea Doria si fu chiesto certo "veleno per mandarvi a D. Gio. d'Austria, che teneva trattato di avvelenare il Principe "d'Orange." I went very carefully through the volume in question without finding any trace of such a letter, and I had the assistance in the search of a friend who met with no better success. The calendar, made, I believe, at the end of the last century, seemed, however, generally accurate.

² It is scarcely necessary to say that this passage was written during the reign of Napoleon III., and that the crime referred to is the *coup d'état* by which the President of the French Republic secured for himself the Imperial throne.—ED.

announced in a time of profound peace by a crime which rivals in its proportions the crimes brought forth by the passions and conflicts of the sixteenth century, appears to be accepted as reasonable by many Frenchmen and not a few Englishmen, who probably, nevertheless, condemn Philip II. and his satraps, and applaud the heroic resistance opposed to them by the Netherlands.





I.

DESPATCH FROM DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA TO PHILIP
II., DATED 16TH FEBRUARY 1570, DESCRIBING THE
TAKING OF GALERA.

From a transcript taken from the original at Simancas, and forming part of a collection of papers bequeathed to the Royal Academy of History at Madrid by Don Luis Lopez Ballesteros.

DON JUAN DE AUSTRIA AL REY D. FELIPE II.

S. C. R. M.

Con Don Alonso Puerto-Carrero di aviso á V. M. de la tomada de Galera, remitiendome á el en lo demás como persona que se halló presente á todo y sabría referirlo por no cansar á V. M. con larga escritura viniendo de camino. En esta escribiré lo demás y responderé particularmente á cinco cartas que he recebido de V. M. con dos correos; la una de 26 del pasado y las demás de 1^{ero}, 3, 6, y 7 del presente, y ya escribí á V. M. á los 30 del mismo la causa porque hasta aquel dia no habia despachado correo; pero de aqui adelante aunque no haya cosa de momento cumpliré lo que V. M. manda como se hacia de antes, que entonces por aguardar á que de dia en dia pudiera enviar la nueva que deseaba lo diferí.

Para poder la segunda vez hacer mas plaza y camino á los soldados, aunque tubieran la que les bastaba la primera vez (que no hay para que tornar á tratar de ello) se hicieron dos minas y despues que se las dió fuego y hicieron razonable efecto, por la frente de la popa y lado izquierdo de ella se batió el lugar por cuatro partes en frente de la popa las dos, y las otras dos por los lados para impedir y detener á los Moros que no pudiesen estar á la defensa, y otra abajo á la parte de la proa con dos medias culebrinas; y habiendolos batidos buenas dos horas y no cesando de hacerlo por que me resolví de allanarselo bien, envié á reconocer por dos partes y habiendolo hecho y visto todos y nuestra gente que habia llegado un soldado á ganarles una bandera que tenian mas abajo de la bateria de la mano izquierda, habiendoles dado el dia antes la orden de como y cuantos y con que cabos habian de remeter, como lo verá V. M. por las relaciones que van con esta, siguieron su camino con buen animo, y aunque al principio, por el miedo que les puso las minas y el daño que les hacia la artilleria no salieron muchos á la defensa; pero hicieronla en todo el lugar de tal manera que fue fuerza ganarlos casa por casa, y duró

I.

DESPATCH FROM DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA TO PHILIP
II., DATED 16TH FEBRUARY 1570, DESCRIBING THE
TAKING OF GALERA.

From a transcript taken from the original at Simancas, and forming part of a collection of papers bequeathed to the Royal Academy of History at Madrid by Don Luis Lopez Ballesteros.

DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA TO PHILIP II.

S(ACRED) C(ATHOLIC) R(OYAL) M(AJESTY).

By Don Alonso Puerto-Carrero I advised your Majesty of the taking of Galera, referring you, as to other particulars, to him, as a person who had been present at the whole operation and who could describe it, in order not to weary your Majesty, while on a journey, with so long a letter. In this one I will write what remains to be said, and particularly I will reply to the five letters which I have received from your Majesty by two posts, one of the 26th of last month, and the rest of the 1st, 3d, 6th, and 7th of this month. I had already on the 30th ult. written to your Majesty the cause why up to that day I had not sent off any courier, but from henceforward, although there may be nothing of moment [to tell], I will obey your Majesty's order, and do [*i.e.* write] as heretofore, which I deferred doing, expecting day after day that I should be able to send off the desired intelligence.

That on this second occasion the soldiers might have more room and a better road, though they had sufficient the first time (but there is no need of returning to the discussion of that [subject] now), two mines had been constructed, and after these had been fired and had produced a reasonable effect on the front of the poop¹ and on the left side, the place was bombarded from four points, two on the front of the poop and two on the sides, to impede and keep back the Moors from its defence, and on another point below, towards the prow,¹ with two half culverins; and after this cannonade had been kept up without cessation for two good hours, as I had resolved to lay everything as low as possible, I sent to reconnoitre the place on two sides; when this was done, it having been seen that one of our soldiers had succeeded in seizing a banner, planted below the battery on the left, our troops advanced in the order and under the leaders agreed on the day before, as your Majesty will see in the accompanying reports, in the best spirits. At first, owing to the fear caused by the mines and

¹ The terms "poop" and "prow" are used in consequence of the resemblance which the rock-built town bore to a galley, whence its name Galera.

el hacerlo desde las nueve de la mañana hasta la noche, peleando dentro de las casas por las calles y en los terrados, y no peor ni con menos animos las mugeres que los maridos; ellos pasaron todos á cuchillo y realmente por lo que se ha visto y vé parecen mas de dos mil y quinientos Moros los muertos. También dí luego orden que matasen las mugeres, niñas y niños como se comenzó [á] hacer, pero viendo el mal rostro que hacian los soldados quitandoles su ganancia (que no es con lo que menos cuenta tienen) mandé que no pasasen adelante y disimulé que ganase cada uno lo que pudiere, y creo que pocos han quedado sin provecho, porque ha sido increíble el numero de mugeres, niñas y niños que habia, y harta cantidad de ropa y trigo y cebada, lo cual he hecho comprar de los soldados por cuenta de V. M. á tres reales la hanega del trigo y á dos la de la cebada. De nuestra parte no ha muerto ninguna persona conocida ni de los demas creo que hubo cincuenta entre heridos y muertos. El capitán Don Pedro Zapata salió herido y ya se halla mejor.

Habemos tratado de lo que convenia hacer de este lugar, y por haber en él tanto numero de muertos, y quedar tan destruido y atormentado por las baterías y minas (aunque el sitio es inespunable) nos habemos resuelto de que se queme y derrive porque á ello nos obligaba tambien no haber soldado que se pudiera tener de guarnicion ni hay orden en ello, y hacese esperiencia en los lugares que tienen mas regalo y mejor alojamiento que los que dará esto; y así mandé que se le pegase fuego por todas partes, y que lo que quedare por derrivar y destruir lo hagan los vecinos de Huesca, que les importa tanto asolar si pueden la memoria, y que no se pueble mas, y si lo hicieren sea él bajo cerca del rio.

En hacer esto y en retirar la artilleria con todos los pertrechos de ella, enviar alguna que no es necesaria á Huesca, recoger todas las pelotas que se han podido y dar tiempo á otras cosas forzosas que se habian de aperibir, y principalmente tiempo para que hallemos vitualla adelante, y en haber enviado á reconocer los caminos me he detenido hasta ahora y espero partir mañana a dormir á Cuellar, que es tres leguas de aqui, y el día siguiente llegaré á Caniles, que es una legua de Baza y cuatro de Seron, que este lugar parece que cumple enprender primero para dejar con mas seguridad esto de por aqui y lo de Baza y su comarca, y de lo que en todo se hiciere y sucediere dará aviso á V. M.; y porque los que se tienen de todas partes confirman que hay mucha gente en el rio de Almanzora, y que piensan defender no solamente los lugares, pero la campaña, torno á suplicar á V. M. que mande considerar que todos negocios y mas los que importan tanto como este es bien asegurarlos, y atrabesandose tan poco como será crecer tres mil hombres mas, especialmente hallándose la persona de V. M. tan cerca con la cual su sombra y respeto han de acrecentarse las fuerzas y los animos de todos. Yo no podré decir en esta

the damage inflicted by our artillery, the Moors did not sally out in any great numbers to oppose them; yet in the place itself the defence was so obstinate that it was necessary to take it house by house, and the taking of it lasted from nine in the morning till night, fighting going on the while in the houses, in the streets, and on the roofs, the women fighting as well and as bravely as their husbands. All were put to the sword, and really from what I have seen and see, it would appear that more than two thousand five hundred Moors are slain. Although I at first gave orders that women, boys, and girls should be killed, and a beginning had been made, yet seeing the evil looks with which the soldiers saw themselves deprived of their booty (which is by no means the thing upon which they count least) I forbade the slaughter to proceed further, and let each one take what he could get, and I believe that there are few but have got something, so incredible was the number of women, girls, and boys [congregated] here, together with great store of clothing, wheat, and barley, which last I have caused to be purchased from the soldiers, the wheat at the rate of three reals the fanega, and the barley at two reals. On our side no person of note is killed, nor do I believe that we have lost fifty in all, both in killed and wounded. The Captain Don Pedro Zapata was wounded, but he is recovering.

We have been considering what ought to be done with the place, and seeing how full it is of dead, and how shattered and destroyed by the batteries and mines (although the site is impregnable), we have resolved that it be burned and razed. To this resolution we are also driven because we have no soldiers fit for garrison duty, and it would be better to make the experiment of so employing them, if it is to be made, in some places where the appliances and lodging would be better; so I have ordered that [the town] should be fired at all points, and that if anything is left to be pulled down and destroyed, it should be done by the people of Guescar, to whom it is so important that the memory of the place, if possible, should perish, and that it should never again be inhabited, or that at least if it is to be inhabited, the site should be fixed lower down near the river.

In this work and in removing the artillery and all things pertaining to it, sending what is not wanted to Guescar, collecting what cannon-balls we could, and in attending to other urgent matters which had to be looked after, especially providing a store of victual ahead of us, and reconnoitring the roads, I have been detained until now. To-morrow I hope to set out and sleep at Cuellar, which is three leagues off, and the day following I shall arrive at Caniles, which is a league from Baza, and four from Seron. This place it appears to me to be necessary to undertake first of all, in order that we may leave this district in security. As to Baza and its neighbourhood, and that which we may do and whatever may happen, I will advise your Majesty. And because what we hear, from all quarters, confirms us in the belief that there is a strong force in the valley of Almanzora, and that it is their intention to defend not only the towns but the open country, I once more entreat your Majesty to consider, that it would be well to make all these affairs especially in such important points as this secure, when security can be attained merely by augmenting your forces by three thousand men, especially as your Majesty's person being so near, the

precisamente el numero de gente que hay, pero en segundo alojamiento tomaré muestra particular, de manera que no pueda haber fraude y se sepa puntualmente los soldados que llevamos y de ello daré noticia á V. M. con lo demás que se ofrezca.

Yo escribí al duque de Sesa que enviase tres compañías de infanteria á Guadix para que saliesen de allí otras tantas, porque se comenzaban á deshacer, y [se pudiesen] tambien poner buenos los capitanes que son harto necesarios aquí, aunque el uno de ellos que se llamaba Madrigal ha fallecido de enfermedad, cuya compañía se dió á Antonio Moreno, y los otros dos llegaron aquí ayer con trescientos y ochenta soldados. El tiempo ha hecho siempre bueno, y así persevera, aunque de dos dias aca va haciendo mudanzas y ha llovido : deseolo tal por llevar la gente mas dispuesta para lo que se ha de hacer y principalmente para la artilleria que lo quiere siempre bueno.

La posesion de Galera se ha dado ne la manera que V. M. me mandó, y á los del duque de Alba se ha dicho sobre lo de Castilleja lo que V. M. me escribe.

Al Marques de los Velez no solicitaré su vuelta como V. M. lo manda, y en lo que toca al cargo de la caballeria haré lo mismo en cuanto á esperar si viene su hijo ó no, que para encomendarla de prestado no sabria á quien la encargar, y V. M. crea cierto que tiene necesidad de cabeza que la gobierne y á quien acudan y obedezcan los otros miembros de ella ; pero V. M. proveerá y mandará lo que mas será servido, que es lo que he de obedecer.

Cuanto al cargo de Maestre de Campo General, quando el sugeto era el que convenia era muy necesaria tal persona por tocar á él las principales cosas que se mandan y proveen en el egercito. Pero faltando estas en él á lo que juzgo, lo supplirán Luis Quijada y el Comendador Mayor, como V. M. dice, y á los que hacen el oficio de Maestres de Campo se les encargará tambien lo que cumple que hagan.

Cuanto al sacar de los Moriscos de paz que hay en este reyno conforme á lo que escribió el Comendador Mayor de Castilla, para dejar lo de este reyno con la seguridad que conviene por muchos respetos ; él ha dicho lo que [á] todos nos parece, y lo que verdaderamente cumple, porque ellos son los que recetan, ayudan y alimentan con avisos, municiones, y bastimentos á los levantados, como lo entendemos y tocamos con mano en Granada, y quanto al sacarlos dejando aparte para decirlo abajo si conviene ó no por la consecuencia de los de Valencia y otras partes, parece que habiendo tiempo para ello y la gente necesaria se debria hacer por el camino y forma que lo de Granada y meterlos quanto mas adentro en Castilla se pudiese, y que al sacarlos se les diese licencia, tiempo y aparejo

¹ "*Maestre, Maestro,*" or "*Maese de Campo,*" was at this time the title of the commander of a *tercio*, a force which varied much both in number and composition. It usually however consisted of three thousand men, and it was composed sometimes of infantry, and sometimes of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The commander of a *tercio* was also sometimes called *coronel* or colonel, and that title came into general use in the

respect and influence which attach to it must augment the strength and courage of all. I cannot here say precisely what number of troops I have ; but at our second camp I shall hold a particular inspection, so that fraud will be impossible, and that I may ascertain exactly what soldiers we have with us, and inform your Majesty of this and other things that may offer.

I have written to the Duke of Sesa to send three companies of infantry to Guadix, in order that they may replace other three whose men were beginning to disband and that their captains might recover their health ; although one of them who is called Madrigal is dead of disease, and his company has been given to Antonio Moreno, and the other two arrived here yesterday with three hundred and eighty soldiers. The weather has been fine and so it continues, although two days ago there was a change and some rain ; I wish it may remain fair, that the troops may be the better disposed for what they have to do, and especially for [the sake of] the artillery, which always needs fine weather.

The possession of Galera has been given as your Majesty ordered, and as to that of Castilleja the people of the Duke of Alba have been told what your Majesty wrote.

According to your Majesty's command, I shall not solicit the return of the Marquess of Los Velez, and in what concerns the charge of the cavalry I shall do the same, in so far as to wait to see if his son comes or not. As to putting it in the hands [of another officer] for a short time, I do not know to whom to entrust it, and your Majesty may well believe that there is great need of a head to command whom the others will support and obey ; therefore will your Majesty consider [the matter] and order that which is best for your service, which it will be my business to execute ?

As to the charge of Brigadier-General,¹ when the person [holding that post] is fitted for it, such an officer is necessarily brought into contact with the principal parts of the business of commanding and supplying the army. But supposing him to be wanting in these [requisite qualities], Luis Quixada and the Grand Commander will supply the deficiency, and to those who hold the posts of Adjutants, some portions of the duties may be committed.

As to the removal of the peaceable Moriscos who dwell in this kingdom, according to what the Grand Commander of Castille has written, in order to leave the [affairs] of this kingdom in that security which for many reasons is desirable, he has already said that which we all think, and what in truth must be done ; for these [peaceable Moriscos] are the people who aid and abet the rebels, and supply them with intelligence, munitions, and provisions, as we well know and indeed see going on around us in Granada ; and leaving for the present out of the question, whether the removal of them is required for the effect it may have in Valencia, I think that it ought to be done, time being suitable, and a sufficient force at hand, in the way and manner in which it was done at Granada, and that they should be sent as far away into Castille as possible, and that at their

Spanish armies, superseding *Maestre de Campo*, during the Thirty Years' War. *Maestre de Campo General* seems to imply something more than the command of a *tercio*, and may possibly have been the title of an officer of high rank on the staff of the commander-in-chief.

para que llevasen todas los bienes muebles que pudiesen, y darles tambien licencia para que pudiesen vender y disponer de los raices, y que dejasen entre todos tantas personas cuantas pareciesen convenientes á que tratasen de ello con decirles y ofrecerles juntamente que aquietaudose estas alteraciones se les consentirá que vuelvan á sus casas y á gozar de ellas, y de la que de antes tenian, y conveniendo hacerse como se dirá, gastando diez ó doce dias en ello se sacaran los de Benamaurel, Baza y su contorno, Gor y Guadix con parte de la gente de este egercito y la que podria venir de Ubeda, Baeza, Quesada, y algunos de las propias tierras de donde salen, con los cuales podrian ir hasta salir de este reyno, y despues las ciudades de Andalucia y Castilla los llevaran. Queda el punto principal el cual convendrá que V. M. lo mande resolver y conforme á ello la determinacion, si esto seria causa de remover humores en los de Valencia y Aragon y reyno de Murcia y otras partes donde los hay, que siendo cosa que está por ver en los tales y que tienen los pensamientos ocultos no se puede hacer justicia cierto, ni convendria siendo negocio tan ambiguo darle mas seguro termino del que se ha conocido y visto en los demas que tan intempestivamente se alzaron y resolvieron á egecutar lo que traen entre manos, lo cual parece que trae dificultades en acabarse, teniendo estos en tierras de V. M. quien los fomenta, ayuda y favorece. Pero V. M. mandando considerar los proes y los contras podrá ordenar lo que mas será servidio.

Del Campo cerca de Galera, 16 Hebrero, 1570.

Posdata. Estan tan obstinados estos revelados y segun se entiende de todas partes con determinacion de dejarse antes hacer pedazos que rendirse ni venir en ningun buen concierto, que no se debe hombre prometer de ellos ningun partido honroso. Pero en caso que sucediese lo contrario, como tras la opinion que se tiene y ellos publican puede ser que viniesen á rendirse á merced y gracia de V. M. desco que V. M. me mande avisar que se ha de hacer de ellos, por no errar en cosa que tanto importa.

removal, leave, time, and assistance should be given to them to carry away, so far as possible, all their movables, and that they also should have license to sell and dispose of their landed property, and that they should leave as many out of the whole number of these persons as might seem desirable to treat of the terms on which, when these troubles are quieted, they might be allowed to return to their houses and enjoy their former property; and that supposing it is determined to adopt this course, in ten or twelve days the [Moriscos] might be removed from Benamaurel, Baza and its neighbourhood, Gor and Guadix, by means of a part of this army, and of the force that could come from Ubeda, Baeza, Quesada, and from some of the very districts whence the removal takes place; and they might march under the charge of the escort until they had passed the frontier of the kingdom, and afterwards be transferred to the care of [the militia of] the cities of Castille and Andalusia. There remains the principal point which it will be well that your Majesty should decide, and take your determination accordingly, whether this [policy of removing the Moriscos] may be the cause of dispelling the [evil] humours of those of Valencia and Aragon, and the kingdom of Murcia and other parts where they are found, which being a thing to be looked for in the people themselves, who keep their thoughts secret, it is impossible to be sure that the decision is a just one; nor being a matter so doubtful will it be prudent to anticipate that any step will have more success, than that which has been known and seen heretofore with the others, who so unexpectedly rose [in rebellion] and resolved to execute that which they had taken in hand; whence it appears that there will be difficulties in finishing the affair, so long as these [rebels] have in the dominions of your Majesty [a party] who encourages, aids, and favours them. However, your Majesty after giving directions that the *pros* and the *cons* should be considered, can order that which is best for your service.

From the Camp near Galera, 16th February 1570.

Postscript. These rebels are so obstinate, and according to the intelligence which comes in from all quarters, so fixed in their determination rather to be cut in pieces than submit, or enter upon any good plan of reconciliation, that no man can promise any honourable arrangement with them. But in case the contrary should happen, as, in spite of the opinion which is entertained and which they themselves give out, it may be that they may choose to submit themselves to the mercy and grace of your Majesty, I wish that your Majesty would advise me of what is to be done, that I may make no mistake in an affair of so much importance.

II.

FRAGMENT OF A LETTER FROM DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA TO DOÑA MAGDALENA DE ULLOA, WIDOW OF LUIS QUIXADA. AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER 1570.

Traslado de una Carta del Señor DON JUAN DE AUSTRIA para DOÑA MAGDALENA DE ULLOA viuda de LUIS QUIXADA. MS. Real Academia de la Historia: Miscelanea de Jesuitas. T. 72, N^o. 85, fol.

SEÑORA,

Beso las manos de Vmd. por el cuidado que tiene de responder siempre á mis cartas ques lo principal, porque lo [que] deseo es por saber á la continua de la salud y estado de Vmd.

A lo que devo responder de una que e recibido de los cinco del presente lo haré en esta . . . ¹ No ay que dudar sino que las cosas estan de suerte que quanto la persona determina en un punto, en otro mas breve le conviene mudarlo y asi lo que á este proposito ay que dezir es que en todo se ha de proceder segun los tiempos corrieren; solamente seria yo porfiado en caso que me quisiesen inbiar á Flandes á donde por ser tan lexos no me conviene ir, y tambien por no ser á mi proposito la quietud de aquel pais. Por cartas de amigos que pueden tener alguna inteligencia e entendido que se trata de que la princesa vaya á aquella tierra, y con ella el Duque de Medinaceli; no lo e juzgado por despropósito; no sé si lo causa el desearlo; cierto yo creo que seria lo mas acertado: Dios lo haga assi.

Esta negra guerra no es acabada, pero está á esta hora en tal estado que si nuevos umores no se rebuelben, lo que para mi ay que hazer podria ser acabado á lo mas largo por todo Otubre; deseolo tanto que aun visto dudaria dello: Dios lo haga, que á mi harto bien me estaria.

Aora e recebido una letra de Su Mag^d de su mano en que me dize la necesidad que de mi tiene para esto de la Liga y otras cosas; creeré lo que viere en todas ellas. Huelgo mucho de que Don Juan de Mendoza aya dicho á Vmd. las sospechas que se han tenido de mi ida á Granada, de las quales e dado á Vmd. la cuenta que de tan lexos se puede. Creo que Su Mag^d y sus ministros estan satisfechos de la verdad y de que aqui

¹ Claro en el original.

II.

FRAGMENT OF A LETTER FROM DON JOHN OF
AUSTRIA TO DOÑA MAGDALENA DE ULLOA,
WIDOW OF LUIS QUIXADA. AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER
1570.

Copy of a Letter of DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA to DOÑA MAGDALENA DE ULLOA, widow of LUIS QUIXADA. MS. in the possession of the Royal Academy of History [at Madrid]: Miscellanies of the Jesuits; Vol. 72, fol.

MADAM,

I kiss your ladyship's hands for the trouble you have had in always replying to my letters, which is the chief [kindness you can show me], for that which I most desire is ever to be informed of your ladyship's health and welfare.

As to what I ought to say in reply to a [letter] which I received about the fifth of the present [month] I will do it in this . . . ¹ There is no doubt but that things are in such a state that whatever a man may determine one moment, he is obliged to change the next, and so all that can be said on this head is that in everything it is necessary to proceed according to the course of events. In one case only I should stand out, were they to choose to send me to Flanders, whither it would not suit me to go, it being so far off, and also because the quiet of that country is not to my liking. By letters of friends who are in the way of being well informed, I have heard that the Princess² is going thither, and the Duke of Medinaceli with her. I do not think the [appointment] unsuitable; indeed, perhaps because I desire [to see] it [made], I believe it would be the best to make; [so] God grant that it may be so!

This black war is not yet over; but it is now in such a state that, if no evil humours again arise, all that remains for me to do may be finished at the latest by the end of October. I long for it so much that even [if the end were] seen I should doubt of it. May God so dispose it that it may be of benefit to me!

I have just now received a letter from His Majesty, in his own hand, in which he tells me of the need he has of me for this [affair] of the League and other matters. Of all these things I shall believe what I shall see. I am very glad that Don Juan de Mendoza has told your ladyship of the suspicions which have arisen in consequence of my having gone to

¹ Blank in the original.

² The Infanta Juana, Princess of Brazil, sister of Philip II.

se procede en todo mas conforme á su serbiçio que de donde estan saven hordenar, y sobre todo esto se han escrito diversas vezes algunas cossas que han aprovechado para otras, porque mostrandome yo sentido para con todos ellos y lo mismo el Duque de Sesa y Comendador Mayor como participantes en el caso, les avemos dado á entender que si piensan que pretendemos mas á nuestro gusto y plazer que á lo que estamos puestos, que hazen mal en servirse de nosotros con tan asperas condiciones, lo qual podemos mal hazer si no se nos remite como á presentes lo que conviene hazerse en esta guerra, que es ir yo á Granada desde donde ay mucha mayor comodidad de asentar las cosas que de un lugar desproveido como este; y esta ida no pretendia yo executarla con mi sola opinion sino con la de estos señores que me asisten y entienden que es lo que conviene hazerse. A todo esto se añadieron otras cosas tratadas con la llaneza que al caso convenia, pero atengome á lo que algun dia, Dios queriendo, verbalmente se dira.

Dize Vmd. haziendomela mui grande, que mire lo que hago por tener aora todos puestos en mi lo ojos, y que no sea tan galan sino que antes evite todas las ocasiones de que podria ser dañado. De nuebo beso las manos de Vmd. por la que me haze, de lo qual la suplico que no se canse. A esto, Señora, respondo con la pura verdad de que soi tan amigo, que doy á nuestro Señor infinitas gracias desde *que mi tio y padre* me faltó, y procurando siempre bevir como ausente de quien tanto bien me hacia, y assi creo que no me he gobernado tan mal ni travaxado tan poco que considerado esto aya quien afirme lo contrario.

Galas, aunque vien quisiera ussarlas, el trabaxo de nuebe meses de campaña no diera lugar á destruyrme, quanto mas, Señora, que no todos los tiempos y condiciones son unas, antes veo que en gentes de razon y no brutas se mudan juntamente con la hedad, si otras ay en el mundo que para dezir mal travan de que quiera: no me espanto que de Dios dixeron y mormuran y aun Vmd. me escriva que llega esto á tanto que ni de mi osa preguntar, por manera que en quanto á esta parte los santos no biben seguros de las bexaciones de este mundo; en el qual procuraré deregirme lo mas conforme al parecer de Vmd. que yo supiere, á quien suplico me guarde siempre un oido, porque á nadie quiero ni desseo satisfacer tanto como á quien devo la criança que en mi hizo y el estado que aora tengo, que esto reconoçeré yo aun en la sepultura. Supplico á Vmd. perdone discurso tan largo, pues las inbinciones deste siglo bastan causar lo que hombre menos pensava, y que me haga saver si las de la S^a Abadesa llegan á tanto que inquieten mucho la justicia de Vmd.

Granada, whereof I have given your ladyship such an account as can be given from such a distance. I believe His Majesty and his ministers are satisfied as to the truth, and that all our proceedings here are in better conformity with [the interests of] His Majesty's service than they could themselves have contrived by [sending] orders from Court; and about this whole business some things have been at different times written which have been useful for other purposes, for I having shown that I felt hurt at all these [suspicions], and the Duke of Sesa and the Grand Commander, as participating in the matter, [having done] the same, we have given them to understand that if they think we are more careful and attentive with regard to our own liking and pleasures than to that [work] which we are appointed [to do] here, they are doing wrong in employing us under such hard conditions, [and] that we can do our duty [but] ill, if it is not left to us, as being on the spot, to do what ought to be done in this war, [one of the things which ought to be done being] that I should go to Granada, from whence affairs may be directed with greater convenience than from a place so unprovided as this is, and that I did not pretend to make this change of quarters on my sole judgment, but also on that of the gentlemen who assist me and who knew that it was the right thing to do. To all this other things were added, [which have been] treated of with all the plainness which the case requires, but I look forward to saying it to your ladyship by word of mouth some day, if God will.

Your ladyship tells me with your great and wonted kindness to consider well what I am doing, all eyes being now fixed upon me, and not be too adventurous, but rather to avoid all occasions of risk. Once more I kiss your ladyship's hands for what you are doing for me, of which I entreat you never to become weary. To this, Madam, I will answer with the simple truth which I love so much, that since [he who was to me] my uncle and father has been taken from me, I give to our Lord infinite thanks, endeavouring always to live as absent from one who did me so much kindness, and also I think that I have not governed myself so ill, nor laboured so little that, this [loss] considered, any one will say of me the contrary.

As to holiday attire, although I might be inclined to use it, the toils of a nine months' campaign would be sufficient to unfit me for it, especially, Madam, as all times and conditions are not the same, and people who have sense and are not mere brutes change with age; though others there are in the world who in order to say an ill word catch at anything. I do not therefore wonder at what they say and murmur about me, seeing that they do the same about God himself; nor that even your ladyship should write that things have come to such a pass, that you do not dare to ask about me, seeing that in this respect the saints themselves do not live secure from the vexations of this world; wherein I will endeavour to steer my course as much as I can in conformity with the advice of your ladyship, whom I entreat ever to grant me a hearing, for there is no one whom I so much desire to satisfy as her to whom I owe my bringing up and the place in the world which I now hold, [obligations] which I will acknowledge even in my grave. I beg your ladyship to excuse so long a discourse, since the inventions of this world are sufficient to cause that which

Buelvo [á] acordarla que si allá ay algunos hijos de cavalleros que sean á proposito para mis paxes, que tengo necesidad dellos y de que Balverde bea si conoce á alguien que lo sea para hazer el oficio de Fran^{co} Lopez, que de acá yo todavia me retifico que aquel Fran^{co} de Leon que ayudava al correo mayor, y hace aqui el oficio, tiene buena pluma y abelidad. Para esto esperaré en todo lo que á Vmd. pareciere.

De acá no se me ofresce otra cosa de nuevo de que abisar mas de que la gente que tengo en el Alpujarra hacen algunas buenas faciones ; anse benido á reducir muchas gentes y son pocas . . .

Falta lo restante de la carta.

II*.

COPIES OF LETTERS WRITTEN TO RUY GOMEZ DE SILVA, PRINCE OF EBOLI ; AND TO PHILIP II., KING OF SPAIN ; BY DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA, AT BARCELONA, 8TH AND 12TH JULY 1571, REPRESENTING THE GRIEF WHICH AN ORDER ISSUED BY THE KING HAD CAUSED HIM.

Preserved in the BRITISH MUSEUM ; BIBL. EGERTON ; Papeles Varios ;
1333-1691. 329 *Plut. D. xvi. E. ff.* 235, and 229, 230.

Copia de Carta que escrivio el Ser^{mo} Señor DON JUAN DE AUSTRIA, a RUI GOMEZ DE SILVA repressentandole quanto sentimiento le havia caussado la orden, que le havia embiado la Magestad del Rey Nu^o S^e DON PHELIPPE EL SEGUNDO.

PUES Vm. despues que llego ay havra savido la nueva orden que Su Magestad ha querido, que yo guarde, no le cansare con volverla aora a referir, pero valiendome de lo que entiendo tengo en Vm. y de la licencia, que como padre me ha dado, para que le acuda con mis causas, dire a lo menos, que he sentido y siento esta, lo que la raçon me obliga ; no tanto Señor por lo que es vanidad, que de andar apartado della pongo Dios por testigo, mas da me mucha pena, que yo solo en el mundo aya merecido

a man least expects, and to let me know whether those of the holy abbess have gone so far as greatly to disturb your ladyship's [feelings of] justice.

I once more remind your ladyship that if there be in your neighbourhood any gentlemen's sons who may be suitable for my pages, I am in need of some, and that Balverde ought to see whether he knows any one to do the duty of Fran^{co} Lopez, for that I can from hence assure him that that Fran^{co} de Leon, who assisted the Postmaster-General and is doing the duty here, possesses a good pen and ability. As to all this, I shall hope to receive your ladyship's opinion,

Here there is nothing new to tell, except that the troops which I have in the Alpujara are achieving some good exploits ; many people have made their submission, and there are a few——

The rest of the letter is wanting.

Although the date of this interesting fragment has not been preserved, the mention of Luis Quixada's death, and of Don John's campaign being in its ninth month, and also his expectation that the war will be ended by the close of October, indicate that the Letter was written at the end of August or beginning of September 1570, most probably at Guadix.

II*.

COPIES OF LETTERS WRITTEN TO RUY GOMEZ DE SILVA, PRINCE OF EBOLI ; AND TO PHILIP II., KING OF SPAIN ; BY DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA, AT BARCELONA, 8TH AND 12TH JULY 1571, REPRESENTING THE GRIEF WHICH AN ORDER ISSUED BY THE KING HAD CAUSED HIM.

Preserved in the BRITISH MUSEUM ; BIBL. EGERTON ; Papeles Varios ; 1333-1691. 329 Plut. D. xvi. E. ff. 235, and 229, 230.

Copy of a letter addressed by DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA to RUY GOMEZ DE SILVA, representing the grief which an order issued by the King, PHILIP THE SECOND, had occasioned him.

As you have no doubt become aware since I arrived here of the new order which His Majesty desires that I am to obey, I will not trouble you by sending it to you for reference. But availing myself of the leave you have given me to come to you as a father with a statement of my affairs, I will at the least tell you how much this [order] has grieved and grieves me, as it is reasonable that it should do. I take God to witness that it is not out of mere vanity that I would [desire to be allowed] to depart from

orden tan nueva, quando con mayor confiança vivia de que mostrara Su Magestad a todos que la tenia de mi, y que olgava que yo fuesse mas honrrado, confieso a Vm. que ha quebrado tanto en mi este disfabor de igualarme con muchos a tiempo que todos miran, que algunas veces he estado por disponer de mi siguiendo otro camino de servir a Dios, y a Su Magestad, pues en el que llevo se me da a entender tan claramente, que no acierto, aunque si algo me haze reparar es persuadirme que assi como no selo merezco, no sale de Su Magestad semejante voluntad, sino de alguna perssona que querra ser autoridad suya tener yo poca. A fee pues, Señor Rui Gomez, que si las entrañas y pecho de cada uno se trasluciese que quiza el que mayor justificacion publica de si [tuviera],¹ tendria mas necesidad de consejo, y por el consiguiente de remedio, y desta verdad mas siento por extremo, que sea tal testigo tanto daño presente venidero (por ventura) no por culpa, ni opinion de los menos habladores, sino por la de aquellos, que toda su bien aventurança ponen en mostrar se afuerça de discontentos, y de donde [se]¹ viere. Todo esto me mueve a decir y a entender otras cosas, que callo, creer, que falsas relaciones son, las que me persiguen, aunque de qualquier suerte devo quexarme mucho de la mia por haver valido tan poco, que tras tantas obligaciones vengo hasta agora a parar por mandado de Su Magestad (que es lo que siento mas que nada) en igualdad infinita con gentes que por haverme Dios hecho su hermano no la pusso entre mi y ellos. Bien veo que no es tanto lo que he servido que sea aun digno de coronas de laurel, pero que en tan poco se estime, lo que he deseado agetar y travajado que en lugar de algo mas llegue a mucho menos en el pecho de mi Señor y Rey, esto es lo que fatiga no poco a mi espiritu, y de lo que descanso volviendome a Vm. a quien supplico que sin callarme nada me escriba que puede haver causado a Su Magestad, tratarme assi, porque si de sola su voluntad pende dandome a entender que no merezco la gracia della holgare antes de servirle en otro estado, que de cansarle en el presente mas, sobre todo lo qual si a Vm. le pareciere desseo le hable y a mi me aconseje, acordandosele quanto mereçera con Dios en hazer oficio de Padre con quien ya no tiene otro sino mil personas que travaran de la ocassion de mi poca hedad, y experiencia para destruirme ami, como si fuesse honrra y provecho dellos quedarlo yo, y por lo que me ymporta este particular vuelvo de nuevo a encomendarle y encomendarme en Vm. de quien solamente confio quanto puedo. Nrº Señor, etc., de Barzelona a 8 de Julio 1571.

¹ Suggested by Don Pascual de Gayangos as necessary to complete the sense.

it ; but it gives me much pain that I alone in this world should have deserved [the putting forth of] an order so novel, when I was living in the full belief that His Majesty would show to all that he expected [some-what] of me, and that it pleased him that I should be held in even greater honour [than I have been]. I confess to you that this unkind treatment, of putting me on an equality with many [others] at the time that all are observing [how I] am treated has at times led me to think of giving up my post [and] seeking some other path wherein to serve God and His Majesty, since for this place which I now hold it is given me so clearly to understand that I am not fitted ; yet if anything can console me it is the persuasion that, as I do not deserve [the treatment I receive] it proceeds not from His Majesty's will but from [that] of some person who tells him that if little [authority] be held by me His [Majesty's] authority will be [the greater]. In truth, Señor Rui Gomez, if the bosom and heart of every man could be seen into perhaps [it would be found] that the greater public justification a man has for his conduct, the more need he would have of counsel and therefore of assistance ; and in consequence of this [my] truth I am the more extremely hurt, whereof is witness the great damage [which I suffer] both at the present time, and perhaps in the time to come, not from any fault of mine nor from the [ill] opinion of those, who talk least, but by the [ill opinion] of those who place all their happiness in showing themselves, in the most public way, discontented. All this, besides other things which I hear but do not speak of, moves me to say how false the reports are which persecute me ; and whatever may be the lot [of other people] I may well complain much of mine, seeing that I have so little advanced in His Majesty's favour, that after so many obligations I am come at this time of day to be placed on an equality with many other people, whereon God, having made me His [Majesty's] brother, did not place me and them. I see plainly that, although what I have done may not be worthy of crowns of laurel, what I have desired and striven to do is so lightly esteemed that instead of rising somewhat, I have actually fallen in the mind of my Lord and King ; and this it is which so troubles my spirit, and from which I would have repose, turning to you whom I entreat to write, without any concealment, what it is that has caused His Majesty so to treat me. For if [I shall find that] it is by His Majesty's own sole will that I have thus been given to understand that I do not deserve His [Majesty's] favour, I would prefer to serve him in some other post than to displease him any more in the present [command]. Above all, whatever your opinion may be, I desire that you should tell me it [frankly] and give me your advice, remembering how meritorious it is before God to act the part of a father to one who has no other father but you, and who [is beset by] a thousand persons who seek occasion in my youth and inexperience to ruin me, as if ruining me would be for their honour and advantage. Seeing how important this matter is to me, I once more commend it to you, and I commend myself to you, in whom my whole confidence is placed. Our Lord, etc. From Barcelona, on the 8th of July 1571.

[*Copia de*] *Carta del Ser^{mo} DON JUAN DE AUSTRIA a la Magestad del Rey N. S. DON PHELIPPE EL SEGUNDO su hermano en repuesta a la que le escrivio de su mano, con aviso de haver recebido las instrucciones y demas despachos, que le havia embiado para la jornada de Italia, y representando quanto sentia, que no mostrasse entera satisfacion de su proceder y deseos.*

SEÑOR—Por la merced y favor que V. Mag^d me ha hecho con la carta de mano propia, besso infinitas veces sus manos. Juntamente con ella he recebido las instrucciones y otros despachos, para mi viaje, y han llegado tan en tiempo, que me pessa del que aqui se pierde, y por el conseqüiente del servicio de V. M. aguardo yo cada hora al Marques de Santa Cruz, con cuya llegada podremos luego partir, por estar todo lo que conviene para el viaje en orden. Quanto lo que toca a seguir las instrucciones, y el parecer de las personas que V. M. ha mandado señalar, para que me assistan, y consejen, y particularmente el Comendador mayor, lo hare cierto como conozco, que soy muy obligado, y olgare mucho, sea tal con tanta sinceridad y prudencia que se acierten las cosas tan del servicio de V. M. como esta que llevo a cargo mio, y en verdad que no es otra, la que desseo, ni pretendo, sino que todos atendamos a este solo fin posponiendo otros particulares no tan importantes, a lo menos para mi como es este, y assi no dude V. M. de que ire siempre procediendo en esta conformidad y suplicandole mande advertir me de continuo de lo que yo no entendiere, pues como otras veces he escripto a V. M. fio tan poco a mi hedad experiencia y opinion que no vea muy bien ser grande la necesidad, que tengo del ageno, por lo qual de nuevo supplico a V. M. con la humildad que puedo, que se me vaya advirtiendо reprehendiendо lo que se juzgare (despues de ser oydo) que dejo de acertar, porque no sera cierto por falta de voluntad, que en esta no ay nadie en el mundo a quien yo no de a entender le llevo la ventaja, que la raçon me obliga. La instruccion que V. M. me hiço merced de su mano la primer jornada que sali a las galeras, voy siempre viendo como cossa que tanto vale, y sera tanto mas aora, que pienso, lo desea V. M. a quien pretendo dar gusto de manera que para mi ninguno puede ser mayor, que favor cumplido con lo que V. M. quiere.

Al Papa respondi por haver parecido al Comendador mayor, que no convenia aguardar repuesta de V. M. y que era bien se estoviesse en aquella sustancia, estare con recato para lo venidero, de lo que tocara semejantes materias.

Muy grande merced me ha hecho V. M. en mandar a Antonio Perez, se me embie traslado de lo que se escrивe a los ministros en Italia cerca

[*Copy of a*] Letter from DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA to PHILIP II. *his brother, in reply to one written in the King's own hand, acknowledging the receipt of instructions and other despatches relating to the expedition to Italy, and expressing his sorrow at finding that the King did not entirely approve his proceedings.*

SIR—For the grace and favour which your Majesty has done me in writing me a letter in your own hand, I kiss your hands many times. With it, I have received the instructions and other despatches for my voyage, and they have reached me in such good time that I regret [the time] which has been lost and the consequent prejudice of your Majesty's service. I am every hour looking for the Marquess of Santa Cruz, upon whose arrival we may at once set sail, that being the only thing needed to enable us to proceed on our voyage. As to what concerns following the instructions and advice of the persons whom your Majesty has been pleased to appoint in order that they may afford me their aid and counsel, and especially the Grand Commander [Luis de Requesens], I certainly will do it, for I know that to be my duty, and I am glad that it should be thus [ordered] that the affairs both of your Majesty's service [in general] and of this which is entrusted to my charge should be assured by so much sincerity and prudence. In truth I neither desire nor look for anything else but that we should all strive after this sole object, postponing other points less important. At the least thus it is with me, and therefore your Majesty need have no doubt but that I shall always proceed in conformity with this [desire], and entreating your Majesty to cause me always to be informed of that in which I may have shown any want of understanding, for, as I have at other times written to your Majesty, I trust so little to my age, experience, and opinion, that I see plainly the great need I have of [the counsel of] others; therefore I again entreat your Majesty with all possible humility that you will ever admonish and reprehend me whenever you shall judge that, after I have been heard, I have failed to do what is fitting. For never [shall that happen] for want of good-will, there being no man in the world to whom in that respect I will allow to have the advantage of me, as in reason I am bound. Of the Instruction which your Majesty gave me with your own hand on the first voyage I made in the galleys, I am every day seeing the great value; and such will be the case still more now, according, as I think, to the wish of your Majesty, to whom it is my aim to give satisfaction, there being in my eyes nothing more desirable than to obtain the favour and accomplish the wishes of your Majesty.

I have answered the Pope; the Grand Commander thinking that it was not fitting to await your Majesty's reply, and that [my letter] would do if it were so shaped that I might be prepared with a defence in the future when I may have to treat on similar matters.

Your Majesty has done me a very great favour in directing Antonio Perez to send me a copy of that which has been written to the ministers

del tratamiento que se me ha de hacer y no solo me sera de mucho gusto conformarme con la voluntad de V. M. en este particular pero aun olgaria de poder adivinar sus pensamientos en todo lo demas para seguirlos como lo he de hacer, solo me atreveré con la humildad y respecto que devo a decir que me fuera de infinito favor y merced que V. M. se serviera tratar conmigo ay de su boca, lo que en esta parte deseava por dos fines, el principal porque en cosas desta qualidad no es servicio de V. M. que ninguno de sus ministros ayan de conferir conmigo lo que es su voluntad, pues ninguno dellos esta tan obligado a procurarla como yo, lo otro porque huviera hecho antes de partir de ay algunas prevenciones endereçadas al mismo fin, que se conseguiera, como V. M. lo quiere y con menos rumor, y por lo que devo a haverme hecho Dios hermano de V. M. no puedo escusarme de decir ni dejar de sentir haver yo por mi valido tan poco, que quando todos creyan merecia con V. M. mas y esperavan verlo, veo por su mandado la prueba de lo contrario igualandome entre muchos, no merecida cierto en mi animo, porque de tenerle yo harto mas endereçado al servicio de V. M. que a vanidades ni a otras cosas tales hago a Dios testigo y de la pena que me da esta ocasion por solamente verlo de poca satisfacion que de mi se muestra, y assi son muchas las veces, que voy imaginando si seria mas a gusto de V. M. que yo buscasse otro modo de servirle, pues en el presente creo de mi, soy tan desgraciado, que no llego a seguir lo que mis deseos en esta parte me obligan y piden entretanto yre obedeciendo quanto posible sea la orden que V. M. manda aun que temo la dificultad de la adulacion que me dicen ay en Italia. V. M. me crea cierto que ni deseo honor ni bien sino para mejor servirle como con el se haze, pero la consideracion deste particular no toca a mi sino executar lo que se me manda a que no faltare jamas por ningun caso. Nro. S^o etc. 12 de Julio 1571.

n Italy, as to the manner in which I am to be received and treated, and not only will it be to me a pleasure to conform myself to your Majesty's will in this matter, but I would be glad to have the power of divining your thoughts in all things else in order to follow them, as it is my duty to do. Yet with due humility and respect, I would venture to say that it would be to me an infinite favour and boon if your Majesty would be pleased to communicate with me directly with your own mouth, which I here desire for two reasons. Of these the chief is, that in affairs of this quality it is not for the good of your Majesty's service that any one of your ministers should be enabled to deliberate with me as to what your pleasure is, none of them being under the same obligations to give effect to it that I am. The other reason is, because I might have made, before leaving [Court], certain arrangements directed to the end of securing with less noise that which your Majesty desires; and because something is due to me inasmuch as God has made me your Majesty's brother, and I can not therefore avoid saying so, nor help feeling hurt, that I should have been so little considered that at the time when all think I have deserved something better at your Majesty's hands and look to see [me obtain] it, I should behold a proof of the contrary in your order reducing me to an equality with many others [of your servants], a thing certainly in my conscience not deserved, having always held myself more ready for your Majesty's service than for vanities or any other things. God can bear witness of the pain which this occurrence has given me, for no other reason than because it shows how little satisfaction my services have given; and therefore I very often find myself thinking whether it would be more according to your Majesty's pleasure if I were to seek some other mode of serving you, since in my present post I believe myself to be so out of favour that I cannot attain the accomplishment of that to which my desires here tend and strive. Meanwhile I will obey, as far as possible, whatever they may be, the orders which your Majesty may give, although I fear the difficulty [arising out] of the flattery which they say prevails in Italy. Your Majesty may believe me that I wish neither for honour nor wealth unless for the purpose of therewith serving your Majesty better; but the consideration of this matter does not concern me, it being my duty to execute that which I am ordered, in which I shall never fail in any case whatsoever. Our Lord, etc. 12th July 1571.

The "Instruction" in the King's own hand, given to Don John on occasion of his first sea-voyage in command of the royal fleet, and mentioned in the above letter, has been printed by Lor. Vanderhammen y Leon in his *Don Juan de Austria*; Madrid, 1627, 4^{to} pp. 42-44. A MS. copy, in an old hand, is in the British Museum; Bibl. Egerton; *Papeles Varios*; 329 Plut. D. xvi. E. ff. 231-2.

III.

NOTICE OF, AND EXTRACTS FROM, THE REPORT
PRESENTED TO THE DOGE AND SENATE OF VENICE,
BY SEBASTIAN VENIERO, CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE
FLEET OF THE REPUBLIC AT LEPANTO, ON HIS RETURN
FROM SERVICE, ON 29TH OF DECEMBER 1572.

*For a transcript of this interesting paper I am indebted to the kindness of my
friend Mr. RAWDON BROWN.*

*Relacion presentata il 29 Decembre 1572 dal CLARISSIMO SER SEBASTIAN
VENIER, Procurator Capitanio General da Mar ritornato, esistente
nella Filza marcata Provveditori Generali e Capitani Generali da Mar
1552 a 1711, appartenente all' Archivio del Veneto Collegio V. Secreta (*)*.

OGN' uno che parla diè cercar non esser in contumacia de chi l' ascolta, per esser quietamente udito, onde pensando io esser forsi d' alcuno imputato di haver con troppo importunità più volte dimandato licentia, del che a suo tempo et luocho renderò raggioni, le quali spero saranno non solo bastanti ad escusarmi, ma ancho sufficienti a giustificarmi, in questo mezzo V^e Ecc^{ze} suspendendo la imputation mia saranno contente benignamente ascoltarmi in materia di tanta importanza quanto è l' intender il successo d' un Capitanato General in una guerra così grave et pericolosa, con una Lega di un Summo Pontefice et di un Re Cattolico et altri dipendenti dal qual ragionamento V^e Ecc^{me} Sig^{rie} con la prudentia loro, potranno cavar qualche benefitio a le deliberation future, se ben le cose d' importantia ho scritto di tempo in tempo con ogni diligenza, ancorchè alcune fiata per li tempi contrarii o per negligenza delli portatori et spesso per esser state intertenute da li ministri de Collegati o per vedere et considerar se li avisi facevano per loro, o per vanagloria di esser loro li primi che dessero le nove, come per letere del Borizzo da Napoli si legge, le lettere mi sono venute tardi, ond' io senza colpa son stato imputato. Io attenderò a la brevità, ma infiniti accidenti occorsi in 21. mese portano via alquanto di tempo.

III.

NOTICE OF, AND EXTRACTS FROM, THE REPORT
PRESENTED TO THE DOGE AND SENATE OF VENICE,
BY SEBASTIAN VENIERO, CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE
FLEET OF THE REPUBLIC AT LEPANTO, ON HIS RETURN
FROM SERVICE ON 29TH OF DECEMBER 1572.

*For a transcript of this interesting paper I am indebted to the kindness of my
friend Mr. RAWDON BROWN.*

*A report presented on the 29th of December 1572, by the most noble SER
SEBASTIAN VENIERO, Procurator Captain General of the Sea, on his
return.⁽¹⁾*

“EVERY man who has to speak must endeavour not to be considered contumacious by those who have to listen, for the sake of being quietly heard. Hence, thinking that I perhaps may be blamed by some for having with too great importunity asked for leave [to resign my post] of which in its time and place I will give the reasons, which I hope will be sufficient not only to excuse but to justify me, [I must entreat] that your Excellencies, suspending any blame of me, will be content kindly to hearken to me in a matter of so great importance, as the account of my Captain-Generalship in a war so grave and perilous, carried on in a League with a Sovereign Pontiff and a Catholic King, and other dependent [princes], from which discourse your most excellent Lordships with your wonted wisdom may derive some benefit towards future deliberation; although on the affairs of importance I have written from time to time, yet on some occasions, either in consequence of bad weather, or the negligence of messengers, or often from having been detained by ministers of the allied powers considering whether the news would be favourable or vaingloriously desiring to be the first to tell the news, as may be read in the letters of Borizzo from Naples, my despatches may have arrived late, whence I, without fault of mine, have been blamed. I will now endeavour to be brief, but the infinite occurrences of twenty-one months will take some little time [in telling].”

He then relates that the news of his appointment ⁽²⁾ as Captain-General, reached him at Candia on the 2d of February 1571; and that on the 18th of March he set sail with eight galleys, and touching at Suda and Canea (ports of Candia), and the Island of Cerigo, arrived on the 27th in the harbour of Zante. Pursuing his voyage between Zante and Cephalonia,

*



*

*

*

米

✻

*

*

*

✱

*

✱

*

✱

*

*

✱

*

✱

*

*

*

*

he captured a Turkish "*fusti di 14 banchi*." Having reached Corfu he received, on the 1st of April, his flag as Captain-General, from the hands of the most illustrious (*clarissimo*) Augustin Barbarigo, "whom," he adds, "may God pardon if he needs pardon, for I believe that he is with the souls of the blessed, for having bravely fought and died for the faith of Jesus Christ and his country, and to whose family and heirs your Serenity and the country should never fail to show favour." (3) At Corfu he found twenty-eight galleys, all in bad condition, and very ill provided, and was generally dissatisfied with the state of the artillery and defences of the place. While waiting for the arrival of other galleys coming from Venice, he visited and reinforced Sopoto, whence he proceeded to the Turkish port of Durazzo, which he cannonaded with little effect. On his return to Sopoto, he found that the governor, Captain Manoli Mormori, in retaliation for the annoyance he had received from the Turkish garrison of Castello Gradici, had employed the troops from Corfu in an abortive attack on that stronghold. Repulsed, with the loss of a brave captain killed, and nineteen men killed or taken, they returned, disputing about the causes of the failure, "every man trying to throw the blame on his fellow."

On the 1st of May despatches, dated 9th of April, were read from their Serenity, ordering thirty galleys to be sent down to Candia, where there were fifteen already. Veniero thereupon deliberated with Barbarigo and the other officials as to the policy of sending thither other ten galleys under the Procurator Canal.

On the 6th of May despatches arrived from Famagosta [in Cyprus] stating the urgent need of succour in which that besieged garrison stood. Only 100 Turkish galleys, it was said on good authority, would be ready to sail from Constantinople, to carry assistance to the besiegers, who would therefore have to wait for great part of their supplies and reinforcements, until their fleet could return to fetch them. Veniero was of opinion that the ninety-four galleys at his disposal could not be better employed than in carrying relief to Famagosta from Candia. But his colleagues, especially Paolo Orsini, being all opposed to this course, on the ground that the force was not sufficient, it was not adopted; and Veniero expresses his regret for a decision, but for which, he says, "Famagosta might still have stood, with a hope of easily recovering the kingdom, and the Turkish fleet would not have ravaged Candia, Zante, Cephalonia, Corfu, and Albania, to our shame and dismay."

Finding many of the galleys in bad condition, not only the old ones, but also the new ones come from Venice, and that it would take some time to repair them, Veniero employed the time in making a cruise with twenty-two or twenty-four of the best vessels, towards the east. He landed at various points of the enemy's coast to collect provisions, and at all of them learned that the men had fled to the mountains to escape being sent to the oars by the Turks. At Zante he received the news of the conclusion of the League, and the event was celebrated by great rejoicings.

On the 26th of June, being at Corfu, a Cypriot captain ("*sopra-comito*") brought from Candia intelligence that the Turkish fleet had mustered at Suda, and that Occhiali Pasha had proposed to Piali Pasha to take Canea. Veniero therefore sent Barbarigo with five galleys, after two

*

*

*

*

**

*

*

Trovandomi con le galie mal armate et ricordandomi che l' anno passato Andrea Doria haveva voluto venir a veder le nostre galie mi pensai di 13. venute de Colfo et mal a l' ordine disarmargene 3. delle qual fatto mio conto cavava homeni 386. alle 10. restante bisognavano 240. che mi restavano 146. de Scapoli in tutta l' armata a 40. per galia mi manchariano (396.) a volerle far a 60. che anche erano pochi bisognavano 800. metter ancho 100. per nave assendeva ad homeni 1300. hor pensi V. Ser^{ta} de che voglia me trovava

*

*

*

*

Havendo ordinato che mi fosse mandato una quantità de soldati sopra l' armata mi furono mandati al serar della porta li più tristi et desgratiati che fussero che mi vergognava che fossero veduti, et manco del numero et da 30 amalati che non potevano star in piedi, et fui necessitato mandarli in dredo, et non poti far altro per non indusiar chi non si voleva incontrar in la mala ventura.

*

*

*

*

Hebbi ordine da V. Ser^{ta} de metter 100. soldati per galia non havendo io pratica in quel locho parlai co 'l Sig^r. Marc'antonio qual me disse che con sui parenti et amici el me ne faria haver, ma li soldati non veniriano senza li sui capi, ne li capi li lasciariano venir senza di loro et che un Sig^r. Gasparo Toralta li in Callavria me ne daria 1200. ma bisognava che 'l facesse Collonello, et che non guardasse da ducati 80. al mese a ducati 100. io anchora che mi pareva non haver autorità di far Collonelli, pur lo

others previously sent in the direction of Messina, to get tidings of the confederate fleet; and also summoned the galleys from the Gulf [of Venice]. Bad news of the taking of Malatesta also came from Cattaro, and if the Albanians were to reconcile themselves, as it was not doubted they would, with the Turk, "what," he says, "could he do with fifty-five ill-appointed galleys?"

Arrangements for the defence of Corfu having been made, the destination of the fleet was debated in council, when all the officers were in favour of Brindisi, except Veniero himself, who resolved upon going to Messina. The shifts to which he was reduced for want of soldiers he thus describes:—

"Finding that my galleys were slenderly provided with fighting men, and remembering that the year before [Giov.] Andrea Doria wished to inspect our galleys, I bethought me of thirteen [lately] come from the Gulf in very bad condition. Of these I laid up three, which placed at my disposal 386 men. But for the other ten galleys 240 men were wanted, so that there remained to me only 146. Of sailors, allowing no more than forty to each galley, I was short 396; and if I desired to raise the number in each to sixty—which is few enough—800. To give to each ship a complement of 100 men, the number required reached 1300. Your Serenity may conceive my state of mind."

On the 7th of July six heavy galleys came in, and on the 8th Barbarigo, who had found no vessels in the Gulf. News also came of the burning of Zante by the Turkish fleet, upon which Veniero sent two galleys and a frigate thither to obtain further intelligence, and another galley to Candia, with orders that the squadron from that island, in repairing to Messina, should shape its course by the coast of Barbary. Veniero himself being prepared to sail on the 10th of July, he ordered the last detachment of soldiers to come on board. "At the hour of shutting the gates," he says, there was sent me a body of the most miserable and wretched fellows that ever were, whom I should have been ashamed to see [on board my ship]. They were short of the required number, and thirty of them were sick, and could hardly stand, and I was obliged to send them back, nor could I have done otherwise without causing delay which might have been disastrous."

On the 11th of July, two hours before daybreak, Veniero took his fleet to sea; and on the 23d they reached Messina. Marc Antonio Colonna, Commander-in-Chief of the Papal squadron, met the Venetians outside the port, and convoyed them in with the customary salutes.

After relating his difficulties in obtaining supplies for his fleet, and of money, and the manner in which he overcame them, Veniero proceeds thus:—

"I had your Serenity's order to provide 100 soldiers for each galley, but not having any experience of that place I spoke to the Signor Marc Antonio [Colonna], who told me that by means of his friends and relatives he could furnish me [with the men I needed], but that the soldiers would not come without their chiefs, nor would the chiefs allow the soldiers to come without them, and that a certain Signor Gasparo Toralbo, in Calabria, would give me 1200, but that I must make him colonel and be prepared

feci, et a lui et al Sig^r Prospero Collona che vene dopoi et ad altri ho dato molti danari, et non ho hauto l' ametà delli Soldati, come per i Conti V. Ser^{ia} potrà far veder, et potria esser imputato ma il tempo ricercava così; Ho ancho dato a le galie danari in luogo de biscotto, et se non havesse fatto così el me saria manchato se ben poi D. Giovanni, me ne prestò el qual manchamento saria stato causa de grandissima ruina, li qual danari però sono stati con vantaggio di V. Ser^{ia} a quello che li costa li biscotti, come per li conti la vederà a laude de messer Marco Fallier mio sopramasser molto da ben et sufficiente nel suo uffitio, et che ha tenuto et tien con ogni diligentia le raggion di V^a Ser^{ia}.

Adi 23 de Avosto gionse D. Giovanni con 42 galie et fu accettato da noi con quelle maggior cerimonie che potessimo. Sua Altezza ne chiamò a Consulto et ne propose che dovessimo veder che forze che havevimo, che lui haveva 84 galie computando 3. de Savogia et quelle de Malta, $\frac{m}{7}$ Spagnoli $\frac{m}{7}$ todeschi $\frac{m}{6}$ Italiani tutte bone genti, el s^r Marc' Antonio disse che haveva poche galie ma ben ad ordine. Io dissi che era venuto da Corfù con 58. galie sotil, 6. grosse et 3. nave. Che in Canal de Corfù due galie sotil et due nave charge de biscotti munition et soldati erano state prese da l' Armata Nimica et una a' la Zafalonia, et haveva mandato in Colfo. 3. haveva perso per fortuna de mar et de fuogo 7. che era con 48. non molto ben ad ordine de homeni da spada per le malatie presa delle nave, et altre che erano sequestrate da la armata turchesca che era andata in Colfo, ma che il Sig^r Prospero Collona me doveva condur fanti $\frac{m}{2}$ haveria dal Duca d'Acri 1200 et 1200. dal S^r Gasparo Toralta et 4. altri Capitani con 800. che sariano 5200. che già i sariano ad ordine se i non fosse stati impediti, et ne erano ancho impediti le vituarie dal Vice Re de Napoli, che le 6. galie grosse erano ben ad ordine, che aspettava 60. galie de Candia, me dimandò come sariano ad ordine de homeni da spada, risposi al solito de 40 in 50. perchè le nostre ciurme tutte combatono. Disse che ne haverà de sopra abondante accomoderà li altri; delle vituarie date un memorial, ne domandò della impresa, respondessimo che aspettando sua Altezza le altre sue galie da Napoli et da Genova, et noi di Candia che attendessamo queste a' l' ordine, et poi si parlaria della impresa, et questa risposta fu fatta, consultata prima co' l s^r Marc' Antonio. Sua Altezza si contentò. Et acciò non havesse un pocho di allegrezza senza molta gramezza, hebbi lettere da Napoli della perdita de Dulcigno Antivari et Budua, et che l' Armata parte andava verso Catharo et parte verso Zara, alla qual ancho si voltava l' Esercito, dicessimo a Sua Altezza che venute le sue galie da Napoli et da Genova messe le nostre ad ordine de Biscoti et Soldati seben quelle di Candia non erano venute che se dovessimo tirar a' la volta di Taranto per non lasciar che l' Armata turchesca con tanta licentia ne facesse tanti dani, havendone tolto Dulcigno, Antivari et Budua, et lasciar ordine a' Messyna et per la costa de Callavria che le galie de Candia venissero a Taranto, et che questo non impediva

to give him from 80 to 100 ducats a month. Although I did not consider that I had authority to make colonels, yet I did it both for him [Toralbo] and Signor Prospero Colonna, who came afterwards, and gave money to other persons ; but I did not get above the half of the soldiers, as by the accounts your Serenity can cause to be ascertained, and for this I may be blamed, but the occasion required [that I should do as I did]. To [the people on board] the galleys I also caused money to be given instead of biscuit, and if I had not done so provisions would have failed, although Don John [of Austria] afterwards lent me some, a failure which would have been the cause of the greatest disaster. But this [giving of] money was more for your Serenity's advantage than the biscuit [would have been] as the accounts will show, to the credit of Messer Marco Fallier, my chief purser, an excellent man and most efficient in the discharge of his duty, who has kept and keeps watch with all diligence over the interests of your Serenity.

"On the 23d of August Don John [of Austria] arrived [at Messina] with 42 galleys, and was received by us with all the ceremonies that were in our power. His Highness called us together to council and said to us that we ought to see what forces we had, and that he, on his part, had 84 galleys including 3 of Savoy and those of Malta, and 7000 Spaniards, and 7000 Germans and 6000 Italians, all good troops. The Signor Marc Antonio [Colonna] said that he had but few galleys, but [that they were] in excellent order. I said I had come from Corfu with fifty-eight light galleys, 6 heavy ones, and three ships ; that in the channel of Corfu 2 light galleys and 2 ships laden with biscuits, munitions, and soldiers, had been captured by the enemy's fleet, that 1 ship at Cephalonia had also been taken, that I had sent into the Gulf [of Venice] 3 [galleys], that I had lost by the accidents of the sea and by fire 7, [so] that I remained with 48 galleys not very well provided with soldiers on account of sickness, the capture of the ships, and the blockade of the vessels in the Gulf by the enemy's fleet, but that the Signor Prospero Colonna was about to bring me 2000 foot, and that I should have 1200 from the Duke of Atri, and 1200 from Signor Gaspar Toralbo, and 4 other captains [were coming] with 800 which would make in all 5200, and that they would have been ready by this time, had they not been hindered, as also their provisions still were, by the Viceroy of Naples ; that the six heavy galleys were now in good order, and that I expected 60 galleys from Candia. He asked me how many soldiers I reckoned each galley ought to have ; I replied, usually from 40 to 50, because our rowing crews all fought. He said that having a superabundance of soldiers, he would supply the rest [that were wanted] ; as to the victuals a memorial should be given in ; he then asked about the enterprise [to be undertaken]. We replied that as His Highness was waiting for his other galleys from Naples and Genoa, and we [for ours] from Candia, we should get things into order and then speak of what was to be undertaken ; and this answer was made, after counsel taken with Signor Marc Antonio [Colonna]. His Highness was satisfied. And as there is never a little gladness without a great deal of sadness, I had letters from Naples notifying the loss of Dulcigno, Antivari, and Budua, and that part of the fleet was going to Cattaro and part to Zara, towards which

ogn' altra impresa che si volesse far, mostrò di contentarsi et ne dete mandati et lettere per biscotti, danari et soldati che il Vice Re non voleva che il S^r Prospero levasse ne che il Borizzo mi mandasse danari contanti et a cambio non se ne trovava.

A 29. Avosto hebbi lettere che l' Prov^t. Quirini era giunto a' Saragosa, [? Siracusa] et le altre di Sua Altezza. A. 2. Settembre giunse tutti dui li provveditori et le 60. galie tutti se allegrassimo et concludessimo tutti 3. noi generali di andar a trovar l'inimico. Due giorno dopo Sua Altezza disse di voler far un consulto general per proponer se si doveva andar a trovar l' inimigo, el s^r. Marc' Antonio disse che sarà ben fatto, et io che già questo era deliberato ne accadeva più proponerlo, S. Altezza disse di non voler proponer per deliberar, ma per satisfar a tanti gentil' homeni. Io dissi tra de noi che hauti che havessimo biscotti et soldati, se ne veniva messo in difficoltà el venir verso il Colfo et l' Inimico, de venir con le nostre forcie et quelle del Pontefice; Fatto il Consulto tutti in voce consentirono. Sua Altezza ne offerse $\frac{m}{2}$ todeschi, 1500. Spagnoli, 1500. Italiani, io non voleva dubitando anci conoscendo le insolentie ma li altri consigliarono, et io consentiti per non dar suspetto, de 3000. eccetuati li todeschi, et nel imbarcarli, biscotti, et vittuarie hebbi molte difficoltà et molte insolentie da soldati; le richiesi el levarse dissono che volevano venir a Corfù à intender de l' Armata nemica, quando havessimo nova che l' era tornato in Canal de Corfù, dissero di venir a Capo Santa Maria per intender di essa, sollicitando pur io, dissero che il tempo non era fermato, cose che mi facevano disperar dissi aviemmo almeno le navi, et così fu fatto.

À li 16. Settembre andassimo senza alchun' ordine anci assai confusi à sorzer à la fossa di S. Zuane 14. o. 16. miglia lontan di Messina, io mandai a dimandar se 'l voleva che caminassimo in bataglia o come, me rispose che 'l me lo faria intender, et mi mandò la bataglia.

Alli 17. à Capo Spartivento mia 40. senza ordine navigassimo salvo i corni da sì, la bataglia da sì, el soccorso do sì, a passo a passo.

Alli 19. sorzessimo sopra Capo Collona alquanto in mar et acciò

point also the army was moving. We said to Don John that when his galleys had come from Naples and Genoa, and ours were provided with biscuit and soldiers, we ought, even if those from Candia had not arrived, to sail for Taranto, to prevent the Turkish fleet, which had taken Dulcigno, Antivari, and Budua, from doing what damage it pleased, leaving orders at Messina and on the coast of Calabria for the galleys from Candia to come on to Taranto, and that this need not stand in the way of any other enterprise which might seem desirable to undertake. He seemed content and gave us orders and letters for biscuit, money, and soldiers, which the Viceroy did not choose that Prospero Colonna should levy, and for the money which Borizzo was to send me in specie, not being able to obtain [letters of] exchange.

"On the 29th of August I had letters [saying] that the Proveditore Quirini had arrived at Saragoza' [? Syracuse] and the other [ships] of His Highness. On the 2d of September both the Proveditori arrived and the 60 galleys. We were all very glad, and we three Generals determined to go in search of the enemy. Two days afterwards His Highness said that he wished to hold a general council, to discuss the question, whether we ought to go in search of the enemy. [To this] the Signor Marc Antonio [Colonna] said that it would be well, and I that the matter had already been deliberated on, and that there was no occasion to discuss it any more. His Highness rejoined that he did not wish to raise the question for the purpose of its being deliberated on [anew], but in order to satisfy so many gentlemen. Between ourselves [*i.e.* Marc Antonio Colonna and me], I said that as soon as we had biscuits and soldiers, we would, if difficulties were made about our advance towards the Gulf and the enemy, advance with our forces and those of the Pontiff. The council being held, all with one voice consented. His Highness then made me an offer of 2000 Germans, 1500 Spaniards, and 1500 Italians. I was unwilling [to accept it], doubting, indeed knowing, their insolence; but the others advised [acceptance], and I, not to give rise to suspicions, consented to take 3000, the Germans excepted; and in the embarkation of them and their biscuits and victuals I had [to contend with] many difficulties and much insolence from the soldiers. I then asked that we should weigh anchor; they said that they wished to reach Corfu to hear news of the enemy's fleet; when news came that it had returned to the Canal of Corfu, they said they were for going to Cape Santa Maria to hear [more] of it: I still urging [our departure], they said that the weather was not yet settled—excuses which made me despair. I said we had at least the ships; and so things went on.

"On the 16th of September we proceeded without any order, and even rather in confusion, to go out as far as the Creek of San Giovanni, 14 or 16 miles distant from Messina. I sent to ask if [His Highness] wished that we should sail in order of battle; it was replied that I should be informed; and I was [afterwards] told in battle-order.

"On the 17th we sailed 40 miles to Cape Spartivento without order, except that the wings were by themselves, the centre by itself, and the reserve by itself, and at a very gentle rate.

"On the 19th we were off Cape Colonna, well out to sea; and in

paresse che l' havesse sorto per mi, mi mandò ad offerir 600. fanti li a Cotron resposi che non ne haveva bisogno mi mandò poi a dir un poco più à la real che Sua Altezza haveva bisogno di acqua, li mandai a dir che si ogn' altro di havessimo bisogno di far acqua, tardi arivessimo a Corfù et per coverzer questa si scoperse più, perchè mandò a dir che l' aspettava le galie grosse, risposi che le galie grosse con quel tempo, havendone perso di vista potriano tenir la volta del Paxù et l' Armata nemica esser in la Prevesa et havendone inteligentia mandarle ad espugnar, et però meglio era aspettarze tirandosi in mar a la volta de Corfù che sequestrarsi fra quelli dui cai. Credevo che questi advertimenti spiacesse a quelli Capitani de guerra però che 'l me mandò a dir che andasse avanti che 'l me seguiria, li risposi che Sua Altezza era Capo et toccava andar avanti et io seguirlo, ma che doveva anch' io dir la mia opinion, et sollicitar l' andata, che la tardità ne era stata pur troppo nociva et che sia il vero che li dispiaceva li arecordi vene il S^t Marc' Antonio a me et disse che 'l voleva mandar el Cap^o Zilandrada con due sue galie una del Pontifice et una mia a soprintender della Armata che li dovesse dar un peota, poi disse sua Eccellenza (et credo che questa fusse la vera causa perche 'l venisse) escusando l' haver sorto li et che dovesse schivar el romper della liga, resposi che Dio mi guarda che bisogna ben aspettar la Compagnia ma non perder tempo ; Hebbi lettere dal Capitano delle galie grosse che quasi el si era smarrito et che 'l non sapeva che camin tenir, el mandai a dir a Sua Altezza qual disse de voler mandar 6. galie per una a remurchiarle, et non arrivando quella sera, li manderà a dir che camin el debbi tenir.

A li 23. con vento fresco et con mar alquanto fortunevole a due hore di notte sorgessimo al fanari, et alchune galie non poterono ferar. A li 25. a' Casopo à li 26. a Corfù dove fra loro fu proposto l' impresa de Sopotò o de' Margariti, dui giorni dopo rechiedendo io l' andar avanti, et che bisognava combatter o far retirar l' armata in stretto, mi fu opposto che haveva poco pan, et che 'l tempo era troppo avanti, et ditomi se tu pensi menar questa armata in Arcipelago tu ti ingani, che dovemo far adunque diss' io la impresa de Margariti. Questa parola credo li dispiacesse ma non puoti contenermi.⁽⁴⁾ A li 28 mi richiese pecci 6 da batter oltre 4 che havevimo sopra le galie et anchor che mal volentieri li levava da la fortezza, et tanto più che vedeva esser superfluo et solo per metter tempo che era una fantasia metter in terra fantarie et artelarie da batter havendo a' le spalle un' armata de 200 e più galie et altri vasselli assai, pur per satisfarli li tolsi in un giorno, me richiesero poi piche et polvere et per non retardar l' andar avanti come mi haveva promesso lasciar 5 galie le quali ne seguitasse poi. 30 Settembre sorzessimo a le Gomenizze et el giorno dredo non si levando mi mandò a dir che l' aspettava le me galie, li feci responder che Sua Altezza non restasse per questo che due erano gionte, et le altre 3. erano bone galie che presto ne ariveriano havendo noi a remurchiar le galie grosse, resolta questa resorse

order that it might appear that he had sailed at my request, he sent to offer me 600 infantry there at Cotrone; I replied that I did not want them. A message was again sent to me very shortly after, that His Highness's ship needed to take in water. I replied, that if every other day it was necessary to take in water, we should arrive very late at Corfu; and to cover this [blunder] he laid himself still more open, sending me word that he was waiting for the heavy galleys. I replied that the heavy galleys, having lost sight of us, might in such weather bear away for Paxos, and that the enemy might be at Prevesa, and having intelligence of it, send a [squadron] to attack them, and that it was better to wait for them off Corfu than shut ourselves up [here] between these two Capes. I believed these counsels displeased these captains of war, for word was sent to me that I should advance, and the rest would follow; I answered that His Highness was commander-in-chief, and that it was his place to lead and mine to follow him, but that it behoved me also to express my opinion and urge our advance, as delay had already been too hurtful, and that even if the truth displeased him, I could not but remind him of it. The Signor Marc Antonio [Colonna] then came to me, and said that [His Highness] wished to send Captain Gil de Andrade with two galleys, one of the Pope's and one of mine, to obtain intelligence of the [Turkish] fleet, and that I was to give him a pilot. His Excellency also said, and I believe that was the real cause of his coming, excusing what had happened, that the breaking up of the League must be avoided; I replied, God forbid! that it was indeed necessary to wait for the rest of the fleet, but that time should not be lost; I had a letter from the Captain of the heavy galleys, saying that already he had nearly lost his reckoning, and that he did not know what course to hold, and I sent to tell this to His Highness, who replied that he would send six galleys for each [heavy galley] to tow them, and if they did not come this evening, he would send to tell them what course to hold.

"On the 23d with a fresh wind and a rather heavy sea, at two in the night we reached Fanari, but some of the galleys were unable to anchor. On the 25th [we were] at Casopo; on the 26th at Corfu, where there was some talk amongst the captains of making an attempt upon Sopoto or Margariti. Two days afterwards, when I entreated that we might sail, and [urged] that it was necessary either to give battle or compel the enemy's fleet to fall back to its quarters, I was opposed on the ground that they had little bread, and that the season was far advanced, and they said, if you think you will lead this fleet into the Archipelago, you deceive yourself. How then, said I, is our expedition to be confined to Margariti? This speech I believe displeased them, but I could not contain myself⁽⁴⁾. On the 28th I was asked for six pieces of cannon, besides four which we had on board the galleys, and which I had taken, very unwillingly, from the fortress, all the more so, because I saw that they were superfluous, and that it was only to gain time, for it was a mere fancy to think of landing infantry and artillery, having already at our back a force of more than 200 galleys, and many other vessels. However, to satisfy them, I supplied them in one day; and being then asked for pikes and powder, and in order not to delay our sailing, as [His Highness] had promised [that we should sail], I left five galleys to follow us, and on the 30th we went

un' altra che restava per el tempo ma non havendo fondamento, se vene à metter per prova del Capitanio delle galie grosse per remurchiar, et mi mandò a dir ch' el Capitanio haveva el Copano per acqua et la gondola per legne che 'l non se poteva levar mandai a dollermi con sua Magnificenza qual mi rispose che haveva ben la barca et gondola in terra ma che 'l se levava et già salpava sua Altezza lasciato el remurchio tornò a sorzer.

2 Ottobre un' altro poco de intertenimento vene Andrea Doria à veder come era in ordine la mia galia et anche le altre, mi scaldai alquanto che un Andrea Doria volesse venir a veder come era ad ordine la galia de un General di Vostra Serenità essendo stato per inanzi D. Giovanni et laudatala, pur lo lasciai andar a veder. Quel giorno c^a le 22 hore vene differenza tra Andrea Callergi sopra-Comito (⁵) et el Capitanio Mutio per acomodar delli soldati sopra le balestriere, mandai el mio Comito (⁵) con un Compagno de stendardo per veder de acomodarli, questo bravo con alchuni suoi dite parolle vergognose et villanie al mio Comito messe man a le arme et butato il Compagno di stendardo (⁵) in balanza li deteno delle bastonate, mandai il mio Armiraglio (⁵) con 3. Compagni a chiamar el Capitanio che 'l venisse a parlarmi, esso et alchuni suoi messeno man a le armi et schiopi et deteno con un quadreto in la spalla a' l' Armiraglio et li brusò la vesta, a tutti 3. li Compagni deteno delle ferite a' Jacobo Furlan passorno el corpo per un fianco, dellà a pochi dì morite, mi bisognò mandar un' altra galia in soccorso acciò non finissero di amazzar l' Armiraglio et Compagni, et forsi tagliar a' pecci il resto della galia, li quali non volsero mai rendersi fino che 'l Capitano fu quasi morto et li altri feriti, presi che furono formato il processo vedendo che ogni giorno venivano fatte diverse insolentie, et amazzati de i mei homeni in galia che fu morto da un soldato spagnol un homodela Sebenzana, et da un' altro un' altro galioto, et quel giorno furono tirate due archibusate nella mia galia, et à questo mio Compagno de stendardo che fu poi morto essendo in Copano le fu portato via la pelle del naso, ne per lamento ch' io facessi et darli li processi et rei, poteva veder alchuna provision, pensando che si andasse così dredo i me haveriano potuto ancor tor le galie, me parse farli apicar: venne a galia el suo auditor dicendo che su le mie galie erano stati amazzati alcuni sui soldati li domandai chi lui disse non so il nome, io li narai il caso et feci legger il processo disse voler anche lui esaminar, me contentai, esaminò il suo Alfier et un suo soldato et deposero precise come nel mio processo, visto così si partì satisfatto, la sera vene il Cl^{mo} Barbarigo et Prov^{ri} et Capⁿⁱ delle galie grosse, et mi dissero che D^a Giovanni era molto in collera che 'l non mi voleva più per amico, et che sue Signorie li portassero le nostre conclusion, et che così se negoziasse, et s' io era contento de star a' la punishment che mi daria la vostra Serenità et che Sua Altezza voleva scriver a' li Illus^{mi} Sig^{ri} Capi; li resposi ch' io era l' offeso, e se Sua Altezza non

out to Gomeniza. Next day, as we did not weigh anchor, [His Highness] sent word that he was waiting for my galleys. I answered, that His Highness need not wait for them, for two had arrived, and the other three were good galleys, which would soon join us, we having to tow the larger vessels. This [point] settled, another arose about the weather, but that having no foundation, I made some inquiries as to the steps taken by the captains of the larger galleys respecting their towage. I was informed that the captain had his launch engaged in taking in water, and his gondola in fetching wood, and could not weigh anchor. I therefore sent to that officer to complain of this; but he replied that, although he had his boat and his gondola ashore, he was, nevertheless, getting his anchor up; and as soon as His Highness had weighed anchor, casting off his towing-ropes, he began to sail out.

“On the 2d of October another delay occurred, [Giovanni] Andrea Doria came to inspect my galley and others [of my squadron]. I was considerably irritated by an Andrea Doria coming to see whether a vessel commanded by one of your Serenity's Generals was in good order, it having been already inspected and praised by Don John [of Austria] [himself]. Nevertheless I allowed him to make the inspection. That day about twenty-two o'clock a quarrel arose between Andrea Callergi, captain of a galley ⁽⁵⁾, and Captain Mutio, about putting the soldiers over the cross-bowmen. I sent my lieutenant ⁽⁵⁾ with an ensign ⁽⁵⁾ to see if they could settle it. [But] the bully and some of his men said shameful and villainous words to my lieutenant, clapped their hands to their weapons, and knocked down and beat the ensign. [Upon this] I sent my flag captain ⁽⁵⁾ with three men to call the captain to come to speak with me. He and his people again seized their weapons, discharged a ball at the flag captain, and burnt his coat, and wounded his three companions. Jacopo Furlan was thrust through the side, and died in a few days afterwards. To prevent my flag captain and his people from being murdered and perhaps [to save] the rest of the crew from being cut to pieces, I was at last obliged to send another galley to their aid. The [rioters] would not surrender until the captain was nearly killed, and the others wounded. After they were taken, and a statement [of the affair] had been drawn up; seeing that every day various outrages were perpetrated, that men in my galleys were slain, that a man of the Sebenzana galley had been killed by one Spanish soldier, and an oarsman by another, that this very day two musket-shots had been fired into my galley, and my ensign, who afterwards died, being in the launch, had had the skin of his nose carried away, and that no complaint made or evidence produced by me led to any result; and thinking that if things were to go on thus, my own galleys would be seized upon, it seemed to me right that I should hang the culprits. [After this had been done] there came to my vessel the [Spanish] auditor [of Captain Mutio's division] saying that on board my galleys some of his soldiers had been put to death. I asked who? He said he did not know the names. I thereupon told him what had happened, and made him read the written statement. He said he wished to examine into the affair on his own account: I was content; and he then examined the ensign [of the captain who had been hanged] and one of his soldiers, and they deposed to the

mi voleva per amico ch' io non la voleva per inimico, che quanto scriver a Vostra Serenità che l' era in sua libertà, quanto de star a la pena che havesse parso a Vostra Sublimità di darmi come poteva far altramente ; et saria ancho contento de star al giuditio del Pontefice et della Maestà di suo fratello pur che mi giudicasse de raggion, mi mandò poi a dir che 'l non voleva scriver, et io scrissi la verità come per le lettere si vede, che so come porta la raggion et la giustitia.

A' li 3. si levassimo et quando fossimo in dromo della Prevesa con vento prospero et piacevole calassimo le velle, et a' remi tutta la notte et li 4 à hore 21. ruinate le ciurme arivassimo a' Guiscardo, dove oltra il sdegno del perder del tempo et del danno delli gallioti me sopragionse dolorosa perdita di Famagosta tolendomi del tutto la speranza di più recuperar quel regno. Li Cl^{mi} Barbarigo et Provveditori con la Ecc^a del Sig^r Marc' Antonio furono a' sua Altezza dove al solito per schivar l' inimigo fu proposto di far l' impresa di S^{ta} Maura, o' de Giavarino, inteso io et contraditto tandem conclusero di andar di longo, alli 5. per andar valorosamente et presto ⁽⁶⁾ andassimo in Val d' Alessandria 12. miglia più avanti, et per un poco di vento contrario sorzessimo, et qual imediate cessò et non si levassimo fino a le 22. hore andati quanto son longhe due galie tornorno a' sorzer et la sera el Clar^o Barbarigo raggionando me referite che i dicevano che noi non volevimo combater ma che fenzevamo.

A li 6. levati et andati mezo miglio tornassimo al primo loco de là a 2. o 3. hore se levassimo a la volta de Curzolari et la matina di 7. a' l' Alba à la punta d' un scoglio che si dice Vila-marin, et la punta de Malcanton si scoperse vasseli armati, fatto più chiaro si vide tutta l' armata turchesca, D. Giovanni venne a la mia pupa e mi disse "che e combata?" io "è necessità" et non si può far di mancho, sua Altezza andò per l' Armada mettessimo le galie grosse due per schiera, un poco avanti, le galie sottil non si puote mai metter ben in fila, et questo mi dava un poco di fastidio, à la banda sinistra verso il scoglio era il Barbarigo con li dui Provveditori a la banda destra al mar era Andrea Doria in mezo noi 3. Capitⁱ el s^r Marc' Antonio à la destra et io a la sinistra, imediate a la mia sinistra doveva esser 3. sue Galie la Capitania de Genova Hettor Spinola, la Granata de Spagna et el Capitano Zilandrada, et non li vidi niuna, poi Hieronimo Venier et Francesco Bon, questi dui morti, et poi Gabriel da Canal che

precise facts contained in the statement. Seeing that things were so, [the auditor] went away satisfied. In the evening the most illustrious Barbarigo, and the Proveditori and the captains of the heavy galleys came, and they told me that Don John [of Austria] was very angry, and would have me no more for his friend; that they were to bring him our final resolve, in order that so an arrangement might be come to; and that, if I was content to submit to the punishment which your Serenity would inflict upon me, His Highness would write to the most illustrious chiefs [of the Council of Ten]. I replied, that I was the offended party, and that if His Highness did not desire to have me for a friend, I did not desire to have him for an enemy; that as to writing to your Serenity, he was quite at liberty so to do; and as to submitting to the punishment your Sublimity might choose to award to me, how could I do otherwise? Moreover, I was quite content to be judged by the Pontiff, and by His Majesty the King, his Highness's brother, provided they would judge me fairly. [His Highness] afterwards sent to tell me that he would not write; and I [myself] wrote the whole truth, as my letters can prove, knowing on which side right and justice lay.

"On the 3d we weighed anchor, and when we were off Prevesa, with a fair and light wind, we lowered the sails, and rowing all night, on the 4th, at 21 o'clock, with our rowing-gangs much distressed, we arrived at Guiscardo, where, besides the mortification of losing time, and of the injury to the galley-slaves, there was superadded to me [the news] of the miserable loss of Famagosta, depriving me of all hope of ever recovering that kingdom [of Cyprus]. The most illustrious Barbarigo and the Proveditori, with His Excellency Signor Marc Antonio [Colonna], went to His Highness, where, [in order] as usual to avoid the enemy, it was proposed to undertake the attack of S^{ta} Maura or of Giavarino. I having heard this, and having opposed it, they concluded at length to proceed [on our course]. On the 5th, by way of a brisk and speedy passage, ⁽⁶⁾ we reached the Val d'Alessandria, 12 miles further on, but in consequence of a little foul wind we anchored. Although the wind very soon fell, we did not get under weigh until 22 o'clock, and then having hardly gone two galleys' length, we again anchored. That evening the most illustrious Barbarigo, talking with me, told me that they said that we did not want to fight, but pretended [to desire it].

"On the 6th, having weighed anchor and sailed half a mile, we returned to the same place. At 2 or 3 o'clock we sailed towards the Curzolari [islands], and on the morning of the 7th at dawn, near the point of a rock called Vilamarin and the point of Mal-canton, armed vessels were perceived. As the day broke the whole Turkish fleet came into view. Don John [of Austria] [soon afterwards] came to astern of me, and said: 'Are we to give battle?' I [replied]: 'We must, we cannot do otherwise.' His Highness then went through the fleet. We placed the heavy ships two and two together, a little in front; the galleys could not be got into a correct line, and this gave me a little annoyance. On the left side, towards the rocks, was Barbarigo with the two Proveditori; on the right side, towards the sea, was [Giovanni] Andrea Doria; in the centre we three chiefs, the Signor Marc Antonio [Colonna] on the right [of Don John of Austria] and I on the left. Next to [me on] my left there ought to have

ebbe 4 ferite et successive una galia grossa prima qual fusse non so ma cadaun vol esser stato quello tirò un pecco et diede in mezzo l' Armata nemica, et tutte le altre seguitorno onde l' Armata se partì et schivando le galie grosse venne verso di noi et noi verso di loro; all' incontro de noi Capitⁱ erano 4 fanò Don Giovanni investite il Bassà Ali prova per prova et io à l' Alboro, et 4 galie vennero per investirme al lai canco et Dio volse che tutte m' andò per pupa, se voltorno al lai destro, in quello sopragionsero quelli due valorosissimi gentil' homeni, m^r. Chatarin Malipiero et m^r. Zan Loredan, che haveva mandato a chiamar et investirono due de quelle galie, et valorosamente combatendo tutti dui furono morti, la mia galia con l' artelaria, archibusi et archi non lasciò passar niun turco da la pupa del Bassà a' la prova per il che Don Giovanni hebbe largo campo de montar et conquistar il Bassà, il qual fu morto nella Bataglia, et posso dir con verità che se non fosse stato la mia galia che così facilmente non conquistava il Bassà, io oltra el combatter a' prova combatteva con le galie una al lai destro, et l' altra un poco più per pupa, tandem li miei montorono sopra, Z. Batt^a Inverardo mio di casa portò la mia bandiera sopra una di esse et sopra l' altra il Capitano Zan Batt^a Belacato si portò valorosamente et io lo vidi, il qual poi con mio grandissimo dispiacer fu morto a Santa Maura, menati parte de turchi nella mia galia, et parte incadenati et serati nelle sue, el mio Armiraglio et Comito volevano torle a remurchio, et vedendo io Dⁿ Giovanni un poco discosto da me che combatteva vuolsi andarlo ad agiutar et in quello el se sbrìgò, et fu finito la battaglia che durò hore 3. et più. Sua Altezza se tirò verso i Curzolari et io vedendo non so che galie turchesche che con i trincheti scapavano a' la volta de S^a Maura, voleva investirli et non potì per esser intressate alchune nostre galie per prova, le due galie che haveva conquistate, furono tolte per pupa da due altre galie spagnole, sortì a' Curzolari Sua Altezza mi mandò il Copano con dui sui gentil' homeni a' levar et andatò mi fece un mondo de carecce abbrazzandomi, et così fece tutti quelli Capitani et gentil' homeni, laudandosi molto della gagliarda battaglia, et honorata fattion che havevano fatto le nostre galie, et la verità si vede a' le morte et ferite el mio Armiraglio, Comito, Collonello, Capo de provisionati, bombardieri et altri al n^o de 106 feriti, morto el Capo de soldati, un bombardiero, et altri 4 io un poco in un zenochio, et se ben dui giorni avanti mi haveva fatto una fontanella per due piaghe che haveva nella gamba stiti 18 giorni a guarir.

Capi morti della nostra armata:

El Clarissimo m^r. Augustin Barbarigo Provveditor General . . Benetto

been three of His [Highness's], the flag galley of Genoa [commanded by] Hettor Spinola, the Granada of Spain, and the [galley of] Captain Gil de Andrade, but I saw none of them; then Hieronimo Veniero and Francesco Bon (these two were slain), and next Gabriel da Canal, who received four wounds. One of the heavy ships, which was first I do not know, but every one claimed to have been first, fired a gun into the midst of the enemy's fleet, and all the rest followed [her example]; whereupon the [enemy's] fleet divided itself, and avoiding the heavy vessels, bore down upon us, and we upon them. In front of us chiefs were four galleys bearing the lamps of principal officers. Don John [of Austria] attacked that of the Pasha Ali, prow to prow, and I at midships. Four galleys then came to attack me on the left side, but by God's will all went by my stern, and turned back towards my right, on which they were met by those two most gallant gentlemen, Messer Chatarin Malipiero and Messer Zan Loredan, whom I had sent to call, and they attacked two of these galleys and, most valiantly fighting, were both of them slain. My galley with its artillery, arquebuses, and bows, prevented the passage of a single Turk from the poop of the Pasha's vessel to the prow, by which means Don John [of Austria] had a fair field in which to board and vanquish the Pasha, who was slain in the battle; and I can say with truth that if it had not been for my galley he would not so easily have conquered the Pasha. Besides fighting from the prow I fought with one galley on my right quarter, and with another somewhat further astern. At length my people boarded, when Zan Battista Inverardo, one of my household, planted my banner upon one, and upon the other Captain Zan Battista Belacato, as I myself saw, bore himself most valiantly, who to my great sorrow was afterwards killed at Santa Maura. Of the Turks, part were brought on board my galley, and part chained and shut up in their own. My flag captain and lieutenant desired to tow them off; but seeing Don John of Austria fighting at a little distance, I wished to go and help him, but in the meanwhile he beat off his assailants, and so ended the battle, which had lasted 3 hours and more. His Highness steered towards the Curzolari [islands], and I seeing I cannot tell how many Turkish galleys with their sails set, escaping in the direction of Santa Maura, desired to attack them but could not, some of our galleys being entangled by their prows. The two galleys which I had conquered were towed away by their sterns by two other Spanish galleys. When I arrived at the Curzolari [islands] His Highness sent his launch for me, with two of his gentlemen, to bring me [on board the flagship], and when I went [thither] he made me a world of caresses, embracing me, and so did all those captains and gentlemen, greatly extolling to one another the gallant battle, and the honourable deeds which our galleys had done, and the truth was seen in the killed and wounded; my flag captain, boatswain, colonel, purser, bombardier, and others to the number of 106 being wounded, and the chief of the soldiers, a bombardier, and other 4 being killed. I was slightly [wounded] in one of my knees, and as I had two days before made me an issue for two hurts which I had in my leg, I was 18 days in being cured.

"Officers killed in our fleet.

"The most noble m^r. Augustin Barbarigo, Provveditor-General—Benetto

Soranzo . . Marin Contarini . . Hieronimo Contarini con 3 cugti ⁽⁷⁾ Corneri
 . . Marc' Antonio Lando . . Antonio Pasqualigo . . Z. Batt^a Barbarigo . .
 Chattarin Malipiero . . Z. Loredan . . Vincenzo Quirini . . Francesco Bon . .
 Hieronimo Venier . .

DI CANDIA

Jacomo de Mezo . . Zorzi Barbarigo.

DE CYPRO

Z. Battista Benedetti.

DE CORFÙ

Piero Bua.

DE DALMATIA

Hieronimo Bisanti da Catharo.

DE ITALIA

Jacomo Dressano Vesentin.

La Vittoria è stata grande, regratiamo sommamente Iddio ma la perdita nostra non è stata piccola havendo perso tanti valorosissimi gentil' homeni delli quali Vostra Serenità si poteva servir in ogni importante occasione, io per me li ho più tosto invidia che compassione, essendo morti honorevolmente per la nostra patria, et la fede di Jesù Christo, la sorte de morti et feriti à tocato a tanti nostri, a li suoi de' capi non altri che feriti un solo d' una frezzata, nel corno destro, 7 nostre galie sono state tutte mal menate, et morti li patroni che cadauna di esse haveva 4 e 5 galie turchesche adosso, et credo che habino investito quelle che erano avanti, et quelle da dreto non li hano dato soccorso, io non ho veduto per esser lontane, ma mi è stato referito da molti et precipue dal Comito d. Piero Bua da Corfù che dappoi preso è scampato da turci el qual vi prego ad udir et in questo repossero alquanto; à noi ha toccato el combater, le morti et ferite, et ad altri tor suso la preda, che io Signori de tanta Vittoria ho guadagnato Duc^{ti} 505 lire 2 sol. 6. alchuni cortelli, una filza de Coralli, et do negri non boni a pena da vogar in mezo d' una gondola, et se quelli la Serenità Vostra li vol sono a sua richiesta che tanto più alleviarò la spesa non havendo tanto de intrada che mi faccia 10 mesi et ho molto intacato mio genero ⁽⁸⁾ per questo Capitanato; questo è quanto io ho guadagnato de questa vittoria et de altro non per el quarto de quel che ho speso che quasi tutti si hanno fatto licito a sconder le mie X^{me} et chi crede che habbia guadagnato molto vegna a' contribuir a' le spese et son contento partir con loro, mi sono state ancho usurpate le mie giuriditioni che dui soli che ho beneficiato che non sono stati nella giornata un fiol ⁽⁹⁾ de mio fiol in mesurador del sal a Zara, me vien messo in difficoltà, et a' un' altro antico de casa mia la sopramassaria che fu già istituita da m^{re} Z. Vitturi già General mi è stata tolta asserendo esser stata data via dal Pro^{re} della artellaria, et confermata da li Ecc^{mi} Sig^{ri} Capi et dapò che io debbo haver questa desgratia, acciò possi dir non haver guadagnato ne beneficiato alchun mio, renuntio ancho questo de mio nepote, ancho 70. 80. banditi che ho liberati per essersi portati valorosamente nella giornata, parte de i quali sono de terraferma li Rettori non voleno scancelar le loro condenationi, acciò anche in questo sia trattato da manco

Soranzo—Marin Contarini—Hieronimo Contarini with 3 relations (⁷) Corneri—Marc' Antonio Lando—Antonio Pasqualigo—Z. Batt^a Barbarigo—Chattarin Malipiero—Z. Loredan—Vicenzo Quirini—Francesco Bon—Hieronimo Venier.

OF CANDIA,

Iacomo de Mezo—Zorzi Barbarigo.

OF CYPRUS,

Z. Battista Benedetti.

OF CORFU,

Piero Bua.

OF DALMATIA,

Hieronimo Bisanti of Catharo.

OF ITALY,

Iacomo Dressano of Vicenza.

“The victory was great, God be heartily thanked; but the loss was not small; seeing that we have lost so many most gallant gentlemen who might have served your Serenity in every important occasion. For my part, I look upon them rather with envy than compassion, since they died honourably for our country and the faith of Jesus Christ. The chance of killed and wounded has fallen heavily on our people, while of their officers [in the Spanish and Pontifical divisions] there is but one who is more than wounded, slain by an arrow, in the right wing [of the fleet]. Seven of our galleys were roughly handled, and their captains slain, each of them having had 4 or 5 Turkish galleys to deal with, [which] I believe [happened] because they attacked those in front of them, and were not supported by those behind. Being at a distance I did not see it myself; but I have been told so by many, and especially by the boatswain of Piero Bua of Corfu, who was afterwards captured by the Turks and made his escape, whom I pray you to hear, as I trust you will. To us has fallen the lot of fighting, death, and wounds; to others that of carrying off the prey. By this great victory, sirs, I have gained 505 ducats, 2 lire, and 6 sols, some knives, a string of coral, and 2 black men hardly fit to row in the midships of a gondola, who, if your Serenity wishes to have them, are at your disposal, which would somewhat diminish my expenses, seeing that I have not sufficient income to meet the charges of ten months; and in this command have been obliged to draw too largely upon my son-in-law (⁸). This is all I have profited by this victory, and it does not amount to one-fourth of what I have expended, for nearly everybody has taken leave to keep back my tenths; and if those who believe that I have gained much will but come and share my charges, I am content to share my gains with them. Even my jurisdictions have been usurped. To two persons only, who were not present in the battle, I have given posts; one is my son's son (⁹), who is a measurer of salt at Zara, and about him difficulty has been made; another is an old [retainer] of my house, from whom the land-stewardship which was formerly established by Messer Z. Vitturi, lately general, has been taken away on the plea that it had been already given by the Proveditor of the artillery and confirmed by their Excellencies the

de tutti gl' altri generali che hano dato simili Benefitij, delli quali fu levata fama che 'l mio Secretario haveva guadagnato un pozzo d' oro, et tamen alla sua morte non fu trovato tanto che 'l potesse sepelir, oltra li depositi che l' haveva de' morti et anche a un fiol d' un mio povero Peota che mi ha servito questo viaggio et si ha trovato nella giornata che li ho dato una guarda d' una porta dal Zante vacata el Rettor non l' ha voluta admetter; Ho anche 3. Christiani recuperati fra quali è un venetian che ha trovato alchuni sui parenti et si contentano star con me; per tornar donde haveva lasciato nel partir da D^o Giovanni doppo l' abbracciamento dissi V. A. a le fin vederà che niun harà più consigliato, ne sarà stato più causa della vostra grandezza di me. Doveressimo spazzar una o due galie a' li nostri Principi, disse manderemo et te lo farò intender.

Passò li 8. li 9. li 10. havendosi S. Altezza slargato da me 3. in 4 miglia, et pensando che altri avessero espedito come era la verità perchè la nova gionse a' Napoli, avanti che la mia per la galia Giustiniana, me parse espedir et deti ordine che 'l trovasse S. A. et S. Ecc^a et le facesse intender che spediva a V^a Serenità et non li ritrovando che 'l venisse al suo viaggio, Iddio volse che 'l non li ritrovo che certo el saria stato intertenuto, et ancho ha piacciuto a Sua Divina Maestà che questa sia stata prima et de quì data a Roma, onde hanno hauto a male, et renovato il sdegno contro di me, che i volevano che li fosse tanto soggetto che non potesse spedir ne galie ne fregate non solo a V^a Serenità ma neanche a Vostri Regimenti senza sua licentia, et essendo venuto una vostra fregata dal Zante S. A. non volse che la venisse di longo a me ma la intertenne una fregata che haveva per pupa me la mandò a levar et messe li homeni in ferì, un altra fregata che era venuta dal Zante et la rimandava la retene tolse mie lettere et le aperse et 4. giorni dopo me le rimandò, molti de quelli vechiardi veneno a me dolendosi che li erano fatte molte estorsion et villanie, che si voleva provederli che i me porteriano delle vittuarie, mandai il mio Armiraglio a dir a Sua Altezza che 'l facesse provision o se 'l voleva che la faria io Sua Alt^a si dolse molto della espeditione della galia, et alchuni de quelli gentil' homeni usorono parole indegne de Cavalieri et gentil' homeni honorati verso il mio Armiraglio et verso me, et se per la disciplina di Christo mi fosse lecito li manderia una giusta mentita, la provision che 'l fece in terra fo che non solamente fu tolta la robba sachizati et brusati albanesi, ma li spendadori delle mie galie et mio istesso.

chiefs ; and since I am to endure this misfortune, that I may say that I have neither gained anything [for myself], nor bestowed any place on any one of my family, I renounce even this [place] of my grandson. Even in the case of 70 or 80 banished persons, whom I set free on account of their bravery in the battle, part of whom are from the mainland, the Rectors would not cancel their condemnations. So that even in this I am treated worse than the other generals who have conferred similar favours. As to favours, it was noised abroad that my secretary had secured a mine of gold, and yet at his death, enough to bury him was not found, over and above certain deposits, which he had in his hands from persons who were dead. Also the son of my poor pilot who had served me in this voyage and was in the battle, to whom I had given the keepership of a port at Zante, when it fell vacant, the Rector refused to admit him [to it]. I have likewise rescued three Christians, amongst whom is a Venetian, who has found some of his relations, and they are content to stay with me. To return to the point from which I have diverged. At the parting with Don John [of Austria] after his embrace, I said : ‘ Your Highness at last will see that no one has given better counsel, nor has been more the cause of your greatness than I. We ought to despatch one or two galleys to our Princes.’ He said : ‘ We will send them and I will give you notice.’

“ The 8th, 9th, and 10th [of October] being passed, His Highness being four or five miles off, and I thinking that others might have sent off [the news], as was indeed the truth, because it reached Naples before my [despatch] by Giustinian’s galley, it appeared to me right to send him off, and I gave him orders to wait upon His Highness and His Excellency [Marc Antonio Colonna] and inform them that I was sending to your Serenity, and that if he could not see them he should proceed on his voyage. God willed that he should not see them, whom if he had [seen] he certainly would have been detained ; and it also pleased the Divine Majesty that by this means the first tidings from hence reached Rome. This they took very ill, and it renewed the ill-will against me, for they desired that I should be in such subjection to themselves that I could despatch neither galleys nor frigates, not only to your Serenity, but even to your local governors, without their leave. One of your frigates from Zante His Highness would not allow to come direct to me but detained her. A frigate which I had lying astern [of my vessel] he sent and took from me, and put the men in irons ; [and] another frigate which had come from Zante and which I had ordered to go back, he detained and took my despatches [out of her] and opened them, and [only] sent them back four days afterwards. Many of those poor old fellows came to me complaining that many extortions and villanies were practised upon them, and that if I would provide them [with means] they would carry the victuals for me. I sent my flag captain to say to His Highness that provision ought to be made [for these people], or that if he wished, I would do so myself. His Highness complained bitterly of the despatch of the galley [to Venice with the news of the battle], and some of the gentlemen [about him] used words unbecoming officers and gentlemen and persons of honour to my flag captain and to me, and if the discipline of Christ had allowed it, I would have given them [in reply] the lie direct. The provision made

Gionti à Lefcada alli 14. Ott^e S. Alt^a volse partir la predda suo modo, lui far 3. Commissarij, 3. l' Ecc^a del Collona, et io altri 3. furono usate una infinità de cautelle per non dir cavillation havendo Sua A. Dottori che consigliavano et fecero ancho scritture alle qual non volsi responder per non multiplicar in parole, volse S. A. la X^{ma} de tutte le galie et di tutti li schiavi, non volsi consentir ne contrastar, et per non tediare Vostra Serenità di giorno in giorno et anche la memoria non mi serve gionti a Corfù alli 26. mandò sopra la mia galia un spagnol che era stato longamente a Constantinopoli a tor li schiavi de rescato, et tolse chi li piacque sino li spai ben con una covertina che anch' io mandasse su le sue resposi che credeva à la sua parolla, pensando che se io mandava et che havesse dimandato un schiavo, che a Sua Alt^a o ad alchun dè suoi gentil' homeni non avesse piaciuto de darmelo saria venuto in contentione et à le fin haveria convenuto cieder et con indignità, però mi parse di donar quello che non poteva vender. Hebbi molte querelle de violentie fatte da Spagnoli contro li nostri et fino al mio coadjutor volsero tor alchune robbe del q^m m^e Valerio Valeresso che 'l portava à li sui Commissarij, però se a quel tempo io domandai licentia non fu già per mio interesse ma parendomi che tutte queste superchiarie fossero con indignità de Vostri Capitⁱ et armata sua non le possendo io soportar pregai quella che facesse un Capitano in mio loco più prudente et più paziente di me, acciò che io non fossi causa della dissolution della liga, come per le mie lettere appar, et Dio volesse che in quel tempo fosse stato esaudito; à li 28. fatte le parolle di cerimonie anci de fedolia et offerte poco da vero per il publico et privato, accompagnatolo un peccio fino che S. A. mi mandò a dir et più di una volta che ritornassi.

Lasciò il Conte di Sarnò per tor il resto de schiavi da rescato delli quali se Spagnoli et altri ne hanno hauto commodità, non so perchè li nostri con tante ferite et morti ne debano esser privati, el qual Conte vene co 'l S^t Lelio de Massimis al scoglio che io udiva messa, et mi narò a modo suo el caso delle ferite date dal S^t Prospero Collona al S^t Pompeo da Castello, con parole tante alte per non dir superbe o meglio insolente in esaltazione della Casa Collona et depression di quella dal Castello che fu miracolo che mi potesse astenir di non responder per le rime, ma hebbi qualche rispetto a li tempi correnti, et procedii per il modo che particolarmente significai a Vostra Serenità et mi piace ch' io ho fatto cosa de satisfation havendola anchora conduto per suo Collonello.

on shore was not only that the property was seized, [and] the Albanian [huts] plundered and burnt, but that the stewards of my galleys and myself [received similar treatment].

“ Having arrived at Lefcada on the 14th of October, His Highness wished to divide the booty in his own way, he himself appointing 3 commissioners, His Excellency [Marc Antonio] Colonna 3, and I other 3. An infinity of precautions, not to say chicaneries, were used, His Highness having doctors [in attendance on him] who advised and also drew up writings, to which I would not reply, in order not to multiply words. His Highness would have [for himself] the tenth of all the galleys and of all the slaves ; I did not choose either to agree to this or to resist it ; and not to weary your Serenity [with our proceedings] from day to day, and also because my memory does not serve me [respecting them all], [I pass to what happened] after our arrival at Corfu. On the 26th he sent on board my galley a Spaniard who had been long employed at Constantinople in the redemption of captives, and took what [prisoners] he pleased, even the soldiers, under cover of the excuse that I also might send on board his vessels [for the same purpose]. I replied that I believed his words, thinking [however] that if I sent and asked for a slave, and if it did not please His Highness or some of his gentlemen to give him to me, we should have come into contention, and at the end I should have had to yield [the point] in an undignified manner ; wherefore it appeared to me [best] to give what I could not sell. I had many complaints [to make] of acts of violence done by the Spaniards to our people, and they even wanted to take away from my coadjutor some articles of property of the late Messer Valerio Valeresso, which he was carrying to that gentleman’s executors ; and it was at that time that I demanded leave to retire, not for any interests of my own, but because it seemed to me that all these trickeries were an insult to your captains and fleet, and being unable to put up with them [any longer], I begged that another captain should be appointed to my command, one more prudent and patient than I, in order that I might not be the cause of the dissolution of the League, as may be seen in my despatches, and would to God that at that time my request had been granted ! On the 28th, after the greetings of ceremony were got through, and the expressions of confidence and offers of civility, in which there was little truth, in public and in private, I accompanied His Highness some way [out to sea] until he sent more than once to tell me to put back to harbour.

“ He left [behind him] the Count of Sarno to take away the rest of the slaves of ransom, of whom, as the Spaniards and the others have had a good supply, I do not know why our [people] with so many of both killed and wounded [amongst them] are to be deprived [of their share]. This Count came with the Signor Lelio de Massimis to the rock where I was hearing mass, and narrated to me, in his own fashion, the story of the wounds given by Signor Prosper Colonna to Signor Pompeo da Castello, with such high words, not to say haughty or rather insolent words in magnification of the House of Colonna and depreciation of that of Castello, that it was a miracle that I could restrain myself from paying him back in his own coin ; but I had regard to the times we lived in, and I acted as I

* * * * *

* * * * *

* * * * *

(et mi ho inganto ch' el credeva un Orlando et trovandomi in Colleggio l' ho favorito, ma è un conio).

P^o Mazo gionse l' Ecc^{mo} General Foscari, et alzai le man al cielo rengraziando Iddio che in capo de 26 mesi, non vedendo via de far niuna cosa buona veniva di tante fatiche liberato, sperando haver immediate la mia licenza, deti a Sua Eccellenza quelli informationi che mi parvero necessarie et che sepi.

* * * * *

acciò secondo el solito l' allegrezza * * non passa senza qualche dolor * * *, così questa gionta de l' Ecc^{te} mio successor s' accompagnò con la morte del mio da ben et sufficiente secretario Z. Francesco Stella al qual pochi si potevano antiponer, et forsi parangonar.

* * * * *

. . . veni in Histria sperando che in capo de 28 mesi doppo doi grandissime malattie oltre la vecchiezza otenir licentia, la dimandai, et quella mi perdoni se forsi son stato importuno che non l' ho già dimandata per non servir la mia patria fino la morte inclusive, ma la prima fiata imediate dopo la vittoria perchè conosceva io che stando con Spagnoli conoscendomi non atto a soportar le sue insolentie seria stato causa de romper la liga tanto estimata da V^e Ecc^e esser salutifera che Iddio lo voglia, la seconda, vedendome in letto a la morte che non poteva uscir de pizzolo ne de letto, fatto sordo che poco udiva, nè son anchora recuperato parendomi haver qualche ostacolo nell' armata, scrissi, et Dio volesse che

more particularly informed your Serenity ; and I am glad that I gave satisfaction [in the business], having also managed it through his colonel."

* * * * *

The remainder of the Report narrates the proceedings of Veniero during the time he continued in command of the fleet, and afterwards in the minor post of Commander of the Gulf of Venice ⁽¹⁰⁾. His personal relations with Don John of Austria came to an end on the departure of the Spanish fleet from Corfu. Occasional indications, however, occur of the bitterness of feeling with which the Venetian regarded his Spanish generalissimo.

After various details of the arrangements made for the care of the sick and wounded, for granting leave to officers, and re-distributing troops, Veniero gives an account of an expedition to Margariti and the surrender of that fortress by the Turks, ⁽¹¹⁾ and of an unsuccessful attack upon Santa Maura early in February 1572, conducted by a certain Colonel Roncon, who had promised him to take the place in three days, and of whom his chief remarks : "I was much deceived in him, inasmuch as I believed him an Orlando, and in council favoured his pretensions, but he is a coney.

"On the 1st of May the Most Excellent General Foscarini joined us, and I raised my hands to heaven thanking God that at the end of 26 months not seeing a way of doing any good, I was relieved from such fatigues. Hoping to have my leave immediately, I gave His Excellency such information as appeared necessary and was in my power."

His joy was somewhat clouded by the death of his good and efficient secretary, Z. Francesco Stella, "whom few could surpass or even equal."

Being then ordered to proceed to the Gulf with 7 galleys, he narrates at considerable length the unsuccessful siege of Castel-Nuovo by Count Sciarra Martinengo, with whom he had been ordered to co-operate.

He records a visit made to him on board his galley by Monsieur d'Umala [d'Aumale], ⁽¹²⁾ who had come to the Adriatic at the head of a party of French volunteers, and served in the naval campaign of the following autumn on the shore of the Morea under Don John of Austria. The discontent, pretensions, and general insolence of the Frenchmen are also noted.

Touching at Ancona, Veniero met the Duke of Parma (Ottavio Farnese) at Loretto. Towards the end of July he went to Istria, and having had two bad attacks of illness and feeling himself growing old, he again asked for his recall ; having done so, he said, "Not because I was unwilling to serve my country unto the death inclusive, but the first time immediately after the victory, because I knew that being with Spaniards and feeling that I was not apt to put up with their insolences, I might be the cause of breaking up the League so highly esteemed by your Excellencies as being salutary, may God grant that it prove so ! and now this second time, being in bed and at the point of death, unable to leave

all' hora si havesse fatto in mio luogho, che seria stato con più vostra dignità et manco mio travaglio.

* * * * *

. . . me maravigliai che a i 26 de Settembre, Vostra Serenità non havesse ricevute le mie de 19, 21, et 30 de Agosto che io era in boca de Catharo et andava a Budua, considerai le lettere, ma più come poteva eseguirle con la mia galea che andava a fondi, et tre galee zotte et strupiate, una che non conosce il remo, doi che ancho ad esse manchano homini, senza soldati, senza danari, senza biscotto, et senza armisi ⁽¹³⁾.

* * * * *

. . . non possendo io far alchuna utile operation, son venuto in Histria et con licentia di Vostra Serenità son venuto a li piedi suoi, più honorato di quello che meritano le poche mie opere, essendo obligato oltra la natural obligation de cittadin per tanti honori et favori fattimi da la patria mia et cittadini sui, per li quali non debbo sparagnar ne sparagnarò in ogni occasione che mi si apresenterà quanto mi trovo al mondo et la propria vita.

SEBASTIAN VENIER,

Procurator de San Marco et Capitanio General da Mar.⁽¹⁵⁾

NOTES.

(1) pp. 384, 385. The Report fills eighty-three folio pages, each containing twenty-one lines, except the last, which has only four lines. Written in the Venetian dialect, which the author spoke, its style presented many difficulties to the translator—difficulties which I should probably have found insurmountable, but for the kindness of Mr. Rawdon Brown and Sir James Lacata, who have been good enough to revise the proof sheets of the translation. For the ease of the English reader I have broken Veniero's long and sparsely-punctuated periods into shorter sentences. The original spelling has been retained; but of some of the proper names, which have been disguised, as Aeri and Toralta, the usual orthography is followed in the translation.

The public services of the author are thus recorded by Girolamo Alessandro Capellari, in his *Campidoglio Veneto, cioè Alberi delle famiglie Venete Patrizie*, MS. in 4 vols. folio, in the library of St. Mark:—

Sebastian Veniero, being in 1562 captain of Brescia, by his great prudence settled certain disputes about boundaries with the people of Cremona. In 1564, and again in 1567, he was one of the senators deputed to adjust similar differences with Carnia (Carniola?). In 1568, on the expectation of an attack by the Turk, he was sent as *Proveditore* to Corfu, in command of a large force. One of the most famous senators who ever illustrated his great country, he was constantly employed in important posts both at home and abroad, and in that of *Avogadore di Commun* he surpassed all his contemporaries in eloquence. He was likewise *Savio grande*, *Consigliero*, and *Proveditore-Generale sopra le Fortezze*; and on the 15th May 1570 he was made *Procuratore di S. Marco*, of the *Procuratia di Ultra*, on which he went as *Proveditore-Generale* to Corfu, where he organized the light cavalry and took the castle of Sopoto. In 1571 he

my bed and cabin, and having become so deaf that I heard little." Other passages of the report also allude to the sores in his legs, and to attacks of fever.

On the 12th of October he received letters from their Serenity ordering him to go to the Gulf of Cattaro and disturb the Turks who were building a fort at the port of Barbagna. "I marvelled," he says, "that your Serenity on the 26th September had not received my despatches of 19th, 21st, and 30th of August, when I was in the Gulf of Cattaro and was going to Budua. I duly considered the order, but how was I to execute it with my own galley ready to go to the bottom, three others disabled and half furnished, one that would not row, and two in which men were wanting, and entirely without money, biscuit, and tackle (13)?"

He appears to have returned home soon afterwards, where he entered Venice in triumph and was evidently much pleased by his reception (14). The Report concludes thus:—

"Not being able to undertake any useful operation, I have come to Istria, and by the leave of your Serenity to your feet, more honoured than my few deeds deserve, and by so great honours and favours bestowed upon me by my country and her citizens, bound beyond the natural obligation of a citizen, never to spare, nor will I spare [in their behalf], on every occasion which may offer itself, whatever I possess in the world, and even my life itself.

"SEBASTIAN VENIER.

"*Procurator of St. Mark, and Captain-General at Sea* (15)."

NOTES—*Continued.*

went as *Proveditore-Generale* to Candia, and while there was chosen *General del Mare*; and under his gallant conduct and by his exertions was obtained the most famous victory of the Curzolari, in which he was wounded in the knee by an arrow, and by which his name will be celebrated for all ages. In 1574 he was one of the Procurators appointed to carry the umbrella to Henry III., King of France, when at Venice; in 1575 he was made *Savio del Consiglio*; and, lastly, on the 11th of June 1577, he was elected Prince of Venice by the unanimous vote of the forty-one electors and with the universal joy of the whole city. He reigned eight months and twenty-two days. He died on 3d March 1578, and was buried in the Church of Maria degli Angioli at Murano, under an inscription, Dr. Gregorio Manzino pronouncing the funeral oration; and the learned Giacomo Barbaro composed various poems on his death. Under his likeness in the palace may be read these words:—"Lauream servatæ patriæ quam armatus imperator ad Echinadas paulò ante in triumphum retuleram, Princeps omnium sententia creatus, ita civili moderatione muniui ut dubium reliquerim, fuerim ne in Republica administranda Princeps justior et sanctor, ac in rebus bellicis fortior et felicior imperator." In the family tree he is said to have been the son of Moisè Venier by a daughter of Leonardo Donato, and (1562) the husband of Cecilia di Nadalin Contarini, by whom he left a daughter, of whose name and date of birth we are not informed, and who became the wife, first, of Federico Cornaro, and secondly, of Francesco Morosini.

(2) p. 385. Early in the war Veniero had been sent to command at Corfu as *Proveditore-Generale*. In this post, although an old man, "he showed," says Paruta, "that years had not chilled his youthful courage;" and he planned and executed the

capture of the Turkish stronghold of Sopoto on the Albanian coast. He was afterwards appointed *Proveditore-Generale* of Cyprus; but he never took possession of that perilous preferment, being detained by illness at Candia, where he received the news of his promotion to the command of the Venetian fleet. Paruta: *Guerra di Cipro*, lib. i. pp. 41, 53.

(3) p. 387. Aug. Barbarigo was appointed *Proveditore-Generale di Mare* at the same time that Veniero was made Captain-General, and in his absence acted as Commander-in-Chief. Paruta: *Guerra di Cipro*, lib. i. p. 85.

(4) pp. 394, 395. Veniero may have alluded in a sneering manner to the unsuccessful demonstration against Margarita made in 1570 by the Venetians, when the *Proveditore Celsi* was sent there with forty-eight galleys, and five thousand men, under Sforza Pallavicino, were landed and re-embarked almost without firing a shot. Veniero took a subordinate part in the expedition, and remonstrated in his usual energetic style against the proceedings of Pallavicino. (C. Paruta: *Guerra di Cipro*, lib. i. pp. 42, 44.) Mr. Rawdon Brown suggests that some covert sarcasm or gibe, now unintelligible, may have been the cause of the offence which Veniero conceived his remark might have occasioned. *Margarita* or *Margarita*, besides its Italian meanings of a pearl and daisy, in the Venetian dialect means a glass bead, and in Venetian slang a halter.

(5) pp. 396, 397. It is not very easy to render the grades of these Venetian officers into exact English equivalents. In a table of the monthly pay of a ship's crew, dated 18th April 1778 (Archives of Venice, *Miscellanea Terminazione*, No. 76, p. 22), with which I am furnished by Mr. Rawdon Brown, the superior officers are thus placed and paid:—

	Zecchini.
1 N. H. Governorator de' Condannati	80
2 Nobili, per cadauno	8
1 Cancellier	6
1 Sopramasser	6
1 Ammiraglio	8 $\frac{1}{2}$
1 Compagno di Stendardo	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
1 Cappellan	2 $\frac{1}{2}$
1 Administrator	10
1 Scrivanello	2
1 Eccelente	5
1 Barberotta	2
1 Comito	6 $\frac{1}{2}$
1 Sotto-Comito	4
1 Peota	4
1 Pavon	3 $\frac{1}{2}$
1 Sotto-Pavon	2 $\frac{1}{2}$
1 Pavoncin	2 $\frac{1}{2}$
etc. etc.	

Of two other vessels the chief officer is a *Sopra Comito*, with the monthly pay of 40 zecchini.

(6) pp. 398, 399. "*Per andar valorosamente et presto*," "by way of a brisk and speedy passage," words ironically expressing his contempt for the slow and dilatory progress of the Commander-in-Chief.

(7) pp. 402, 403. *Cugnato*, *Cognato*, a relation by the mother's, or wife's side.

(8) pp. 402, 403. *Ho molto intacato mio genero*. In the Venetian dialect the public servant who speculated or was a defaulter in his accounts was said to be guilty of *intaco di cassa*. Although Veniero cannot be supposed to mean that he had robbed his son-in-law, the expression seems to imply that in his own opinion his drafts had been excessive, or that he had, as Mr. Rawdon Brown suggests, sponged on his daughter's husband. As Capellari (*see* note 1) gives no date to either of her marriages, we are

unable to identify the son-in-law who had the honour of being drawn upon for the credit of his country. If 1562 be, as Capellari seems to imply, the date of Veniero's own marriage, this good-natured son-in-law, whose credit was found so convenient in 1571-2, must have been the husband of an elder and probably illegitimate child.

(9) pp. 402, 403. As Capellari (*see* note 1) does not give the salt-measurer or his father a place in the Veniero family tree, the latter may be presumed to have been illegitimate.

(10) p. 409. See Vol. I. pp. 472 and 482.

(11) p. 409. See *supra*, p. 395.

(12) p. 409. This may have been Claude de Lorraine, first Duke of Aumale (third son of Claude, first Duke of Guise), born 1526, killed before La Rochelle 14th March 1573; or one of his two sons—Charles, the eldest, second Duke of Aumale, born 1555, died at Bruxelles 1631; or Claude, the fourth son, known as the Chevalier d'Aumale, a knight of Malta, born 1563, killed at St. Denis 3d January 1591. If the latter were in search of military adventure in 1572, his birth must have taken place at an earlier date than 1563, as stated in *Biographie Universelle*, vol. iii. p. 69, or 1564, as stated in Anderson's *Royal Genealogies*, Table ccclxviii. p. 609.

(13) pp. 410, 411. The task seems to have been executed by Soranzo. See Vol. I. p. 428.

(14) p. 411. Vol. I. p. 502.

(15) pp. 410, 411. Veniero, says Paruta (*Guerra di Cipro*, lib. iii. p. 214), "enfeebled by his great age and many toils, having obtained leave of the Senate, returned home with the greatest glory, being met by the Bucentaur, having on board many Senators, at the Church of Sant' Antonio, which is in the outward parts of the city near the Lido, and was received with many demonstrations of honour by the nobles and the populace." On the 11th of June 1577 he was elected eighty-sixth Doge of Venice, and he died on the 3d of March 1578. *Fasti Ducales* Joan. Palatii, Venetiis, 1696, 4to, p. 226.

IV.

REPORT PRESENTED TO THE DOGE AND SENATE OF
VENICE BY GIACOMO FOSCARINI, ON HIS RETURN
FROM HIS COMMAND AS CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE FLEET
OF THE REPUBLIC IN THE YEARS 1572-1573.

*For a transcript of this interesting paper I am indebted to the kindness of my
friend Mr. RAWDON BROWN.*

*Relazione del Cl^{mo} Sig^r. GIACOMO FOSCARINI (1), il Cav^r. che fu General
l' anno 1572-1573.*

SERE^{MO} PRINCIPE ILL^{MI} ET ECCELL^{MI} SS^{RI}

QUANDO a Zara ricevei la lettera Ducal della S. V. (2) ed della V.V. Ill^{me} et Eccell^{me} Sig^{rie} che mi dette nova come era piaciuto a V. S. (2) et alle V.V. SS^{rie}. Ill^{me} con il consiglio migliore darmi carico di Cap^o generale di mare in cambio dell' Eccell^{mo} General Veniero, certo che detta nova quantunque mi fu di contentamento et allegrezza per l' accrescimento dell' honore, il quale ho sempre stimato più che ogn' altra cosa sia che esser si voglia, eccetuando però il servitio di V. S. quale anteporè sempre mai alla mia vita propria, et perchè mi fu signal manifesto che V. S. si trova contenta del servitio mio nel cargo de Proveditor General delli Regni di Dalmazia, et Albania del qual servitio acciò la potesse restar contenta oltre l' haver usata in esso tutta la diligenza, industria, et fedeltà che da un buon servitor et ministro si po aspettar, mi ritrovo in detto cargo haver speso del mio più di trentamille ducati, perchè conosceva le era necessario far così et va in simil carchi et pratica con Capⁿⁱ Colonelli et Soldati non bisogna che pensi se vuol servir de guadagnar, ma de spender et dar il suo a chi ne vuol perchè chi fa così fa utile a V. S. et ch' el suo nome ha laudato et havuto in reverentia per tutta Italia, et per tutto il mondo, sicome è causa del contrario, chi fa altramente, et sum ogni dì più contento di haver speso tanto del mio in servitio di V. S. de V.V. SS^{rie}. Ill^{me} havendolo in servitio del mio Principe et delli miei Signori per li quali son obligato di spender il sangue, et li quali conoscono così bene e con tanto honor rimunerano li fedeli servitori ne mancherò in ogn' altra occasione che la S. V. mi comandi di far il medesimo, per queste cause mi dette contentamento et allegrezza l' antedeta nova, et lettera Ducal della S. V. Ma havendo dopo cominciato a pensar sopra la grandezza del cargo nel quale V. S. mi adoperava et la qualità dell' Eccell^{mo} General Venier mio predecessor rimasi confuso, considerando che tutto lo Stato di V. S. tutta la riputatione, tutta la grandezza, et presente, et futura era messa nelle mie mani, et che l' Eccell^{mo} vostro general Venier con il suo valor, et bona fortuna haveva acquistato una Vittoria la maggior che alcun Cap^{no} di Mar

IV.

REPORT PRESENTED TO THE DOGE AND SENATE OF
VENICE BY GIACOMO FOSCARINI, ON HIS RETURN
FROM HIS COMMAND AS CAPTAIN-GENERAL OF THE FLEET
OF THE REPUBLIC IN THE YEARS 1572-1573.

*For a transcript of this interesting paper I am indebted to the kindness of my
friend Mr. RAWDON BROWN.*

*Report of the Most Noble Signor GIACOMO FOSCARINI⁽¹⁾ who was Captain-
General in the year 1572-1573.*

THE Report begins with a wordy expression of the writer's satisfaction at receiving, at Zara, the news of his appointment to the Captain-Generalship, both on account of the distinction conferred, and of the proof afforded by such promotion of the Senate's appreciation of his services as Proveditore-Generale of the kingdoms of Dalmatia and Albania, in which capacity he had, like other zealous servants of the Republic, expended upwards of 30,000 ducats from his own private resources, over and above his pay.

havesse mai havuto al mondo, et che seben mi trovava haver così bona volontà et così bon desiderio di servir V. S. come Sua Eccell^{za} perchè in questa parte non cedo ad alcuno conoscendo ch' obbligo mio è di concorrere in questo a effetto con ogn' uno, et non lassarmi metter il pie inanzi, et alcuno pur dubitava di non haver così buona fortuna, come Sua Eccell^{za} ha havuta et vedeva che ogni gran cosa pareria poca a chi guardasse la grande et gloriosa impresa di Sua Eccell^{za}. et che le mie attioni messe a parangone con le sue pareriano piccole pur la prudentia, et benignità di V. S. mi dette animo, et hora mi da conforto perchè ho sempre mai havuto speranza, che V. S. per la sua benignità resteria pagato quando conoscesse che da me non fosse mancato del mio debito, et per la sua prudentia vederia precipuamente di guera tutti, non ponno far le medesime imprese perchè il far le imprese dipende dalle occasioni et non manda la fortuna a tutti le medesime occasioni con questa speranza mi son confortato, et inanimato, allora nel principio di questo cargo et hora mi conforto, che di ordine di V. S. son venuto a suoi per farli relatione del mio maneggio, del quale sebene alla giornata secondo la occorrenza ne ho dato conto minutamente alla S. V.

Nondimeno volendo lei, che le faccia come una balanzone, et un summario del mio conto come fanno li fattori di Mercadanti a suoi Patroni la obedirò in questo come in altro, et spero che V. S. conosce, e conoscerà, che da me non ha mancato de ogni opera possibile acciò si eseguissero le commissioni che la mi diede nel principio del mio cargo de Cap^o General, et mostrerò come a buon servitor, et ministro si conviene, che ho obedito agli ordini di V. S. mio Principe, et Sig^{re} et quanto sono state in me eseguite le sue commissioni perchè questo è quel che mi par che si die ricercar da chi serve, quando è nel fin del suo manegio, et che il servitor die mostrare al patron de haver fatto le commissioni principali che io hebbi da V. S. sono state queste come ela sa; la prima è quasi più importante dell' altre fu che usassi ogni diligenza a fine che l'armata di V. S. fosse di tutto ponto all' ordine per mezo il mese di Aprile, occiò si potesse far qualche impresa de importantia, inanci chel Turco, che non poteva usar così presto, venisse fuori con la sua armata; la seconda che essendo unito col Sig^r. Dum Giovanni, et con l' Eccell^{mo} Sig^r. Marcantonio Colona operassi insieme con l' Eccell^{mo} Proveditor General Soranzo che nella Morea se occupasse Modon o altro luogo importante; la terza che procedessi con il Sig^r. Dum Giovanni con ogni termine di honore et di rispetto, accomodandomi alla sua natura per schivar ogni discensione le potesse accadere, non potendo far ben l' armata quando li capi non sono d'accordo, per farlo benevole a V. S. et indurlo con destrezza a far quel che fosse servitio di V. S.; la quarta che facessi il medesimo con l' Eccell^{mo} Sig^r. Marco Antonio Colonna facendo sempre in ogni occasione certa sua Eccell^{za} che V. S. gli era grandemente obligato per li buoni officij fatti da Sua Eccell^{za} a beneficio di V. S. li doi anni passati, et che quando fosse il tempo, et ne apparisse l' occasione Sua Eccell^{za} vederia dalli effetti quanto V. S. havesse hauti cari detti officij, et stimasse la persona et valor suo; la quinta che non mancassi di solitudine per tenir sana l' armata; la sesta et ultima che tratassi et facessi trattare da tutti li nobili nostri, bene, et con rispetto de colonelli

He then recapitulates the chief heads of the instructions given to him for his guidance on assuming the command ; (1.) That by the middle of April the fleet was to be in complete readiness to undertake some enterprise of importance before the Turkish fleet had put to sea. (2.) That having effected a junction with the Spanish and Pontifical fleets, he and the Proveditore-General Soranzo should make an effort to occupy Modon, or some other important place in the Morea. (3.) That he should treat Don John of Austria with all honour and respect, and accommodate himself to His Highness's disposition ; so to avoid all occasions of dissension, and skilfully incline him to enterprises advantageous to the service of their Serenity. (4.) That he should act in the same manner towards His Excellency the Signor Marc Antonio Colonna, losing no opportunity of assuring him how greatly their Serenity considered themselves obliged to him for his good offices during the last two years, and how gladly they would at any fitting time show their gratitude for his services, and their esteem for his person and his character. (5.) That he should take the greatest care of the health of the fleet. (6.) That he should treat and cause to be treated by the Venetian nobles with due consideration and kindness all the colonels, captains, gentlemen adventurers, soldiers, and sailors, according to their several grades and conditions, in order to avoid the inconveniences which had arisen at other times, and to encourage those in the service to remain in it, and recruits to enter it ; and that it should be generally made known that any disorder that occurred was against the mind and intentions of their Serenity.

"These were my chief instructions," he continues, "and these I have been careful to obey. The fleet of your Serenity had been ready for sea before the end of March, three months before the time when the Turkish fleet left the Dardanelles, and therefore it had great opportunities of striking a blow at a time when 100 galleys, being unopposed, could do more than 300 which had to resist an enemy. But out of respect to Don John of Austria as Commander-in-Chief of the League, and to avoid

Capⁿⁱ gentil huomini Venturieri, soldati et Galeotti secundo li suoi gradi, et conditioni acciò si schivasse l' inconvenienti nasce di altre volte, et si desse animo a chi serviva di continuar la servitù et a chi non serviva di venir a servire et se facesse conoscer al mondo, che se vi era occorso qualche disordine era stata contra la mente, et intento di V. S. et che V. S. intendendo, le havea provisto. Queste sono le prime commissioni che mi diede V. S. alle quali io ho obedito, et le ho messe in opera perquanto è stato in me perchè come sa V. S. l' armata sua fu unita di tutto ponto all' ordine innanzi che fusse fuori Marzo talchè con essa sola si poteva far gran cose; stando il Turco ancora in Costantinopoli dove stette tre mesi dopo inanzi che uscisse de lo stretto, et certo si perde una gran occasione perchè senza dubbio come intende V. S. può far più 100 galee, quando non hanno scontro perchè può serrare il mare a suo piacere che 300 quando hanno scontro d' un' altra armata grossa, che le sta a fianchi et disturba i suoi disegni. Ma per essequire la comissione di V. S. di portar rispetto al Sig^{re} Don Giovanni considerando che l' andar nostro inanzi senza Sua Alteza era un' introdur causa di disension, et un far torto a Sua Altezza general di tutta la Lega, et un mostrar di non stimarlo o non volerle haver quel rispetto che si doveva come general supremo, et per la comission generale di V. S. et considerando dall' altra parte, che Sua Altezza tardava la quale sicome è stata sempre la prima a dir di voler fare, così è stata sempre l' ultima a venire a far, deliberai col parer dell' Eccell^{mo} General Proveditor Soranzo di non tentar cosa alcuna per all' hora, ma mandar Sua Eccell^{za} da Sua Alteza a farli intendere per nome di V. S. e mio, che l' armata stava di tutto ponto in ordine spalmada et unita a Corfù, ne mancava altro se non mettersi in viaggio per andar in Levante per seguir la vitoria acquistata l' anno passato però che pregava Sua Alteza che con quella prestezza che vedeva con la sua prudentia esser necessaria venisse a raccogliere il frutto di essa vitoria, che quanto meglio era in ordine, perchè sicome l' andar inanzi senza la sua persona tenissimo, per cosa non conveniente, et atta a generar mal' animo dissensione e discordie, così stimassimo per il contrario che l' andar dell' Eccell^{mo} Soranzo gli dovesse essere un spron, et che questo fosse un principio di essequir l' ordine di V. S. di haverli rispetto, et proceder con lui con destreza perchè non li poteva far il maggior honore che mandarli quel Sig^{re} che era il primo, che fosse nella nostra armata et che V. S. più volte haveva mandato per ambasciatore al suo Re al Imperatore al Papa, et al Sig^{re} Turco Principi di tanta grandezza, l' Eccell^{mo} Soranzo della sua prudentia, et Eloquentia per muovere il detto Sig^{re} Dum Giovanni al ben comune, ma valse più o le commission secrete c' haveva da Filippo, o il parere de' suoi consigieri poco amici di V. S., sichè alla conclusione seben come intese V. S., all' hora il Sig^{re} Dum Giovanni lo raccolse con gran dimostrazione de amore, et de honore, et mostrasse con parole haver gran voglia di venire dopo haver tenuta molti dì Sua Eccell^{za} indarno, hora aspettando una cosa, hora un' altra, hora scusandosi con un modo, hora con un' altro, et pur dando ogni giorno buone parole, alla fine licentiò il detto Eccell^{mo} Proveditor General Soranzo mandando in sua compagnia, Gil d' Andrada con xxij Galere, et due Galeotte promettendo di seguitarli in breve termine con tutto il resto della sua armata, ma il venir fu così

causing dissension, and considering that His Highness was always the first to say that this or that [enterprise] should be undertaken, and yet the last to come to deliberate about it, I determined, with the concurrence of the Proveditore Soranzo, not to attempt anything for the present, but to send Soranzo to inform His Highness that our fleet was ready to prosecute the victory of the past year, and to entreat him to come with all convenient speed to gather the fruits of that great success. Although the putting to sea without him might have been taken by Don John as an affront, he could take the mission of Soranzo only as a spur to action, and as a compliment, seeing that Soranzo had been sent at various times as ambassador to the King of Spain, the Emperor, the Pope, and the Great Turk. But the prudence and eloquence of the Proveditore could not prevail over either the secret orders of the King, or the advice of counsellors unfriendly to your Serenity. Don John received him with all honour, and expressed great desire to join the Venetian fleet, but he never failed to find an excuse for remaining where he was. At last he consented to send Gil de Andrade, with 23 galleys and two galliots under his command, with Soranzo [to Corfu], assuring the Proveditore that he himself would speedily follow with the rest of the fleet. Nevertheless, all April, all May, and all June passed away, until the news came of disturbances in Flanders, and of the coming thither of M. de Genlis with the Huguenots. Then Don John wrote that in this disquieting aspect of affairs he could not sail without fresh orders from the King, as if he had desired to go to France or Flanders with the galleys, or could not have sent these galleys [to join the Venetians] with the Duke of Sesa or the Marquess of Santa Cruz, and have allowed us to attempt some useful enterprise. Grieved that so much time and opportunity should be lost, and that His Holiness and your Serenity should expend so much treasure in vain, the Signor Marc Antonio Colonna wrote to Don John, to point out to him the mortification and displeasure with which we saw the time and the occasion passing away; and seeing that His Highness spoke fair and acted unfairly, and held out hopes which he never fulfilled, [Colonna] often said to me, as I wrote to your Serenity at the time, that the Spaniards were evidently but ill affected towards your Serenity, and that it would be more for the advantage of your Serenity to take steps to negotiate a peace with the Turk now when it was reasonable to believe that he would make peace on good conditions, than to maintain a war establishment, and spend so much treasure to keep a fleet in harbour. Orders from the King for His Highness to come to the eastward afterwards arrived, and Occhiali issued from the Strait [of the Dardanelles] with a fleet of 210 galleys, as was understood from the spies; and then, as nothing remained to hinder His Highness, the advance of our vanquished enemy ought to have made him blush and be ashamed of himself, [seeing] that he, the victor, did not go forth to meet him. We did not fail to do what we could, by urging him by means of letters.

presto che differì tutto Aprile, tutto Maggio e tutto Giugno, non per altro se non per mancamento di buona volontà fin tanto che venne la nova delli rumori di Fiandra, et dell' andata di Monsig^r Genlis in quei paesi con gli Ugonoti, all' hora scrisse che non poteva in tanti sospetti partire, se non haveva nova commissione del Re quasi ch' el volesse andar in Franza o in Fiandra, con quelle Galie et se non voleva venir in persona non potesse mandar le galere sotto il Duca di Sessa o il Marchese di Santa Croce, o qualchedun altro de suoi, et lasciar andar noi altri a far bene, l' Eccel^{mo} Sig^r Marco Antonio si rodeva et haveva tanto dolore quanto ogn' un de noi altri vedendo che si perdeva, anzi era hormai persa tanta la occasione di far bene, et che Sua S^t et V. S. butavano tanto tesoro indarno, scriveva al Sig^r Dum Giovanni con mostrarli l' affanno, et dispiacere nostro la perde et tempo, et dell' occasione, et vedendo che Sua Altezza con tutto che dicesse bene operava male, e ne dava buona speranza, ma mai l' effettuava, mi disse più volte, come all' hora scrissi a V. S. che vedeva un mal' animo nei Spagnoli verso la S. V. che saria più utile alla S. V. procurar di haver dal Turco la pace all' hora che poteva credere ragionevolmente, che il Turco la faria con buone condizioni che stando su la guerra spendere tanto tesoro per tenere l' Armata in Porto venne dopo l' ordine a Sua Altezza del Re che venisse in Levante, et l' occhiali uscì dallo stretto, et passò in la Morea con 210 Galee per quanto se intese dalle spie, et poi sen vide a talchè nissuno cosa riteneva più Sua Altezza et la uscita del nemico nostro vinto lo doveva arrossire, e vergognar, che lui vittorioso non venisse innanzi noi non mancavimmo di far quel che potevimo co' l' sollicitar con lettere.

Ma pur differì tanto che venendo, l' Occhiali innanzi con l' armata Turchesca et havendo io havuto nova commissione dalla S. V. de non perdere più tempo, feci instantia all' Eccel^{mo} Sig^r Marc' Antonio della partita et Sua Eccell^{za} fu sempre desiderato di servir V. S. havendo ricevuto lettere di Sua Altezza per le quali scriveva che procurasse di soddisfarne, et impedir che l' armata Turchesca non facesse danno alli luoghi di V. S. vedendo che stando a Corfù et non spendendo il tempo bene non poteva dar soddisfattione alla S. V. che non desiderava altro momento, che si operasse alcuna cosa et che stando medesimamente a Corfù non poteva impedir il nemico, che non ruinasse Tino, Cerigo, il Zante, la Zeffalonia, et altri Stati di V. S. Il che quando fusse occorso saria stato una perdita di riputation infinita della S. V. con infamia di noi altri che havemo il cargo di governar l' armata con dispiacer e danno di V. S. con ruina delli poveri sudditi et haveria dato infinito ardir riputation et animo a Turchi, che nella prosperità sono insopportabili, però si messe Sua Eccell^{za} et partissimo con resolution di combattere col nemico quando avesse voluto la giornata secondo la commission di V. S. perchè se ben se intenda, che haveva 70 gallere sottil più di noi si giudicava però che le 6 galere grosse, et le navi valessero in fattion quanto esse, et che l' armata del Turco sebene se ritrova in ordine, pero quandò si venisse alle mani resteria spaventata per la memoria della rota, et che il medesimo rispetto, et la fresca memoria della vittoria daria alli nostri animo nella qual cosa consiste assai il vincere delle battaglie essendo facil cosa, che chi ha gran cuore, et animo resta superiore da chi è spauriti e teme, e cominciata la

“But yet he so delayed, that Occhiali drawing nearer with the Turkish fleet, and I having fresh orders from your Serenity to lose no more time, I pressed upon the Signor Marc Antonio [Colonna] the propriety of putting to sea. His Excellency was always desirous to serve your Serenity, and having received letters from His Highness in which he was told to endeavour to satisfy us, and to prevent the Turkish fleet from doing damage to places belonging to your Serenity, and seeing that while we lay at Corfu we could not prevent the enemy from laying waste Tino, Cerigo, Zante, Cephalonia, and other States of your Serenity, and that if that occurred, it would lower your Serenity's reputation and increase the intolerable insolence of the Turks, His Excellency made up his mind to sail, and we sailed, resolved to fight the enemy whenever he pleased to give us battle, according to the instructions of your Serenity. Although the Turks had 70 light galleys more than we had, we considered that our six heavy galleys and the ships made up for them, and that, in action, the Turks would be cowed by the memory of their defeat, and we inspired by the recollection of our victory. After consultation with the Proveditore-General of Corfu, the vessels sent towards the Morea were six heavy galleys, twenty ships, and 140 light galleys. Twice, on the 5th and 10th of August, we came in sight of the enemy, but we could not bring him to action, because on the first occasion we met him just as night fell, and the next time he would not face our heavy galleys, but endeavoured to draw off our light galleys, so as to engage with them alone, a thing which neither the Signor Marc Antonio nor I chose to do, the difference in

nostra deliberatione col Clar^{mo} Prov^t General de Corfù ne inviassimo per la Morea 6 galere grosse 20 navi 140 galere sottile, ritrovassimo due volte alli 5 et alli 10 d'agosto il nemico, come più diffusamente all' hora fu scritto alla S. V. ma una volta per essersi incontrati su la notte non potessimo venir alle mani, l' altra perchè il nemico non volesse affrontarsi con le galere grosse, et navi, ma volse tirar da parte le galere sottile, et venire a giornada con esse la qual cosa ne il Sig^r Marc' Antonio ne io volessimo far, essendo troppo gran disavantaggio combatter con 140. galere sottil contra 210. tanto più quanto se intendeva che le galere turchesche erano ben in ordine di archibusieri et come prudentemente diceva l' Eccell^{za} del Sig^r Marc' Antonio se die stimar che chi è stato rotto una volta, et vien alla secunda giornada non venga trasportato dal troppo ardir inconsideratamente. Ma con maturità habbia considerato le forze sue, e quelle del nemico, et non si die mai far nella guerra quello che si vede, che il nostro nemico grandemente desidera, perchè si può, et die credere chel desiderio si fondato sopra la speranza de Vittoria, bene è vero che l' Eccell^{mo} Prov^d General Soranzo fu dal troppo ardir trasportato quasi troppo innanzi et l' Eccell^{mo} Sig^r Marc' Antonio mandò vedendo il pericolo di disordinar l' armada l' Ill^{mo} Sig^r Pompeo Colona a farlo ritornar indietro, et poi disse all' Eccell^{mo} Sig^r Soranzo, et a me che nelle cose di guerra era conveniente che nelli consigli ogn' uno dicesse il suo parere, ma nelli fattioni ogn' uno attendesse a essequir la deliberation fatta nel consiglio seben fosse stata fatta contra il suo parere perchè il disparer nelli suoi consigli giova, perchè dicendo ogn' uno le ragioni della sua opinione si vien facilmente a conoscere, quel che è più utile, ma i dispareri e disordini nel fatto sono causa della perdita et ruina. Dopo questo accidente l' Occhiali, se ne ritirò nella Morea, et noi ritrovassimo Corfù.

Il frutto che portò l' andata nostra fu questo perchè andando a incontrar l' armata Turchesca, et facendola ritirar venissimo a conservar la reputation acquistata l' anno passato e fu tanto maggior la riputazione quanto l' armatadi Filippo con la persona di Dum Giovanni era lontana è tutto il nervo di quella armata era di V. S. ne seguì anco un' altro beneficio che proibivissimo all' Armata Turchesca di dar il guasto alle Isole di Cerigo et del Zante, le quali haveria senza fallo ruinate se noi stavamo fermi a Corfù con tanta riputazione sua, infamia nostra ruina de sudditi diminution della riputation, et danno della S. V. quanto ella con la infinita sua prudentia benissimo intende le cause ma del nostro ritornar indietro sono state queste perchè essendo il nemico ritornato non volendo venir a giornada con tutta l' armada de vasselli grossi et sottili, ne potendo noi astringerlo o sforzarlo, non si doveva star fuori per combatter, et per venir un' altra volta a giornada, con l' armada Turchesca come V. S. cometea, e tanto desiderava manco si poteva far nissuna impresa havendo tanto vicina una Armata nemica così grossa come ha inteso V. S. la qual ne haveria sturbato ogni disegno si che non si potendo far altro se ritornò a Corfù dove si unissimo col Sig^r Dum Giovanni con 33 galere e tre galeotte et intendessimo che Sua Altezza essendo giunta haveva fatto scelta di 30 galere et le havea avviati verso Levante per seguirarne, et ne fu riferito quello che intesi poi per lettere di V. S. che lui si era doluto et l'

numbers between 140 and 210 being too great, and the Turks being well provided with arquebusiers; besides, as the Signor Marc Antonio prudently remarked, it was necessary to take care that, having once been victorious, we did not rush too hastily and rashly into a second conflict; and also in all operations of war it is well to avoid doing that which the enemy evidently desires to be done, hoping thereby for victory. The Proveditore-General Soranzo having advanced somewhat too far, the Signor Marc Antonio Colonna, seeing the danger of the fleet falling into disorder, sent the Signor Pompeo Colonna to cause him to return, and said that in time of war, while, in council, every one should give his own opinion, in action every one should obey the resolution taken, however adverse to that opinion it might be. After this occurrence Occhiali retired to the Morea, and we returned to Corfu.

“The result of our cruise, compelling, as it did, the Turk to fall back, was favourable to our reputation, especially considering that Don John and the King’s forces were far away, and the strength of the fleet consisted of those of your Serenity. It also prevented the Turk from ravaging the islands of Cerigo and Zante, which otherwise he would have done, to his own glory and our damage and shame. The presence of his fleet in the neighbourhood prevented us from undertaking any other enterprise, being strong enough to frustrate any plan we might have formed, and left us no option but to return to Corfu, where we found Don John of Austria with thirty galleys and three galliots. As to what the Catholic ambassador complained of in the presence of your Serenity—thereby tacitly imputing to us negligence in your Serenity’s service, and a want of due respect to Don John’s person—that Don John, on arriving at Corfu, found there neither a frigate nor a letter, nor any person to tell him where the fleet was, nor what course he should take to join it, or even to avoid the enemy, certain it is that if there had been any truth in that complaint, a great error would have been committed; but I, as I wrote at the time, having ordered the Proveditore-General of Corfu to furnish every information, His Highness could not complain, nor had he any cause to direct his King’s ambassador to make such a charge; and I hope that your Serenity understands, as the Signor Marc Antonio Colonna understood

Amb^{re} Catt^{co} apresso V. S. in collegio tacitamente, m' haveva imputato di negligenza nel servitio di V. S. et di poco rispetto verso la persona di Dum Giovanni non ritrovò a Corfù ne fregeta ne lettera ne persona che le avisasse dove potesse ritrovar l' armata, et che strada dovesse tener per unirsi più presto, et più sicuramente con essa et per guardarse dall' incontro dell' Armata Turchesca. Certo Seren^{mo} Principe gravissimi et Ill^{mi} Sig^{ri} se questa relation et questa querella contenesse verità saria gran errore, ma come io scrissi all' hora havendo io comandato al Clariss^{mo} Proved^r di Corfù che gli desse ogni avviso non si poteva doler ne haveva causa di commetter all' Amb^r del suo Re che ne desse questa imputation, ma spero che V. S. intendi hora quello che intese et disse il Sig^r Marc' Antonio quando comunica con Sua Eccell^{za} questo fatto che Dum Giovanni di haver mancato e dubitando, che V. S. non si dolesse come iustamente si poteva di lui, fece quel che fanno in general quelli che hanno paura di essere incolpati, che incolpano gl' altri per discargar et discolpar se stessi.

Dum Giovanni mostrò di haver havuto dispiacere dell' andata nostra in Levante senza lui et lo mostrò a noi medesimi perchè havendo l' Eccellent^{mo} Sig^r Marc' Antonio, et io fatto di questa scusa con Sua Altezza et mostratali le necessità di tal nostra resolution et esecuzione lui usando la Sua Altezza naturale la quale seben procura di tener nascosta mostrando benignità pur alle volte si mostra vedendo di non poter biasmare, non volse ne anco lodar le nostre attioni ne mostrò di haver havuto le nostre scuse ma rispose, che non haveva che trattar sopra le cose passate, ma solamente delle presente et de quelle che se haveano da operar per beneficio comune. Ridotto poi il Cons^o Sua Altezza mostrò lo sdegno che haveva contra l' Eccell^{mo} Marc' Antonio perchè per soddisfar V. S. per mantener la sua reputatione et stati s' era messo dalla mia instantia a andar in Levante senza aspettar la sua persona perchè volendo Sua Eccell^{za} l' Ill^{mo} Sig^r Pompeo Colonna entrasse in consiglio come era entrata l' anno passato per occasion del comendator maggior ma non essendo il comendator presente che doveva restar anche lui, replicò il Sig^r Marc' Antonio, che si come io che era General di V. S. entrava con il mio luogotenente l' Eccell^{mo} Prov^r General Soranzo di sua santità entrasse con il suo luogotenente l' Ill^{mo} Sig^r Pompeo Rispose Dum Giovanni non volendo dar satisfation a Sua Eccell^{za} laudò assai l' Eccell^{mo} Soranzo comendando assai il suo volere, accortezza giudicio, et prudentia, et dicendo che la sua persona meritava ogni honore, et perchè il suo valor potea giovar in consiglio era ben fatto, che entrasse, et se gli facesse questo honore, le qual parole quando fossero state dette per verità et con sincerità doveriano esser care a noi come mostrassimo di haverle, ma essendo dette per far dopio affronto all' Eccell^{mo} Colonna Sig^r tanto affettionato a V. S. e tanto desideroso della sua grandezza e non per lodar l' Eccell^{mo} Soranzo, ma per voler con un tiro Spagnolo inferir che nell' Ill^{mo} Sig^r Pompeo, non fosse ne qualità, che meritasse questo honor, ne valor et prudentia da giovar al suo parer alla lega diedero gran affanno a Sua Eccell^{za} come disse e come scrissi a V. S. all' hora haveva tutto questo per il servitio di V. S. et che Dum Giovanni oltraggiando quelli che havevano servito V. S. et difeso il suo stato mostrava haver poco bon

and said at the time, that Don John having himself failed [to keep his engagement], and doubting that your Serenity would complain of him, as you might justly have done, did that which people who are afraid of being blamed commonly do,—find fault with others, in order to clear and justify themselves.

“That he was displeased at our having sailed without him Don John showed plainly enough, and showed to ourselves, for the Signor Marc Antonio and I having excused ourselves for the step, and having explained to him the necessity for it, His Highness, though he heard us with benignity, would neither blame us nor say we had done right, but replied, as if he had not heard our excuses, that he was not going to discuss what was past, but to confine himself to the present, and to what still remained to do for the general advantage. When the council met, His Highness displayed his grudge against the Signor Marc Antonio for sailing at my request without him in order to do a service to your Serenity, by objecting to the proposal of His Excellency, that the Signor Pompeo Colonna should sit in the council, as he had done last year, on the suggestion of the Grand Commander [Requesens], who was not with us this year. [To this objection] Marc Antonio replied that as I, being general of your Serenity, came to the council with my lieutenant the Proveditore-General Soranzo, he, surely, as general of His Holiness, might also bring his lieutenant, the Signor Pompeo. Being unwilling to do what His Excellency desired, Don John thereupon praised Soranzo in high terms, commending his zeal, courtesy, judgment, and prudence, and saying that he deserved every honour, and because his wisdom was of use in the council, it was indeed well that he should have the honour of sitting there. Had these words been spoken in truth and sincerity we should have been pleased with them; but spoken as they were, in order to offer a double affront to Colonna, a gentleman so well affected towards your Serenity, and not to praise Soranzo but, with a Spanish stroke, to cause it to be inferred that the Signor Pompeo possessed no qualifications to entitle him to this honour, nor any worth or sagacity which could render his opinion of any benefit to the League—they gave great offence to His Excellency, as he said, and as I wrote to your Serenity at the time. This [indignity] he received because of the service he had done your Serenity, and Don John, by thus insulting those who had served you, showed that he bore your Serenity but little good-will. In the council His Highness said that although many people were saying that he had

animo verso la S. V. disse Sua Altezza nel Cons^o che seben molti dicevano che la sua venuta in levante era per un complimento, et non per far fattione che l' animo suo era però altramente disposto et che l' animo si conosceria dalle opere, et fu di parere che si andassea ritrovar il nemico, et se inviassero innanci le navi, et vasselli, che portavano vittovaglie, monitioni, et altre cose necessarie per l' impresa acciò nelli bisogni non venissero al manco et così fu risoluto con qualche difficoltà, come all' hora intese V. S. et se partissimo con 22. navilii, 6 galere grosse di V. S. 2. di Fiorenza 197. galee sottile et Sua Altezza mostrando con parole alle quali con fatti mal corrispose animo di voler far gran cose, et de anteponer il servitio comune al particolare del suo Re scrisse al Duca di Sessa, et a Giovanni Andrea Doria, a Messina che venissero a ritrovare con le 13. galere, $\frac{m}{2}$ Spagnuoli che havevano.

L' andata nostra fu come sa il mondo impetuosa ma seguendo la materia giongessimo sopra il nemico che haveva l' armata fra l' Isola di Sapiaientia et Modun, et se fossimo stati come saressimo stati se li Spagnoli non havessero tardato haveressimo gionto le galere turchesche innanzi che si ritrovasse sotto Modun, ma il nemico se ben era in spiaggia con le poppe a terra era talmente difesa dall' artiglieria dalla fortezza, et da 400. pezzi in circa che haveva in terra che non si poteva accostare fu tentato di dar la batteria a Modun per mare ma l' artiglieria del castello et il mar ne astrinse a partir, calassimo a Navarin et fu risoluto di tentar quella fortezza per non poter far cosa di meglio et per la commodità del Porto, et Dum Giovanni haveva tanta speranza di prenderlo in 2. o tre giorni per la relation havea dalli suoi che haveva mandati a riconoscer la fortezza che non volse che se metesse in terra altra gente, et che li Spagnoli et venturieri acciocchè tutto l' honore et tutto il guadagno fosse suo, e forse a un bisogno per lasciar dentro una guardia de Spagnoli se fosse stata presa, et diedi il cargo di quell' impresa al Principe di Parma suo german. Ma havendo consumato 3. in 4. giorni con poco profitto sopravvenne la cavalleria Turchesca in num^o di 20 milla et più et messero dentro il soccorso non essendo stata avertita Sua Altezza di metter le guardie alli passi acciò non entrasse si scomenzò a scaramuzzare con poco danno et parecchi Spagnoli fuggirno andandosi a far Turchi, Dum Giovanni consultandosi quel che se havea a fare propose la partita con dir che le vettovaglie gli erano venute a manco che la fantaria che era in Terra non poteva far acqua per rispetto della cavalleria de nemici, et che per la medesima causa stava in pericolo che Navarin non si poteva più prendere per il soccorso che haveva havuto et per lo agiuto che poteva havere da detti cavalli et quando ben si prendesse non si haveria potuto tenir non essendo vetovaglie da provederlo, ne tempo da star li tanto che si fortificasse da novo, ne importando l' impresa che si dovesse metter a risego l' armata noi non potendo patir che fosse stato perso un' anno così inutilmente, et speso tanto tesoro indarno, et quel che importa più persa tanta occasion desideravamo pur di trattenersi perchè mentre che eravamo vicini al nemico havevimo pur speranza ch' el Sig^r Iddio ci appresentasse come accadè nelle guerre qualche occasion di romper il nemico, ma partendosi perdevimo ogni speranza, però non vollessimo consentir alla partita, et offerissimo a Sua Altezza aiuto di vetovaglie non ostante la

come to the east merely out of compliment, and not for the purpose of undertaking any enterprise, yet his mind was far otherwise disposed, as would be seen by his actions. He was of opinion that we should go and find the enemy and send forward the ships and the vessels laden with victuals, munitions, and other things necessary for the expedition, that they should not fail us at need. This resolution having been with some difficulty adopted, we sailed with twenty-two ships, six heavy galleys of your Serenity, and two of Florence, and 197 light galleys; and His Highness showing in words a disposition, with which his acts but little corresponded, to do great things, and to prefer the common interest to the private interest of his own King, wrote to Messina, to the Duke of Sesa, and to Giov. Andrea Doria, ordering them to join him with their thirteen galleys and 2000 Spanish troops.

“Our departure was thus, as the world knows, full of impetuosity, but the result was that we overtook the enemy, as he had brought his fleet between the isle of Sapienza and Modon. Had we been where we should have been if the Spaniards had not delayed us, we should have come up with the Turkish galleys before they had got under [the guns of] Modon; but [as things were], the enemy was so well in shore, with his poops turned towards the land, and was so effectually protected by the artillery of the fortress, and about 400 other pieces which he had placed in position, that it was not possible to come alongside of him. An attempt was made to batter Modon from the sea, but the artillery of the castle and of the Turkish fleet compelled us to retire. We then cast anchor at Navarino, and it was determined, for want of anything better to do, and on account of the convenience of the harbour, to attack that fortress. From the report of his own troops which he had landed, Don John had conceived so strong a hope of taking it in two or three days that he would not allow any force to be sent on shore other than the Spaniards and the adventurers, in order that all the glory and gain might be his own, and perhaps, that he might leave a Spanish garrison in the place if it should fall into his hands. The command of the enterprise he gave to his relative the Prince of Parma. But three days having been consumed with little advantage, there came upwards of 20,000 Turkish cavalry and succoured the place, His Highness not having been advised to set a guard on the passes, to prevent the entrance of reinforcements. A few skirmishes, with little loss, began to take place, and divers Spaniards deserted, meaning to become Turks. A consultation being held, Don John proposed our departure; saying that provisions were beginning to fail, that the troops could not obtain water, and were in considerable peril because of the Turkish cavalry; that in consequence of this cavalry, and the reinforcements which it had brought, the chance of taking Navarino was much diminished; and that, even if it were taken, it would be impossible to hold it on account of the want of victuals, and of time to strengthen the fortifications, and that the acquisition was not of sufficient importance to justify us in risking the loss of the fleet. Being unable to bear that a year, so much cost, and so fair an occasion should be utterly thrown away, we desired first to consider whether, being still in presence of the enemy, God might not give us, as often happens in war, some

qual offerta mandò di novo a persuaderme la partita per l' Eccell^{mo} Sig^r. Marc' Antonio fece poi il medesimo lui in persona et vedendo che l' Eccellent^{mo} Soranzo et io stavimo fermi nel nostro parere si alterò di sorte che non potè nasconder la collera mudandosi di colore come scrissi a V. S. et havendo noi detto all' Eccell^{mo} Colonna che si maravigliavano di tanta turbation Sua Eccell^{za} ne referì che Dum Giovanni li haveva risposto che non si maravigliava, vedendo la ostination nostra di essersi mutado di colore ma di non haver fatto, altro il qual altro non so quello che potesse essere, se non venir all' armi fra noi. Ma pur lui volesse non ostante la nostra resistentia far a modo suo e di propria autorità comandò a Dum Francesco di Mendoza generale delle navi suo maggior domo che si partisse con le navi per il che fussimo sforzati a consentir di ritornare alla Zeffalonia per rinfrescarsi et poi ritornar innanzi ma vennero li tempi tanto cattivi che fu forza ritornar a Corfù, et Dum Giovanni si partì dandone bone parole al solito et esortandone a metter a bon' hora per l' anno futuro l' armata in ordine a fornirla ben de genti da guerra non se fidando tanto nelli galeoti che mal ponno combattere e vogar e mostrava di voler far gran cose, ma vedendo l' Eccell^{mo} Sig^r. Marc' Antonio l' Eccell^{mo} Soranzo, et io li mali fatti e le cose come passavano e desiderando servir V. S. poichè non si haveva potuto confar le imprese desiderate, almanco col scriverli il vero e quel che credevimo che dovesse essere in servitio della S. V. essendo più facile a noi che eravamo sul fatto, et che vedevamo, et maneggiavamo, che a V. S. che era lontana, et se governava per relatione veder con qual speranza V. S. poteva continuar la guerra et qual era più utile la guerra o la pace, considerassimo 3. cose lo stato della S. V. li compagni et il nemico, in V. S. ritrovavimo che ella era gravada di spesa eccessiva, perchè oltre la spesa dell' armata in guardia delli stati di mare comessi alla mia cura, V. S. spendeva quanto saria bastante a mantenere un esercito in terra ferma, perchè alla guardia di Zara, Cattaro, Spalatro, Trau, Budua, et altre fortezze delli Regni di Dalmatia et Albania erano 13. mille e 400. fanti in circa a Corfù, 5. mille e 600. fra il Regno di Candia il Zante la Ceffalonia Zerigo, e Tine 12. mile 300. che fanno in tutto 31. mille 300. fanti nelli compagni, considerassimo nel Pontefice poche forze, et da non esser messe in consideratione in così gran guerra; nelli Spagnoli poco bon animo conoscendo nell' haver tardato tanto innanzi che succedessero li rumori di Fiandra, e dopo nell' haver havuto dispiacer dell' andata nostra in Levante, in non haver voluto oprimer l' armata quando la era fra la Sapientia et Modun, et in haver voluto contra l' honesto astringerne a partir vedendo che non era utile le reputation anzi pericoloso haver un general della Lega che facesse star l' armata tutta lesta nei porti, et che fossi così colerico, che quando, li compagni non volessero condescendere nei suo parer entrasse in tanta colera che non potendola tener nascosa si mutasse di colere, dalla parte del nemico considerassimo la sua potentia, in terra, et in mare perchè se l' anno dopo la rota haveva rimesso un' armata di 210. galere la poteva l' altro anno accrescer assai, et farla maggior di quella della Lega o al meno eguale in terra, che haveva tanta gente, et cavalaria che in 3. o 4. giorni poteva con 20. o 25. mille cavalli soccorrere le fortezze, sotto li quali fossimo andati se ben non havesse armata da resister alla nostra, attese tutte le qual cose

opportunity of striking a blow at him ; whereas, if we took our departure, all hope of this was at an end, and we, therefore, would not consent to the retreat proposed, but offered to supply His Highness with what victuals he required. Notwithstanding this offer, he again sent to persuade me to agree to retire, employing His Excellency the Signor Marc Antonio ; and afterwards he did the same thing in person ; and on that occasion, seeing that Soranzo and I stood firm in our opinion, he became so angry that he was unable to conceal his indignation, but changed colour, as I wrote to your Serenity. We happening to say to Colonna that we were surprised to see His Highness so much disturbed, His Excellency replied that Don John had told him that the wonder was, not that he had changed colour, but that he had not done something else, which something else I cannot say what it could mean, except coming to blows. But in spite of our resistance, he was resolved to have his own way, and of his own authority he ordered Don Francisco de Mendoza, general of the ships, and his chamberlain, to take the ships to sea, by which means we were forced to consent to return to Cephalonia to recruit, meaning afterwards to go back against the Turk ; but such bad weather came on, that we were obliged to proceed to Corfu, whence Don John took his departure, as usual speaking us fair, and exhorting us to have the fleet in good order betimes next year, to man it well with soldiers, and trust less to our oarsmen, who could not both row and fight well, and [otherwise] made a show of desiring to do great things.

“Marc Antonio Colonna, Soranzo, and I, however, seeing his poor performances, and wishing to serve your Serenity, if not by the accomplishment of the desired enterprises, at least by writing you the truth, and that which we, who were on the spot and managed your affairs, believed to be for your Serenity’s service, [determined to lay before your Serenity our] views of the prospects of success in continuing the struggle, and of the relative advantages of prosecuting the war and of making peace. To this end we had to consider three things, the position of your Serenity, your allies, and your enemy. Your Serenity we found to be burdened with the excessive cost [of the war], because, besides the expense of this fleet [engaged in] guarding your maritime possessions, your Serenity was spending as much as would maintain an army on the mainland, there being 13,400 men employed in the protection of Zara, Cattaro, Spalatro, Trau, Budua, and other fortresses of the Dalmatian kingdom, about 6500 at Corfu, and 12,300 in Candia, Zante, Cephalonia, Cerigo, and Tino, making in all 31,300 men. Looking at your allies, we found the forces of the Pope to be few, and hardly worthy of being taken into account in so great a war, while amongst the Spaniards there was little good-will to the cause, as might be seen in the delays that took place [in their joining us], even before the disturbances in Flanders happened, in their displeasure at our sailing towards the Levant, in their unwillingness to crush the [enemy’s] fleet, when it was between Sapienza and Modon, and in their having, contrary to honourable dealing, compelled us to retire [from Navarino]. We also saw that it was not only discreditable but even dangerous to have a General of the League who kept the fleet in harbour the whole summer, and who was so choleric, that when his companions

concludessimo, ch' el seguitar la guerra era pericoloso di grande spesa, et con speranza di poco utile, et ditto questo nostro parere li Eccell^{mi} Colonna, Soranzo, et io ne dessimo avviso alla S. V. acciochè con la sua prudentia prendesse quel partito che giudicasse a proposito et conservation dello stato suo, et non potendosi far in Levante cosa alcuna deliberassimo che l' Eccell^{mo} Proveditor-General Soranzo venisse con 20. galee in Golfo de Cattaro per ruinar il forte fatto da Turchi alla bocca con molto danno delle galee, navi, et altri navilii di V. S. come Sua Eccell^{za} fece col suo valore.

Questo è quel tanto che è occorso nel mio generalato in tempo di guerra. Parve poi alla S. V. di concluder la pace et mi diede nuova commissione che attendessi solamente alla guardia et che venendo Piali bassà con armata stessi avveduto, et ben in guardia come se fusse in guerra, ma li facessi poi come ad amico ogni dimostratione di honor, et di amorevolezza dandoli delli avisi dell' Armata Spagnola perchè V. S. era così pregata a fare in nome del Gran Sig^{re} tutte le qual cose adempi mandando buoni rinfrescamenti sopra al Bassà mentre fu su l' Isola di Corfù et come scrissi alla S. V. et havendomi esso Bassà ricercato del mio parere se doveva ritornar in levante o andar a ritrovar Dum Giovanni lo consigliai a ritornar a dietro perchè non poteva combatter con l' Armata di Spagna senza gran pericolo, et li diedi tal consiglio conoscendo che la vittoria dell' uno, et dell' altro, non poteva se non essere dannosa alla S. V. et che per ella taceva, che le cose de questi doi gran Principi stessero in bilanza, et sospese, et il detto Bassà come sa V. S. seguì il mio consiglio, et dopo il suo ritorno, io ho lasciate fuori le guardie ordinarie son venuto a piedi della S. V. et li affermo, che nell' anno della guerra nel qual son stato general dell' Armata di V. S. l' esser in Lega è stato di gran danno a V. S. poichè se non fosse stato il rispetto di Don Giovanni nel principio dell' April sarei andato in Levante con le 115. Gallere sottili e le sie grosse di V. S. et haveria potuto prender Modun, per non haver la muraglia tutta dalla parte di maci, et qualche altro loco de importanza non havendo nessun ostacolo dell' armata nemica, et haveria potuto scorrer le Marine della Morea, et della Natolia, et delle Isole dell' Arcipelago mettendo ogni cosa a foco, et a fiamma, et depredando li Paesi, con che haveria fatto ricchi et animosi li soldati, e data infinita reputation alla S. V. et gran danno alli nemici, et al Sig^{re} medesimo perchè all' ultimo sicome la ricchezza de' sudditi è danno del Sig^{re} ma per obbedienza aspettando da Don Giovanni mi è bisognato star in porto.

Per venir alla conclusion dico a V. S. umilmente, che mi son sforzato

could not agree with his opinions, he fell into such a passion that his colour changed. Lastly, looking at the enemy, we saw that he was so powerful both by land and sea, that, the year after his defeat he sent out a fleet of 210 galleys, which in another year he would be able to increase until it should exceed, or at least equal, that of the League; and that by land he had such abundance of cavalry, that in three or four days he could send twenty or twenty-five thousand horse to relieve any stronghold that we might choose to attack, supposing his fleet not able to resist ours. All these things considered, we came to the conclusion that the prosecution of the war was dangerous and costly, and afforded little hope of advantage; and Colonna, Soranzo, and I, having formed this opinion, communicated the same to your Serenity, in order that you might, with your wonted wisdom, take that course which you deemed fitting for the safety of the State. Not being able to do anything in the Levant, we determined that the Proveditore-General Soranzo should take twenty galleys into the Gulf of Cattaro, to destroy the fort built by the Turks at the mouth of it to the great damage of the shipping of your Serenity, which His Excellency accomplished with his usual valour.

“This is what occurred during my command in the time of the war. It having seemed good to your Serenity to make peace, you gave me fresh instructions to act only on the defensive; and that if we fell in with Piali Pasha, I should be on my guard as in time of war, but treat him as a friend and show him all honour and courtesies, and give him news of the Spanish fleet, as your Serenity had been asked to do in the name of the Grand Signor. All these instructions I fulfilled, sending good refreshments to the Pasha when he was off Corfu, as I wrote to your Serenity; and when he asked my opinion whether he should steer for the Levant, or go in pursuit of Don John, I counselled him to go home, because he could not engage the Spanish fleet without great danger; and I gave him this advice, knowing that a victory won either by one or the other could only be hurtful to your Serenity, and desiring to keep the powers of these two great Princes in a state of equipoise. The said Pasha, as your Serenity knows, followed my advice; and I, after I had sent forth the ordinary protecting squadrons, came to place myself at the feet of your Serenity. And I can affirm that, during the year of the war in which I was general of your Serenity’s fleet, the being one of a League was a great loss to your Serenity; for, but for the respect due to Don John in the beginning of April, I would have gone to the Levant with your 115 light and 6 heavy galleys, and I would have taken Modon, which then had no walls towards the sea, and some other important place, there being no hostile fleet to oppose us, and I might have scoured the coasts of the Morea, and Anatolia, and the islands of the Archipelago, burning and spoiling these countries, to the enrichment and encouragement of the soldiers, to the great credit of your Serenity, and the great damage of the enemy; instead of which, out of obedience to Don John, I had to remain in port waiting for his coming.

“In conclusion, I humbly say to your Serenity that I have done my

di eseguire le commissioni di V. S. et le ho per quanto ho potuto essequito l' Armata della S. V. a tempo è stata in ordine. Ho difeso tutti li stati di V. S. nel mio generalato il nemico non ha preso pur una barca ne abbrugiato pur un cason de sudditi di V. S. con il Sig^r Don Giovanni, et cum l' Eccell^{mo} Colonna ho trattato secondo gli ordini di V. S. l' Armata il che è stata principalmente gratia del Sig^r Dio è stata sana a niuno, è stato fatto torto, li personaggi forestieri sono stati onorati, et benissimo trattati, et specialmente l' Ill^{mo} Marchese di Umena ⁽³⁾, al quale ho fatto tutti quei favori, et honori che sono stati possibili per obedire a V. S. et per li suoi meriti, perchè certo mostra gran spirito e gran bona volontà verso la V. S.

Mi resta a dir quattro parole non per dar ricordo a V. S. et alle Vostre Eccell^{ze} che sono piene di prudentia, ma non mancar del mio debito, et acciocchè li nostri Giovani imparino in' altra occasione però darò alcuni avvertimenti imparati con la esperienza.

Primo. che nelle guerre bisogna sopra ogni cosa la prestezza, et usar le occasioni perchè chi è tardo lassa preparar il nemico o non sa seguitarlo quando è in disordine vince in dano.

Il secondo, che nelle guerre di mar bisogna esser fuori sempre al principio di Aprile, et guereggiar sino a mezzo autunno perchè l' inverno non si può far bene non bastando haver bone armate, ma bisognando haver buon tempo.

Il terzo, che è dannosa la compagnia de' più potenti a' quali bisogna haver rispetto.

Il quarto, che nell' esequir le imprese di guerra bisogna che tutti li capitani siano d' accordo.

Il quinto, che bisogna fidarsi delle proprie forze non di quelle de collegati, perchè li collegati si muovono più per l' interesse suo che per quello del compagno, perchè l' interesse di Fiandra ha fatto tardar Don Giovanni come lu medesimo disse.

Il sesto, che bisogna haver Cap^{no} General non principe, ma persona che possa aspettar, e premio e castigo dal patron.

Il 7^{mo} che bisognaria che delle Lege fosse un general senza passion, et che non dependesse più da un Principe che dall' altro, perchè chi dipende da un Principe, come fu Don Giovanni dal Re Filippo cercherà sempre il servizio di quello.

Ottavo, che chi ha gran stati et paesi ha molte volte quello che par alli altri impossibile come il Sig^r Turco che ha in sei mesi rimessa un' Armata de 210 Gallere contra la opinion universale.

Nono, che si fa guerra con grande vantaggio con un Principe più potente, perchè il più potente se è roto presto si rimette cosa che non può far l' inferior.

Decimo, che con le armate sole che non ha da metter, et sbarcar essercito grosso in Campagna, mai prenderà se non facesse in un subito, Terre dal Turco per il gran soccorso che in pochi giorni possono haver di cavalleria.

Undecimo, che chi non ha speranza di rovinar o in tutto o in gran parte il nemico è molto prudente in cercar di far pace, et mantenersi in essa col nemico, come ha fatto, e spero anco se manterrà la S. V. con il

best to follow your Serenity's instructions, and, in so far as I could, have kept your fleet in good order. During my generalship I have defended all the States of your Serenity, and the enemy has not taken a boat nor burned a cottage belonging to your subjects. My intercourse with Don John and Colonna has been such as you ordered me to make it; the health of the fleet, chiefly by the grace of God, has been good; and all the foreign personages have been treated with honour and courtesy, especially the Marquess of Mayenne ⁽³⁾, to whom I have shown all possible respect and favour, in virtue of obedience to your Serenity's commands and his high spirit and his good-will to your Serenity."

A very long-winded passage, which the writer calls "four words for your Serenity," next conveys, for the instruction of the young, some hints drawn from his experience, and arranged under eleven heads, which may be thus abridged:—

"(1.) Quickness to seize an opportunity and improve a victory is above all things essential to success in war.

"(2.) In naval war, you must go to sea at the beginning of April, and carry on operations till the middle of autumn: good weather being as important as a good fleet.

"(3.) It is bad to have allies more potent than yourself, to whom it is necessary to defer.

"(4.) The chiefs must be of one mind.

"(5.) Trust to your own forces, and not to those of colleagues, who are more guided by their own interests than yours. The affairs of Flanders kept Don John from coming in time.

"(6.) The Captain-General must not be a Prince, but a person who may expect reward or punishment from his master.

"(7.) The Captain-General of a League must be a man without passion, and not more dependent upon one than another of the allied Princes; dependence, like that of Don John on King Philip, being sure to make him lean to the service of that side.

"(8.) The master of wide dominions can often effect what seems an impossibility. The Turk in six months had 210 galleys afloat contrary to the universal opinion.

"(9.) The more powerful combatant can recover from the effects of a great defeat much more easily than his weaker antagonist.

"(10.) The Turk's great abundance of cavalry renders hopeless any attempt to seize any portion of territory which cannot be secured within a few days.

"(11.) If to crush or cripple the enemy be hopeless, it is more prudent to make peace with him, and keep it, as your Serenity has done—and, it is to be hoped, will do—with the Turk; and, with a view to

Sig^r. Turco, ma per star in pace, non consiste solo in V. S. ma bisogna che la medesima volontà sia nel Sig^r. Turco et in quelli a quali lui da fede e puol ben essere che con tutto che V. S. non li dia occasion, et si affattichi per tenersi amici li Bassà, pur lui voglia guerra. Riverentemente ricorderò a V. S. che si provedi per tempo, e a mio parere saria meglio mandar un' essercito de 40 mille Fanti, et 4 mille Cavalli in la Morea, et haver un' Armata de 150. gallee sottile et 20 grosse che metter 30 mille fanti in guardia e star solamente su la difesa perchè oltre la reputation si potria far qualche ben, e se tenirà la guerra lontano dalli stati di V. S. e si scorreria risigo di guadagnar stati e di perder solo genti nella qual occasione senza dubbio saria meglio che V. S. procuri agiuto di galee e genti che se obblighi a nove leghe vedendo quanto sono inutili et in tal occasione similmente l' haver Fanti e galeotti forestieri saria a propositissimo perchè in occasion di danno perdendosi li sudditi si perde assai, ma perdendo li forestieri non si perde niente, o poco potendosi in un tratto rimettere li esserciti et le armate con li sudditi. Quello che da l' esperienza ho imparato ho voluto dir a V. S. et alle V. V. Ill^{me} Eccell^{me} Signorie le qual prego nostro Sig^r. Dio le conservi longamente in quella pace che per sua bontà gli ha concesso etc^a (4)

NOTES.

(1) pp. 414, 415. This Report exists in the collection of Reports of the *Provveditori-Generali e Capitani-Generali da Mar* 1552-1711, in the Archives of Venice. It fills fourteen folio pages, each containing twenty-seven lines. To the copy here printed the transcriber appends the following note:—

Nella presente relazione frequentemente si risontrano errori non solamente d' ortografia ma specialmente parole che non stanno col senso mancando il più delle volte metà delle lettere di una parola. Si ebbe di mira per quanto fu possibile di correggere codesti errori aggiustando le parole secondo il senso.

In this *Report* there are many errors not only in orthography, but especially in words not agreeing with the sense, and often wanting half their letters. As far as possible care has been taken to correct these, and to supply words in accordance with the sense.

I may add that these emendations have been made under the experienced eye of my friend Mr. Rawdon Brown, to whom I am indebted both for communication of the original, and for revising my translation. Foscarini's style being very diffuse, I have taken the liberty of considerably abridging in the translation the less important parts of his narrative.

(2) p. 414. Here and throughout the *Relazione*, S. V. or V. S. stands for "Serenità Vostra" or "Vostra Screnità."

(3) pp. 432, 433. Charles de Lorraine, Marquess and afterwards Duke of Mayenne, second son of Francis, second Duke of Guise, the celebrated chief of the Catholic League in France, born 1554, died 1611. By Italian writers his name is often written Umena, and by Spanish Umanes. He is perhaps the M. d'Aumale mentioned by Veniero in his *Report*, p. 341.

(4) pp. 434, 435. Girolamo Alessandro Capellari (*Campidoglio Veneto, cioè Alberi delle famiglie Venete Patrizie*, 4 vols. fol. MS. in St. Mark's Library at Venice) gives the following account of the author:—

"Giacomo Foscarini, the son of Luigi Foscarini, a most eminent doctor, knight,

the preservation of peace, it will be well to be on friendly terms with the Pashas and other personages trusted by the Grand Signor."

The report concludes thus :—

“With profound respect I would remind your Serenity to exercise foresight ; and in my opinion it would be better to send 40,000 foot and 4000 horse to the Morea, and keep a fleet of 150 light and 20 heavy galleys, than to employ 30,000 men solely in garrison duty and standing on the defensive ; because, besides the reputation that would accrue, something more tangible might be gained, and the war would be kept at a distance from your Serenity’s States, and taking the chance of increasing your territories, you would lose only soldiers. In that case it would be better, if need were, that your Serenity should increase your galleys and troops than that you should entangle yourselves in new leagues, seeing how useless these are ; and foreign soldiers and sailors would be the more desirable, inasmuch as otherwise, in case of disaster and a loss of your own people, the loss would be serious, while in losing foreigners the loss would be nothing, or very little, and you could speedily fill up your armies and fleet with your own subjects. That which I have learned by experience I have thus desired to say to your Serenity, and to the Most Excellent Signiory, whom I pray God long to preserve in the peace which His goodness has granted to us,” etc. (4)

- 1594 President of the building of the Rialto bridge ;
- 1594 Ambassador to Clement VIII. on his visit to Ferrara ;
- 1594 *Generale di Mare* for the second time ;
- 1595 Appointed to treat with an Imperial Commissioner on the affairs of the vscocchi ;
- 1595 An unsuccessful candidate for the Ducal throne."

He was married to Elena, daughter of Lorenzo Giustinian, by whom he had a son, Giov. Battista, born 1564. He died in 1602, aged 79 years, and was buried in the church of the Carmine, where a fine monument, with his full-length statue, still preserves his memory in the following epitaph :—

V.

LETTERS OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA TO DON RODRIGO DE MENDOZA, WRITTEN IN THE NETHER- LANDS, 1576-1578.

I. LUXEMBURG, Nov. 5, 1576.

Don John's journey to Luxemburg—Unpromising aspect of affairs in the Netherlands.

DE Antonio Perez se abrá entendido mi llegada á Paris pues se la escrivi y lo que hasta alli avia pasado, dedonde segui luego otro dia que llegué mi viaje con mas priesa de lo que avia menester por aver sido visto y conocido de todos los criados del embaxador, entre los quales no podia durar mucho el secreto y así ni tuve tiempo de esperar mas ni osé sino correr dia y noche ; pero con hallar los caminos muy bellacos, y tomados de la peste, uve de arrodear y caminar dos dias en unos mismos cavallos con que se acrescentó el trabajo y la jornada. Alfin bendito Dios yo llegué aqui á los 3 deste, y hallé las peores nuevas que podia destos estados, pues solo el en que estoy se sabe cierto que déxe de estar levantado, y Frisa que tiene Robles á su cargo. Los demas estan juntos y conbocando armas y naciones estrañas para contra Españoles, y entretanto van dando y quitando leyes á su modo, y todo esto se haze debaxo de nombre de por el Rey y con el mismo se admite y se adereça la casa del de Oranje para que entre en *Bruseles* (*sic*).

He escrito al Consejo todo y [a] algunos en particular de mi venida ; no sé lo que me responderan, ni si me admitiran que esperando estoy á entenderlo con lo demas que Antonio Perez podra dezir mejor que yo agora : este es el termino tan miserable en que anda lo de aca : Dios lo remedie que el solo puede. Gran deseo tengo de saber nuevas de alla y que se trató y dixo de mi huyda, pero de lo que [lo] tengo mayor [es] de

D. O. M.

“*Jacobo Foscareno D. Marci Procuratori, ob civilem sapientiam, rei militaris scientiam, et magnam animi celsitatem, universus Venetorum consensus in gravioribus Reipubl. negotiis primas semper detulit partes. Hinc ad maximos Europæ Principes Legatus missus, Fidei et Eloquentiæ, Dux ad Illiricos fines tuendos electus, Vigilantiæ et Fortitudinis, bis maritimæ Classis Imperator dictus, providi et excelsi animi, Cretæ insulæ Provisor, rectius Dictator factus studii et sapientiæ. Semper et ubique domi, foris, pace, bello, togatus, armatus, Justitiæ, Prudentiæ, Pietatis, et virtutum omnium egregium exemplar sese exhibuit. Tot igitur, tantisque encomiis clarus, Coelum petiit, anno 1602. Jo. Baptista filius D. Marci Proc. ad paternæ gloriæ metam proprius adspirans posteriorum incitamento P.*”

V.

LETTERS OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA TO DON
RODRIGO DE MENDOZA, WRITTEN IN THE NETHER-
LANDS, 1576-1578.

I. LUXEMBURG, Nov. 5, 1576.

Don John's journey to Luxemburg—Unpromising aspect of affairs in the Netherlands.

YOU will have heard of my arrival at Paris from Antonio Perez, to whom I wrote all that had happened up to that time. From thence the day after I pursued my journey with all haste, which was necessary, because I had been seen and recognized by all the ambassador's servants, by whom the secret could not be long kept. So I had neither time to wait, nor dared to delay; but pushed on day and night, though the roads were so villainous and so infested with plague that I had to make great circuits, and to ride the same horse for two days, which greatly increased the fatigue of the journey. At last, thank God, I reached this place on the 3d of this month, and found the worst possible tidings of these Provinces; for only this one in which I am [Luxemburg] and Friseland, of which Robles has charge, can certainly be said to have withstood revolt. The rest are leagued together and calling out troops and [seeking] foreign aid against the Spaniards, and making and repealing laws in their own fashion, all these things being done under the name and in behalf of the King, whose name is also used while they are taking steps to admit Orange into Brussels and fitting up a house for him there.

I have written to the Council in general, and to some of its members in particular, of my having come. I know not what the reply may be, nor whether they will receive me, but am waiting to hear this and other things, which Antonio Perez will be able to tell better than I can as yet. Such is the miserable condition of affairs here, which may God remedy, for He only can do it. I am in great anxiety to hear of news from home

entender lo que se haze despues que me partí en lo que yo concertava entre Vm. y su hermano por que como es cosa que toca tanto á esa casa [a] que yo tanto bien y descanso deseo, poneme en mucho cuydado y querria saber que se concluye; escrivamelo y de letra que me lo declare.

Al duque me encomiendo y que de mi lo que digo y lo que alla entendera es lo que le puedo escrivir que del y su salud espero las nuevas que pretendo. A nuestro Orgacio hago saber, que si Marina bayla en casa de Antonio Perez, que paga lo que holgo en esta tierra adonde sueña todos sus amigos y se halla entre estraños, y aunque no es esto lo peor de lo que se padeçe que me tenga lastima como á tan su amigo en lugar de la que no le tengo á el, pues deve holgarse si me cree á medida de lo que no me huelgo yo.

Que Otavio viene muy deshecho de nalgas y lo mismo le acaesçiera á su señoria si vbiera dormido tan poco, corrido tanto, y pasado por lo que nosotros, que ybamos llamando muchas vezes A! don Rodrigo, A! éonde de Orgaz. A mi dama beso las manos y que la prometo que era ella de las mas llamadas, y la mas escojida en mi memoria y que asi lo será pagando á lo que me figuro devo á la suya, que la suplico me escriba como se halla sin la presencia de su galan, tras que la hago saber que ál fin ella pasa lo que entre ausentes se siente; y no declaro lo que es por que tanto lo sabra sentir, quanto supiere ser mi amiga, que yo la escriviré con otro; mas que pues no puedo agora, la imbio siquiera estas nuevas que la doy demi para obligarla á, recebirlas yo della, y mire que como va la imbie este recado.

A mi tuerta beso las manos y no digo los ojos hasta que yo la escriba á ella, que se le acuerde deste su amigo que lo es agora suyo, y tan grande que no puede en esta parte ni tiene mas que ofrecerla por pago de los que la devo, y que este recado va tan en seso por que desde tan lexos asi ha de yr. A nuestra prima no se las beso por que lo haga su primo sin compañía de nadie, pues para esto ninguna puede ser buena; que bien la acuerdo se acuerde de darme la quenta que deve de mi mayor amigo, á quien guarde Dios y dé lo que puede y yo le suplico. De Lucembure (*sic*) á 5 de Nöbre 76.

DON JN^o DE AUSTRIA.

El sobre dice:

Al Señor Don Rodrigo de
(borrado) terda adelantado
en su mano.

and what is said there about my flight, and especially what has been done since my departure in the affair which I concerted between you and your brother, and which, being a matter of such moment to a house whereunto I desire all good and peace, gives me much anxiety. As I desire to know what has been concluded, write it to me, and with all fulness, that I may comprehend it clearly.

Commend me to the Duke, and [say] that of me which I say, and what there I shall understand is that which I can write to him; and of him and his health I hope for such news as I desire. I wish to inform our Orgacio that if Marina dances in the house of Antonio Perez, she is paying for her amusements in this country, where she was mistress of all her friends, whereas she is now among strangers; and that although this is not the worst fate one can suffer, he ought to pity me, who am so much his friend, instead of me pitying him for amusing himself far more than I myself am able to do.

Ottavio [Gonzaga] has arrived with buttocks much worn, and the same thing might have happened to your lordship had you slept as little and ridden as much as we, and gone through what we have undergone and are still undergoing, often calling upon [or invoking] Don Rodrigo and the Count of Orgaz. I kiss the hand of my lady, and I promise her she was amongst those most called for [or invoked], and the most cherished in my memory, and ever shall be, as is due to her own remembrance [of me]. I entreat her to write how she finds herself without the presence of her lover; and moreover I inform her that what she feels is neither more nor less than absent lovers usually feel. I do not go into further explanations, because her own feeling of it will be in proportion to her true love for me. I will write to her at greater length by another [courier], but as I cannot do so now, I send her what news of me I can, to oblige her to send me news in return of herself, and let her take notice of the way in which this half-message is sent to her.

Of my one-eyed [lady] I kiss the hands, I do not say the eyes, until I can write to her myself to bid her remember this friend of hers, who is now so entirely her own, that he cannot in these parts offer, nor has the means to offer, her payment of all he owes her. And [I wish her also to know] that this message of mine is couched in such cautious language, because it is well that it should be so shaped, being sent from so great a distance. Of our cousin I do not kiss the [hands], because her cousin may do it [in my name] without witnesses, since for this [business] none can be so good as he. Let her bear in mind that she is to answer to me for the happiness of my greatest friend, whom may God keep, and grant him [all] that He can give and I can pray for.

From Luxemburg, 5th Nov^r 1576.

DON JN^o DE AUSTRIA.

Address on the back :

To the Señor Don Rodrigo [name blotted] Adelantado—in his hand.

II. MARCHÉ-EN-FAMINE, FEB. 17, 1577.

Negotiations with the Estates—His private sorrows.

VNA de dos, ó todos los correos de España son muertos, ó todos se an perdido despues de despachados, porque de razon asi ha de ser en el tiempo que a que no he tenido cartas de alla, de Vm. á lo menos. Bien se yo que a casi tres meses que ni pename el amor, y quiera Dios no sea por lo que pena ; pero no creo que es por lo que pudiera temerse sino hubiera andado fuera de la corte ya donde tan poco se deve aver sabido las vezes que se me a despachado. Y porque de los caminos no sé que prometerme, quiero avisar en esta de que le escrivi con un correo que imbie á los 22 de diziembre, y fue una carta para mi dama, como agora va tambien ese pliego para ella : deste y de esotro y de los demas que fuere recibiendo me vaya avisando que asi lo hare yo. Ora quanto á lo de aca dire poco, remitido en lo mas á lo que se entendera de esotros pliegos grandes. En sustancia, la paz está hecha en nombre de su Magestad entre mi y los estados, y si bien no han sido las condiciones della como se a deseado y travajado, avemos llegado á do se a podido que es el termino de los Reyes, al in (*sic*) en la religion y obediencia salua como lo esta, lo demas el tiempo lo a de dar y espero en Dios que lo yra dando muy apriesa, y que con esto se pueda dezir que como hallados á caso se a de hazer cuenta destos estados, por que si por armas lo llevaramos (como muchas vezes ha estado roto) lo mejor que nos pudiera suçeder fuera la ruyna total y perpetua desta tierra, y lo peor Dios lo sabe, y los jentes lo adivinan, viendo la nececidad y estrechez de los tiempos.

Pues estos mismos como digo y el yr acomodando las cosas poco á poco, daran á lo ultimo esto ganado de tan perdido come lo hallé sabe Dios por culpa de quanto, y de quien prinçipalmente. Yo le doy graçias que me veo despidiendo jentes y deshaziendo prevenciones de guerra que ya tenia muy adelante, y en esto empeçamos á ocuparnos agora los estados yo (*sic*) ; ello los Españoles salen y tras ellos me llevan el alma, que encantado querria estar antes que tal ver. A Dios se lo perdone al brujazo que alla está que del naçe tanto daño ; entre los tratos que ha avido entre estos hombres y mi (*sic*) me han puesto en tantas ocasiones de perder la paçiencia que, aunque he tenido algunas vezes infinita otras, al fin no he podido, y heles atropellado diziendoles lo que son, y lo que mereçen de manera que de todo punto nos avemos hecho inutilis los unos á los otros. Ellos me temen y tienen por colerico, y yo les aborrezco y tengo por muy grandissimos bellacos y asi es menester que luego salga yo y venga otro, porque no nos veamos çierto entre algun nuevo desconçierto que dañe. Alla lo escribo muy apretadamente, tengalo para si solo, que yo no puedo ni quiero estar mas aca, pues por graçia de Dios hize á lo que vine que es aver echado como seme hordenó las armas de aqui quando tan en mano andavan de unos y de otros.

II. MARCHÉ-EN-FAMINE, FEB. 17, 1577.

Negotiations with the Estates—His private sorrows.

ONE out of two, or all the posts of Spain are dead, or all are lost since despatched, for this must be so, considering the long time since I have had letters from thence, from you. At least I well know that for about three months I have been tormented by love, and please God, that it may not be in its usual way of tormenting; although I really believe that the cause [of the silence] is not that which might be feared, but only that I have been lately very much out of the capital and in places where it was not easy to know how many times I had been written to [officially]. And as I cannot answer for the roads, I may as well here advise you that I wrote by a courier whom I despatched on the 22d of December, and that there was a letter from my lady, as now there is also this sheet for her. Of this and the others and the rest which I ought to have received, let me be advised, as I also will do to you. Now as to affairs here I will say little. Referring [you] for the most part to the other long letters (the public despatches?), in substance the peace has been made in His Majesty's name between me and the States, and if the conditions of it are not such as might have been desired and as I strove to obtain, yet we have arrived at what was possible, which is the goal of Kings. In fine, religion and obedience being saved as is the case, the rest time must show you, and I hope in God it will show it quickly; and with this, one may account these States as things recovered by chance; for if we were [to attempt to] carry the day by arms (as many times there has been mischance) the best that could happen to us would be the total and perpetual ruin of this country, and the worst, God knows [what it might be], and the people foresee it, seeing the necessity and straitness of the times.

Yet, as I said before, time and circumstances and things settling themselves little by little will give us in the end this gain from out of what seemed, when I came here, so great a loss, God knows by the fault of how many, or of whom chiefly. I owe him thanks that I am now myself dismissing people (soldiers?) and undoing preparations for war, which I had in a state of some forwardness; and in this we begin to occupy ourselves, the States (and) I. The Spaniards are going away, and they carry my soul with them, for I had rather be enchanted than see this happen. It is for God to pardon the sorcery which goes on yonder, and from which springs so much evil. In the meetings which have been held between these men and me, they have driven me on so many occasions to lose my temper, that although I have kept it in countless cases, yet there have been others when I have lost it, and have rated them roundly, telling them what they are and what they deserve, so that on every point we made ourselves useless to one another. They fear me and consider me a choleric person; and I abhor them and consider them very great scoundrels; and so it is needful now that I should go and another come [in my place], for so sure as we meet it is certain a new disagreement will arise, and do mischief. I have therefore written home very urgently—let

A nuestro conde figuro ay para quien hago tambien esta misma carta, poretenga la por suya. Como el es de los diablos si esos angeles tienen con el la parte que suelen, guay de mí que quanto a que llegué á esta tierra, demas de otros infinitos trabajos, puedo dezir que he estado preso, pues nunca he salido de dos aposentos en los lugares adonde he mandado, y allí mediando (*sic*) dias y noches, pues á fe que la vida que espero, que no es qual se la dio quien es causa de la que paso. Señores, escrivanme mas que lo hazen por su vida, y diganme que se dize y trata alla de nuestros trabajos, á los quales solo falta ser desagradecidos para ser de todo punto inoportunos (*sic*). A la prima digo sin besarla ni aun la ropa, que solamente á ella, y á don Rodrigo su señor, y á ese gordo de Orgacio, no maldigo si se huelgan, y á todo el mundo si, sin eçetucion de nadie; mas ¡o que día este y estos para no holgarme yo! porque haze mañana un año justo que me despedí para in eterno de la amiga á quien mas quise, y mayor amor tendre toda mi pobre vida, y así estoy agora sin otra memoria que deste caso para hazer la pena tanto mayor, y es verdad como su muerte que casi como quando la vi, seme atraviesan los tragos que trague, O tengala Dios adonde confio, que es solo (*sic*) el contento que dexo. Si ubieren llegado alla prendas tuyas mirenme mucho por ellas, y escrivanmelo todo, que todo me lo deven á mí. Al duque no escrivo porque no puedo çierto. Pero á lo menos escrivale Vm. este cuydado que le ofrezco quando mas no puedo.

Orgacio amigo, si don Rodrigo no escribe mejor que suele, no me escrivais vos por vida mia sino copíame su carta, por que la entienda y la lea, y despues meteos su letra adonde la borreis bien, por que entienda como la haze. Adios mis amigos, de Marché á 17 de hebrero 1577.

DON JN^o DE AUSTRIA.

Conde hermano: solicitame la respuesta de mi dama, que de ese hombre no fio agora sino sus cuydados, y acuseme Vm. si son mayores que fueron, que iguales o menores solo la de Guadalupe lo puede aver hecho, y si tuviere por penitencia esta comision, acordaos quan hos hizo por esta +.

El sobre dice:

Al Señor do Rodrigo, heb?

this be a secret between us—that I neither can nor will remain here any longer, since I have, by God's grace, accomplished that for which I came, which was to put an end to the war, according to the orders given me, when both parties were ready ranked one against the other.

As I suppose our Count is with you, I write this same letter also for him, wherefore let him consider it as his own. How can he be one of the devils, if the angels about him hold with him their wonted converse? Ah, woe is me! for from the moment I set foot in this country, besides other infinite troubles, I may say that I have been a prisoner, for never have I stirred out of my two rooms in the places where I have been, but have spent my days and nights there; nor is the life I expect [to lead] such as he leads who is the cause of what is taking place. Sirs, on your lives [I charge you to] write to me more, and more fully, than you have done, and tell me what is said and thought yonder of our labours by people who, if they add [to their other faults] that of ingratitude, want nothing more to become in all respects intolerable. To my cousin I say, without kissing even her robe, that to her only, and to Don Rodrigo her lord and to that fat Orgacio, do I not grudge their happiness, if they are happy, which I do, without exception, to all the rest of mankind. But what a time this is for my talking of happiness, when it is just a year to-morrow since I took leave for ever of her whom I most dearly loved, and shall love during my miserable life! Even now I can think of nothing else but that event, and, to say the truth, my grief is almost as great as that which I suffered when she died, and I feel the choking in my throat which I felt when I heard of her death. May God keep her where I trust she is, this [hope] being the only happiness she left behind her. If any of her effects have arrived yonder [at Court] let them be well taken care for, and write to me all [you hear], which is but due to me from you. I do not write to the Duke, because in truth I cannot. But do you, at least, write to him offering my good wishes, since I cannot do more.

Friend Orgacio, if Don Rodrigo does not write better than is his wont, do not, by my life, write to me yourself, but copy me his letter so that I may understand and read it, and then put his original scrawl where you may blot it handsomely, that he may perceive what sort of a hand he writes. Adieu, my friends. From Marché, 17th of February 1577.

DON JN^o DE AUSTRIA.

Brother Count, try and obtain for me a reply from my lady, for now I have no trust in that man except that he will cause me troubles, and pray inform me whether these [troubles] are greater than what I had before, for if they are less or only no greater it is only to our Lady of Guadalupe I shall owe it; and if you should consider this commission a penance remember him who made you by this +.

Addressed on the back :

To Señor Don Rodrigo, heb?

III. LUXEMBURG, Oct. 29, 1577.

Efforts for Don Rodrigo's promotion to a command and advice to him—Necessity of caution in their communications—Don Rodrigo's marriage to his niece—Disorderly conduct of one of Don John's officers, brother of his lady.

MIL años ha que no escrivo y mil años ha que no puedo hazerlo por ser tantas y tan varias las fortunas que he corrido, que no ha auido cosa á que no me haya visto obligado, unas vezes apretadisimo de tiempos, otras de enemigos, las mas de los propios amigos, y irresoluciones desa corte, y otras de poca salud, porque la traygo muy al propio compañera de mis trabajos. Quedo agora rehaciendome de nueva purga y sangrias que he auido menester, de apretado como digo que he andado estas dias, y asi no podré ponerme á volver á ler las ultimas ni primeras cartas de Vm. para responder á ellas, mayormente siendo la letra qual ya savemos. Diré pues en pocas palabras que si quiere lo que me escrivo y lo desea lo que yo, que se ayude por su parte, que, por la mia quanto me es posible hago desde aca, no solo en los oficios que se abran entendido largamente de Escovedo, pero en los que he ido continuando hasta con este correo, con el qual escrivo á su Mag^d. y amigos lo que me sera merced y servicio suyo que avia de desir, primero que la reciba don Rodrigo, en lo de la cavalleria, en cuyo cargo (dexando á una banda passion y deseo de su presencia) digo que estará tambien puesto y tan honrradamente de presente, que si bien queremos todos mirarlo hallaremos que sera otra cosa que dexarse holvidar ay, sin mas honrra ni provecho de la que se gana en pasos tan continuos y de tan hordenaria grandeza; y como la que yo deseo á Vm. es de amigo que le quiere quanto el mismo sabe, no me contento con que se haga conocer solamente, adonde por qualquiera facil ocasion se perderá la memoria con el hombre. Que esto acaece á los que se contentan de morir adonde nacen. Tras esto si obiere quien trate de otra manera de resolucion, yo me reporto, no dando ventaja al deseo ni voluntad de nadie quanto á lo que yo entendiére ser bien y reputacion de don Rodrigo de Mendoça, que es solamente lo que veo que hasta agora tiene que agradecerme, de lo que me pesa y no poco.

Ora vuelvo á dezir que segun el intento que llevare en este particular y el consejo del duque, siendo tan de amigo y verdadero hermano, se ayude y apriete, que yo cierto lo e hecho y hago con la eficacia y veras que escrivo; y aunque antes de la respuesta desta espero tener aviso de

III. LUXEMBURG, OCT. 29, 1577.

Efforts for Don Rodrigo's promotion to a command and advice to him—Necessity of caution in their communications—Don Rodrigo's marriage to his niece—Disorderly conduct of one of Don John's officers, brother of his lady.

IT is a thousand years since I have written, and a thousand years since I have been able to write, so many and various fortunes have I gone through that there is nothing that I have not been compelled to do; often being pushed by time, often by enemies, chiefly by my own friends and the irresolutions of the Court, often by bad health, which I also bear about with me as the appropriate companion of my cares. I am now recovering from more purging and bleeding, which have been necessary, and from the pressure of these last few days, and even now I cannot turn and look over your letters, last and first, to see what to reply to, especially the writing being what we know it is. I will therefore say, in very few words, that if you really wish what you write about, and are as anxious about it as I am myself, you must help yourself on your side, since I am doing on mine all that is possible, not only through the instructions given to Escovedo, and of which there must be by this time full cognisance at Court, but also through those which I have kept sending ever since, and have even repeated by this last courier; writing to His Majesty and friends, how I consider this [your appointment] to be for his royal service, at the same time that it is a favour conferred on myself; and instructing the same [Escovedo] as to what he is to say [to the King] before Don Rodrigo is favoured with the generalship of the cavalry, a charge which, leaving aside all passionate affection, and the desire for your presence in these parts, I am sure he [Don Rodrigo] will fill so honourably and so well, that if we choose to consider the matter attentively we shall find it a very different thing from the life he [Don Rodrigo] is now leading, allowing himself to be forgotten in those parts without more honour or profit than that which is to be gained in perpetual commonplace affairs. And as my wishes for you are those of a friend who loves you, as you ought to know by this time, I am not satisfied that you should only make yourself known where the least common accident may put an end to man and his memory [after him], which is the general fate of those who are contented to die wherever they are born. However, if there be any one who may devise a better resolution [in this affair], I shall refrain [from urging mine], but yielding to no person whatever in good-will and desire for your welfare, and what I hold to be advantageous for the reputation of Don Rodrigo de Mendoza; this [good-will] being the only thing for which as yet he owes me any gratitude, which grieves me not a little.

And now I again say that, according to the intentions you may have in this particular, and the advice of the Duke (which cannot fail to be that of a good friend and true brother), you must help yourself and use all [his endeavours to obtain that charge], since on my part I have done all I

lo que se abrá resuelto, con todos erá bien embiramela tanto mas si es como la que yo querria, en el qual caso no se me detenga ni repare en nada, sino bengase luego por la via de Ytalia que es la que a mi juizio deve seguir porque con esto y su presencia se venceran las dificultades que por ventura se ofreceran allá, en que y hallo ó ningunas ó pocas, aunque no trayga gran dinero, que es lo que mas cuesta y á las vezes menos se a de mirar. Fuera desto bien se me puede creer que tambien llevó Escovedo bien á memoria á nuestro conde, y que si viniese por acá pensaria no faltarme nada; mas no sé cierto como nos hagamos en cosa mas señalada que se abrá entendido del, porque ni la veo aunque la busco, ni en efecto la ay de presente. Es verdad que me parece que si viniendo Vm. viene el, nos descubrira el tiempo alguno ocasion de abraçar, y por ventura aun mas presto de lo que se confia en la apariencia, porque lo de acá pide grandes cosas y en ellas ando por hallar al conde; digaselo de mi parte y que tras tener esto por propio, lo haze muy mal en no escrevirme tanto a, si ya no tiene allá quien lo haga peor con el, aunque lo mas cierto será hazerlo el con ella. Volviendo pues á responder á lo principal que me ha quedado en memoria, digo que quanto al otro particular que ya dexé empeçado y quedó á cargo del arçobispo que es de Toledo, di tambien precisa comision á Escovedo que lo tratase en mi nombre y con las veras y á los tiempos que le fuese advertido. Creo que lo abrá hecho y deseo mucho entender en que està, y lo que se promete en ello, porque hasta agora por otras cosas que no me a podido escrevir Escovedo, veo claro lo mismo desta. No menos que lo de arriba holgaré de entender qué tenemos en lo del Adelantamiento, que lo veo helado, ó no oygo que suene nada, quando con la muerte del que lo era lo he juzgado yo por muy mas llano. Antes de holvidarme devo acordar que si permite dios que se siga el vernos, no se prende sobre tiniente, porque lo herraria Vm. si le tomase por intercesion á obligacion de nadie, y no por la pura necesidad que tendrá de tenerle tan chapado, como es menester para su honrra y la mia, y este creo que le hallará entre la propia cavalleria, con que satisfará tanto mas á los que ha de mandar, que importa mucho.

Al duque no escrivo y hagolo muy mal en no hazerlo. Disculpeme

could do, and still continue to work in that direction, with the same zeal and sincerity with that which I am now writing. And although before the answer to this letter reaches me I hope to be fully informed of what has been decided in the matter, yet it will be advisable to let me know as soon as possible, especially if the decision is such as I wish it to be. Such being the case, you are not to delay or be hindered by any obstacle whatever, but are to come immediately, by way of Italy, which is, in my opinion, the best you can take, because with this [speedy departure] and your presence here (*allá*) any chance difficulties there may easily be surmounted; and, indeed, I see none at present, or very few, though you may bring but little money, which is the hardest thing to obtain and at times the last to be looked for. I ought, moreover, to be believed when I say that Escovedo took with him a good recommendation and memorial of our Count [Orgaz], and that, if he also chanced to come here (*acá*) I might imagine that nothing more was wanting [for my happiness]; but, in truth, I do not know how we can procure [for him] a better thing or higher charge than that [of which you will have heard from himself]; and you must have known from him, because I, although I look for it, cannot discover any; and, in fact, there is none [vacant] at present. Yet it seems to me that if he comes with you time will show us some opportunity that we may seize, perhaps much sooner then we have reason to expect from appearances; because the affairs of this country demand great deeds, and in these there may be an opening for the Count. Pray tell me so in my name, and that, besides taking this [wish of mine] as his own [desert], he is very wrong in not having written to me long ago; unless it be that he has by his side some one who treats him worse still [than he does me]; although I very much suspect that it is he who ill-treats her. And now, in answer to the chief part [of your letter] which remains in my memory, I will say, with regard to the other matter, that I left the affair commenced and in charge of the Archbishop, who now is, of Toledo; and that I also gave strict directions to Escovedo to treat of the matter in my name with all zeal, and at such opportunities as he might be advised. I believe he has done so by this time, and I long to know how matters stand, and what hopes of success he has, because up to the present time, on account of other business about which Escovedo has been unable to write, I conclude that he has nothing to report [about this affair]. I shall likewise be equally glad to hear that we are advancing in the matter of the *Adelantamiento*, which seems to me to be quite at a standstill, since I hear nothing stirring about it, when I had reason to believe that by the death of him who held the charge the thing would be much easier of attainment. Before I forget, I must caution you that, if God grant we meet here, you ought not to engage any lieutenant [before you come]; for you will do wrong if you take one because you are asked to do so, or for the sake of obliging any person whatever, instead of only considering the absolute necessity of having about you a skilful officer such as your own reputation and mine requires. I believe you will find such a person in the cavalry itself, which will be so much the more satisfactory to those whom you are to command, a matter of much consequence.

I do not write to the Duke by this post, and I am very wrong in not

esta vez, que con otro lo hare despues de tener un poco de mayor luz de la que obiere por allá, pues han de depender dello escritos, dichos y hechos, como él sabe. Dele Vm. bien este recado de mi parte demas que presupongo que le toca casi la mayor parte de lo que escrivo.

Y porque se halle tanto mas presto lo a que se a de responder, y en algunas cosas podria hazerlo de mano agena en tiempo que de la mia no es posible, sino fuese por no fiar nuestros gustos de otro que no los aya tratado, será bueno dexarlos siempre en nuestras cartas para lo ultimo y aun que venga lo que se tratare desto en pliego aparte, aunque esta prevencion holgaria yo que valiese por no dada á condicion que al llegar desta estubiesemos seguros de mi pretension.

¡ Guay de mi para con primo y prima, pues debaxo amistad trato lo que yo me sé del que ama ! por todo he pasado, y así veo que por todo ha de pasar el obligado á ello, mayormente tras tantos años de bien logrado que no parecieran agora tan largos como un dia de apercibiros para un triste despedida. A osadas que lo sabe bien el desventurado que lo a provado á costa de lo que supo sentir el mismo que lo ubo de padecer, y así veo a lo que me pongo en lo que trato, hasta que el tiempo haga lo que escrivia por las paredes el marques viejo de las Navas, que ô el lo cura todo, ó alfin lo pone del todo, y que sea la verdad desidlo vos mi Orgacio, que saveis de tiempo y de todo, y savemos que hos curara con ponerlos del todo. Ese pliego para mi dama haga encaminar seguramente como los pasados veo que lo an ydo. Hanlo venido tambien hasta agora las que me a imbiado suyas que no es poco, ni huelgo poco dello. Danme en verdad mucha pena sus melancholias, aunque como tan mi amiga que la meresco serme, no me deven tocar la menor parte dellas, pero si tan caro la ha de costar y tanto la quiero, yo mas quiero de una tan grande amiga su salud y el contento que su memoria en su daño, par mas y mas provecho mio que sea. Digala esto y que estoy muy sentido de su hermano y con gran razon, pues me a obligado á procurar otra resolucion de la que tenia tomado en quedarse, por aver dado una cuchillada, tras auer dicho malas palabras á un gentilhombre flamenco de los que me siguen, que es muy bueno para en el tiempo presente, y el respeto y caricias con que yo los trato y conviene hazerlo merecerlo ellos, y por la consecuencia de los otros.

Deseo tener nuevas de la yda á palacio de mi belucha, y de que aya sido y aya parecido como me pareciera á mi, por ser lo que se vera tratandola. Ella deve yr bien llena de regalo de en casa de la señora duquesa que deve aver recebido en ella, y no la abran hecho pequeño provecho los dias della para en palacio. A su padre querria ver que su Magestad

doing so. Make my excuses to him for this time, and tell him that I will write by another courier, when I have ascertained what is going on at Court, since writing words and facts must depend on the information I may receive, as he well knows. Be very careful to give him this message from me, for I believe I may assume that the greater part of what I here write [in this letter] touches him very nearly.

And in order that those parts [of our letters] to which an immediate answer is required should be the sooner found, and also because I may be compelled to use my secretary's hand at times, when it is impossible for me to write (were it not for the consideration of not entrusting our secrets to persons who have no knowledge of them), it will be advisable always to leave such matters for the end of our letters, and even to treat them in a separate communication ; although I would willingly hear that this warning of mine has become entirely useless, provided on the arrival of this letter we might be sure of having gained our common object.

God help me with the two cousins, since I dare treat in a friendly and confidential manner of what I well know of him who loves. I have myself gone through all that, and therefore I think that whoever is in his position must needs go through it, especially after so many years of unaltered happiness, which for sure will not seem to him half as long as one day of preparation for a sad leave-taking. Certainly, the wretched man who has tasted [the pains of love] knows this well, at the expense of what he felt. I see, therefore, what risk I run, until Time has accomplished that sentence which the old Marquess of Las Navas used to write on the walls [of his palace] viz. that "Time is the cure of all things or the end of everything." Whether this axiom be true or not, you had better, dear Orgazio, tell us, for you are a good judge as to time and other things, and we all know that he [Time] will cure you by coming to an end with you. This letter for my lady I beg you to forward, as I know you have done with the last. Those which you have hitherto sent me, coming from her, have reached me safe ; which is no small matter [considering the insecurity of the roads], and I am very happy that it is so. Yet, in truth, her melancholy gives me much pain ; being such a friend of mine (as I deserve that she should be), her sorrows ought in no small degree to be mine also. But if she is to pay so dearly for it, and, loving her as I do, I would rather be assured of her good health and happiness than of her affectionate remembrance of me, precious as that is to me, if it is to be to her own hurt. Tell her so, and that I am very much displeased with her brother, and with good reason, for he has compelled me to change my resolution as to keeping him here, having stabbed one of the Flemish gentlemen attached to my person, besides insulting him with abusive language. The said gentleman is a very good officer, as times go, and he and his companions have been treated by me with courtesy and kindness, as is fitting, both because they deserve it and because of its effect with the rest.

I long to be informed of my *belucha* having gone into the palace, and that she has been found [as handsome and well behaved] as she would have seemed to me on such occasion, for I am sure her qualities are such that she will improve upon acquaintance. She no doubt takes with her a good store of loving gifts from the Duchess's house, and the days she has

se serviese de él en lo en casa de su hijo, por ser cierto propio en ello, dandole con que en recompensa de lo que dexa y lo mucho que ha que sirve. Buena carta de convaliente es esta, pero escribiendo á un amigo se pica el hombre, como se da al diablo escribiendo á quien no lo es por cumplimento. El jaéz negro deseo que venga, si està acavado, y aun si hubiere otro lindo holgara de comprarle para dar por aca. Cavallos seran harto menester para todo; tiempo es agora de imbiarme los que quedaron alla por mios, y aun los demas que he escrito á Escovedo y adios. De Lucembure á 29 de Otubre 1577.

DON JN^o DE AUSTRIA.

Resoluime despues de escrita esta de escribir al duque la que va con ella de mano ajena dandole un poco de cuenta de mi y de lo de acá. De lo demas Vm. se là podrà dar y embiarle esa carta.

Sobre :—Al Ill^{te} Señor, el Señor

Don RODRIGO DE MENDOÇA.

IV. LUXEMBURG, JAN. 1, 1578.

Excuses Escovedo's apparent neglect of Don Rodrigo's interest—Don Rodrigo's desire for employment, and his marriage.

Por la priesa con que parte este correo, y tener Dios sabe quanto que hazer no respondere agora á la de 28 de Noviembre, aunque quisiera harto hazerlo mas particularmente que podre. Dize bien que estoy mas que maravillado de lo que Vm. me escribe del no averle hablado Escovedo no digo una sino mil vezes sobre lo que tan á cargo llevó y tantas le he despues escrito : atribuyalo cierto, Señor don Rodrigo, no tanto á falta de voluntad, como al demasiado trabajo que pasa en esa corte por no poder acavar de negociar lo que tanto y tanto nos conbiene alla y aca, por que al fin los hombres discontentos y fatigados llegan á holvidarse aun de si propios, Escovedo lo anda y con razon, pues en su nombre y en el mio la tiene grandisima para estarlo; con todo quisiera yo que obiera mostrado el cuydado de lo que toca á Vm. que sabe me dexó y tengo, y creo de verdad que para con su Magestad le habrá tenido muy mayor de lo que ha savido mostrar fuera de alli; y porque no puedo negar muchas obligaciones en que me an puesto los trabajos de Escovedo padeçidos en mi presençia y por mi horden, y que no le deva lo mucho que me a descansado en los mios, y con esto otras cosas tales, confieso que me pesaria en gran manera, si viese ó entendiese qualquiera desavenimiento entre el y mi mayor amigo, y asi me ha de hazer esta graçia el señor don Rodrigo

passed under her roof must prove very serviceable to her for her future life in the palace. I should very much like to hear that His Majesty employs her father in the household of his son [the Prince], for certainly he is very apt for any employment of that kind, and the King might thus compensate him for that which he leaves, and reward his long and good services. This is a fair letter for a convalescent, but writing to a friend spurs one on, just as one gives oneself to the devil, when writing to those who are not friends, out of mere compliment. I desire that the black horse furniture, if it is finished, should come hither; and if there is any other pretty thing of the same kind to be had, I would be glad to buy it to give as a present here. Horses I shall also want, for all kinds of service. Now is the time to send me those that remain yonder of my own, and also those about which I have written to Escovedo. And so, adieu.

From Luxemburg, the 29th of October 1577.

DON JN^o DE AUSTRIA.

Since writing this, I have resolved to write to the Duke the letter, written by the hand of another, which goes with this, giving him an account of myself and of affairs here. Of the rest you can inform him, and send him this letter.

IV. LUXEMBURG, JAN. 1, 1578.

Excuses Escovedo's apparent neglect of Don Rodrigo's interest—Don Rodrigo's desire for employment, and his marriage.

ON account of the haste with which the courier is departing, and my having God knows how much to do, I will not answer now your letter of the 28th November, although I am very anxious to do it, more particularly as I am, I may well say, astonished at that which you write to me, about Escovedo not having spoken, I will not say once, but a thousand times to you, of the matter which was so specially in his charge, about which I have since so often written to him. I certainly attribute this, Don Rodrigo, not so much to a want of will as to the excessive anxiety which he undergoes at Court, from not being able to conclude the negotiations about the affair which so very deeply concerns us both there and here, [anxiety] by which at last men, wearied and discontented, arrive at forgetting even their own selves. Thus it is with Escovedo; he is wearied out, and much reason there is for it, both on his own account and my own. Yet, with all this, I wish he had taken all possible care of the business which concerns your interest, and which he knows you entrusted to me, and that I keep always in mind; yet, in truth, I believe that as far as His Majesty is concerned he [Escovedo] has been more careful and attentive in this matter than he has been able to show out of the palace; and because I cannot deny the many obligations laid upon me by the labours of Escovedo

pues lo es, que no pase con el cosa, que no sea antes para mayor confirmacion de amistad, porque çierto me daria mucha pena que obiese mas que esto entre un tan grande mi amigo y una persona á quien quiero lo que realmente devo á Escovedo. Demanda es por çierto muy justa la que hago y tanto que no dudo un punto de alcançarla por lo que me importa á mi, que es infinito. Quanto á lo demas bien sabe Vm. que no he deseado cosa tanto como verle adelante en lo que le estoviese mejor, y asi le digo delante de Dios que lo e procurado siempre con aquellas veras que lo que mas puedo desear para mi propio. Yo jugava quando estuve en esa corte las dos vezes que he estado de vuelta de Ytalia (*sic*) que una de las cosas que mas convenian á sus partes y calidad, era emplearse en lo que haze á los hombres mas conoçidos por tales, mayormente en compaña de quien no faltará á buen seguro en nada de lo que le tocará; pero esto vemos que sucede por muchas vias, y asi es cordura allegarse á la mas segura y de mejor fundamento; y pues lo que toca á lo del casamiento lo trata el duque tan de veras, y como tan buen hermano y cavallero y amigo, eso juzgo y juzgaré siempre por lo mejor y que merezca la mayor instançia, por que estotro fuera bueno para un interin y para poner en nueva obligaçion á su Magestad no solo en lo presente mas aun en consideraçion para lo avenir pues un año de (*sic*) leçion en don Rodrigo de Mendoça mereçe despues un lugar de los mas prinçipales que se proveen; y asi per esto he deseado y lo que se a visto, mas aviendo llegado las cosas tan adelante, y las de la suçesion de su casa á tanta neçesidad no ay que poner por agora el intento en otra alguna, sino agradar al duque en lo que tambien esta á todos, para lo qual pluguiera á Dios pudiera yo desde aca, lo que desde cerca y lexos quisiera poder, pero á lo menos no faltaré en mi posible pues trataré antes de pasarle que de quedarme atras en tal demanda; y por que como digo la priesa deste despacho me obliga á corta escritura reservaré para con otro el usar de todas mis dilijençias para con su Magestad y arçobispo y los demas que viere conbenir: sería bueno avisarme de alla quienes pareçe que devan ser estos y lo demas que biniere á cuento de la materia, y así nos suçeda todo como lo deseo yo. A Otavio (*sic*) se haria grande agravio si se diese á otro la cavalleria, por que demas de que la mereçe por entenderla, juntasele lo demas que es menester para el cargo, y es tan Español en entrañas como lo soy yo, que es quanto lo sabria encareçer, sino pregunten lo á estos traydores y veran por su respuesta si está bien encareçido.

undergone with me and by my orders, and that I also owe him much ease in my own work,—for these and other reasons I confess that I should be grieved in a special manner, if I should hear of any disagreement between him and my greatest friend. And so, Don Rodrigo, being my greatest friend, you must do me this favour, that you do not allow anything to stand between you and Escovedo, that may in any wise result in anything but the greater confirmation of our friendship; for surely it would give me great pain that there should be more than this between one so much my friend and a person whom I love so much, as indeed I ought to do, as Escovedo. The request which I make is quite just, and I do not doubt in the least of obtaining [what I ask], seeing it is of infinite importance to me.

As to other matters, you well know that I have desired nothing so much as to see you forward in that which may be the best for you, and so I can say before God that I have always striven for this as earnestly as I could do for myself. When I was at Court on the two occasions of my return from Italy, I judged that one of the things which best suited your parts and quality was that you should be employed in that which makes men most known for such, especially in company of him who will assuredly never fail in any duty that he undertakes, but we see that failure happens in many ways, and so it is the prudent course to choose the most secure [way] and that which has the best foundation. And as to that which relates to the affair of the marriage, [seeing that] the Duke has taken it up so earnestly and so like a good brother and gentleman and friend, that course I consider, and always will consider, the best, and that which deserves more solicitous attention; for the other course is only to be followed as a temporary expedient, and with a view to place His Majesty under new obligations for the present as well as for the future. For one year's scholarship under Don Rodrigo de Mendoza will make him [the scholar] well fitted for one of the chief charges that are to be filled up; and it is for this reason that I have taken in the affair the interest which has been seen. Things, however, having gone so far, and the accession to his house being so pressing a necessity, there is nothing else to be done for the present but to please the Duke in that which is so much for the welfare of the whole family. In order to promote this, would to God I could do from hence that which I always desire, whether near or far off. At any rate this I can say, that I shall never fail in doing all I can in this matter, and will endeavour rather to be better than worse than my word. And because, as I said before, the haste in which this courier is despatched compels me to be brief, I must reserve for another occasion the use of all my means of persuasion so far as it may seem expedient for me to employ them with His Majesty, the Archbishop, and the rest. But it is also advisable that I should be informed, from Court, who the persons are who ought to be written to, what [other] means are to be employed, and all other particulars relating to the affair. And may things turn out as I could wish them! A great insult will be done to Ottavio [Gonzaga] if the cavalry be given to any one else, for besides that he deserves it on account of his knowledge of the duties, he possesses the other requisites for the charge, and is as Spanish to the core as I am, which is the best

No escrivo esta vez á mi dama por lo dicho arriba ; no desterré á su hermano como pensé y el mereçio hazerlo, pero conmutose en que sirviese en una compañía de infanteria, en que antes le honrré que le castigué.

Ayude á lo de los cavallos que se me han de imbiar, por que es de creer que los abré harto menester, y por respuesta desta escrivame antes poco (*sic*) y despacio y legible, que mucho, á priesa y garavatos que el diablo no los leera, ni nadie bastaria sino una amiga de las que lo (*sic*) saven y pueden todo. Aqui tengo al de Parma con que estoy contentisimo, por que vale mucho, y ha de ser lo que promete su sujeto para gran servicio de su Magestad. Andamos de partida para la vuelta de nuestra jente aunque antes començaran las armas de veras por que imbio á socorrer á Roremonda ; pero seguirémoslas despues con el ayuda de Dios con mayores veras, pues casi soy forçado à combatir, y lo seré mañana por muchas razones que aunque no quieran me an de ser recebidas y tomadas en quenta segun me hallo y me tienen. A nuestro conde no escrivo hasta saber mas que sé del ; bueno anda si es á caça y en su casa ; pero mejor andava quando le caçavan á el en las ajenas. Ojo :¹ escrivirme algunas mas vezes, que lo sepa mi dama con tiempo para tener nuevas della, y de quien ella me las dará. Que quando partiran correos, nuestro Antonio lo dira, á quien devemos todos mucho, y señaladamente don Rodrigo, y yo que lo conosco agradeceré algun dia si Dios fuere servido ; el dé á Vm. quanto yo le deseo y que nos veamos en la casilla del amigo con mucho contento tras nuevos mejores años para todos que ha sido para mi el de 77. De Lucembure á 1º del mes y año de 78.

DON JNº DE AUSTRIA.

El sobre dice :

Al Illº Señor el Señor Don Rodrigo de Mendoça en su mano.

V. TIRLEMONT, FEB. 23, 1578.

Various private matters—Death of Don Diego—Notice of the victory at Gemblours and Don John's regret at not being able to prosecute it—M. de Billi sent by him on a special mission to the King—Don John's annoyance at hostile criticisms of his measures at Court.

HAME escrito el Sº Antonio Perez lo que su Magestad auia hecho sobre lo del Adelantado, y que se auia resuelto de ayudarlo muy de veras, y yo aseguro que el mismo Adelantado no se a holgado mas, porque daua ya mucha pena ver la tardança desto.

¹ Ojo is an expression equivalent to "take notice." It answers to the *eye* or the *pointing hand* used in old MSS. and printing.

thing I could say in his praise, yet these traitors are asking for the post for themselves, and they will see by the reply [they get] whether this [to be thoroughly Spanish] is held of much account.

I do not write this time to my lady for the reasons given above. I have not banished her brother as I thought of doing, and as he deserved, but [his punishment] is commuted into serving in a company of foot, in which I have rather done him honour than chastised him.

Help me in the matter of the horses which are to be sent me, for there is reason to believe that there will be great need of them; and for reply to this write to me before long, and leisurely and legibly [and not] in a hurry and in pot-hooks which the devil could not read, and no one can except a mistress, one of those who know everything and can do everything. I have the [Prince] of Parma here, of which I am very glad, for he is of great value [to me] and he will be, as his character promises, of great service to His Majesty. We are about to set out on our return to our army, although it is some time before beginning fighting in earnest, for I am going to send to succour Ruremonde; but after this [is done] we will go on, with God's help, and more in earnest still, for I am almost forced to fight, and shall be even to-morrow, for many reasons which, however unwillingly, must be accepted and taken into account, in the position in which I find myself, and affairs keep me. To our count I write only to know whether he is well, and is hunting, and at home; yet he is better when he himself is hunted in other people's houses. Now be sure to write to me more frequently, and let my lady know in time that I may have news of her, and of whomsoever she will give me [news]. As to the time of the departure of couriers, you will be told by our Antonio [Perez], to whom we all owe so much, especially Don Rodrigo. I, who knew him well, will show how grateful I am to him some day, if God be pleased to put it in my power. May He grant you all I wish for you, and permit that we may meet in our friend's snug retreat and in happiness after new and better years than the year 1577 has been to me.

From Luxemburg, 1st of the month [of January], and of the year 1578.

DON JN^o DE AUSTRIA.

V. TIRLEMONT, FEB. 23, 1578.

Various private matters—Death of Don Diego—Notice of the victory at Gemblours and Don John's regret at not being able to prosecute it—M. de Billi sent by him on a special mission to the King—Don John's annoyance at hostile criticisms of his measures at Court.

THE Señor Antonio Perez has written to me what His Majesty has done in the matter of the *Adelantado*, and I assure you the *Adelantado* himself has not been more glad of it, for the delay of this business has been giving me much pain.

Deseo saber que está acauado de cumplir, y qué es lo que me toca á mi para ayuda dello, sobre lo qual he respondido á nuestro Antonio, y escribole que se me avise de los oficios que he de hazer en Roma, pero que querria fuesen cubiertos por la consideracion que deuo al amistad antigua de la de Riela.

Escriuame pues, sobre todo, y quando tuviere que dezir cosa que le esté bien no tarde tanto en hazerlo, si me es, como le soy, amigo.

La muerte de don Diego he sentido como quien le queria mucho, y conocia lo que yo [le queria¹]. Alfin en todas partes se muere, sin que llegue á auer en ellas la guerra que tenemos agora en esta. Tengale Dios en el cielo, que si creo tendrá, si murió como me dizen, de que he holgado harto, porque sauia que lo auia menester, sino auia mejorado en algo la conciencia.

Ese pliego que va para mi dama se le encomiendo y que le reciba seguro en su mano. Su hermano a vuelto á hazer otras calaueradas, porque acordó de dar un candelero á otro sin mas proposito que tanto, y asi se ha huydo y sauidolo yo mas de seis dias despues. El, cierto, no es para seguir estos pasos, ni estos pasos para él, porque obligaria á cortar-selos á cada uno.

Creo que se abrá recebido lo que escreui de S^a Arjenton sobre la vitoria que Dios nos auia dado. El mismo Dios saue qual quedo de hallarme tan en extremo imposibilitado de no proseguir con ella tan adelante quanto se pudiera, si con auerme creydo tanto a me ubiera su Majestad proveydo como convenia, que á estarlo y aseguro que Bruselas fuera suya, y con ella la mayor parte destos payses. Pero han hecho su cuenta y asi se ponen á defendersenos vicocas de no nada, y de manera que nos hazen costar sangre de gente honrada. Y asi embio á Mos de Villi con este despacho para cerrar en no faltarme cosa por hazer, y que entienda su Majestad lo que passa y le cumple, y entendamos lo que hordena; porque andar sin una mas que firme y ayudada resolucion solo seguirá cierto lo que le escriuo y dirá mas largo Robles. Al mismo me remito que lo dirá tambien á Vm.; mas por amor de mi que me le regale y meta á su Majestad quando tratare de hablarle, porque es una perla, cierto.

Lleva cartas para su Majestad arçobispo y Velez, sobre lo que yo dexé empeçado, y en la instruccion capitulo señalado en que se le manda que con todos haga los oficios que le dixere y concertaren los dos; pero quisiera yo harto mas no remitirlos á otro que á mi propio, pues tanto lo es lo que tan de cerca toca á Vm.

Yo quedo bueno, bendito Dios, y no es poco segun lo que trabaja el cuerpo; pero principalmente segun lo que padece el spiritu, que es lo

¹ Falta probablemente "le queria," aunque tambien forma sentido conforme está.

I wish to know what has already been accomplished, and what I can do to be of assistance in the affair, about which I have answered our Antonio, and written to him that I should be advised of the services I am to render at Rome, not that I desire these should be kept secret, on account of the consideration which I owe to the ancient friendship of the [Countess] of Ricla.

Write to me then about the whole business ; and when I find an opportunity to say anything which may be of use, I will not delay in doing so, if he is as friendly to me as I am to him.

The death of Don Diego I have felt like one who loved him much, and knew him as I did. People are now dying in all parts, even where there is no war, as we at present have in this [country]. May God take him to heaven, as indeed I believe he will, if he died as they tell me, of which I am very glad, for I know that he needed it, unless he had somewhat bettered his conscience.

The letter which goes for my lady I commend to her, and may she receive it safely into her hand. Her brother has been again committing follies, for he thought fit to give another [officer] a blow with a candlestick, for no reason at all ; and so he has taken flight, and I was informed of it more than six days afterwards. He certainly is not made for such courses, nor are such courses for him, for I shall be obliged to cut both them and him short.

I suppose you will have received that which I wrote from St. Argenton about the victory which God had given to us. God Himself knows how troubled I am to find myself so utterly unable to prosecute that victory so far as it might have been carried, after I had trusted that His Majesty would have so provided me with what was needful ; for, if I had been so provided, I am sure Bruxelles would have been his own, and with it the greater part of these Provinces. But now they [the Provinces] have taken their resolution [the other way] ; and therefore little trifling villages are defending themselves against us, in such fashion as to cost us the blood of brave men. And on this account I send Monsieur de Billi with this despatch, to ensure that I leave no stone unturned, and that His Majesty should understand what is going on, and what it befits him to do, and that we understand what his orders are ; for if we go on without a more than firm and staid resolution, there will surely follow that which I write and which Robles will tell at greater length. To the same [Robles] also I refer you for what he has to communicate to you. Furthermore, for my love's sake, be kind to him, and put him in the way of seeing His Majesty, whenever he desires an interview, for he is a pearl indeed.

He carries letters for His Majesty, the Archbishop and Velez, about the affair which I have left begun, and [about] the marked chapter in the instruction in which it is ordered that he may transact the business with all parties in the manner agreed upon between the two ; although I would much prefer not to let the affair be in any hands but my own, such being the warm interest I take in whatever concerns you.

I am well, God be thanked, and that is no small matter considering the bodily fatigue I undergo ; but chiefly considering what I suffer in spirit, compelled thereto by this miserable present world, mortal enemy of

que obliga el miserable mundo presente, enemigo mortal de los pobres ausentes, y tanto que diz que aueys de dar disculpas de seruiçios muy leales que no llegan á serlo, sino hos dexais prender y perder como una bestia. Asi me dizen que no falta quien diga por allá que quando me ubieran prendido ¿ que se perdía ó importava? Vengase pues por acá el que tiene tal opinion contra lo que yo pensé que era amigo, que por lo que evitará para si conocerá lo que he de hazer yo, que no euitaré peligros sino los viles, ni supe nunca apartarme de otros, y si viniese lo veria, quiça á su despecho, el que de lexos condena.

Yo no creo podré escriuir al duque; sea tambien esta para él en tal caso, y que por amor de Dios le pido que miren entrambos hermanos que con el tiempo se passa todo quando antes no se ganó en lo que se desea, y conviene que le ganen alla en efetuar lo que tambien está á todos, y que se acaue ya el casamiento para descanso dellos y satisfacion de sus amigos, sin esperar mas algun açidente que trayga mucho que arrepentimos.

Endustrien¹ á Mos de Villi, que de mi parte hará lo que se le dixere, pues lleva, como digo, cartas y comision para ello. Nuestro señor &^a Desta abadia junto á Tilimon á 23 de hebrero. 1578.

DON JN^o DE AUSTRIA.

Mos. de Villi lleva la copia de la que escriuo á su Magestad con él sobre lo que toca á Vm. Diga que se la muestre para que conforme á ella negocie.

Fuera en el sobre: Al Illustre señor Don Rodrigo de Mendoça en su mano.

VI. TIRLEMONT, JULY 20, 1578.

Dangers that menace Don John on all sides—His forces very inferior to those of his enemies—His gloomy view of affairs.

QUATRO ó cinco dias a que recebi la de 9 de Abril que ha tardado harto á esta quenta. Tengo poco que dezir en respuesta della, y menos tiempo para hazerlo, pues me tiene á mi su Magestad muy mas apretado que le pudo merecer nunca ningun cristiano, aunque fuese de los malos que se usan agora, pero merezcose mucho menos yo que ningun otro, pues jamas tuvo voluntad tan suya ni hombre tan dispuesto para ser ahijado donde quiera, como se conoce en cada minima ocasion, y como junto con esto todas mis obligaciones para dar la cuenta que devo de mis aciones, y me veo puesto muy á peligro de darla, infeliçe, de puro abandonado.

Estoy con razon muy sentido, si bien demas que confio en Dios que

¹ Equivale á “industrien ó instruyan.”

the poor absent [ones], wherein you have to make excuses for very loyal services which are not held to be so [*i.e.* loyal] unless you let yourself be taken and destroyed like a beast. So I am told there is no lack at Court of people who say, if I should be taken prisoner, what would be lost, or what would it signify? Let him come here who holds that opinion [so] contrary to that which I think should be [the opinion of] a friend, that by what he avoids for himself he may know what I have to do, and how I shun no dangers except the contemptible ones, nor can ever withdraw myself from others; and if he should come, he would perhaps see that [happen] in spite of him, which from afar he condemns.

I think I shall not be able to write to the Duke, so, in that case, let this [letter] be also for him; and let me entreat, for the love of God, both brothers to observe how with time everything passes away when one has not already secured that which one desires, and that it is fitting to make all haste in effecting that which is for the good of all, and in accomplishing the marriage for the ease of the parties, and the satisfaction of their friends, without further delay, lest some accident should happen to the sorrow of us all.

Let them instruct Monsieur de Billi that he shall do on my part what he shall be told, since he carries, as I say, letters, and a commission for that. Our Lord, &c. From this abbey near Tilimon (Tirlemont) the 23d February 1578.

DON JN^o DE AUSTRIA.

Monsieur de Billi carries with him a copy of the [letter] which I wrote to His Majesty with the additional matter which concerns you. Tell him to show it [to you], for I am negotiating in conformity with it.

VI. TIRLEMONT, JULY 20, 1578.

Dangers that menace Don John on all sides—His forces very inferior to those of his enemies—His gloomy view of affairs.

IT is four or five days since I received your letter of the 9th of April, which, as it appears by this, has lingered long [on the road]. I have little to say in reply, and less time to say it in, for His Majesty keeps me much closer than any Christian ever deserved [to be kept], even were he one of those bad ones now in fashion, and I deserve it much less than any other, since he never had a will so much his own, nor a man so disposed to be sacrificed at His [Majesty's] good pleasure, as is well known on every, even the least, occasion; and yet with this [disposition] and all my obligations to give a due account of my conduct, I am myself, unhappy [wretch that I am], in great and immediate danger of having to give this account whilst utterly abandoned.

I am with reason much displeased; but I nevertheless trust in God, who will act in His accustomed way, that I shall be blameless before Him

ha de hazer lo que suele, quedaré disculpado ante el y el mundo de qualquiera sinistro suceso, sauendo como sauen que tras todas mis diligencias y trabajos me tiene con solos $\frac{m}{10}$ ò $\frac{m}{12}$ infantes y $\frac{m}{5}$ cauallos, para ressttencia de $\frac{m}{14}$ y $\frac{m}{40}$ infantes, sin el nuevo cue (*sic*) que me sale agora de Francia, de manera que estoy bueno por todos lados, y aun no me deuen creer. Si es que nos remitimos á solos milagros de Dios, pareçeme que le tentamos demasiado, y que pues no se los mereçemos con ayudarnos no es obligado á hazerlo. Si quieren que yo los haga no puedo, por que el mismo Dios me hizo hombre, y no anjel ni santo, y así no ofrezco sino lo que como tal podré, que sera alfin dar con la caue (*sic*) en las espadas de nuestros enemigos, y morir honrradamente, si nos bieremos obligados á esta auentura o prouar á romper por ellos, peleando cada uno de nosotros con 4 dellos. Y creame, señor don Rodrigo, que no es modo de dezir, sino uerdad que costará caro si Dios leuanta su mano de nuestro fauor; veamos en tal caso que habra ganado su Magestad con perdernos, y que abré perdido yo, pues no falté como no faltaré çierto á la menor de mis obligaciones; pero resientome entretanto que solo para mi falten parte siquiera de aquellos exercitazos que sobraron aqui para traerme á mi al pobre estado en que me tienen. Mas doy gracias á Nuestro Señor que me ha dado vn pecho muy compuesto para pasar por esto y para aquello, con lo qual no me ahogare en tanta agua, hasta que se convierta en pura sangre. Ora baste lo dicho por esta vez de donde se puede sacar lo mas y mas que no digo, mayormente remitiendome á don Alonso de Sotomayor en mucha parte dello que se podra dezir, el qual va con mi ultimo descargo, por que lleva el protesto de lo que me sucediere ni por culpa mia, ni con pena alguna, pues soy yo el sobre quien llueven las patochadas de todos.

Al arçobispo escrivo haziendo lo que Vm. me dize en su carta, que es agradecerle lo hecho y encargandole muy de veras lo por hazer; y lo propio digo por nuestro conde, pues está en el mismo caso con los negocios que tiene con el, á quien escrivo la que va con esta remitiendome en lo de aca á ella, por ser de los amigos con quien huelgo descansar, y por no poder alargarme tanto en aquella conformidad. Yra tambien con esta otra que trate de lo da mi pasada, que sea tal que la pueda mostrar y hazer el oficio que dize. De lo que holgare yo mucho, porque antes la vea quemada que meta por mio mas el pie en ella, aunque me haga Dios otra vez (*sic*) cortesano de asiento librandome de soldado de los de tiempo tan infelice.

Espero los cauallos con harta necesidad dellos, por que los mios se acauaron con auer dado los buenos, y envejecido los que me an quedado. El de Vm. deseo ya ver pues sera sin falta, aun mejor que me le pinta, de quien creo seguramente todo lo que me dize, pues puede creer de mi que le merezco quanto no sabia encarecer por lo que le quiero y deseo el bien de todas sus cosas.

and the world of whatsoever evil issue [may occur], knowing, as they know, that after all my diligence and labours I have only 10 or 12,000 foot and 5000 horse to make head against 14,000 cavalry and 40,000 foot, without [taking count of] the news that I am to be immediately attacked from France, so that I am provided for on all sides; and even now it seems I am not to be believed. If we are to trust to God's mere miracles, it appears to me that we try Him too much, and that if we do not deserve them by aiding ourselves, He need not be expected to perform them. If they wish me to do [miracles] I cannot, for God Himself has made me a man and not an angel or a saint, and so I offer [to do] only what as such I am able to do, which at the last will be to go headlong on the swords of our enemies and die honourably, if we shall see ourselves obliged to this adventure, or to attempt to break through them, each man of us fighting with four of them. And believe me, Don Rodrigo, this is no figure of speech, but a truth, which shall cost [us] dear if God withdraws His hand from our protection. In that case let us see what His Majesty will have gained in our destruction, and what my own loss may be, since I do not fail, as indeed I will not fail, in the least of my duties. But in the meantime I am angry that only for me are wanting, turn which way I will, those great armies which abound here, in order [as it would seem] to drag me individually into the miserable plight in which they keep me. Yet I thank our Lord who has given me a heart stout enough to endure this, and to resolve not to be drowned in this deep water until it has been turned into pure blood. I have now said enough for this time, from which you may gather the most [of what there is to say] and more than I have said, especially referring, for much which might be said, to Don Alonso de Sotomayor, who goes with my last justification, for he carries my protest against whatever may happen without fault of mine, or blame of any kind to be attached to me; since I am he upon whom are cast the blunders of all.

To the Archbishop I write, doing as you said to me in your letter, which is to thank him for [what he had] done, and charging him very earnestly [with] what he has to do; and the same I say for our Count, as he is in the same case as to the affairs which he has with him, to whom I write what goes with this, referring him to this letter for the news of this country, he being one of the friends with whom I delight to repose myself, and not being able to write to him so fully [as I could wish]. I will send, along with this, another letter that will treat of my coming hither; and it shall be so worded that it may be shown about and serve the purpose spoken of. And I shall be very glad if the purpose is served, for I would rather it were burnt than that I should have anything more to do with it, even if God were to make me once more a peaceful courtier, delivering me from the condition of a soldier in these unhappy times.

I am expecting the horses, with great need of them, because mine are used up, as I have given away the good ones, and those which I have left have become old. That horse of yours I am very anxious to see, as he is doubtless even better than your description, you being one whose every word may be safely believed, and who may also rely that I am worthy of all your kindness, for the unspeakable love I bear to you, and the interest I take in all that concerns you.

Al duque no escriuire de mi mano á lo menos por lo dicho ya arriba : sea por amor de mi esta suya porque vea qual está este su mayor amigo, y quanto justamente se resolucra antes á meterse en vna hermita que voluer, si escapo desta, tras tantas de que me a Dios escapado, á ser yo el que tenga tan á riesgo al mismo Dios su cristiandad, á mi Rey sus estados, y á mi mi honrra que tanto y tantos trauajos me cuesta, todo lo qual cuelga agora de un pobre hilo que está en mis manos, aunque mi honrra se saluará en qualquier suceso, pues con ayuda de Nuestro Señor ninguno abrá que la ofenda ; pero dueleme lo demas como cristiano y cauallero obligado á dolerme destas cosas, quando bien me hallara tan lexos dellas como los que las juzgan y quiça no temen ni se curan de lo que digo. No sé si me queda por responder en algo ; si deue de ser porque no quiero voluer á sudar tercera ó quarta vez en leer letra tan inlejible.

Del juego de cañas tengo nuevas y no digo embidia porque no la tengo cierto sino lastima al tiempo que corre. Dios le mejore lo mucho que es menester, y me guarde á Vm. como deseo, acordandole que con menos ocupaciones me escribe menos vezes que le escrivo. De junto á Tilimon (*sic*) á 20 de Julio y sin sol mas a de un mes.

DON JN^o DE AUSTRIA.

Al márgen dice :

A otra de 19 que auia recebido antes se me a olvidado de responder, y agora no puedo ni aun escribir una letra mas de que cierro este pliego. Vispera de Santiago.

El sobre dice :

Al Ill^e Señor el Señor Don Rodrigo de Mendoza en su mano.

Supp^o á V. S. me torne á hembiar luego esta carta.

FOR transcripts of the six preceding letters I am indebted to the kindness of my friends Don Pascual de Gayangos and Don Manuel Zarco del Valle. I have also to acknowledge the valuable aid rendered to me by the former of these gentlemen in the English translations, the familiar colloquial style of the original letters causing frequent obscurities of meaning not to be penetrated by any translator who does not possess, like Don Pascual, the advantage of being equally master of Spanish and of English. Even with this aid I fear there are a few passages of which the sense is still doubtful.

Don Rodrigo de Mendoza, to whom these letters are addressed, was the second son of Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, Count of Saldaña, and Maria de Mendoza, daughter and heiress of Rodrigo de Mendoza, Marquess of Cenete, which title was also borne by her husband in her right. Diego was the eldest son of Iñigo Lopez de Mendoza, fourth Duke of Infantado (born 1469, died 17th September 1566), and he died on the 29th of March 1566, before his father, leaving issue :—

1. Iñigo de Mendoza, who succeeded his grandfather as fifth Duke of Infantado, born 1536, died 1601. He married Luisa Enriquez de Cabrera, sister of the Almirante of Castille.

2. Rodrigo de Mendoza.

3. Diego Hurtado de Mendoza.

To the Duke I do not write, with my own hand at least, for the aforesaid [cause]. For love of me let this [letter] be also for him, that he may see what is the present condition of this his greatest friend, and how justly I am resolved rather to take up my abode in a hermitage than to return [hither] if I escape from this [peril], after so many others from which God has delivered me. With such toils and such peril am I maintaining for God his Christian religion, for my King his Estates, and for myself my honour, all which hangs now by one poor thread which is in my hands ; although my honour shall be safe, come what may, since with the help of Our Lord no person shall have wherewith to damage it, yet for the rest I mourn as a Christian and gentleman ought to mourn for such things, even were I as far from them as those who judge them, and perhaps neither fear [the result] nor care for what I say. I do not know if there remains anything [more] for me to answer ; but it may be so, for I do not choose to go back [to your letter and] sweat for the third or fourth time over handwriting so illegible.

Of the cane-play I have news and will not say that I am envious, for I have no envy indeed, but only sorrow for the [evil] times that are. May God send us better days [here], which are much needed ; and preserve you to me as I desire ; and do you take notice how, with fewer occupations, you write to me much less frequently than I write to you. From near Tilimon [Tirlemont], 20th of July, and without sun for more than a month.

DON JN^o DE AUSTRIA.

On the margin :

To your other letter of 19th, received before, I have forgotten to reply, and now I cannot do so, or write a line more, but [have only time sufficient] to close this sheet. Vesper of Santiago.

(Addressed) :

To the most illustrious lord, the lord Don Rodrigo de Mendoza, in his hand.

I entreat your lordship to forward this letter immediately.

4. Pedro Gonzalez de Mendoza.

5. Juan Hurtado de Mendoza.

6. Enrique de Mendoza y Aragon.

7. Alvaro de Mendoza.

8. Ana de Mendoza, married to the Almirante of Castille, brother of her elder brother's wife.

Iñigo, fifth Duke of Infantado, is the "Duke" so often alluded to in these letters. By his Duchess he had twelve children, none of whom survived infancy except one daughter, whom he therefore determined to marry to his younger brother Rodrigo. This is the marriage to which several allusions will be found in the letters (III. and IV.) It did not take place until 1581, when it was celebrated with great pomp, as recorded by Nuñez de Castro in his *Historia de Guadalajara*, Madrid, 1658, fol., p. 190, where the Count of Orgaz is mentioned as being one of the guests.

Don Rodrigo de Mendoza was gentleman of the chamber to Philip II., and was placed by him in the same capacity in the household of his unhappy son, Don Carlos, 1567. Although he had been only four months in the service of the Prince at the time of the arrest of the latter (18th January 1568), Carlos had become much attached to him. When his household was dismissed, and he was removed from his own apartments to be

placed in a strong tower under the custody of Ruy Gomez de Silva, he anxiously asked if he was to be separated from his friend Don Rodrigo de Mendoza. Their parting was one of the few occasions on which Don Carlos displayed any tenderness.¹ The favourite of the son appears to have remained in the service of the father during the rest of his life, which ended in 1586.

Of the Count of Orgaz, whom these letters show to have lived on terms of such brotherly intimacy with Don John of Austria, the Duke of Infantado, and Don Rodrigo de Mendoza, I am unable to give any satisfactory account. According to Lopez de Haro, Doña Maria de Guzman, Countess de Orgaz, married Don Juan Hurtado de Mendoza, Señor de Mendivil. Their son, Don Alvaro, had a son, Don Luis, who died before him, leaving a son, Don Juan Hurtado de Mendoza, who became third Count of Orgaz, and was Captain-General of Seville and "Mayordomo" in the reign of Philip II.

The "cousin" "*prima*" mentioned in the letters is most likely Doña Ana de Mendoza, niece and affianced bride of Don Rodrigo.

"My one-eyed lady," "*Mi tuerta*" (I.) is doubtless Ana de Mendoza y de la Cerda, daughter of Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, Count of Melito, and great-granddaughter of the statesman and soldier of the same name, author of *La Guerra de Granada*, to whom *Lazarillo de Tormes* is also popularly ascribed. She was the wife of Ruy Gomez de Silva, the famous favourite and minister of Philip II., who bore in her right the title of

¹ See Vol. I. p. 72. *Avviso d'un Italiano*, MS. at Simancas, dated 27th January 1568, and printed by Gachard: *Don Carlos et Philippe II.*, Bruxelles, 1863, 2 vols. 8vo, Appendice B, vol. ii. p. 689.

V*.

COPY OF A LETTER WRITTEN TO PHILIP II., KING OF SPAIN, BY DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA, AT BEAUMONT, 20TH APRIL 1578, ON OCCASION OF THE DEATH OF HIS SECRETARY, JUAN DE ESCOVEDO.

Preserved in the BRITISH MUSEUM; BIBL. EGERTON; Papeles Varios;
1333-1691, 329 *Plut. D. xvi. E. ff.* 233-234.

Copia de Carta que escribio el S^r DON JUAN DE AUSTRIA al Rey Nu^o. Señor DON PHELIPPE SEGUNDO aviendo sabido la muerte del Secretario JUAN DE ESCOVEDO.

SEÑOR,

Con mayor lastima de la que sabria encarecer he entendido la ynfelice muerte del Secretario Escobedo, de que no me puedo consolar, ni consolare nunca, pues ha perdido V. M. en el un criado tal, como yo se e yo el que V. M. sabe, y aunque es esto de sentir tanto, como yo lo hago, siento sobre todo que a cabo de tantos años, y servicios aya acabado de muerte tan indigna a el y causada por servir a su Rey con tanta verdad y amor sin otro ningun respecto, ni ynvencion de las que se usan ora, y si bien es la cossa mas vedada parecer que se juzga de dadie temerariamente, no pienso yncurrir en este pecado en este caso que yo no señalo parte,

Melito, until created Duke of Pastrana and Prince of Eboli. Her amours with Philip II. (who was supposed to be the father of her eldest son) and with the secretary Antonio Perez are well known. Ruy Gomez died 29th July 1573.

"Robles" (I. V.) and M. de Villi (V.) are the names of Caspar de Robles, Seigneur of Billy or Villi, Governor of the Province of Friesland, and one of the ablest and most energetic of the leaders of the royalist party in the Netherlands.

I have not been able to discover the names either of the lady lately deceased of whom Don John writes with so much feeling, as having parted with her in Italy on the 18th of February 1576 (II.), or of the lady alluded to in all the letters as "*mi dama*," or of the brother of the latter, whose disorderly behaviour gave his chief so much trouble (I. II. and V.), or the surname of the lamented Diego (V.) The girl whom Don John calls "*mi belucha*," "my little beauty," adopting as it seems into Spanish the Italian term of endearment "*belluccia*," diminutive of *bella*, appears to have been a relative of the Duchess of Infantado, and about to leave her home in order to enter the Queen's household.

Of the originals of these letters, in the autography of Don John of Austria, four (I. II. IV. and VI.) belong to General Don Eduardo Fernandez San Ramon; one (V.) is in the possession of the Marquess of Salamanca, at Madrid; and one (III.) is in my hands, having been bought by me from Señor Sancho, at Madrid, in February 1865.

W. S.

KEIR, 31st July 1865.

V*.

COPY OF A LETTER WRITTEN TO PHILIP II., KING OF SPAIN, BY DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA, AT BEAUMONT, 20TH APRIL 1578, ON OCCASION OF THE DEATH OF HIS SECRETARY, JUAN DE ESCOVEDO.

Preserved in the BRITISH MUSEUM; BIBL. EGERTON; Papeles Varios; 1333-1691, 329 Plut. D. xvi. E. ff. 233-234.

Copy of a Letter written by DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA to PHILIP II. on learning the death of the Secretary, JUAN DE ESCOVEDO.

SIR,

WITH greater grief than I can describe, I have heard of the unhappy death of the Secretary Escovedo, for which I cannot find, nor shall I ever find, any consolation; because your Majesty has lost such a servant as I know him to have been, and I such a one as your Majesty also knows that he was. And although there is in this sufficient cause for the sorrow which I feel, above all else I lament that at the end of so many years and services he should meet with a death so unworthy of him, and caused by his having served his King with so much truth and love, and without any of those other aims and without the craft which are now in

mas tengo por sin duda lo que digo, y como hombre, a quien tanta ocasion se ha dado, y que conocia la libertad con que Escobedo trataba el servicio de V. M. temome de donde le pueda aver venido, al fin yo no lo se cierto, ni no sabiendo lo dire, sino que por amor de Nuestro Señor supplico a V. M. con quanto encarecimiento puedo, que no permita le sea hecha tal ofensa en su corte, ni que la reciva yo tan grande, como la que tambien se me hace a mi, sin que se hagan todas las posibles diligencias para saber de donde viene y para castigarlo con el rigor que merece, y aunque creo, que V. M. lo avra ya hecho muy cumplidamente, y que avra cumplido con el ser de Principe tan Christiano y justiciero quiero asi mesmo supplicarle, que como cavallero buelba y consienta volver por la honrra de quien tan de veras la merecia, como Escobedo, y assi pues le quede yo tan obligado, que con justa raçon puedo ymaginarme aver sido causa de su muerte, por las que V. M. mejor que otro sabe, tenga por bien, supplicoselo que no solo acuerde, y solicite, como lo hare con todos los correos, quanto toca al difunto, asta que le sea hecha entera justicia, y remuneracion de sus servicios, sino que passe adelante en lo demas, con que debo cumplir como cavallero. Todo esto torno a supplicar a V. M. de nuevo quan humilde, y encarecidamente puedo, y que se sirva de mandarme responder a todos estos particulares, por que confesso a V. M. que ninguno pudiera sobrevenir aora, que tanto me inquieta a el espiritu (asta cumplimiento de todos los que tocan al muerto) como su muerte. Yo no se aun como han quedado sus cosas, y assi no puedo tratar de ningunas en particular, mas suplico a V. M. que acordandosele del yntento que Escobedo llebaba, que era el del honor y la limpieza, con que siempre le sirvio, y del poco comodo que deja en su casa, haga toda la merced, que merecen, a los que quedan en ella, y principalmente al hijo mayor de los oficios y beneficios que el Padre tenia, que de que Pedro de Escobedo los merece, y que es sujeto para yr mereciendo cada dia, mas si es empleado y favorecido, V. M. mesmo lo sabe mejor que nadie, y porque pienso, que segun lo que era fuerça gastar, y lo poco que tenia, avra dejado algunas deudas, que podrian dar pena a su alma, y aca a sus hijos, y mujer, supplicare tambien a V. M. les mande hacer merced con que las puedan pagar. Aunque principalmente le supplico quanto puedo, que como a Padre, que he quedado del dicho hijo mayor, me la haga a mi esta tan señalada merced de darle en todo, todo lo que su Padre gozaba; porque quanto a las deudas, yo me acomodare facilmente [a]¹ aquitar lo mas del comer, y vestir, y de lo que tubiera menester forzosamente para pagarlas, que lo menos es, que puedo hacer por descanso de quien trabajo asta morir, como murio, por descansar me a mi, y hacer me acertar el servicio de V. M. en quanto passaba por sus manos, que era, y sera, quanto he pretendido y pretendere toda mi vida. Vea V. M. si estas obligaciones merecen que se use destos oficios, y si quedo con raçon confiado de que me ha de hacer la merced, que pido, en todo lo que le suplico, y supplicare continuamente asta alcançar la justicia, y gracia, que le estaban pidiendo siempre la sangre y los servicios del muerto. Guarde nuestro Señor a V. M. con la felicidad, y descanso que desseo, y tengo menester. De Beaumont a 20 de Abril de 1578.

¹ Suggested by Don Pascual de Gayangos as necessary to complete the sense.

fashion. Even in the worst matter, it is my opinion that nothing should be rashly judged ; but yet I do not think that in this case I incur blame when I say that I point at no one in particular, but believe that there is no doubt the affair is as I have said. As one to whom so many opportunities of [knowing] were given, and who did know the independent manner in which Escovedo bore himself in the service of your Majesty, I am much afraid of the quarter whence [the blow] came. After all, I do not certainly know it, nor, knowing it, would I say more than this, that for the love of Our Lord I entreat your Majesty as lovingly as I can that you will not permit such an outrage [to happen] in your Court, or so great [an affront] to be done to me as that which has been done to me also, without using every possible diligence to know whence [the blow] came and to punish it with the rigour which it deserves. And although I believe your Majesty has already done this very completely, being so Christian and justice-loving a Prince, yet I nevertheless beg it of you, feeling that I ought as a gentleman to take care of the honour of one who so truly deserved it of me, as did Escovedo, and to whom I am under obligations so great that I may with just reason consider myself to have been the cause of his death, as your Majesty knows better than any other person. May your Majesty therefore be pleased, I pray, to approve of my not only reminding you of the affairs of the deceased, but soliciting you, as I will do by every post, with regard to them until entire justice shall have been done, and remuneration for his services made, and of my even letting other things stand still, as I ought, as a gentleman, to do. All this I once more entreat your Majesty as humbly and as earnestly as I can, and that [your Majesty] will be pleased to order answers to be sent me on these various points ; for I confess to your Majesty that nothing can now happen to trouble my spirit like this death, until everything which concerns the deceased has been arranged. As to his [worldly] affairs I do not yet know how he has left them, so of none of them can I speak in particular ; but I pray your Majesty will remember the desire of Escovedo, which was ever to serve your Majesty honourably and with clean hands, and the poor house which he leaves behind him, and that you will show the kindness which they deserve to those who remain in it ; and especially that you will confer upon his eldest son the places and emoluments possessed by his father. That these will be well bestowed upon Pedro de Escovedo, and that he is a man whose merits will every day grow with the employment and favour which he may receive, no one knows better than your Majesty. Considering the position [Escovedo] was obliged to maintain, and his small income, I think it likely that he may have left some debt, which may trouble [the repose of] his soul, and also [weigh upon] his children and his wife. I therefore also ask your Majesty to make them a grant by which these [debts] may be paid. But my chief request is, that as I find myself in the place of father, as it were, to the eldest son, you will do me the signal favour of giving him all [those emoluments] which his father enjoyed. As to the debts, I can easily arrange to defray the most of those which are for food and clothing, and to provide for the payment of those which are most pressing, which is the least that I can do for the

case of one who laboured until his death, and died, to afford me repose and that good assurance as to the service of your Majesty, in all matters that passed through his hands, which I have ever desired and shall desire all my life. It is for your Majesty to see whether these obligations deserve that these offices should be given [in requital of them], and whether I have a right to be confident that the favour which I beg will be granted to me, in regard to all that I have sued for and shall continue to sue for, until that justice and grace are obtained for which the blood and services of the dead are always pleading. May Our Lord keep your Majesty in the welfare and ease which I desire and need. From Beaumont, on the 20th of April 1578.

The words within brackets are inserted in order to give what appears to me the full meaning of the original.

VI.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE HISTORY OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA.

I.—BIOGRAPHIES AND BOOKS CONTAINING NOTICES OF THE EARLY LIFE OF DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA.

Augustissimorum Imperatorum regum atque arciducum, etc. imagines . . quorum arma à serenissimo principe Ferdinando, Arciduce Austriæ . . conquisita . . in . . Ambrasianæ arcis armamentario conspiciuntur. Opus . . Arciducis jussu in vita inchoatum et ab ejusdem serenitatis consiliario et secretario Jacobo Schrenkhio à Nozingen continuatum et absolutum. Cēniponti, 1601. Folio.

THE first edition of this fine and interesting collection of portraits, engraved by Dominic Custos, was printed at Innsbruck in 1591. It is of great rarity, and I have never seen but one copy—that in the Royal Library at Dresden,—which perhaps is imperfect, as, although *succinctæ descriptiones* of the personages are promised on the title-page, it has no letterpress and only 57 plates. The name of Schrenck does not appear on the title-page, and it is remarkable that the impressions are no better than those in the second edition. One portrait, that of the Archduke Ferdinand himself, is dated 1582, and another, Giov. de' Medici, 1586. The plates represent the distinguished personages of the sixteenth century whose effigies and armour the Archduke Ferdinand, second son of the Emperor Ferdinand I. and husband of the beautiful Philippina Welser of Augsburg, collected at his castle of Ambras, in the Tyrol, of which he was sovereign. The collection, which extends to 126 portraits, has been removed to Vienna,

where it may still be seen. In Schrenck's work, of which the text was printed both in Latin and German, the translation being by Engelbr. Noyse, and printed in 1603, each portrait is accompanied by a page of biography. In the Latin edition the biography backs, in the German it faces, the portrait. The notice of Don John of Austria is probably the earliest of his biographies. By a draft of the orders issued by Philip II. with regard to the disposal of the effects of Don John after his death it appears that the Archduke Ferdinand had asked his cousin to contribute to his collection, and that the King directed that "the Archduke should have the arms he had asked for" and which "Don John had promised, the best that could be found." *Minuta*, dated 30th November 1578, preserved at Simancas. There is a later and poor edition of Schrenck's book with bad reduced copies of the portraits, entitled *Armamentarium Heroicum Ambrasianum nunc nova editione instauratum a Jo. David Koelero*. Noribergæ, 1735, 4to.

Œuvres complètes de Pierre de Bourdeille, abbé séculier de Brantôme. Paris, 1822-24, 8 vols. 8vo, and 1838, 2 vols. large 8vo.

Of his *Vies des Grands Capitaines* that of *Don Juan d'Austria*, vol. i. pp. 127-133 (ed. 1838), is one of the most interesting. Brantôme visited Madrid in 1564 or 1566, where he saw Philip II., Queen Isabella, Don Carlos, Don John, and the other personages of the Court, about several of whom he has written gossiping essays. In spite of his carelessness and inaccuracy as to facts and dates, which render him an unsafe guide when followed alone, his notices are amongst the most graphic and valuable of our records of sixteenth-century life and manners.

Don Juan de Austria. Historia; por Don Lorenzo Vanderhammen y Leon, *natural de Madrid y Vicario de Jubiles*. Madrid, 1627, 4to.

Title and 3 preliminary unnumbered leaves, and 327 numbered leaves, which ought to be 370, as after 188 the numeration is faulty, returning to 145, and so showing in the last leaf 43 leaves less than there really are.

Lorenzo Vanderhammen, the first biographer of Don John, was born in 1588 of Belgian parents at Madrid, and pursued a literary career there during the reign of Philip III. Being made secretary to Pedro Gonzalez de Mendoza, Archbishop of Granada, he took orders, and obtained from that Prelate the vicarage of Jubiles in the Alpuxarras, whence he was afterwards transferred to the chapel of the Catholic sovereigns in the cathedral of Granada. In that city he was visited by Nicholas Antonio, the historian of Spanish literature, in 1653. He wrote a life of Philip II.—*Don Felipe el Prudente*, Madrid, 1632, 4to; various religious books; and a dream or vision entitled *Casa de los locos de Amor*, Madhouse of Lovers, which had the honour of being fathered by his friend Quevedo, who placed it amongst his own *Sueños*, and dedicated it to its author. The *History of Don John of*

Austria fills 740 closely-printed pages and is divided into six books. The first of these gives an account of the early life of Don John; the second comprises the War of the Alpuxarras; the third treats of the naval campaigns of 1571 and 1572; the fourth relates the capture and loss of Tunis; the fifth discourses of the troubles at Genoa, and the negotiations respecting them, in which Don John was engaged; and the sixth describes the last two years of his life, 1576-8, in the Netherlands. Although Vanderhammen is said by Antonio to have attained a conspicuous place amongst those who have striven for literary fame, his reputation has hardly survived the century in which he wrote, nor are his works now cited as models of style. Much of his book is a compilation from those of Herrera and Cabrera, but he appears also to have had access to original papers, of which he has made too sparing use.

Vita di Don Giovanni d'Austria, scritta, siccome appare nel proemio, dal contemporaneo Ferrante Caracciolo, conte di Biccari e poscia duca d'Airola, autore de' Commentarii della Guerra fatta coi Turchi da Don Giovanni d'Austria dopo che venne in Italia; possi in istampa da Scipione Ammirato il 1581 in Firenze.

Questo MS. sta a caste 280-385 di un Codice della Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli.

Historia del serenísimo Señor Don Juan de Austria hijo del invictísimo Emperador Carlos V. Rey de España, Dirigida a la excelentísima Señora Doña Ana de Austria hija de Su Alteza, Abadesa perpetua y bendita del Santo y Real Monasterio de las Huelgas de Burgos. Por el Licº Baltasar Porreño, Cura de los Valles de Sacedon y Corcoles en el obispado de Cuenca.

MS. in 380 folio pages, of which the original is, I believe, at Simancas, and a copy, which I have perused, is in the Royal Academy of History at Madrid, amongst the papers relating to Don John of Austria bequeathed to that learned body by Don Luis Lopez Ballesteros. Porreño composed various published works—*Los Oraculos de las Sibillas*, Cuenca, 1512, 4to; *Vida y hechos del Cardinal Gil de Albornoz*, Cuenca, 1623, 8vo; *Dichos y hechos del Rey Don Felipe II.*, Sevilla, 1639, 8vo; *Dichos y hechos del Rey Don Felipe III.*, printed by Jean Yañez in his *Memorias para la Historia de Don Felipe III.*, Madrid, 1723, 4to; besides other historical and theological books, such as histories of Alonso IX. and of the archbishops of Toledo, which have not been printed. A list of his writings is given by Nic. Antonio: *Bibliotheca Hispana Nova*, Matriti, 1783, 2 vols. 4to, i. 184.

In the dedication to Doña Anna of Austria of the life of her father, Porreño says that she had received with so much favour his history of

Alonso IX. and other works that he was encouraged to take up his pen and write, and having cut it in the most delicate fashion, to delineate the history of Don John, father of Her Excellency, and their country. "I entreat," he continues, "that your Excellency will accept of my book, as the daughter of such a father, who by his incomparable valour deserved to be the example of Princes, and by his great erudition acquired the fame of a Mæcenas of the learned, and whom the world, for the honour he bestowed on letters and arms, styled by the illustrious name, in the one of Apollo and in the other of Mars." The MS. is furnished with licenses to print, dated Cuenca, 25th of August 1627, and Madrid, 6th of May 1628. The short address to the reader concludes thus:—"I had hardly finished this book when I received notice that two great historians had been employing the force of their genius on the same subject about the same time as myself. I have not seen their works because they have not yet been published, and I live retired in a humble village. Of the three it may be said that we have spent our time in one and the same enterprise, *Tres sumus in bello*. I yield up my arms to these two great warriors, and submit this my work to their correction and to yours, discreet and devout reader, whom I beg to receive it with the love and good-will with which it is offered."—P. 5. One of these great historians was no doubt Vanderhammen, the other was most probably Antonio Osorio. I find little or nothing in Porreño's book which may not be found elsewhere in print. In more than one passage, especially in the account of Don John's journey to the Low Countries, he appears to have borrowed from whatever authority was used by Vanderhammen. He seems also to have been in possession of the reports on the death of Don John furnished to Philip II. by the physician Ramirez and the confessor Orantes, having in his 26th chapter followed their accounts very closely, and in some cases adopted their very words. The book is written in the same style of indiscriminate panegyric as the *Sayings and Doings of Philip II.* No hyperbole seems to the author too strong to be applied to his hero, whose death, he gravely assures us, was "more lamented in Spain than even that of Hispan, who gave his name to the land, and for whom the women, who before his time used to wear white veils, have ever since worn black ones," p. 378.

Joannis Austriaci Vita auctore Antonio Osorio.

Preserved in MS. in the National Library at Madrid. A transcript is in my possession, furnished to me by the kindness of Don Pascual de Gayangos. The author is mentioned by N. Antonio (*Bib. Hisp. Nova*, i. 148), who says he was a member of the company of Jesus, and a son of a Marquis of Astorga, and brother of Juan Alvarez Osorio, bishop of Leon. He was author of *Ferdinandi Toletani Albæ Ducis Vita et Res Gestæ*, Salamanca, 1669, 2 vols. 8vo, and Antonio had heard that he had made some progress in the annals of Spain from the death of Ferdinand the Catholic to his own time, also in Latin.

L'Histoire de Jean d'Autriche fils de l'Empereur Charles V. [par Jean Bruslé de Montpleinchamp]. Amsterdam, 1683, 1690, 1693, and 1712. Portrait. 12mo. There is also a translation into Dutch; *Het Leven van Don Jan van Oostenryk zoon van Carel denn Vyfden.* Leyden, 1737, in 8vo, with portrait.

The author was a native of Namur and a canon of Ste. Gudule at Bruxelles. In his affected style he confesses that he has drawn the greater part of his materials from Cardinal Bentivoglio, M. de Thou, M. Grotius, Guicciardini, Poton Herviter, and Strada, whom he gratefully calls his "six sons." "I have accommodated myself," he adds, "to the taste of the age, which does not love long political discussions, but is eager to come to the story; if I understand that such discussions are wanted, I will insert them in the next edition, and will also add those relations which connect past history with that of our own time. Enjoy the present, and hope for the future!" The biographer of Don John in the *Biographie Universelle*, 1818, tom. xxii. p. 85, describes the book as "exacte mais écrite d'un style ridicule." To me it seems even more inaccurate than ridiculous. It has at least the merit of being rare. M. Dumesnil in 1827 could find but one copy in the libraries of Paris. It does not now (1866) appear in the catalogues of the British Museum. The edition I have used is that of 1690. The author wrote also a *Histoire du Duc de Mercœur*, Cologne, 1689, 12mo. *Histoire d'Emmanuel Philibert Duc de Savoie*, Amsterdam, 1692, 12mo. *Histoire d'Alexandre Farnese Duc de Parme*, Amsterdam, 1692, 12mo. *Histoire de l'Archiduc Albert*, Cologne, 1693, 12mo. He died some time after 1712.

Histoire de Don Juan d'Autriche; par M. Alexis Dumesnil. Paris, 1827, 8vo. Bruxelles, 1827, 12mo.

A flimsy and inaccurate sketch. In noticing Don John's passage through Paris in October 1576, where we know from his own pen that he remained only a single night, the author accepts as a fact the assertion of Brantôme, that Don John went in disguise to the Louvre, and there fell in love with the Queen of Navarre, "which," he adds, "may easily be believed if we admit the authenticity of certain letters which he is supposed to have written to the widow of Quixada,"—letters of which he gives about seven pages of extracts (pp. 134-141), each teeming with evidence that it is not authentic, without any notice of the source whence he drew them.

Das Leben des Don Juan d'Austria. Eine geschichtliche Monographie; von Dr. Wilh. Havemann. Gotha, 1865, 8vo.

A sensible book, drawn from well-chosen sources.

Papiers d'État du Cardinal Granvelle. Paris, 1841-52. Vols. i.-ix., 4to.

An important work, which it is to be regretted has long remained incomplete. In vol. iv. pp. 495-500, will be found the codicil to the will of the Emperor Charles V., dated Bruxelles, 5th June 1554, acknowledging Don John of Austria as his son, under the name of Geronimo, and explaining his wishes with regard to his bringing up; and the receipt given to Adrian Dubois by Francisco Massi and his wife Ana de Medina, when Don John was placed under their care on the 13th June 1550. See Vol. I. pp. 7, 22.

Carlos Famoso; de Don Luis de Çapata. Valencia, 1566, 4to.

A tedious and prosaic epic poem on the history of the Emperor Charles V. It relates that the Emperor, when he was dying, sent for Don John to his bedside, acknowledged him as his son, and recommended him to the care of Philip II. (fol. 287). It is somewhat remarkable that in Ludovico Dolce's *Vita di Carlo V.*, Vinegia, 1567, 4to, no mention is made of Don John, but the Emperor is said to have left three legitimate children, and one illegitimate daughter, "Margaret, wife of the Duke Ottavio." The preface is dated 24th October 1565.

La Austriada; de Juan Rufo. Madrid, 1584; Toledo, 1585; Alcalá, 1586. Sm. 8vo, and reprinted in *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, vol. xxix.; *Poemas Epicos*, vol. ii. Madrid, 1854, 8vo.

The Araucana of Ercilla, the Austriada of Juan Rufo, and the Monerrate of Virues, being taken at the same time from Don Quixote's shelves by the barber, were ordered by the curate to be preserved as the finest specimens of Spanish poetry. "They are," he said, "the best books written in Castillian heroic verse, and may compete with the most famous poems of Italy." The *Austriada* is an epic poem on the wars of the Alpuxarras and of the League against the Turk, and closes with the battle of Lepanto. The early life of Don John of Austria is related in canto v. Juan Rufo Gutierrez, a native and magistrate of Cordova, was sent by that city to compliment Don John on the conclusion of the Morisco rebellion. He was afterwards appointed his chronicler, and accompanied him to Madrid and the Mediterranean. His poem, which, in spite of the praise of Don Quixote's curate and a commendatory sonnet by Cervantes in his own person, seems to be of more value as an historical document than as a literary work, was written during the life of Don John. A letter from the city of Cordova to Philip II. bearing date 6th of December 1578, which is prefixed to the book, and which entreats the King to show favour to the author, states that it was written some years before, apparently immediately after the battle of Lepanto. On the title-page the poem is dedicated to the Empress Maria, sister of the King and of Don John. The last known work of Rufo is *Los seiscientos Apotegmas.* Toledo, 1596. 8vo.

Principis Christiani Archetypon politicum, sive Sapientia Regnatricis, quam regiis instructam documentis ex antiquo numismate Honorati Joaniî Caroli V. imp. et Philippi II. aulici . . . Exponit Athanasius Kircherus è Soc. Jesu. Amstelodami, 1672, 4to.

A biography of the tutor of Don Carlos and Don John of Austria, containing some notices of his life and theirs at Alcalá. The Latin is said to be elegant, the chronology inaccurate.

La Limosnera de Dios. Relacion historica de la vida y virtudes de la excellentissima Señora Doña Magdalena de Ulloa, Toledo, Ossorio y Quiñones muger del excellentissimo Señor Luis Mendez Quixada, Manuel de Figueredo y Mendoza, Commendador del Viso y Santa Cruz . . . Ayo del Serenissimo Señor Don Juan de Austria . . . Escrivela el Padre Juan de Villafañe, Valladolid, 1722. 4to.

The author was a Jesuit who at one time was rector of the College of the Company of Jesus, founded at Villagarcia by the subject of this biography. His rare book is interesting both as a record of a beautiful life, and for the notices which it contains of Don John and his guardian Luis Quixada.

Le Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato durante il secolo decimo sesto, raccolte et illustrate da Eugenio Alberi 183. Firenze, 1839-61, tom. i.-xiii. 8vo.

In Serie i. tom. v. or vol. xiii. of the work (1861) will be found the *Relazione di Spagna di Paolo Tiepolo*, 1562.

” ” Giovanni Soranzo, 1565.

” ” Antonio Tiepolo, 1567.

” ” Sigismundo Cavalli, 1570.

For a transcript of another *Relazione di Spagna*, that of Andrea Badoer and Augustin Barbarigo, 1568, I am indebted to Mr. Rawdon Brown.

Retraite et Mort de Charles Quint au Monastère de Yuste; Lettres inédites publiées d'après les originaux conservés dans les archives royales de Simancas; par M. Gachard. Bruxelles, 1854-5, 2 vols. 8vo.

Don Carlos et Philippe II., par M. Gachard. Bruxelles, 1863, 2 vols. 8vo.

An exhaustive narrative of one of the most keenly canvassed episodes in Spanish history, written in the clear and impartial style for which the author is so well known.

Documentos relativos al Príncipe D. Carlos hijo de Felipe II. remitidos por el archivero de Simancas D. Manuel Garcia Gonzalez.

Printed in *Documentos inéditos para la Historia de España*. Madrid, 1855. Tom. xxvi. pp. 392-568, and tom. xxvii. pp. 5-210.

II.—REBELLION OF THE MORISCOS OF GRANADA, 1569-70.

Historia del rebelion y castigo de los Moriscos del reino de Granada, hecha por Luys del Marmol Carvajal; Granada, 1600, sm. folio, and Madrid, 1797, 2 vols. 4to.

Luys del Marmol Carvajal began life as a soldier, served in his youth under Charles V. in his expedition to Tunis in 1535, and followed the profession of arms for twenty-two years. For some years he was a captive in Western Barbary, and employed that time in acquiring a knowledge of the language and history of the Arabs. The result of these studies was his *Descripcion General de Africa*, Granada, 1573 (vols. i. and ii.) and Malaga, 1599 (vol. iii.), 3 vols. folio. During the rebellion of the Moriscos he served in the royal army as a commissary, and was an eyewitness of many of the events which he has related. His book was not published until many years after the war was over, and may therefore be supposed to be the fruit of long meditation and careful study of the facts. Without any of Mendoza's classical pretension, Marmol is a picturesque and agreeable writer, and tells his tale with a simplicity and candour which conciliates the reader's confidence and good-will. Considering his age and country he is remarkable for his fairness; he states the wrongs of the Moriscos and the crimes and blunders of their Christian rulers with much impartiality, and on the whole takes a moderate and just view of the proceedings of the unhappy people of whose ill-fated struggle for freedom and revenge he was the witness and chronicler.

Guerra de Granada que hizo el Rei D. Felipe II. contra los Moriscos de aquel reino sus rebeldes, por Diego Hurtado de Mendoza. Lisboa, 1610 and 1627, 4to, and Valencia, 1730 and 1776, 4to, and in the *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, tom. xxi. *Historiadores de sucesos particulares*, edited by C. Rosell, Madrid, 1852, tom. i.

Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, son of Íñigo Lopez de Mendoza, first Marquess of Mondejar, held high military and diplomatic posts under Charles V. and Philip II., but towards the close of his life, being in disgrace at Court, retired to his house at Granada, where he was living amongst his books and manuscripts at the time of the rebellion of the Moriscos. He was an able and practised writer both in prose and verse, and in point of style enjoys the reputation of being one of the first of

Castillian historians. His desire to imitate Sallust and Tacitus, and his consequent affectation of their terseness, sometimes render his narration meagre and obscure. But he tells his story with great vigour and spirit, and he enjoyed the best opportunities, which he does not seem to have neglected, of knowing the truth of what he wrote. Like Marmol, he states the case of the Spaniards and their unhappy Morisco subjects with considerable fairness and moderation. In the MS. from which the first edition of the *Guerra de Granada* was printed, the end of Book iii. being wanting, the blank was supplied in the next edition by João de Silva, Count of Portalegre. The missing passage being afterwards found, was first incorporated with the original in the edition of 1730. Mendoza died at Madrid in 1575, aged seventy-three.

Correspondencia de Felipe II. y de otros personajes con D. Juan de Austria desde 1568 hasta 1570 sobre la guerra contra los Moriscos de Granada.

Printed amongst the *Documentos ineditos para la Historia de España*, tom. xxviii. pp. 1-154; Madrid, 1856, 4to, from a MS. volume in the possession of Don Pascual de Gayangos, at Madrid.

Guerras Civiles de Granada per Ginés Perez de Hita. Parte i. Zaragoza, 1595, 12mo. Parte ii. 1604, 12mo. There is a neat edition of both parts, Madrid, 1833, 2 vols. 12mo; and that of Paris, 1847, 8vo, is compact and convenient.

Of this celebrated romance the second part treats of the rebellion of the Moriscos, and as the author served through the whole of the war, he was an eye-witness of many of the scenes which he relates. His sketches of the leaders on both sides are spirited and life-like, and although many of his incidents may well be supposed to be fictions, there is no doubt that his narrative gives a generally accurate picture of the course of the war.

Historia General del Mundo, del tiempo del Señor Rey Don Felipe II. desde el año 1554 hasta al de 1598 que passo a mejor vida. Escrita por Antonio Herrera Coronista-Mayor, etc. Valladolid, 1606-12. 3 vols. Fol.

The account which this standard Spanish historian gives of the war of the Moriscos is but meagre. It will be found in Part i. Books xv. xvi. and xvii.

Felipe Segundo Rey de España; por Luis Cabrera de Cordova. Madrid, 1619. Fol.

A history of the reign of Philip II. down to 1583. The Morisco war is treated of in Books viii. and ix.

Jac. Ang. Thuani *Historiarum libri CXXXVIII. ab anno 1543 ad annum 1607* . . . Londini, 1733. 7 vols. folio.

Histoire Universelle de J. A. de Thou, de 1543-1670, trad. sur l'édition de Londres, [par J. B. Le Mascrier Ch. Le Beau, l'abbé Des Fontaines, etc.] Londres, [Paris], 1734. 16 vols. (the 16th being a *Table des Matières*), 4to.

De Thou was born in 1553 and died in 1617, and personally knew many of the historical personages whose career he traced. He began his great work in 1591, and published the first eighteen books of it in 1604. The war of the Alpuxarras is narrated in Book xlviii. vol. vi. pp. 71-157 (ed. 1734).

Consultativa Epistola erga Christianos veteres in sublevatione Sarracenica in regno Granatensi anno MDLXVIII. in Alpuxarrensis populis aliisque locis in defensionem Fidei occisos. Granatæ; apud Balthasarem de Bolivar, 1669, 4to.

This book is placed by Nicolas Antonio (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Hispaniæ Nova*; Matriti, 1783, 2 vols. 4to) amongst the works of Diego de Escolano, Archbishop of Granada, who died in 1668. I have a Spanish translation entitled *Memorial a la Reyna N.S. circa las muertes que en odio de la fe Christiana dieron los Moriscos revelados a los Christianos viejos (y algunos nuevos) residentes en las Alpuxarras . . en el Levamiento del año 1568, por Diego*, indigno arzobispo de Granada. Granada, 1671, 4to.

A catalogue of obscure martyrs who suffered during the Morisco war, for some of whom the archbishop, in the regency of Mariana, Queen-Dowager of Philip IV., desired to obtain the honour of canonization.

Histoire des Mores Mudejares et des Morisques, par le C^e Albert de Circourt. Paris, 1846, 3 vols. 8vo.

A very valuable and agreeable book, of which vol. ii. chaps. xviii.-xxxii. and vol. iii. chaps i.-xiv. relate the history of the Morisco rebellion.

History of the reign of Philip II., King of Spain, by William H. Prescott. London, 1855-59, vols. i.-iii. 8vo.

In this last, and unhappily incomplete, work of one of our most distinguished modern historians, the story of the Morisco war, recounted with all his usual grace, will be found in vol. iii. pp. 3-241.

III.—THE WAR OF THE HOLY LEAGUE, AND THE CAMPAIGNS
OF TUNIS, 1571-74.

Relacion de la Guerra di Cipro y sucessos de la batalla naval de Lepanto por
Fernando de Herrera. Sevilla, 1572, sm. 8vo.

His famous ode on the battle of Lepanto, *Cancion en alabanza de la divina Magestad por la vitoria del Señor Don Juan*, first appeared at the end of this little volume.

Chronica del Señor D. Juan de Austria. Primera Parte. Por Geronimo Costiol. Barcelona, 1572, small 8vo. With this rare little book is usually found another work by Costiol, *Canto al modo de Orlando de la memorable guerra entre el Gran Turco Selim y la Señoria de Venecia, con la felicissima vittoria del Ser^{mo} Don Juan de Austria. Traduzido [de lengua Italiana]*. Barcelona, 1572, sm. 8vo.

Costiol refers in his Preface to the second part; but I have never been able to see it, and doubt if it was ever printed. Possibly the poem above mentioned may be considered to fill its place.

Relacion del progreso della Armada de la Santa Liga; por Marc Antonio Arroyo. Milan, 1576, 4to.

A very clear and concise account.

Real Aparato y sumptuoso recebimiento con que Madrid recbio al a Ser^{ma} Reyna D. Ana de Austria . . . despues de celebradas sus bodas . . . Una breve relacion del triumpho del Sereniss. don Juan de Austria . . . El parto de la Reyna . . . y el . . . baptismo del S.S. principe don Fernando . . . Compuesto por Juan Lopez de Hoyos. Madrid, 1572, sm. 8vo.

The "*Relacion del triumpho de D. Juan de Austria*" occurs in the *Epistola* to the Cardinal Espinosa, Bishop of Sigüenza, prefixed by way of dedication to the volume; and it narrates the solemnities which took place at Madrid on All Saints' Day, 1st November 1571.

Chronica y recopilacion de varios sucessos de Guerra que ha acontescido en Italia y partes de Levante y Berberia desde . . . MDLXX. hasta . . . MDLXXIV. Compuesta por Hieronymo Torres y Aguilera. Çaragoça, 1579, 4to.

One of the best Spanish contemporary books on the subject.

Felicitissima victoria concedida del cielo al Señor don Iuan d' Austria en el golfo de Lepanto de la poderosa armada Ottomana. En el año de nuestra Salvacion de 1572 (sic). Compuesta por Hieronymo Corte-Real, cavallero Portugues [En Lisboa], 1578, 4to.

A rhymed chronicle of little merit as a poem, but founded, the author avers, on the most authentic information he could obtain.

Felipe II.; por Luis Cabrera de Cordova.

The notice of the Turkish War will be found in Books ix. and x. pp. 635-747, and that of the conquest and loss of Tunis in Book x. pp. 761-3, and 790-3.

Historia del Mundo; por A. Herrera.

The account of the War of the Holy League, and of the Expedition to Tunis, occurs in Parts i. Books xvi. and xvii. and ii. Books i.-v.

Historia Pontifical y Catholica, en la qual se contienen las vidas de todos los Pontificos Romanos. Partes i. and ii. hasta Pio V. y Gregorio XIII.; compuesta por el Dr. Gonçalo de Illescas. Madrid, 1652. 2 vols. folio. Partes iii. and iv. por Luis de Bavia. Madrid, 1652. 2 vols. folio.

There are several earlier editions of this book, between 1565 and 1613, but the above is the one which I have used. The account of the first campaign of the fleet of the Holy League occurs in part ii. lib. vi. pp. 718-26; of the second, in part iii. cap. iii. pp. 7-9. The capture of Tunis is also related in part iii. cap. v. pp. 19-20; and its loss in cap. xiii. pp. 39-41. Although Gonçalo de Illescas wrote a most graphic account of the expedition of Charles V. to Tunis (*Jornada de Carlos V. á Tunes*), which is printed in the *Bibliotheca de Autores Españoles, Historiadores de sucesos particulares*, vol. xxi. 1852, pp. 451-458, nothing can well be more wearisome than his *Historia Pontifical*, unless it be the continuation by Bavia and his successors.

Descripcion de la Galera Real del Serenissimo Don Juan de Austria Capitan General de la mar que compuso Juan de Mallara, Vecino de Sevilla.

MSS. in 4to of 558 leaves, paged on one side, in the Columbian Library of the cathedral of Seville. Prefixed to it is a notice of the author, Juan de Mallara, by Christoval Mosquera de Figueroa, filling 11½ leaves.

"Our Lord the King Don Philip," says Mallara, "having determined to attack the Turk, and to appoint his brother Don John of Austria his Captain-General of the Sea, at the same time ordered the construction of

a royal galley, which in size and speed should be greatly superior to ordinary galleys, and should be adorned with the finest and most beautiful sculpture and painting that could be procured; accompanied with histories, fables, figures, devices, letters, hieroglyphics, sayings, and sentences, setting forth the virtues which ought to be united in a Captain-General of the Sea, so that the galley herself should serve as a book of memory, which, being always open, should admonish Don John of his duty on all sides." After his appointment, therefore, on the 15th January 1568, orders were sent to the Duke of Francavilla, Viceroy of Catalonia, to begin at Barcelona the building of such a vessel, of the best Catalanian pine. The superintendence of the "*ornato de la popa*" was given first to Don Sancho de Leyva, and afterwards, on that officer being called away to guard the shores of Andalusia during the Morisco War, to Don Francisco Hurtado de Mendoza, Count of Monteagudo. The designs were furnished by the painter Giovan. Battista Castello, known as el Bergamasco; and Mallara made certain remarks upon them, pointing out defects which but for the war would have been laid before Don John. In 1569 the galley was sent round to the Guadalquivir, and to Seville, where the work of its decoration went on under the care of D. Sancho de Leyva, and the captain Antonio de Alcate, the architect Benevenuto Torte, and the sculptor Juan Bautista Vazquez.

Of the decorations, the following particulars may suffice. The figurehead, over the *espolon* or spur for running into the enemy, was Neptune seated on a dolphin, indicating the maritime power and pre-eminence of the King of Spain. The poop was divided into nine compartments for paintings, marked off by twelve *terminos*, terminal figures, in high relief, painted and placed on a gilded ground, which sustained friezes, in low relief, similarly painted and gilt. The terminal figures and the mottoes belonging to each were,

In the centre,

<i>Justice</i>	CUIQUE . SUUM . TRIBUO.
<i>Force</i>	FORTES . DEUS . IPSE.
<i>Temperance</i>	SUSTINE . ET . ABSTINE.
<i>Prudence</i>	NOSCE . TEIPSUM.

On the right,

<i>Pallas</i>	NUSQUAM . ABERO.
<i>Argus</i>	VIGIL . OMNIBUS . INSTO.
<i>Hercules supporting the world</i>	NEC . ME . LABOR . ISTE . GRAVABIT.
<i>Diana with hound</i>	INSTAT . REVOCAT . ADSUM.

On the left,

<i>Mars</i>	(No motto given.)
<i>Mercury</i>	OPPORTUNE.
<i>Prometheus and eagle</i>	CORDE ALENDA PATRIA ALES.
<i>Ulysses stopping his ears against the Sirens</i>	NE DULCIA CEDANT.

See further Vol. I. p. 108.

The effigies of twelve illustrious sea captains also formed part of the decoration, six ancients on the right, and six moderns on the left. The ancients were—(1) Minos, (2) Jason, (3) Themistocles, (4) Caius Duilius,

(5) Pompey the Great, (6) Augustus Cæsar: the moderns—(1) Roger, King of Sicily; (2) Roger de Loria; (3) Jayme the Conqueror, King of Aragon; (4) Alfonso, King of Aragon and Sicily; (5) Andrea Doria; (6) The Emperor Charles V. Twelve very tedious *elogios* on these personages occupy ninety-three leaves (313-406). That on Charles V. ends with this couplet,

“Si Dux, si Cæsar, si Rex, si Divus amatur,
Omnibus exemplum Carolus unus adest.”

Cartas de Don Juan de Austria, hijo de Carlos V. y otras á varias personas escritas desde 1570 hasta 1576.

The letters, copied from the originals, some at Simancas, and others in the archives, of the Duke of Medina Sidonia, are printed in the *Documentos ineditos para la Historia de España*; tom. xxviii. pp. 155-303. Madrid, 1856.

Documentos sobre la Armada de la Liga y batalla de Lepanto sacados del archivo de Simancas, por D. Juan Sans y Barutell, segun se hallan en su coleccion manuscrita, existente en el Depósito Hidrográfico.

Printed amongst the *Documentos ineditos para la Historia de España*; tom. iii. pp. 184-360. Madrid, 1843, 4to.

Correspondencia entre Don Garcia de Toledo, cuarto Marques de Villafranca, y el Sr. D. Juan de Austria, hijo natural de Carlos V., desde el año de 1571, hasta el de 1577, sobre sucesos de la Armada de la Liga, que fué la que combatio en Lepanto, y otros que sucesivamente se hicieron en los mismos años.

This interesting and valuable correspondence is printed in the *Documentos ineditos para la Historia de España*. Madrid, 1843, 4to, tom. iii. pp. 1-184. One or two of the latter letters belong to the time when Don John was about to assume, and one to that in which he had actually assumed, the Government of the Netherlands.

Relacion de los sucesos de la Armada de la Santa Liga y entre ellos de la batalla de Lepanto desde 1571 hasta 1574 inclusiva, escrita por el P. Fr. Miguel Servia, religioso Franciscano, confesor de Don Juan de Austria.

Printed from the MS. in the possession of Don Francisco Truyols, Archdeacon of Mallorca, in the *Documentos ineditos para la Historia de España*; tom. xi. Madrid, 1847, 4to, pp. 359-454. The author is

supposed to have been born at Muro in Mallorca, early in the sixteenth century. Having taken the habit of St. Francis, he was successively master in theology, guardian of Inca, and provincial of his order. He also visited the West Indies and New Spain. The date of his appointment as confessor to Don John is unknown; but by a commission signed at Genoa, on the 14th May 1571, by D. Geronimo Manrique, inquisitor and vicar-general of the Spanish fleet, he was named as the deputy of that ecclesiastic in those offices. Don John presented him with an ivory crucifix, said to have been the gift of Pius V., which, according to the MS. chronicle of another Franciscan, Andres Noguera, "that most serene Prince held in his hand at the time of his victory over the Mahometans." On the death of Fr. Miguel Servia, which took place at Palermo in 1574, his companion Fr. Juan Fee carried this crucifix and probably the MS. *Relacion* to the Observant convent of Jesus, near Palma, where the crucifix used to be exposed to the veneration of the faithful in the chapel of the Concepcion. At the suppression of the convents in 1835 it disappeared and has not since been traced. The *Relacion* supplies many facts and dates of the personal history of Don John, not to be found elsewhere.

Historia de la Combate Naval de Lepanto; por Cayetano Rosell. Madrid, 1853, 8vo.

An excellent book, with a valuable appendix of documents.

I Trionfi Feste et Livre fatte dalli Signori Conservatori e popolo Romano . . nella entrata dell' illust^{mo} Signor Marc Antonio Colonna. Descritti da Domenico Tassolo e Baldassare Mariotti. Venetia, 1571, 4to.

There is another edition entitled *La Felicissima et honorata intrata in Roma del Ill^{mo} Signor Marcantonio Colonna*. Viterbo, 1571, 4to.

Ragguaglio delle Allegrezze Solennità e Feste fatte in Venetia per la felice Vittoria, Al dar^{mo} Sig. Girolamo Diedo, Consigliere de Corfù, Rocco Benedetti. Venetia, 1571.

A very interesting letter, forming a tract of eight leaves, dated Venice, 20th November 1571. The rejoicings were even then not over, and Benedetti promises Diedo another letter narrating a "*festa*" which the jewellers and other trades were about to give.

Coleccion de Documentos ineditos relativos a la celebre Batalla de Lepanto sacados del Archivo general de Simancas por el coronel de ingenieros, Don José Aparici. Madrid, 1847. 8vo, pp. vi-43.

This tract contains the sailing orders issued to the fleet by Don John

at Gomeniza—" *El orden que esta Armada de le Santa Liga ha de tener*," etc.; the muster-roll of the troops—" *Estado* ;" the despatch of Don John giving his first account of the battle to Philip II., dated Petala, 10th October 1571, with Philip's original note on the despatch; the "*Relacion de lo que hizo la armada de la Liga cristiana desde el 30. de Setiembre de 1571 años hasta 10. de Octubre*," etc., is contained in the despatch; and facsimiles of an original sketch of the "*Orden de Batalla*" and of Philip's note and Don John's signature. A fragment of the *Relacion* is printed in *Documentos ineditos*, iii. pp. 216-223, but as much is wanting both at the beginning and the end, and as the variations in what is given are numerous, it is perhaps taken from some mutilated rough draft. This tract is therefore a valuable addition to the papers treating of Lepanto given in the *Documentos ineditos*.

Arcus aliquot Triumphal . et monumenta victor . classica in honor . invictissimi ac illustriss . Jani Austriæ Victoris non quieturi. Auctor . Joan . Sambuco. Quibus adjectum est ejusdem argumenti Carmen Heroicum per Hugonem Favolium. Antverpiæ apud Phil. Gallæum MDLXXII. Small folio, twenty-eight leaves including title-page, on which are sixteen arches and other engraved emblematical designs, each filling a page.

Of this very rare book I have seen but two copies, my own, and that in the Royal Library at Bruxelles. The author, Joannes Sambucus, well known as a physician and an author of *Emblems* and Latin verses, was born in Hungary, and died at Vienna in 1584. In his dedication to Don John of Austria, he says that he made these designs for his own amusement, and that the publication of them is to be considered as a testimonial of the admiration and gratitude which he entertained towards the hero of Lepanto and defender of Christendom against the Turk. The winter of 1571-2, during the dismal government of the Duke of Alba, was certainly not a time very propitious for expensive public rejoicing in the Netherlands. The book may therefore be considered as a literary tribute, or pageant on paper, contrived by the author and publisher.

Historia delle cose successe dal principio della guerra mossa da Selim Ottomano a' Venetiani, fino al di della gran Giornata Vittoriosa contra Turchi, descritta . . da M. Gio. Pietro Contarini Venetiano; Venetia, 1572, 4to, with a folded map containing a sketch of the battle; and 1645, 4to.

Of the account of the Battle of Lepanto in this tract, there is an abridged English translation entitled,—"*The battaile of Pescherias fought by sea, upon the coast of Greece, between the Navie of the Christian League, under the conduct of Don John de Austria, and the Turkish fleete governed by Haly Bassa, the viii. of October, 1572 (sic). Out of Peter Contarini;*" forming the 8th chapter of *The Second part of the booke of Battailes fought in our age*; London, 1587. 4to, ff. 35-63.

Historia nova nella quale si contengono tutti i successi della guerra Turchesca dal' anno 1570 sino all' hora presente composta dal Sig. Emilio Maria Manolesso. Padova, 1572, 4to.

There is also a French translation, apparently made under the care of the author himself: *Description de toute l'Isle de Cypre . . . contenant l'entière Histoire de tout ce qui s'y est passé depuis le Déluge . . . jusqu'en . . . 1572.* Par Père F. Estienne de Lusignan . . . Paris, chez Guillaume Chandiere . . . 1580, 4to. In the *Dedication* to Loys de S. Gelais, Seigneur de Lansac, Fr. Estienne de Lusignan says that the Italian version was full of errors which he has corrected, and that he has made various additions. There is also an address or dedication to M. de St. André, Doyen de Carcassin and Canon of Notre Dame, Paris, signed I. G. A., probably the translator. Fr. Angelo Calepio's *Vraye et fidele Narration*, is at p. 237, *sqq.*

Chorographia et breve historia universale dell' isola de Cipro ; per Fr. Steffano Lusignano. Bologna, 1573, 4to.

This book contains an interesting contemporary account of the siege of Famagosta by Frate Angelo Calepio, a Dominican, who fell into the hands of the Turks at the taking of Nicosia. It is entitled "*Vera et fedelissima narratione del successo dell' espugnatione e defensione del Regno di Cipro fatta per il rev. P. F. Angelo Calepio*," and will be found at ff. 91-124 of the volume.

Cyprium Bellum inter Venetos et Selymum Turcarum Imperatorem gestum, authore Petro Bizaro, Basileæ, 1573, 8vo, of which there is a French translation: *Histoire de la Guerre qui c'est passée entre les Venetiens et la Sainte Ligue contre les Turcs pour l'Isle de Cypre, és années 1570, 1571, et 1572. Faicte en Latin par Pierre Bizare, et mise en François par F. de Belleforest.* Paris, 1573, sm. 8vo.

Of Bizari's account of the Battle of Lepanto there is an English translation, somewhat abridged, in *All the famous Battels that have been fought in our age* . . . Imprinted at London, by Henry Bynneman and Francis Coldock. 4to, 2 parts, 2d part dated 1587, Part i. pp. 320-325. The description of the Turkish Admiral's galley on p. 334 is worth consideration. It will be found in the original, Basileæ, 1573, p. 253.

Epistola de Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, a Mateo Vazquez. Obras de Cervantes, Madrid, 1863, 12 vols. 4to, vol. viii. pp. 449-456.

This interesting Epistle, written in *tercetos*, except the last stanza, which is in *quarteto*, and consisting of 244 lines, was addressed by Cervantes at the end of 1577 or the beginning of 1578, during his captivity at Algiers,

to the Secretary of State of Philip II. After a eulogy on Vazquez, Cervantes informs him of his military services at Lepanto, Tunis, and the Goletta, and of his capture and slavery, and, in the name of the twenty thousand Christians who are his fellow-captives, he exhorts the King, through his minister, to renew and complete the glorious enterprise against the infidel enemy of his father the Emperor Charles V. The poem contains a spirited description of the actions at Lepanto and at Tunis, valuable as the accounts of an eye-witness, as well as coming from the pen of Cervantes. It is considered by the critics as unquestionably his work in point of style, which it is also presumed to be because there are included in it, with some slight variations, the last sixty-seven verses of his comedy called *El Trato de Argel*. The MS. was discovered in 1863 in the archives of the Conde de Altamira. It is not in the author's autograph, but in a handwriting of the time, and is headed "*Miguel de Cervantes captivo á Mateo Vazquez mi Señor.*"

The notices of Lepanto, the subsequent campaign of the fleet of the League in 1572, and of the loss of Tunis and the Goletta in the story of the Captive in *Don Quixote*, Part i. cap. xxxix., are well known to all readers of Cervantes.

Lettera del Clar^{mo} S. Girolamo Diedo . . . all' illust^{mo} S. Marc' Antonio Barbaro . . . nella quale si describe la gran Battaglia Navale seguita l'anno MDLXXI. a' Corzolari. Venetia, 1575 and 1587. It will also be found amongst the *Lettere di Principi*. Venetia, 1581. 3 vols. 4to, iii. f. 259.

Diedo was "*Consigliere*" at Corfu, and is a trustworthy authority for the Venetian side of the story.

L'Isole piu famose del Mondo descritte da Thomaso Porcacchi, et intagliate da Girolamo Porro. Venetia, 1576, folio.

After the *Descrittione dell' Isole Curzolari*, at p. 85 in this volume, there is a long *Descrittione del Conflitto navale*, vii. Ott., 1571, pp. 87-94, with a neat plate of the battle, copied apparently, with some alterations, from the print by Martin Rota. Although the edition of *L'Isole* of 1572 was dedicated to Don John of Austria, this edition, in spite of its description of his famous victory, is inscribed to the Conte Georgio Trivultio.

Delle Histoire de' suoi Tempi di Natale Conti di Latino in volgare . . . tradotta da M. Giovan. Carlo Saraceni. Venezia, 1589. 2 vols. 4to.

This history begins at 1546 and comes down to 1582. The events of 1570-74 will be found in Books xxi.-xxvi. vol. ii. ff. 55-230. Cicogna (*Saggio di Bibliografia Veneziana*, Venezia, 1847, 8vo, p. 120) considers this history to contain the most copious and exact account of the war of Cyprus to be found in Venetian literature.

Historia Venetiana di Paolo Paruta *divisa en due Parte*; Venetia, 1605, 1645, 1703, and 1718, 4to, of which there is an English translation: *History of Venice, likewise the Wars of Cyprus*, by P. Paruta, *made English* by Henry [Cary], Earl of Monmouth. London, 1658, 4to.

Paruta was born at Venice in 1540, and was therefore contemporary with the events which he has so well related. His first literary production was an *Oratione funebre . . . in laude de' morti nella . . . battaglia contra Turchi conseguita à Curzolari l'anno 1571 alli 7 d'Ottobre*. Venetia, 1572, 4to. In 1579 he was chosen Historian of the Republic, and he afterwards held various offices of the Magistracy. In 1592 he was sent as ambassador to Rome, and enjoyed the credit of having been mainly instrumental in persuading Clement VIII. to receive Henry IV. of France into communion with the Church. He returned to Venice in 1595, and, dying there in 1598, was buried in the Church of S. Pantaleone, and was called on his tombstone "*in Veneta historia facile princeps*." His History was begun, and carried on as far as the end of the fourth book, in Latin, he himself also executing the translation into Italian. The rest was composed in Italian only. It is written with great elegance and dignity, and is considered one of the best works of its class and time. The War of Cyprus forms the second part.

Antonio Mariæ Gratiani . . . *de Bello Cyprio Libri Quinque*. Romæ, 1624, 4to.

Relazione degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato; raccolte da Eug. Alberi. Serie III. Vols. i. and ii. contain the following Reports from ambassadors at the Ottoman Porte, all containing valuable information as to the Turkish Empire and the War of the Holy League:—

- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| 1. Marino Cavalli, 1560 | Vol. i. pp. 271-97. |
| 2. Daniele Barbarigo, 1564 | „ ii. pp. 1-59. |
| 3. Luigi Bonrizzo, 1565 | „ ii. pp. 61-76. |
| 4. Jacopo Ragazzoni, 1571 | „ ii. pp. 77-102. |
| 5. Marcantonio Barbaro, 1573 | „ i. pp. 299-346. |
| 6. Andrea Badoaro, 1573 | „ i. pp. 347-64. |
| 7. Costantino Garzoni, 1573 | „ i. pp. 369-432. |
| 8. Antonio Tiepolo, 1576 | „ ii. pp. 129-91. |

and Serie I. Vol. vi. the *Relazione della Conquista di Tunisi, e della Perdita di Essa e della Goletta esibita da Placido Ragazzoni*, residente Veneto in Sicilia, 1570-74, pp. 465-479.

I Commentarii della Guerra fatta coi Turchi da D. Giovanni d' Austria dopo che venne in Italia scritta da Ferrante Caracciolo, conte de Biccari. Firenze, 1581, 4to.

The author was present at the Battle of Lepanto and in the campaign

of the following year; Nic. Toppi (*Biblioteca Napolitana*, Napoli, 1688, fol. p. 84), amongst other works by him which he says are in the hands of many persons in MS., "mentions *La Vita di D. Giovanni d'Austria*."

Commentarii della Guerra di Cipro, e della Lega de' principi Christiani contro il Turco di Bartolomeo Sereno, ora per la prima volta pubblicati da MS. autografo con note e documenti per cura de' monaci della Badia Cassinese. Pe' tipi di Monte Cassino, 1845, 8vo.

Sereno was employed by Onorato Gaetano, the commander of the Papal troops, to raise sixteen hundred foot for the War of the League, and accomplished the task. He was lieutenant of Gaetano on board the *Grifone* at Lepanto. He also served at Tunis in 1573-4, and in the latter year retired to the cloister of Monte Cassino.

Histoire Universelle de J. A. de Thou.

The account of the War of the League occupies the greater portion of Books xlix. and l. vol. vi. pp. 158-259.

Vita del gloriosissimo Papa Pio V. descritta da Girolamo Catena; con una raccolta di lettere del medesimo Pontefice a diversi principe, e le risposte loro. Roma, 1586, 4to, and 1587, sm. 8vo; Mantua, 1587, 4to; and Roma, 1647, 4to.

A careful biography, written by one who knew Pius V. well, and as secretary to his nephew, Cardinal Alessandrino, had access to all the most trustworthy persons and papers at Rome.

Vide y hechos de Pio V. . . por Don Antonio de Fuenmayor. Madrid, 1595, 4to.

Fuenmayor, a Canon of Valencia, obtained much of the information which his book contains from Francisco de Reynoso, formerly private secretary to the Pope, to whom it is dedicated.

De Vita et rebus gestis Pii V. Auctore Io. Ant. Gabutio. Roma, 1605, 4to.

Apostolicarum Pii Quinti . . . Epistolarum Libri V. . . nunc primum . . . editi . . . curâ Francisci Groubau. Antverpiæ, 1640, 4to.

Vita di S. Pio Quinto, scritta da Paolo Alessandro Maffei. Roma, 1712, 4to, and Venezia, 1712; portrait. Written soon after the canonization of Pius V. in 1710.

Tiara simbolica de San Pio, Papa, Quinto . . . por el P. Fr. Thomas de Granada. En Salamanca, 1715, folio.

The book is divided into three parts, of which the first contains the Life of Pius V., the second his Eulogium, and the third, which is the largest of the three, consists of sermons and other lucubrations poured forth at Salamanca in honour of his canonization.

The Life and Pontificate of Saint Pius the Fifth, by the Rev. Joseph Mendham. London, 1832, 8vo.

A book written with great care, though in the spirit and for the purposes of a vehement Protestant partisan.

Vie di Pio V. : Conte de Falerna.

Marcantonio Colonna alla battaglia di Lepanto per il P. Alberto Guglielmotti. Firenze, 1862, sm. 8vo.

An agreeable volume, partly drawn from fresh materials in the archives of the Colonna family. The hero of the book is made the hero of the Holy League, etc.

Négotiations de la France dans le Levant ; publiées par E. Charrière. Paris, 1848-53, 3 vols. 4to.

The History of Philip II., by W. H. Prescott. London, 1855-59, 3 vols. 8vo. The Turkish war is narrated in vol. iii. pp. 244-317.

IV.—THE AFFAIRS OF ITALY, 1573-76.

Historia del Mundo ; por A. Herrera.

The notice of the Troubles at Genoa is very full, and occurs in Part i. Books iv. and v.

Filipe Segundo, por L. Cabrera de Cordova. The notices of the Troubles at Genoa will be found in Book x. pp. 749-839.

Senatus Populique Genuensis rerum Domi forisque Gestarum Historiæ . . . auctore Petro Bizaro, Sentinati. Antverpiæ, 1579.

At the end of the volume, which contains various other works, are the two following pieces :—

Perbrevis tractatus in quo . . . universo Reip. Genuensis Statu et administratione disseritur.

Leges Novæ Reipublicæ Genuensis a legatis summi Pontificis, Cæsaris, et Regis Catholici in quos per Rempubicam collata fuerat auctoritas, conditæ, et Genuæ die xvii. Martii MDLXXVI. publicatæ.

Annali della Repubblica di Genova del Secolo decimosesto . . . da Filippo Casoni . . . Genova, 1708, folio.

Storia della Repubblica di Genova; da Carlo Varese. Genova, 1834-6, 7 vols. 8vo, Vols. v. and vi.

Relazione di Napoli del Senatore Girolamo Lippomano ritornato ambasciatore del serenissimo Don Giovanni di Austria, l'anno 1575.

Printed by Eug. Alberi, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori Veneti*; Serie II. Vol. ii. One of the most important contemporary notices of Don John, of which there is an account *supra*, pp. 92-101, and a translation of the more interesting passages relating to him.

Correspondencia entre D. Garcia de Toledo . . . y D. Juan de Austria. Documentos ineditos; tom. iii. pp. 1-184.

Histoire Universelle de J. A. de Thou.

The Troubles at Genoa are narrated in Book lxi. vol. vii. pp. 310-347.

Il nobilissimo e ricchissimo Torneo fatto nella magnifica Città di Piacenza nella venuta del Ser^{mo} Don Giovanni d'Austria et da M. Antonio Bendingelli descritto en Piacenza; appresso Francesco Conti, 1574, 4to, p. 59.

For an account of this tournament taken from the above rare tract, see *supra*, pp. 55-63.

Le Gratie d'Amore di Cesare Negri detto il Trombone, professore di ballare; Milano, 1602, folio. There is another edition, or probably a re-issue of the same book with a new title-page, *Nuove inventioni di Balli*; Milano, 1604, folio.

In this book, which is rare, and valuable for the fine prints of dances and costumes by Leon Pallavicino, there are some notices of Don John of Austria, at pp. 7 and 8. Negri was master of the ceremonies at the ball given at Genoa by Giov. Andrea Doria to Don John and the Archdukes Rudolph and Ernest in July 1571; and in May 1574 he was lodged for eight days in the palace of Vigevano, and "taught His Highness many things which pleased him exceeding well."

V.—THE AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS, 1576-1578.

The Spoyle of Antwerpe. Faithfully reported by a true Englishman. Scene and allowed Novemb. 1576. Printed at London by Richard Jones, sm. 8vo. Reprinted with *A Larum for London, or the Siege of Antwerpe*, with the author's hand, George Gascoyne, the Poet, London, Longmans, 1872.

An exceedingly graphic account of the Fury of Antwerp by George Gascoyne, who was an eye-witness.

Mémoire et recueil de ce qu'est passé entre le Seigneur Don Jan d'Autriche . . . depuis sa retraite au chateau de Namur que fust le 24^{me} de Juillet 1577 jusques à la rompure de la paix entre son Altèza et les Estats de par de la rédigé par escrit par le Sieur Grobbendonck comme y aiant esté entre mis.

Printed in the *Compte-rendu des Séances de la Commission Royale d'Histoire*, tom. x. Bruxelles, 8vo, pp. 172-223.

Sommier discours des justes causes et raisons qu'ont constrainct les Estats Generaulx des Pais Bas de pourveoir à leur deffence contre le Seigneur Don Jehan d'Austrice. Anvers, 1577, 4to.

This book was published by the Estates of the Netherlands after the seizure of the castle of Namur by Don John on the 24th July 1577, and the failure of his attempt to possess himself of the citadel of Antwerp. The *Privilege* is dated 9th September 1577. Besides the *Discours*, the book contains various intercepted letters of Don John and his secretary Escovedo to the King and Antonio Perez, dated in March and April 1577, and of Don John to the German colonels Freundsberg and Fugger, by

whose aid he hoped to seize Antwerp (16th July to 8th August); and to his sister the Empress-Dowager Maria (14th August), and some others, with French translations. The volume was published in seven different languages, sent to the various Princes with an address to each, and circulated all over Europe.

Véritable Récit des choses passées és Pays Bas, depuis la venue du Seigneur Don Jehan d'Austrice, Lieutenant, Gouverneur et Capitaine-General pour le Roy en iceulx. Avec Solution des objects contenus au Discours non véritable, mis en lumière par les Estats des dictz Pays touchant la rupture par eulx faicte de la dernière Pacification. Imprimé en la ville de Luxemburg, 1577, 4to. 82 leaves not paged; and Louvain, chez Pierre Zangre et Jehan Maes, 1578, 8vo. 87 leaves not paged. There is a Latin version entitled *Vera et simplex narratio eorum quæ ab adventu D. Joannis Austriaci gesta sunt.* Luxemburgi, 1578, 8vo; a Flemish one *Waerachtich Verhael, etc.* Loven, 1578, 4to; and one in Italian, *Vera Narratione de le cose passate ne' Paesi Bassi dopò la giunta del Ser^{mo} S. Don Giovanni d'Austria . . .* Milano, 1578, 4to.

This paper is the reply of Don John to the *Sommier Discours* of the Estates. Besides an elaborate defence of the conduct of Don John, and the account of his grievances against the Estates, it contains copies of various original State Papers which had passed between them, but which as public documents must have failed to engage and gratify public curiosity, as did the private and confidential communications printed with the *Discours*. The *Récit* was probably printed in the same number of languages as the *Discours*. I have seen in a bookseller's catalogue the title *A true account of things that have happened in the Netherlands since the arrival of Don John of Austria*, 1578, which may be presumed to be the English translation. The Italian version is addressed by the translator, Giuliano Goselini, to D. Antonio de Guzman, Marquess of Ayamonte, Governor of Milan, in a dedication full of praise of the Duke of Alba, "who, acting with so much prudence and foresight, must be allowed by every lover of his country to have worked a holy work ('santamente haver operato') in the Low Countries;" and of Don John, "who by means of his own affability, liberality, and gentleness, had endeavoured to introduce into Flemish bosoms that confidence and sincerity which the consciousness of their heavy offences had banished thence." This dedication being dated 10th January 1578, it is probable that the work had been sent to the Milanese translator before it had been issued at Luxemburg. Although the *Discours* of the Estates is frequently to be met with, the *Récit* of Don John, especially in French, is of very rare occurrence.

Response a un petit Livret nagueres publié et intitulé Declaration de l'intention du Seig^r Don Jehan d'Austrice ci après inseré en laquelle la vraye intention dudit Sr Don Jehan est manifestement descouverte.
Anvers, 1578, 4to.

A piece of eloquent and vigorous invective.

Apologie contre certain Discours émis sous le nom des Estats Généraux des Pays Bas, par Philippe le Franc. Ardenois, 1577.

A reply to the *Discours Sommier*, written after the publication of the *Récit Véritable*, or by some person who had had previous access to the latter. Whether the name of the writer be real or assumed seems doubtful. A strong royalist, he considers that the King and Don John will have much cause to regret the "gentleness and liberality" of their dealings with the party whose aim is "to extirpate the Catholic faith and abolish the royal jurisdiction and authority." But he bears valuable testimony to the strong popular feeling in favour of the Estates. "See," he says, "the difficulty of raising money to pay the troops of the King, and to recompense them for the loss of the pillage of Zirickzee? But if anything is asked by Orange and his adherents, not only property but body and soul are at their disposal." (P. 83.) He asserts that Don John was fully justified in seizing the castle of Namur as a place of safety, the plots against his life and liberty being so open and notorious that the Count of Falkenberg, the Imperial ambassador at Paris, found their success made the subject of public wagers. Of the intercepted letters of Don John the tone was no more bitter than might be expected from a governor writing confidentially to his private friends under circumstances of extreme provocation (p. 202); and for those of Escovedo Don John was not to be held responsible, there being no proof that he had approved of them, and their dates rendering it highly probable that he had never even seen them (p. 204).

Libelli cujusdam Antverpiæ nuper editi contra serenissimum D. Joannem ab Austria Gubernatorem Generalem inferioris Germaniæ qua parte conscientiæ, ut vocant, libertas in eo requiritur, brevis et dilucida confutatio. Auctore Joanne Lensæo, Belliolano. Lovanii, 1578.

A reply by a canon of Louvain to the *Response a un petit Livret*.

Responce aux Lettres de Don Jehan d'Austrice sur le faict des troubles dernière advenus au Pays-Bas. A Anvers, per Jehon le Goust, 1577.

Probably one of the earliest tracts in reply to the *Récit Véritable*. The greater part of it is a reply to the letter which will be found in the

latter work, addressed by Don John to the Estates on the 14th of August 1577, of which letter and others, it is said, he had likewise caused copies to be printed at Paris.

Responce des Estats Generaulx du Pays-Bas, à la proposition qui leur a esté faite au nom de la Sacrée Maiesté Imperiale par l'illustre Seigneur Otto-Heynrich comte de Schwartzenburg etc. son Ambassadeur à cest effect envoyé aux dits Estats. A Anvers, 1578, 4to.

Responce veritable aux lettres patentes et persuasions abusives de Don Jan d'Austrice, donnees à Hevre le xv. jour de Fevrier MDLXXVIII. Anvers, 1578, 4to.

Lettres d'avertissement a la noblesse et aultres deputez des Estats Generaulx du Pais Bas escrites par un serviteur du Seigneur Don Jehan d'Austrice, avecq leurs responses par les quelles la vraye cause des troubles dudit pais est exposée et le masque de don Jean et ses adherens levé.

A Francfort l'an MDLXXVIII. 4to.

Sommaire Annotation des choses plus memorables advenues de jour à autre és XVII. provinces du Pais Bas dès l'an LXVI. jusques au premier jour de l'an LXXIX. A Anvers, de l'Imprimerie de C. Plantin pour Phillipe Galle, 1579, sm. 8vo.

This rare tract, written by Philip Galle, the engraver and publisher, is, as he explains in the preface, a reprint of Memoranda engraved on one of his maps of the Low Countries. He is a warm partisan of Orange and the Archduke Matthias; and his little memoir is useful for its chronological arrangement, and interesting as a record of contemporary opinion and feeling.

Discours contenant le vray entendement de la Pacification de Gand de l'union des Estats et aultres traictez y ensuyvés touchant le fait de la Religion. 1579, sm. 8vo.

A very eloquent tract, written apparently for the purpose of inducing the Catholic Netherlands to adhere to the party of the Estates in the struggle with Spain, in spite of the fair promises of the Prince of Parma. The writer complains that there seems to be less care for religious liberty than there was in 1576, at the Pacification of Ghent, when he used to hear many express the opinion "qu'un chascun garde son ame pour Dieu ou pour le Diable comme il entend" (p. 27). He also affords various incidental glimpses of the state of public feeling in the Netherlands, towards the late Governor, "ce beau filz de putaine, Don Jean" (p. 105).

Relatio ad Sacram Cæsaream Majestatem eorum quæ per suæ majestatis commissarios in negotio Pacificationis Belgicæ Coloniae peracta sunt anno 1579. Ex Germanico in Latinum sermonem traducta. Coloniae, 1579, folio.

The Commissioners were—

Jacobus, Archbishop of Trier.

Gebbard (Truchsess), Archbishop of Köln.

Julius, Bishop of Wirtzburg, Duke of Franken.

Otto Henry, Count of Schwarzenburg.

Apologie ou defense de tres illustre prince Guillaume par la grace de Dieu Prince d'Orange . . . contre le Ban et Edict, publié par le Roi d'Espagne . . . présentée a Messieurs les Estats Generaux des Pais Bas. Ensemble le dict Ban. Leyden, 1581, 4to.

Of this famous tract some writers have ascribed the authorship to Hubert Languet. But Duplessis Mornay asserts that it was written by Pierre Loyseleur de Villiers, the secretary of Orange; and he says that Villiers "qui en estoit l'auteur," read it to him and to Languet in the presence of Orange, and that they advised him to moderate some of the passages. This advice was taken, and the tone of the papers was still further softened, "et de fait encore en ôta-t-on beaucoup d'aigreur." (Note de Duplessis Mornay in De Thou, *Hist. Universelle*, La Haye, 1740, 4to, tom. v. p. 819.) The vigour of the spared vituperation leaves the reader at a loss to imagine what further heights of invective the original composition can have reached. Groen van Prinsterer (*Archives de la Maison d'Orange Nassau*, vol. i. p. 9) says the "Apologie de 1580 est de Villiers," and M. Chevreuil, the latest biographer of Languet (*Hubert Languet*, Paris, 1856, 8vo, p. 162) appears to assent to that opinion, and to believe that Languet "n'en a rédigé et modifié que quelques parties."

Histoire des troubles et guerres civiles des Pays Bas . . . depuis l'an 1559 jusques à l'an 1581. 1582, 8vo, of which there is an English translation. A tragicall Historie of the troubles and Civile Warres of the lowe Countries . . . from the yere 1559 unto the yere 1581 . . . Translated out of French into Englishe by T. S. [Thomas Stoëker], London, n. y. black letter. The dedication to Robert, Earl of Leicester, is dated 15th March 1583.

The notices of the government of Don John of Austria will be found in Book iv. pp. 361-456. Though so nearly resembling one another in their titles, this and the next book are two different works.

Histoire de la Guerre civile du Pays de Flandres . . . depuis l'an 1559 jusques à la fin de l'an 1582. Lyon, 1583, 8vo.

The career of Don John of Austria in the Low Countries forms the subject of Book iv. ff. 278-367.

Novus de Leone Belgico ejusq. topographica atq. historica descriptione Liber quinque partibus Gubernatorum Philippi Regis Hispaniarum ordine distinctus insuper et elegantissimi illius artificis Francisci Hogenbergii CXLII. figuris ornatus rerumque in Belgio maxime gestarum inde ab anno Christi MDLIX. usque ad annum MDLXXXV. perpetua narratione continuatus, Michaelae Aitzingeri Austriaco Auctore. Coloniae, 1583. *Supplement*, 1585. Small folio.

Michael Eytzinger, or Latinized, Aitzingerus, was councillor to the Emperors Charles V., Ferdinand I., Maximilian II., and Rudolph II., and an eye-witness of the Troubles of which he kept a journal in the spirit of a staunch royalist. Editions of his once popular book, with continuations, were published in 1586 and 1587, 1596 and 1605. It is now chiefly valued for the historical prints by F. Hogenberg. The annals of the government of Don John of Austria begin (in the edition of 1585) at p. 270, and end on p. 383, and are illustrated by 28 of these prints.

Comentarios de lo succedido en los Países Baxas desde el año MDLXVII. hasta el de MDLXXVII. por D. Bernardino de Mendoza. Madrid, 1592, 4to. A French translation had appeared the year before. *Commentaire memorable de D. Bernardin de Mendoza des Guerres de Flandre . . . traduite de l'Espagnol* [par P. Crespat]. Paris, 1591, 8vo.

The author served as Captain and Colonel of horse in the Low Countries during the ten years of which his commentaries treat, and he was also ambassador of Philip II. in England and France.

La Grande Chronique Ancienne et Moderne de Hollande, Zelande, West-Frise, Utrecht, Frise, Overysseel et Groeningen, jusques à la fin de l'an 1600 . . . par Jean Francois Le Petit. Dordrecht . . . 1601. 2 vols. folio; with fine full-length portraits by C. Van Sichem.

The transactions of Don John of Austria are narrated in Book xi. vol. ii. pp. 317-357. Le Petit was born a Catholic but became a Protestant, and according to Paquot (*Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire littéraire des XVII. Provinces des Pays Bas.* Louvain, 1765-70, 3 vols. folio, vol. i. p. 201) tampered freely with facts, in order to please the Estates-General of

Holland, etc., to whom his Chronicle was dedicated. Born in 1546, he was, however, a contemporary of many of the later events which he describes, and his testimony may be compared with that of partisans of the other side.

Archives ou Correspondance inédite de la Maison d'Orange Nassau, Recueil publié . . . par M. G. Groen von Prinsterer. Première Serie: tome i.-viii. with one volume of Table des Matières. Leiden, 1835-6-7-8-9, 1847.

This important work has, as yet, been brought down no further than 1584, the assassination of William of Orange.

Correspondance de Guillaume le Taciturne, Prince d'Orange; par M. Gachard. Bruxelles, etc., 1847, 1850, and 1851. Vols. i.-iii. 8vo.

This important work was completed in 1876.

Cartas que el S^r Don Juan de Austria y el secretario Juan de Escovedo descifradas escribieron a Su Magestad y Antonio Perez desde Flandes, of which a very full and interesting account has been given by M. Gachard in his Notice sur un Manuscrit de la Biblioth. Royale de la Haye contenant des Lettres de Don Juan d'Autriche, du Sec. Escobedo, etc. Bruxelles, 1847, 8vo.

A MS. in the Royal Library at the Hague, filling 176 leaves of foolscap with four leaves of *tabla*, and clearly written. Both M. Gachard and M. Mignet, who notices it in the preface (p. vi.) of his *Ant. Perez et Philippe II.* 2d edition, Paris, 1746, 8vo, believe it to be a copy of those letters which Antonio Perez contrived to carry off to Aragon, and used in his process there before the *Justicia Mayor*, a copy probably made, as M. Gachard remarks, when the originals were placed in the hands of the judges. He is of opinion that the handwriting is incontestably Spanish, and of the period when Perez was at Zaragoza, and he gives good reasons for believing that the MS. had passed through the hands of Perez himself. (*Notice*, p. 8.) I did not observe anything in the MS. worth extracting which had not been already printed by M. Mignet or by Mr. Motley.

Papers in the State Paper Office, London, chiefly consisting of the Despatches of Dr. Thomas Wylson, William Davison, — Fenton, and — Wilkes, during the years 1576-7 and 8.

Collection of papers and documents relating to Don John of Austria, copied from the originals in the Royal Archives at Simancas for Don Luis Lopez Ballesteros, and bequeathed by him to the Royal Academy of History at Madrid, where they now are.

I had an opportunity, by the kindness of Don Pascual de Gayangos, of carefully examining this collection in February 1865. A good many of the papers have been printed in the *Documentos ineditos*. Amongst those which I have not observed in that work are the following:—

Cartas de Su Magestad a Don Juan de Austria . 29 Abril 1578.

Cartas de Antonio Perez a D. Juan de Austria.

22 Julio y 19 Agosto „

The second of these may have been amongst the last Don John received from him.

Carta de Don Gabriel Niño de Çuniga a D. Diego de Cordova 1 Octubre „

Carta de Don Gabriel Niño de Çuniga a Su Mag^d . 2 Octubre „

Carta del Padre Confesor Orantes a Ant. Perez . 3 Octubre „

Discurso de D^r Ramirez a Su Mag^d 6 Octubre „

These four papers, all written at the camp at Bouges, give an account of the death of Don John.

Carta de Juan Bautista Tassis a Su Mag^d . . . 10 Octubre „

This letter gives an account of Don John's funeral.

Relacion de lo que debiera al poco mas o menos en la casa del S^r Don Juan ; fecha en Namur al 10 de Octubre, fermada por Juan Gomez.

Relacion de Octavio Gonzaga de los Criados de Don Juan 17 Octubre „

Cartas de Octavio Gonzaga a Su Mag^d . 19 y 20 Octubre „

Minuta of the King's orders for the disposal of the body of Don John and his effects. Madrid . 30 Nov. „

Cartas de Don Gabriel Niño de Çuniga a Antonio Perez.

Paris, 29 Marzo 1579.

Santander, 30 Abril „

Cartas de Don Gabriel Niño de Çuniga a Su Mag^d

Paris, 30 Marzo „

Santander, 15 Abril „

„ 1 Mayo „

Carta de Su Mag^d a Don Gabriel Niño de Çuniga

San Lorenzo, — Abril 1579,

These six letters describe the removal of Don John's body to Spain, and the orders of the King on the subject of its reception.

Correspondance de Philippe II. sur les affaires des Pays Bas; par M. Gachard, Bruxelles, 1848-61, vols. i.-iv. 4to.

This valuable series of State Papers begins 24th November 1558, and is carried on to 31st October 1576.

Memorias de Fray Juan de San Geronimo monge que fue primero de Guisando despues del Escorial sobre varios sucesos del reinado de Felipe II.

Printed amongst the *Documentos ineditos*, tom. vii. Madrid, 1845, 4to, pp. 5-442. These Memoirs contain an account of a visit paid to the Escorial by Don John, on the 13th March 1575, pp. 123-4; a copy of a letter from Don John's confessor (Fray Juan de Orantes, though the name is not mentioned) to the King, narrating the circumstances of his death—"Trasumpto de una carta que envió á S. M. el confesor del Señor D. Juan de Austria y de los casos que pasaron al tiempo de su fállescimiento," pp. 247-257; and of the translation to the Escorial of his remains on the 24th of May 1579, p. 243.

Relacion de la enfermedad y muerte del Señor Don Juan de Austria, cuya cuerpo se llevó de Flándes á España y esta enterrado en Sant Lorenzo el Real al lado del Emperador Carlos V. su padre.

Copied from a MS. in 4to, formerly in the library of P. Florez, author of *La España sagrada*, and printed in *Documentos ineditos para la historia de España*. Madrid, 1845, 4to, tom. vii. pp. 443-8.

The Pope's pitiful Lamentation for the death of his deere darling Don Joan of Austria; and Death's Answer to the same. With an Epitaphe upon the death of the said Don Joan. Translated from the French printed copy by H. C. [perhaps Henry Chettle or Henry Constable]. Colophon [Imprinted by T. C.]

The verses are very poor, the epitaph is somewhat better.

DON JOAN'S EPITAPH.

Don Joan of Austria heere entombd doth lye
That was the worthy warrior willom nam'd,

Who proudly did of late his power applye
 The fatal foyle of Flaunders to have fram'd.
 Of stomach stoute & hawghty hart he was
 And made his vaunt the Emperor's sonne to bee ;
 But yet the thing he sought to bringe to passe
 The living Lord hath frustrate made we see.
 The fyrst of October 1578.

The tract is reprinted in *Restituta, or titles, characters, and extracts from old Books*, by Sir Egerton Brydges. London, 1814, 4 vols. 8vo, vol. iv. pp. 149-152.

Les Mémoires de la Roine Marguerite. Paris, 1628, sm. 8vo, and 1666, 12mo. Goude, 1649, and Bruxelles, 1658, 12mo; of which the best edition is probably *Mémoires et Lettres; revue sur les Manuscrits . . . par M. F. Guessard*. Paris, 1842, large 8vo. There is an English translation entitled *History of Queen Margaret of Valois; rendered into English* [by Robert Codrington]. London, 1653, sm. 8vo.

Las Obras y relaciones de Antonio Perez, Secretario de Estado que fue del Rey de España Don Felipe II. deste nombre. [Geneva?] Imprimido por Samuel Chouet, 1654.

The account of the transactions which led to the murder of Escovedo is given in the *Memorial, segunda parte*, pp. 294-307.

Antonio Perez et Philippe II. par M. Mignet. Paris, 1846, 8vo.

The account of the murder of Escovedo, and the events which led to it, will be found in chap ii. pp. 65-102.

Felipe II. . . . por Luis Cabrera de Cordova.

Books xi. and xii. pp. 873-1010, relate the story of Don John of Austria in the Netherlands.

Historia del Mundo, por A. Herrera.

The account of Don John of Austria in the Netherlands occurs in Part ii. Books vi.-viii.

Histoire Universelle de J. A. de Thou.

The notices of Don John of Austria in the Netherlands will be found in Books lxii. lxiv. lxvi. vol. vii. pp. 391, 468.

Polemographia Auriaco-Belgica scriptore Wilhelmo Baudartio, Deinsiano Flandro [1559-1614]. Amstelodami, 1622, oblong 4to, 2 parts. The 2d part in my copy is dated 1621.

A book chiefly valuable on account of its numerous historical prints. The account of the government of Don John of Austria commences at p. 232, and ends at p. 314 of Part I. It is illustrated with his portrait and prints 78 to 107 of the series. Some of these, such as No. 78, Don John's entry into Bruxelles, and No. 79, his seizure of the castle of Namur, are reduced and not very close copies of the prints of Hogenberg in the *De Leone Belgico* of Aitzingerus.

Historia Belgica nostri potissimum temporis . . . ad annum usque 1598 complectens, conscripta . . . a E. Meterano Belga. Sine loco et anno.

The first edition; afterwards disavowed by its author, who re-wrote the work in Dutch and published it at Delft in 1605, 4to. But it is valuable for the portraits with which it is illustrated.

L'Histoire des Pays-Bas d'Emanuel de Meteren . . . *depuis l'an 1315, jusques à l'an 1612 . . . traduite par I. D. L. Haye . . . en la Haye, 1618, folio; with portraits, many of them fine.*

Meteren is the ultra-Protestant historian of the Low Countries. His account of the government of Don John will be found in Books vi. vii. and viii. of his work.

Francisei Harei *Annales ducum . . . Brabantie totiusq. Belgie.* Antwerpiae, 1623. 3 vols. folio. Portraits in vols. i. and ii.

The author, whose vernacular name was Verhaer, was a native of Utrecht, and a canon successively of Bois-le-duc, Namur, and Louvain, and he died in the latter place in 1632. His account of Don John will be found in the 3d volume of his Annals, pp. 239-285.

Historia de las Guerras civiles que ha havido en los Estados de Flandes desde el ano MDLIX. hasta el de MDCIX.; por Antonio Carnero. Bruselas, 1625. Folio.

Joannis Baptistæ de Tassis *Commentariorum de Tumultibus Belgicis sui temporis Libri octo;* printed by Cornelius Paulus Hoyneck van Papendrecht, in his *Analecta Belgica.* Hagæ Comitum, 1743. 3 vols. of 2 parts each. 4to. Vol. ii. Part ii., pp. 219-600.

J. B. de Tassis was one of those royalists who were arrested by order of the Estates between the death of the Governor Requesens and the

arrival of Don John of Austria. He made his escape by night over the walls of Bruxelles, and joined Don John at Luxemburg. He soon afterwards became Don John's principal chamberlain and secretary, and was employed by him in various confidential services; and he had therefore the best means of knowing the secret history of many of the transactions which he relates. His Commentaries begin at the beginning of the troubles; but the first two books, bringing the history down to 1576, are a general summary of what took place previous to his personal introduction to State affairs. In 1594 he was promoted to the Council of State; in 1598 he was one of the Spanish plenipotentiaries of the Peace of Vervins, and he afterwards represented Philip III. at the Court of France. He died at Valladolid in or about 1610.

De Bello Belgico decades duæ auctore Famiano Strada. Antverpiæ, 1635, 2 vols. 8vo, portraits. Romæ, 1632-47, 2 vols. fol., fine plates, amongst the various translations of which are: *Histoire de la Guerre de Flandre* de Famianus Strada, *traduite par* P. Du Ryer. Paris, 1652, 2 vols. 8vo (with portraits), and *History of the Low Country Warres . . . translated into English*, by Sir. Rob. Stapylton. London, 1650; fol. portraits.

This History, which attained great popularity, is said to have been written at the request and with the assistance of the archives of the House of Farnese, of whose distinguished member, Alexander, Duke of Parma, some critics have considered it as a panegyric. It was criticized by Cardinal Bentivoglio, and fiercely attacked by Schoppius in his *Infamia Famiani Stradæ*. Strada was professor of rhetoric in the Jesuits' College at Rome, and famous for his Latinity both in prose and verse. He was born at Rome in 1572, and died there in 1649. In writing his history he had, he says, access to the letters and memoirs of those who caused, or who figured in, the wars which he described; but although he dedicated the first decade to Odoardo, and the second to Ranuccio II., Dukes of Parma, he denied that he wrote under the influence of the fear or the favours of any Prince. His opinions of political events and personages are not other than a Jesuit of the seventeenth century might naturally be expected to hold and express.

Della Guerra di Fiandra fatta per difesa di Religione da Catholici Re di Spagna Feliçe Secondo e Filippo Terzo . . . per lo spatio di anni trenta-cinque; descritta fedele e diligentemente da Cesare Campana . . . *Parte i. ii. and iii.* In Vicenza, 1602, 4to.

The government of Don John of Austria in the Low Countries fills Book vi. of Part i., f. 173-218. The title of the book sufficiently explains the political views of the writer, but the story appears to be told with considerable fairness.

Delle Guerre della Germania inferiore istoria di Ieronimo Conestaggio
... Vinetia, 1614, 4to.

Jerome de' Franchi Conestaggio obtained considerable literary fame by his book *Dell' unione del regno di Portogallo alla Corona di Castiglia*, Genova, 1585, 4to, often reprinted and translated, which the Spaniards attribute to João de Silva, Count de Portalegre. His history of the wars of the Low Countries is agreeably written, and is supposed to have been the source whence Bentivoglio drew many of his anecdotes. It is however but a fragment, Book x., the portion devoted to the government of Don John of Austria, pp. 485-551, closing with the autumn of 1577. Adrian Stopner published some remarks on it in French, which I know only in the Italian translation, *Avertimenti sopra l' istoria della Guerre della Germ. Inf. di G. Conestaggio; fatte da Adriano Stopnero ... tradotte dal Francese ... per T. P. sine loco*, 1619, sm. 8vo. In this work Conestaggio is described as a Genoese merchant, who passed many years of his life in business at Antwerp, where he was principally brought in contact with the partisans of the Estates, and imbibed their heretical opinions in religion and politics. He is accused therefore of writing with a strong bias in their favour, and a corresponding prejudice against the Spaniards, whose violence and cruelty he exaggerates, and whose successes, when compelled to admit them, he always if possible attributes, to some of the Italians in their service. But the critic, it must be observed, writes with at least an equal leaning to the Spanish side; and if Conestaggio, for example, paints in somewhat dark colours the horrors at Antwerp, when the town was in the hands of the mutineer Spaniards, Stopner would make it appear that the soldiery who had lately sacked Haarlem and Naarden were the most pious and humble of men, much occupied in works of charity and very careful of the preservation of order (p. 78). There is a Spanish book in reply to Conestaggio, which I have not been able to meet with, by Juan Pablo Martyr Rizo, *Historia de las Guerras de Flandes contra la de Conestaggio*, Valencia, 1627, 8vo; and he is also rebuked for his heretical sympathies by Carlos Colonna in the Prologo to his *Guerras de los Estados Baxos desde 1588 hasta 1599*. Ambares, 1625, 4to.

Della Guerra di Fiandra dal 1559 al 1607 dal Cardinal Guido Bentivoglio.
Colonia. Parte i. 1634. Parte ii. 1636. Parte iii. 1639. 3 vols. 4to.

The best edition, supposed to have been printed at Rome though dated Cologne. The first volume was translated into French by Ant. Oudin, and there is also a translation of the complete work by the Abbé Loiseau, Paris, 1769, 4 vols. 12mo. There is a Spanish translation by P. Basil Varen de Soto, Madrid, 1643, fol., and an English one by that indefatigable translator Henry Cary, Earl of Monmouth, London, 1678, fol. Bentivoglio was born in 1579, and died in 1644 in the conclave from which it was expected that he would have come forth Pope. From 1607 to 1617 he was Nuncio at Bruxelles, and from 1617 to 1621 in

Paris. He had therefore excellent opportunities of studying the history which he wrote, in the scenes where it was enacted, and in the society of many of its chief actors.

Oorsprongk, Begin en Vervolgh der Nederlandsche Oorlogen beroerten en borgerlyke oneenigheden, beginnende met d' opdracht der selve Landen gedaen by Keyser Karel den Vijfden, aen sijnen Soon Konink Philippus van Spanjen, en eindigende met het einde van 't jaer M.D.C. . . . bischreven door Pieter Bor Christiaenszoon; in XXXVII. Boeken, en IV. Stukken verdeelt. t'Amsterdam . . . 1679-1684. 4 vols. folio, with fine portraits and plates.

Peter Bor, the standard Dutch historian of the War of Independence, was born at Utrecht in 1559, and died at Haarlem in 1635. He grew up amongst the troubles of which at an early age he determined to be the chronicler, and was indefatigable in collecting materials for his work. The first three books of his history were published in 1595, the next three in 1601, and the rest at various dates, 1621-26, 1630, and 1636. Desiring to make his countrymen more familiar from their infancy with the heroic struggles of their ancestors, he composed a compendium of his great work in verse for the use of children, which was published in 4to at Leyden, 1617, and is now esteemed a literary curiosity. He is a discursive and somewhat tedious writer, negligent of the graces of style, but most industrious in collecting and verifying facts; and in the appendices of his work he has assembled and preserved many important papers. His account of Don John of Austria and his government of the Low Countries will be found in Book x. vol. i. pp. 745-1006, and contains (pp. 1004, 1005) two remarkable letters addressed by Don John to Giovanni Andrea Doria and Pedro de Mendoza, Spanish Ambassador at Genoa, on the 16th September 1578, a fortnight before his death.

P. C. Hooft's *Nederlandsche Historien seedert de Ooverdraght der Heerschappye van Kaizar Kaarel den Vyfden op Cooning Philips zynen Zoon tot de doot des Prinsen van Orange, met het Vervolgh tot het einde der Landtvooghdye des Graaven van Leicester.* Amsterdam, 1640, 1642, and 1677, folio, and 1703, 2 vols. folio. The last two are the most complete editions, and are illustrated with very beautiful portraits and plates. The book has been republished with notes by Van Capellen and others. Amsterdam, 1821, 18 vols. 8vo.

The account of Don John's rule in the Netherlands is to be found in Books xi. xii. xiii. and xiv. Pieter Corneliszoon Hooft enjoys the reputation of being one of the best Dutch historians. "Inter historicos Batavos plurimum excelluit," is the judgment passed upon him by Foppens (*Bibliotheca Belgica*, Bruxelles, 1739, 2 vols. 4to, ii. p. 984). He died in 1647, aged 66.

Annales et historiæ de rebus Belgicis ; auctore Hugone Grotio. Amsteldami, 1657, fol., of which there is a French translation, *Annales et Histoires des Troubles du Pays-Bas ; par Hugo Grotius.* Amsterdam, 1662, folio, and mentioned by Brunet, by L'Heritier, Amsterdam (or Paris), 1672, fol., and one in English, Hugo Grotius, *de Rebus Belgicis, or the Annals and History of the Low Country Wars, rendered into English* by T. M. [Thomas Manley], London, 1865, 8vo.


Histoires des Troubles des Pays Bas . . . sous Philippe II. ; par Vander-vynckt ; corrigé par S. Tarte, Bruxelles, 1822, 4 vols. 8vo.

The Rise of the Dutch Republic ; by John Lothrop Motley, London, 1855, 3 vols. 8vo., and 1858, 3 vols. sm. 8vo.

The great and just popularity of this book renders it hardly necessary to recall the fact that it was the first which gave the English reader a fair view of the struggle between Spain and the Netherlands. The notice of Don John of Austria's career will be found in Part v. vol. iii. pp. 65-224, ed. 1858.

Histoire des États Généraux des Pays Bas (1465-1790) ; par Théodore Juste. Bruxelles et Paris, 1864, 2 vols. 8vo.

An interesting and instructive book, affording much information about the principles, forms, and working of the old constitutions of the States of the Netherlands ; without which much of their history is scarcely intelligible to readers who are not Netherlanders.





- ABDERAHMAN, i. 125.
- Abellan, Antonio, ii. 4.
- Aben Aboo, Diego Lopez, i. 142; horrible treatment of, 142, 188; declared King, 190; reigns as Muley Abdalla Aben Aboo, 193; attacks Orgiba, 194; besieges it, 195; 213; 249; entraps some Spanish deserters, 257; makes his submission, 267; his sincerity questioned, 270; puts El Habaqui to death, 272; renews the revolt, and deals falsely with Don John and with his own allies, 273; defies the Spaniards, 274; again makes overtures to Don John, 276; entrapped and slain by El Senix, 283.
- Abencerrages, the, i. 121.
- Aben Farax [Farax].
- Aben Mequenun, i. 193.
- Aben Umeya, Muley Mahomet, King of the Morisco rebels [Valor, Hernando de Cordoba y de], i. 126; narrowly escapes capture, 142; receives fresh adherents, 145, 151; extends the revolt to the upper valley of the Xenil, 160; makes overtures to Don John, 172; defeated by Los Velez, 179, 180; occupies the old town of Vera, 184; but fails to seize the port, 185; gives mortal offence to Diego Alguacil, 188; who brings about his death, 191.
- Abrojo, Convent of, i. 31, 111.
- Abu Amer, secretary of Aben Aboo, i. 282; slain, 284.
- Accord, the, ii. 156; virtually withdrawn, 157, 159.
- Acosta, ii. 290.
- Acqs, François de Noailles, Bishop of, i. 469, 483, 503, 507; ii. 5.
- Acquaviva, Adrian, i. 458.
- Acqui, Bishop of, P. F. Castaciario, ii. 43.
- Acuña, Vazquez de, i. 223.
- Adolphus of Nassau, ii. 144.
- Adoration in the Conclave, i. 477.
- Adorno, Doge of Genoa, ii. 30, 31.
- Adra, i. 254, 256.
- Adrianople, Selimye mosque at, i. 301, 467.
- Aerschot, Duke of, ii. 144, 177, 180, 203; appointed Governor of Antwerp, 205; 219, 223, 232; duplicity of, 233; summoned to Namur, 245; invites the Archduke Matthias to the Netherlands, 268; appointed Governor of Flanders, 272; sent to welcome the Duke of Anjou, 316.
- Aerschot, Duchess of, ii. 269, *note*.
- Aerschot, people of, rise against the Spanish garrison, ii. 323.
- Agnolo, Fra Giovanni, ii. 342, *note* 4.
- Aguilar, Alonso de, i. 117.
- Aguilar, Pedro de, i. 117, *note* 1.
- Aguilar, Tello Gonzalez de, i. 161, 211, 241, 276, 278.
- Aguilera, Hieronimo, ii. 478.
- Aitzingerus [Eytzinger].
- Alarabi, i. 252.
- Alava, Francisco de, i. 79.
- Alba, Duke of, i. 4, 37, 43; appointed Regent of the Netherlands, 51, 58; urges the enforcement of the Edict of 1526 against the Moriscos, 120; ii. 162; reaches Luxemburg, 163; arrests Egmont and Horn, 164; has them executed, 165; wins the battle of Jemmingem, 165; erects a colossal statue of himself at Antwerp, 166; requests to be recalled, 169; rejoices in his slaughtering of heretics, 171; his colossal statue destroyed, 259.
- Albaycin of Granada, tumult in, i. 115; Moriscos ordered to be removed from, 165.
- Albenga, ii. 45.
- Alberghi, or inns, of Genoa, ii. 32, 38; abolished, 52.
- Alberi, Eugenio, ii. 486.
- Albert, Archduke, i. 346.
- Albotodo, i. 166.
- Albuñuelas, Las, i. 137, 161.
- Albuquerque, i. 14.
- Alcalá, Duke of, Viceroy of Naples, i. 358.
- Alcalá, University of, i. 39.
- Alcantara, Gonzano de, i. 136.
- Alçate, Antonio de, ii. 480.
- Alcazarquivir, battle of, ii. 113, 357, *note* 2.
- Alciato, Cardinal, ii. 106.

- Aldegonde [St. Aldegonde].
 Aldobrandini, Cardinal, i. 331.
 Alençon [Anjou, Duke of].
 Alessandrino, Cardinal, i. 80 *note*, 331, 345, 346.
 Algiers, i. 85; ii. 7.
 Alguacil, Diego, i. 187; plots the death of Aben Umeya, 188, 192.
 Alguacil, Juan, i. 179.
 Ali Pasha, i. 389, 397, 398; killed at Lepanto, 414.
 Alkmaar, siege of, raised, ii. 170.
 Almanzora, i. 165, 281.
 Almarta, i. 203.
 Al Martel, i. 253.
 Almeria, the Negro of, i. 269.
 Al Piceni, i. 253.
 Alpujarras, the name, i. 126; geography and climate of the, 127; martyrs of the, 130; systematic devastation of the, 278.
 Altemps, Cardinal, i. 511.
 Aluch Ali, i. 105; Pasha of Algiers, 156, 180, 371, 388; his career, 397; at Lepanto, 409, 417, 418, 426; receives the name of Kilidj, 468, 483; avoids fighting with Colonna, 485, 489; ii. 7, 12; besieges Tunis, 76; takes part in the siege of Goletta, 80; professes to condemn Sinan's bad faith, 86; subsequent career and death of, 87.
 Alva [Alba].
 Alzamora, Luis de, i. 449, *note*.
 Ambracian Gulf, i. 400.
 Ammanati, Bartolomeo, i. 460; ii. 342.
 Amsterdam, citizens of, make an agreement with William of Orange, ii. 299; 'Satisfaction' of, 299; expulsion of the Catholic nobles and magistrates from, 302.
 Amurath III., Sultan, i. 410; ii. 113.
 Anabaptists, the, ii. 133, 158, 232.
 Anacoz, El, i. 186.
 Andalla, brother of Aben Umeya, i. 151.
 Andrade, Gil de, i. 106, 354, 375, 388, 389, 393, 395; at Lepanto, 406, 484; ii. 20; tries in vain to succour the Goletta garrison, 74; 87, 395, 401.
 Angulo, courier, i. 448, 481; ii. 9.
 Angulo, printer, i. 39.
 Anjou, Duke of, i. 471, 507; ii. 170, 176, 217, 234, 242, 281, 314; arrives at Mons, 316; accepts the terms of the Estates, 324, 328; declares war on Don John, 328.
 Anna, daughter of Don John, ii. 341.
 Anne of Austria, Archduchess, i. 60, 110; wife of Philip II., 110, 449.
 Annunziata, hospital of the, at Naples, burnt, ii. 24.
 Anti-Johannists, ii. 233 [Johannists].
 Antonio, Nicolas, ii. 470.
 Antwerp, cathedral of, desecrated and sacked by a mob, i. 51; ii. 153; further ravages and tumults, 154; the city taken and pillaged by the Spanish soldiers, 172; Spanish Fury at, 182; in the hands of the Estates, 251; the fortifications demolished, 259.
 Aranjuez, i. 48, 152.
 Arce, Garcia de, i. 264; ii. 185.
 Arce, a Spaniard, accused of homicide, at Genoa, ii. 36.
 Arcos, Diego de, i. 189.
 Arcos, Duke of, i. 53, 279, 282, 283, 284.
 AreMBERG, Count of, ii. 149.
 Arguello, Gutierre de, i. 385, 388.
 Arpino, Cavaliere, i. 447.
 Arriola, i. 181.
 Arroyo, M. Antonio, i. 454; ii. 478.
 Arta, Gulf of, i. 400.
 Atocha, convent of, i. 43, 69, 449.
 Atri, Duke of, ii. 110, 391.
 Audience, Royal, at Granada, i. 119, 120.
 Augsburg, Charles V. at, i. 7.
 Augustus, Elector of Saxony, i. 60.
 Aumale, Duke of, ii. 409, 413.
 Austria, Don John of [Don John of Austria].
Auto-da-fé of May 21, 1559, i. 26.
 Avalos, Alonso de, i. 327.
 Avellano, i. 167.
 Avila, Antonio de, i. 149.
 Avila, Francisco de, ii. 18.
 Avila, Lorenzo de, i. 136, 183.
 Avila, Pedro Arias de, i. 139.
 Avila, Sancho de, ii. 124; wins the battle of Mookerheyde, 172; refuses to publish the Edict outlawing the Spanish soldiers, 179, 181; leaves Antwerp, 205, 206.
 Ayala, Luis de, ii. 9.
 Ayamonte, Marquess of, ii. 49, 54, 71, 121, 255, 491.
 BAÇAN, Alvaro [Santa Cruz].
 Badoara, Andrea, ii. 486.
 Badoer, Federigo, Venetian envoy, i. 34.
 Baffo, a renegade, i. 390.
 Baglione, Astor, military commander at Famagosta, i. 313, 363, 368; treacherously murdered by Mustafa, 369.
 Bajazet, brother of Selim II., i. 299.
 Bank of St. George, Genoa, ii. 34, 39.
 Barbarigo, Andrea, i. 430, *note* 1.
 Barbarigo, Augustin, i. 361, 363, 373, 387; at Lepanto, 405; death of, 412, 430; ii. 387, 401, 412.
 Barbarigo, Daniele, ii. 486.
 Barbarigo, Giorgio, i. 430, *note* 1.
 Barbarigo, Z. Batt., ii. 403.
 Barbarigo, Zorzi, ii. 403.

- Barbaro, Candido di, i. 94.
 Barbaro, Giacomo, ii. 411.
 Barbaro, Marc Antonio, Venetian envoy at the Porte, i. 305, 306, 337; enters into negotiations for the surrender of Cyprus, 339; makes terms after the battle of Lepanto, 509; ii. 486.
 Barbarossa, Hayreddin, i. 105, 294, 376, 392, *note* 1, 397, 455; ii. 9-12.
 Barcelona, i. 109, 354.
 Bardez, plot of, in Amsterdam, ii. 302.
 Barlaymont, Count of, ii. 124, 149; aids Don John in seizing the citadel of Namur, 240, 243, 253; death of, 314.
 Barlaymont, Louis de, ii. 235.
 Barradas, Hernando de, i. 245, 266; demands of Aben Aboo tidings of El Habaqui, 272.
 Barredo, Francisco, brings about the death of Aben Aboo, i. 282, 285.
 Bartholomew, St., Massacre of, i. 494; ii. 168, 169, 234.
 Bassompierre, i. 292.
 Bazan, Alonzo, ii. 73.
 Beggars, association of the, ii. 150, 162, 251.
 Beggars of the Sea, ii. 167, 169, 173.
 Belacato, Zan Battista, ii. 401.
 Benahaduz, Sierra of, i. 139.
 Benavides, Francisco de, i. 177.
 Benavides, Rodrigo de, i. 34, 185; ii. 57, 345, *note* 1.
 Bendinelli, M. A., ii. 489.
 Benedetti, Rocco, ii. 482.
 Benedetti, Z. B., ii. 403.
 Benihaffs, the, of Tunis, ii. 11.
 Benitomiz, Sierra of, i. 160, 211.
 Bentivoglio, Guido, ii. 502.
 Bergamasco, ii. 480.
 Bergerac, peace of, ii. 315.
 Berghen, Marquess of, ii. 145; sent to Spain, 150; his death, 166.
 Berrio, Antonio de, i. 250.
 Berruguete, sculptor, i. 36.
 Beznar, i. 125.
 Biccari, Conte de [Caracciolo].
 Bicocca, battle of, i. 1; ii. 31.
 Billi [Robles, Caspar de].
 Binche, palace of, i. 8.
 Birago, Mateo, ii. 43.
 Bisanti, H., ii. 403.
 Bisbal, Bernardino, i. 430.
 Biserta, surrendered to Don John, ii. 18.
 Bizari, Pierre, ii. 484, 489.
 Bleda, Dominican monk, i. 286.
 Blois, Luis de [Treslong].
 Blomberg, Barbara, mother of Don John of Austria, i. 2, 3, 4, 18; visits Don John at Luxemburg, ii. 195; embarks for Spain, 195, 208; receives the tidings of Don John's death, 341; her last years and death, 341.
 "Blood, Council of," ii. 164.
 Bobadilla, Pedro de, ii. 85.
 Bodoarte, Oger, i. 18, 21.
 Bois-le-duc, ii. 159; Bishop of, ii. 220.
 Boisot, Admiral, destroys the relics of the Spanish fleet in the Scheldt, ii. 173; raises the siege of Leyden, 173.
 Bon, Francesco, ii. 401.
 Bonello, Giuseppe, i. 492.
 Bonelo, Michael, i. 482.
 Bonrizzo, Luigi, ii. 486.
 Bor, Peter, ii. 503.
 Borja (Borgia), Francis, Duke of Gandia, General of the Jesuits, i. 19, 377.
 Borja, Hernando de, i. 345.
 Bossu, Count of, ii. 205, 249, 290, 318; in command of the army of the Estates, 318; repulsed at Louvain, 323; at Mechlin, 328.
 Bouges, intrenched camp of Don John at, near Namur, ii. 329; death of Don John at, 335.
 Bours, De, ii. 250, 251.
 Bozmediano, Gonzalo de, i. 163.
 Brabant, declared free of the Inquisition, ii. 147.
 Bragadino, Ambrosio, i. 405.
 Bragadino, Antonio, i. 405.
 Bragadino, Marc Antonio, Governor of Famagosta, holds out against the Turks, i. 312, 363; treacherously entrapped, inhumanly tortured, and murdered by Mustafa, 369.
 Bramante, ii. 28.
 Brantôme on the alleged quarrel between Don Carlos and Don John, i. 54, 59; on the death of Don Carlos, 74; ii. 135, 187, 237, 239; on the death of Don John, 336, *note* 4; on the character of Don John, 358, 469.
 Bras de Fer [Noue].
 Breda, Conferences of, ii. 174; surrendered to the Estates, 253.
 Brederode, Count of, ii. 144, 148; names the association of the Beggars, 150.
 Bresse, Baron of, ii. 246, 249.
 Briatico [Bisbal].
 Brigantine, the, i. 91.
 Brissac, French General, i. 156.
 Brocarius, i. 39.
 Brozas, printer, i. 39.
 Bruges, Bishop of, ii. 262, 265.
 Bruslé de Montpleinchamp, Jean, ii. 472.
 Bruxelles, Union of, ii. 212.
 Bua, Piero, ii. 403.
 Bua, Venetian galley, i. 427.
 Bucentaur, of Venice, i. 502.
 Bueno, Martin, killed at Navarino, i. 492.

- Bues, Adrian de (or Dubois), i. 6, 18; ii. 117.
- Buil, Juan, i. 226.
- Buoncompagno, Giacomo, ii. 26.
- Buoncompagno, Hugo [Gregory XIII.],
- Buono, Francesco, i. 430, *note* 1.
- Buren, Count of, son of the Prince of Orange, ii. 197, 198, 201, 264.
- Burgos, i. 37.
- Burgundy [Charles the Simple; Charles the Bold; Philip the Good; Mary of Burgundy].
- Busbequius, i. 297, 392, *note* 2.
- Butera, Prince, ii. 340.
- CABRERA, historian, i. 74.
- Cacem, el Muedem, i. 269.
- Cacis, Ibrahim el, i. 139.
- Cadiar, outbreak of Moors at, i. 121, 123; country round, 128.
- Calahorra, Juan de, i. 111.
- Calamech, Andrea, i. 460; ii. 342.
- Calamech, Lazaro, ii. 342, *note* 4.
- Calatrava, order of, i. 39.
- Calepio, Angelo, i. 370, *note*; ii. 484.
- Callergi, Andrea, ii. 397.
- Cambiaso, Lucas, i. 453.
- Cambray, Bishop of, ii. 147, 235.
- Cambray, League of, i. 370.
- Campana, Cesare, ii. 501.
- Campanella, the dream of, i. 55.
- Campi, Scipio, engineer, ii. 102, 329.
- Canal, Gabriel da, ii. 387, 401.
- Canale, Paolo, i. 381, 389, 420.
- Caniles, de Aceytuno, castle of, i. 160.
- Çapata, Luis de, chronicler, i. 17; ii. 473.
- Capellari, Girolamo A., ii. 410.
- Capello, Admiral of the fleets of the League of 1538, i. 294.
- Caracciolo, Ferrante, ii. 470, 486.
- Carack Ali, i. 483.
- Caraffa, Cardinal, i. 328.
- Caraffa, Ferrante, i. 455.
- Caramasa, Marquess of, i. 209.
- Carbone, Tommaso, ii. 47.
- Cardenas, Bernardino de, i. 406; killed at Lepanto, 414.
- Cardenas, Juan de, i. 163.
- Cardona, Juan de, i. 106, 319, 357, 381, 386; at Lepanto, 402, 411, 417, 419, 489; ii. 13, 75, 95, 114.
- Carillo, Cristoval, i. 243.
- Carlos, Don, son of Philip II., i. 27; receives the oath of allegiance of the Estates of Castille, 35; personal appearance of, 36; sent to the university of Alcalá, 39; the real and the imaginary, 41; falls down a staircase, 42; dangerously ill, 43; recovers from his fever, 44; his brain probably injured, 44; relations of, with Don John, 54; his hatred for his father, 59; relations with Queen Isabella, 60; his habits, 61; his supposed sympathy for the Netherlanders, 63; President of the Councils of State and War, 66; resolves on flight, 66; applies in vain to Don John, 68, 70; arrested, 71; death of, 74.
- Carlos of Austria, baptismal name of the son of Muley Mahomet, ii. 24.
- Carra, a weight, i. 91.
- Carranza, Archbishop of Toledo, i. 36, 328, 477.
- Carrillo, Luis, at Lepanto, i. 406.
- Carthage, site of, ii. 10.
- Carvajal, Alonso de, i. 169.
- Carvajal, Luis del Marmol, historian [Marmol].
- Carvajal, the Turk, i. 217.
- Carvillo, Luis, i. 345.
- Casimir, Duke John [Pfalz, the].
- Castaciaro [Acqui, Bishop of].
- Castagna, Giov. Battista (afterwards Urban VII.), i. 48.
- Castello, G. B., ii. 480.
- Castello, Pompeo da, ii. 407.
- Castel Nuovo, i. 482.
- Castille, constable of, i. 76.
- Castillo, Juan de, i. 250, 283.
- Castrillo, Luis de, i. 34.
- Castro, Gomez de, i. 39.
- Castro, Luisa de, i. 451.
- Castro, Pedro de, i. 264.
- Cateau Cambresis, peace of, ii. 135.
- Catena, Girolamo, ii. 487.
- Catherine, daughter of Philip II., i. 53.
- Catherine de Medicis [Medicis].
- Catherine, Queen-Dowager of Portugal, i. 78.
- Cattaneo, Silvestre, ii. 53.
- Cavalli, Marino, Venetian envoy at the Porte, i. 296; ii. 486.
- Cazalla, Augustin, chaplain of Charles V., strangled and burnt, i. 28.
- Celsi, i. 315.
- Centilles, Antonio Juan de, i. 40.
- Centurioni, Genoese nobles, i. 37.
- Cercamp, peace of, i. 156.
- Cerro de Sol, i. 124.
- Cervantes, Miguel de, i. 95; at Lepanto, 423; ii. 484.
- Cesi, Cardinal, i. 331.
- Cesi, Count of, ii. 320.
- Cespedes, Alonso de, i. 176.
- Cevray, Baron of, ii. 314.
- Champagny, brother of Cardinal Granvelle, ii. 179, 181, 195, 250, 261, 269, 274, 290; arrested by Orange on the charge of treasonable correspondence with his brother, 319.

- Charles, Archduke, i. 110.
 Charles IX., King of France, i. 48, 79, 310, 343; ii. 163.
 Charles the Bold, ii. 131.
 Charles the Simple, ii. 130.
 Charles V., Emperor, lucky days of, i. 1; at Ratisbon, 2; at Augsburg, 1550-51, 7; places Don John in the charge of Francisco Massi, 7; abdication of, 13; ii. 134, 141; withdraws to Yuste, i. 13; death of, 15; obsequies of, 18, 19; intentions of, regarding Don John, 22; mental and moral powers of, 58; his expedition to Algiers, 85; decrees of, relating to the Moriscos, 118; his liking for Aranjuez, 152; league against Solyman the Magnificent, 294; his friendship for Andrea Doria, 356; his success at Tunis, ii. 9, 12; war with Francis I., 31; relations with Andrea Doria, 32, 33, 99; his government of the Netherlands, 125, 132; his acknowledgment of Don John, 473.
 Charles V., King of France, i. 332.
 Chiesa, Cardinal, i. 331.
 Chimay, Prince of, ii. 241, 245.
 Chimay, surrender of, ii. 296.
 Ciaus [Cubat].
 Cisneros [Ximenes].
 Ciudad-real, Hernando de, ii. 105.
 Cleves, Duke of, ii. 196.
 Coaches, introduction of, i. 10.
 Cobham, Lord, ii. 325.
 Cobos, Francisco de los, i. 118.
 Coello, Alonso Sanchez, ii. 343.
 Coligny, Admiral de, i. 14, 79, *note* 2.
 Colmenar, Juan de, ii. 105.
 Colonna, Marc Antonio, Duke of Pagliano, i. 314, 315; at Venice, 316; opposed by Doria, 319; returns to Rome from Castelrosso, 324; appointed second in command of the Holy League under Don John, 335; sent again as envoy to Venice, 1571, 336; regarded with suspicion by the Spaniards, 376; and by the Venetians, 378; at Lepanto, 414, 416; triumphant return to Rome, 446; at Corfu, 483; joins Don John, 483; dispute with Santa Cruz, 499; sent as envoy to Philip II., 501; ii. 26, 389.
 Colonna, Pompeo, i. 325, 373; ii. 109, 423.
 Colonna, Prospero, i. 1, 371, 373; ii. 391, 407.
 Comet of 1577-8, ii. 283.
 Commendon, Cardinal, i. 349, 350.
 Como, Cardinal of, i. 497; ii. 108.
 Compagno, Girolamo, i. 445.
 Compromise, the, ii. 148.
 Conca, knife of, i. 163.
 Conestaggio, Jerome, ii. 502.
 Contarini, Giovanni Battista, i. 389; at Lepanto, 416, 445.
 Contarini, Giovanni Pietro, ii. 483.
 Contarini, Girolamo, i. 430, *note* 1.
 Contarini, Hieronimo, ii. 403.
 Contarini, Leonardo, i. 472.
 Contarini, Marco, killed at Lepanto, i. 412; ii. 403.
 Contarini, Marino, i. 430, *note* 1.
 Conti, F., ii. 489.
 Conti, Natale, ii. 485.
 Convicts in the galleys, i. 92.
 Cordieri, sculptor, i. 476.
 Cordoba, Francisco de, i. 238, 239; sent to El Habaqui, 246; 248, 265.
 Cordoba, Francisco de, the Morisco, cousin of Aben Umeia, i. 273, 275, 276; sent to the galleys, 277.
 Cordoba, Gonzalo Fernandez de [Sesa, Duke of].
 Cordoba, L. Cabrera de, ii. 476, 488.
 Cordoba, Luis de, i. 34, 170, 171, 345, 351; at Lepanto, ii. 45, 406.
 Cordoba, Martin Alonso de, i. 34, *note* 2.
 Cordova, Morten de, i. 63.
 Corgnia, Ascanio de la, i. 378; appointed to command the land forces of the League, 382; at Lepanto, 405; at S^{ta} Maura, 435.
 Cornaro, Francisco, bailiff of Corfu, i. 437.
 Cornelio, Dr., i. 29.
 Coron, Gulf of, i. 489.
 Coronada, Juan Vazquez, i. 355; at Lepanto, 406.
 Coronato, Bartolomeo, ii. 47, 50, 53.
 Correggio, Francisco Balbi de, ii. 352.
 Corte-real, Geronimo, i. 454; ii. 479.
 Cortes, Juan Bautista, i. 416.
 Cortes of Castille swear allegiance to Don Carlos, i. 35.
 Cosimo I., Duke of Florence, proposes a league against the Turks, i. 313; receives from Pius V. the title of Grand Duke of Tuscany, 313, 329; death of, 314; ii. 27.
 Cosmo de Medicis [Cosimo].
 Coster, printer, ii. 131.
 Costiol, Geronimo, i. 454; ii. 478.
 Council of Ten, Venetian, i. 504.
 Covarrubias, Diego de, Bishop of Segovia, i. 345.
 Crescentio on galley-slavery, i. 100, 101.
 Croy, House of, ii. 145.
 Croy, Jean de [Reulx].
 Cubat Ciaus, i. 306.
 Cueva, Cardinal de la, i. 2.
 Curiel, Geronimo de, agent of Don John ii. 281.
 Curzolarien Isles, i. 402; ii. 399.

- Custos, Dominic, ii. 349, 468.
 Cyprus, Designs of Selim II. on, i. 303 ;
 attacked by the Turks, 312 ; submission
 of, except Famagosta, 313 ; lost to
 Venice by the reduction of Famagosta,
 368.
- DALAY, Morisco chief, i. 142.
 Dalem, ii. 165 ; taken, and the people
 butchered, 314.
 Dandolo, and the fourth crusade, i. 292.
 Dandolo, Nicholas, governor of Nicosia,
 i. 312.
 Darenberg, Count, ii. 43.
 Daud, Mahamete Ben, i. 193.
 Davalos, Alonso, i. 416.
 Davalos, Caesar, i. 385 ; ii. 9.
 Davalos, Carlos, i. 323, 325.
 Davison, William, English envoy, ii. 258 ;
 reports on Don John's position and
 embarrassments, 259 ; further reports
 to Walsingham, 281, 333 ; sends the
 tidings of Don John's death, 336.
 De Bours, ii. 250.
 De Bresse, ii. 249.
 De Heez, ii. 228, 290.
 De Heze, governor of Bruxelles, arrests
 the members of the State Council, ii.
 180.
 De Horsey, Governor of the Isle of Wight,
 ii. 207.
 De la Marck, Lunoy, ii. 291.
 De la Marck, William, ii. 167.
 De la Motte, Pardieu, ii. 289.
 De Thou [Thou, de].
 Devil's Iron Head, name given to
 Marquess of Los Velez, i. 139 [Los
 Velez].
 Deza, President of the royal audience, i. 121,
 122, 132, 153, 157 ; insists on the de-
 struction of Las Albuñuelas, 158 ; 166,
 169, 187, 199, 216, 258, 284.
 Diedo, Girolamo, i. 392, *note* 3 ; ii. 485.
 Dietrichstein, Imperial ambassador, i. 65.
 Dillenburg, ii. 161.
 D'Inchy, Governor of Cambray, ii. 235.
 Does, John Van der, ii. 173.
 Donato, Nicolas, i. 489.
 Don John of Austria, birth of, i. 1 ; known
 by the name Jerome in his childhood,
 5 ; placed under the care of Quixada,
 5 ; brought up at Leganes, 5 ; sent to
 the school of Getafe, 10 ; under the
 charge of Doña Magdalena de Ulloa,
 12 ; rescued by Quixada from fire, 13 ;
 at Quacos, 17 ; rumours respecting his
 birth, 19 ; at the *Auto-da-fé* of 1559,
 26 ; made a knight of the Golden
 Fleece, 30 ; acknowledged by Philip II.
 as son of Charles V., 32 ; henceforth
 known as Don John (not Jerome), 34 ;
 has a household at Valladolid, 34 ;
 rescued again from fire by Quixada at
 Madrid, 38 ; sent to the University of
 Alcalá, 39 ; asks the King's leave to join
 the fleet for the relief of Malta, 45 ;
 on being refused tries to escape, 46 ;
 reaches Zaragoza, 47 ; returns to the
 Court at Segovia, 48 ; visits Getafe,
 48 ; at Aranjuez, 48 ; receives orders to
 accompany Philip II. on his pretended
 journey to the Netherlands, 52 ; carries
 the infant child of the Queen to the font,
 53 ; appointed General of the Sea, and
 so freed from the necessity of taking
 holy orders, 53 ; relations with Don
 Carlos, 67 ; appointed Commander-in-
 Chief of the fleets of Spain, 81 ; hoists
 his flag, 106 ; sails to Gibraltar, 107 ;
 cruises among the Balearic Islands, 109 ;
 accompanies the King to Aranjuez, 152 ;
 enters Granada, 153 ; holds a council,
 156 ; checks the Marquess of Los Velez,
 159 ; ordered to remove the Moriscos
 from Granada to towns beyond the
 frontiers of Andalusia, 165 ; resolves to
 attack Guejar, 208, 216 ; invests Galera,
 222 ; slaughters the inhabitants and
 destroys the town, 228 ; advances on
 Seron, 230 ; takes it, 242 ; receives
 the submission of Aben Aboo by El
 Habaqui, 265 ; orders the removal of
 all Moriscos from the kingdom of
 Granada, 280 ; summoned to Madrid,
 288 ; appointed General of the Holy
 League, 288 ; greets the Cardinal-
 Legate at Madrid, 346 ; leaves Madrid
 for Italy, 351 ; lands at Genoa, 355 ;
 reaches Naples, 357 ; receives from
 Granvelle the gifts of the Pope, 359 ;
 addresses his council at Messina, 372 ;
 inspects the fleet, 380, 381 ; at Corfu,
 390 ; at Gomeniza, 393 ; finally inspects
 the fleet before the battle of Lepanto,
 393 ; receives tidings of the loss of
 Cyprus, 400 ; masterly plans of, for the
 battle of Lepanto, 420 ; his despatch to
 the King after the victory, 433 ; sets
 free Mahomet, tutor of the sons of Ali
 Pasha, 438 ; reaches Messina, 439 ; his
 reception at, 457 ; statue of, at Messina,
 459 ; refers to Philip II. the offer made
 to him of a Greek crown, 466 ; irritated
 by the delay in renewing operations,
 473 ; returns from Palermo to Messina,
 after visiting Margaret, Duchess of
 Parma, 474 ; reprimands Colonna and
 Andrade, 485 ; operations at Navarino,
 490 ; compelled by lack of supplies to
 withdraw, 495, 499 ; sent from Corfu,

501; re-enters the harbour of Messina, 501; hauls down the flag of the League at Naples, 512; sets Said Bey free without ransom, ii. 1; starts from Messina for Tunis, 8; anchors off the Goletta, 9; disembarks his troops, 13; occupies Tunis, 15; charges Serbellone with the task of building a fortress to control Tunis, 16; receives the surrender of Biserta, 18; reaches Palermo, 20; watches the affairs of Genoa, 44; receives Genoese deputations at Vigevano, 44; advises a neutral policy, 44; at Albenga, 45; sends Escovedo to Madrid, 48; sends Priego as his envoy to the Pope, 53; takes part in a tournament at Piacenza, 61; hampered in his policy of aiding and defending Tunis, 66; reaches Naples, 70; hears at Palermo of the loss of the Goletta, 74; receives from Senoguera the tidings of the loss of Tunis, 88; returns to Naples, 91; theories as to the best mode of resisting and foiling the Turks, 97; his relations with European sovereigns and states, 99, 100; at Genoa, 101; interview with the King, 104; visits Doña Magdalena de Ulloa, 104, 105; received at the Escorial, 104; returns to Naples, 105; makes the pilgrimage to Loreto, 114; appointed Governor of the Netherlands, 115; reluctant to accept the charge, 117; lays down the conditions needed in his opinion for success, 118; at Barcelona, 122; is received by the King, 123; pays his last visit to Doña Magdalena de Ulloa, 123; receives the congratulation of the Belgian Council of State, 177; writes to the King from Irun, 185; and from Paris, 186; reaches Luxemburg, 188; receives a deputation of the Estates, 192; is said to have been invited to assume the sovereignty of the Netherlands in his own name, 193; receives the paper containing the demands and offers of the Estates, 193; is visited by his mother, 195; insists on the removal of the Spanish troops by sea, 196; formulates his answer to the Estates, 197; stormy conferences with the Commissioners of the Estates, 198; agrees to accept the Treaty of Ghent, 199; sanctions the Perpetual Edict, 201; goes to Louvain, 203; relations with Elizabeth, Queen of England, 208; sends Dr. Leoninus to the Prince of Orange, 212; in vain makes splendid offers to him, 214; crowned king of the bowmen at Louvain, 217; makes

his public entry into Bruxelles, 219; has three attacks of fever, probably from overwork, 222; is informed of plots to assassinate him, 227; is visited by Sir Philip Sidney, 228; removes his Court to Mechlin, 228, 231; goes to Namur, 233; meets Margaret, Queen of Navarre, 237; seizes the citadel of Namur, 240; fails in his scheme of seizing the citadel of Antwerp, 251; obtains the fortresses of Marienburg and Charlemont, 253; addresses fresh demands to the Estates from Namur, 255; and receives in turn further demands from the Estates, 256; proposes a compromise, 263; accepts the alternative of war, and goes to Luxemburg, 265; puts forth "a true and simple narrative" of recent events, 267, 491; demands money and reinforcements from the King, 275; deposed by the Estates, 275; upbraids the Emperor Rudolph for favouring the designs of his enemies, 279; obtains money and reinforcements from France, 281; position and embarrassments of, 282; weakened health of, 286; scheme of marriage of, with Mary, Queen of Scots, 286; reaches Namur, and publishes a proclamation, 288; receives De Goignies after the victory of Gemblours, 293; takes Nivelles, 296; receives the surrender of Binche and many other towns, 297; summons the Estates to return to their allegiance, 300; anxiously asks for the return of Escovedo and for his own recall, 306; traduced to the King by Antonio Perez, 308; sends the Prince of Parma to attack Limburg, 312; engages the army of the Estates at Rijnemants, 320; foils the conspiracy of Ratcliffe at Tirlemont, 323; retires to Namur, 323; consents to receive the envoys of the Estates, 326; writes to the Queen of England, 328; strengthens his position at Namur, 329; stricken with fever, orders himself to be taken to the camp at Bouges, 330; writes his last letter to King Philip, 331; transfers his authority to Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma, 334; dies, 335; according to some, from poison, 336; his funeral, 337; his epitaph at Namur, 338; his body taken to Spain, and placed in a vault at the Escorial, near to that in which lay the body of his father, 339; his natural children, 340; his colossal statue at Messina, 342; portraits of, 345, *et seq.*; not a reader of books, 351; books dedicated to, 352; letters of, to Philip II., 364, 381; to

- Doña Magdalena de Ulloa, 373; to Rodrigo de Mendoza, 437; to Philip II. on the murder of Escovedo, 464; biographical of, 468; papers relating to, 497.
- Doria, Andrea, i. 9, 295, 356, 392; ii. 12, 31, 32; modifies the Genoese Constitution of 1528, 36; death of, 37.
- Doria, Antonio, i. 466.
- Doria, Giannettino, ii. 34.
- Doria, Giovanni Andrea, i. 86, 106, 317; his hereditary unpopularity at Venice, 318; opposes the plan of relieving Cyprus, 318, 320; desires to withdraw from the allied fleet, 322; strongly blamed at Rome and Venice, 324; but not by Philip II., 325; commands right wing of the fleet of the League, 387; at Lepanto, 406, 499; ii. 7, 37, 40; seizes Porto Venere, 50; takes Noli and La Pietra, 51; 331, 397.
- Doria, Marcello, i. 325; ii. 19, 27, 73, 90.
- Doria, Pagano, ii. 75, 86.
- Doria, Pietro Francisco, i. 406.
- Dragut, the Turk, i. 105, 298, 397.
- Dressano, Iacomo, ii. 403.
- Du Bartas, i. 456.
- Dubois [Bues, Adrian de].
- Dubois, French agent, ii. 242, 473.
- Duffel, William of Orange, at, ii. 152.
- Duodo, Francisco, i. 314, 387, 405.
- Durazzo, Giacomo, Doge of Genoa, ii. 40.
- EBOLI, Prince of [Silva, Ruy Gomez de].
- Eboli, Princess of, ii. 309.
- Ebou Sououd, Grand Mufti, i. 304.
- Edict, the Perpetual, ii. 201, 207.
- Edward, Prince of Wales, ii. 11.
- Egmont, Count of, ii. 135, 140, 144; sent to Madrid, 146; takes the new oath imposed by the Regent, 160; arrested, 164; executed, 165; 289.
- Egmont, Count of, son of the murdered Count, ii. 291.
- Eleanor of France, i. 14.
- Eleugina*, Papal ship, i. 416.
- Elizabeth, Queen of England, i. 66, 310; ii. 22, 91, 109, 168, 176, 178, 200; insists on the removal of the Spanish troops from the Netherlands by land, 201; disapproves of the invitation sent to the Archduke Matthias, 270; signs a treaty with the Estates, 277; accepts the appointment of Matthias, 277; tries to tempt Don John with the prospect of the crown matrimonial of England, 280; displeased with Don John for declaring that his marrying her was impossible, 287; resumes her correspondence with the Duke of Anjou, 315; denounces his alliance with the Estates of the Netherlands, 316.
- Elizabeth of Valois, i. 35.
- El Rendedi, i. 249.
- Elvira, gate of, i. 154.
- Emperor, the Roman, styled by the Turk King of Vienna, i. 296.
- Ende, Van, ii. 250.
- Englefield, Sir Francis, ii. 23, 210.
- Enriquez, Antonio, i. 169, 204.
- Enriquez, Diego, ii. 13, 14.
- Enriquez, Enrique, i. 169, 203.
- Enriquez, Juan de, i. 265.
- Erasso, Antonio de, ii. 309.
- Ercilla, i. 455.
- Eric, Duke of Brunswick, i. 30.
- Ernest, Archduke, i. 45, 346, 353; ii. 100.
- Escobar, the ensign, slain at Tunis, ii. 52.
- Escolano, Diego de, ii. 477.
- Escorial, the, i. 47, 68; ii. 104, 122.
- Escovedo, Juan de, becomes secretary to Don John in place of Soto, ii. 6, 13; sent to Rome, 21; sent to Madrid, 48, 69, 105; at Rome, 112; mission to Madrid, 118, 120, 203; goes to Spain, 233; 247; characterizes the policy of Philip II. as weak and purposeless, 305; his confidence betrayed by Antonio Perez, 308; resolves to inform the King of the intrigues of Perez with the Princess of Eboli, 310; murdered, 310, 447; accounts of the murder of, 499.
- Escovedo, Pedro de, ii. 467.
- Espina, San Pedro de la, convent of, i. 32.
- Espinosa, Cardinal, i. 53, 120, 146, 345.
- Estrelle, Juan Calnete de, i. 95, *note* 1.
- Eugenius, St., translation of, i. 48.
- Eytzinger, Michael, ii. 495.
- FAGAZAS, castle of, i. 108.
- Falanga, Diana di, ii. 20, 340.
- Fallier, Marco, ii. 391.
- Famagosta, held against the Turks, i. 313, 365; harbour of, 365; siege of, terrible pressure on the defenders of, ii. 399.
- Farax Aben Farax, i. 121; proclaims the rebellion, 124; appointed Alguazil-in-chief under Aben Umeia, 126, 133; flies to the mountains from Guejar, 219; is all but murdered, and survives in wretchedness, 220.
- Farnese, Alexander, Prince of Parma, i. 39, 44, 357; at Lepanto, 416, 474, 487, 490; ii. 57, 275; reaches Luxembourg, 286; wins the battle of Gemblours, 292, 293; takes Sichern and Diest, 295; sent to attack Limburg, 312; receives its surrender, 313; reduces the Province, 314; rescues the Legate and his troops

- at Rijnemants, 321; receives from Don John full powers to act in his stead, 334; at Don John's funeral, 338.
- Farnese, Ottavio, ii. 409.
- Fatima, daughter of Ali Pasha, ii. 1.
- Fausto, Vittore, i. 91.
- Favara, Marquess of La, i. 177, 252.
- Faxardo, Diego, i. 170, 185.
- Faxardo, Luis [Los Velez, Marquess of].
- Fee, Juan, ii. 482.
- Felices, Diego, ii. 186.
- Fenton, English agent, reports on the condition of the camp of Don John, ii. 303.
- Ferdinand and Isabella, i. 113.
- Ferdinand I., Emperor, i. 294, 296.
- Feria, Duke of, i. 71, 72.
- Fernandez, Francisco, sacristan at Leganes, i. 10.
- Fernando, Infant of Spain, i. 451; ii. 123.
- Ferrara, Duke of, i. 329, 350.
- Fieschi, conspiracy of, ii. 34.
- Figuerola, Lope de, i. 231, 275, 276, 355; at Lepanto, 406, 414; sent to Philip II. with tidings of the victory of Lepanto, 449, 453; ii. 70, 121, 317, 330; at Don John's funeral, 337.
- Flanders, emigration of weavers from, to England, ii. 147, 162.
- Fleece, Golden [Golden Fleece].
- Fleet, Turkish, at Lepanto, i. 396.
- Fleets of the sixteenth century, i. 85, *et seq.*
- Florence, Dukes of, i. 87, 310, 329, 350.
- Florence, Papal galley, i. 420, 427.
- Flores, Alonso Alvaro, i. 149.
- Florigny, Governor of Philippeville, ii. 298.
- Florio, engineer, i. 108.
- Forchela, Onofrio, ii. 9.
- Foscarini, Giacomo, i. 473, 482, 495, 496, 498, 500; ii. 409; his report to the Doge and Senate for 1572-73, 415; his life, 434.
- Franc, Philippe le, ii. 492.
- Francavilla, Duke of, i. 47, 109, 385, *note* 2; ii. 480.
- France, fleet of, i. 88; relations of, with the Sultans, 298.
- Francis I. of France, taken prisoner at Pavia, ii. 31.
- Francis II., Grand Duke of Tuscany, ii. 51.
- Francis II. of France, i. 30.
- Fregoso, Galeazzo, ii. 43.
- Fregoso, Ottaviano, ii. 30.
- Fresneda, Bernardo de, Bishop of Cuenca, i. 464.
- Freundsberg [Fronsberg].
- Friesland, East, ii. 132.
- Frigiliana, storming of, i. 163.
- Fronsberg, Colonel, ii. 249, 252, 288.
- Froymont, Governor of the castle of Namur, ii. 240.
- Fuenmayor, Antonio de, i. 476, *note* 1; ii. 487.
- Fugger, banking-house of, ii. 120.
- Fugger, Colonel, ii. 249, 252, 282.
- Furlan, Jacopo, ii. 397.
- Fury, the Spanish, ii. 182, 189, 490.
- GAETANO, Honorato, i. 351; ii. 487.
- Gaill, Andrew, ii. 223.
- Galeasse, the, i. 90.
- Galera, i. 203; invested by Los Velez, 221; strength of the fortress, 222; assailed by Don John, and utterly destroyed, 228; ballad on the fall of, 229; despatch mentioning the taking of, ii. 365.
- Galignani, Simon, ii. 353.
- Galip, Hernando el, i. 263; defeated and slain, 273.
- Galle, Philip, engraver, ii. 355, 493.
- Galley, arrangements of the, i. 88; slavery, 92; discipline of the, 93.
- Galli, Cardinal of Como, i. 477; ii. 108.
- Galpagar, i. 46.
- Gandia, Duke of [Borja].
- Gandia, Duke of, ii. 45.
- Garibo, Gariberto*, law of, ii. 36, 46.
- Garzoni, C., ii. 486.
- Gasca, Diego de, i. 150.
- Gasca, Pedro de, i. 131.
- Gascoyne, George, ii. 182, 490.
- Gaztelu, i. 20.
- Gelves, i. 392.
- Gemblours, ii. 288; road from, to Namur, 291; battle of, 293; surrender of the city of, 293.
- Genlis, de, ii. 419.
- Genoa, naval force of, i. 86; factions in, ii. 26, 29; nobles of, 29; populace of, 30; sack of, by Pescara, 26; French expelled from, by Doria, 32; relations of, with Charles V., 32; "Reformers" of, 32; *alberghi* of, 32; Council of four hundred, and Minor Council of one hundred, 33; Doge and Senators of, 33; Golden Book of, 33; Old and New Nobles, Portico of St. Peter, and Portico of St. Luke, 33; Bank of St. George, 34; constitution modified in 1528, 34; popular victory at, 46; embarrassment of the Old Nobles, 46; war between the Porticos, successes of Doria and the New Nobles, 51; a truce agreed on, 52; the Alberghi abolished by the new constitution, 52; history of the troubles at, 488.
- Gerardo, painter, i. 447.
- Gerbi, i. 85, 392, 417.
- Geronimo (Don John of Austria), i. 8.

- Getafe, i. 10.
 Ghent, Great Privilege granted to, ii. 131 ;
 siege of, 181 ; Pacification of, ii. 182,
 189, 194, 202 ; citadel of, destroyed,
 260.
 Ghent, Viscount of, ii. 228, 229, 277.
 Ghibellines, ii. 29.
 Ghislieri, Michael [Pius V.]
 Gianandrea [Doria, Giovanni Andrea].
 Gianfigliuzzi, Borgianni, i. 419.
 Giorgio, Luigi, i. 437.
 Giustiniani, Lorenzo, ii. 436.
 Giustiniani, Omfredo, conveys to Venice
 the news of the victory of Lepanto, i.
 442, 443.
 Giustiniani, Pietro, Admiral of the Order
 of St. John, i. 406, 417, 488.
 Goignies, Anthony de, ii. 289 ; taken
 prisoner after the battle of Gemblours,
 293.
 Golden Book of Genoa, ii. 33, 52.
 Golden Fleece, chapter of the, i. 30 ;
 order of the, ii. 131.
 Goletta, ii. 7, 9 ; besieged by the Turks,
 80 ; taken, and the fortress blown up, 82.
 Goli, painter, i. 447.
 Goltzius, Henry, ii. 355.
 Gomez, Ruy [Silva].
 Gonzaga, Ottavio, ii. 70, 124, 185, 217,
 229, 290, 298, 304 ; at Don John's
 funeral, 338, 453.
 Gonzaga, Sigismundo, ii. 49, 70.
 Gorri, El, Hernando, i. 139, 263.
 Goust, J. le, ii. 492.
 Granada, Luis de, ii. 352.
 Granada, struggle between Christian and
 Mahometan prisoners in the prison of,
 i. 148.
 Granada-Venegas, A. de, i. 166, 262, 267.
 Granadino, Alonso de Velasco, El, i. 263.
 Granvelle, Antoine de Perrenot, Cardinal,
 i. 80 ; represents Philip II. at Rome in
 the conferences relating to the formation
 of the Holy League, 331, 332 ; proposes
 to postpone the action of the League,
 335 ; propounds his ideas as to its
 functions, 342 ; delivers the standard of
 the League to Don John, 359 ; Viceroy
 of Naples, 503 ; ii. 35 ; refuses supplies
 to Don John for the relief of Tunis, 71,
 75 ; advises Don John as to the govern-
 ment of the Netherlands, 124 ; his
 character, 135 ; Primate of the Nether-
 lands, 139 ; sent to the Duchess of
 Parma, 275.
 Grassi, Cardinal, i. 331.
 Gratiani, A. M., ii. 486.
 Great Privilege, the, ii. 131.
 Gregory XIII., Pope, i. 477 ; reforms the
 Calendar, 477 ; eulogizes Don John,
 501 ; his indignation at the peace made
 by Venice with the Porte, 511 ; asks
 Philip II. to make Don John King of
 Tunis, ii. 21 ; and suggests his marriage
 with Mary Queen of Scots, 21 ; sends
 Odescalchi and Morone to Genoa, 43 ;
 protests against Spanish interference in
 the affairs of Genoa, 49, 51 ; letter to
 Philip II. on the loss of Tunis, 90 ;
 urges on Philip the duty of invading
 England, 106 ; sends aid in money to
 Don John in the Netherlands, 227 ; puts
 forth a bull in his support, 281 ; favours
 the marriage schemes relating to Don
 John, 286, 287.
 Grimani, Vicenzo, ii. 435.
 Grobbendonck, Baron of, ii. 223, 246, 262,
 264, 490.
 Grotius, Hugo, ii. 504.
 Guadalajara, i. 37.
 Guadalupe, Our Lady of, i. 19.
 Guajar-el-alto, fortress of, i. 141.
 Guardiola, Monserrate de, i. 429, *note*.
 Guecija, storming of, i. 139.
 Guejar, attacked by Don John, i. 217 ;
 taken, 219.
 Guelphs, ii. 29.
 Guerra, Alcayde of Guescar, i. 204.
 Guerrero, Pedro, Archbishop of Granada,
 i. 156.
 Guidobaldo, Francesco Maria, Duke of
 Urbino, i. 30, 357.
 Guise, Duke of, i. 488 ; ii. 188, 259.
 Guoro, Giacomo, i. 406.
 Gutierrez, Juan Rufo [Rufo, Juan].
 Guzman, House of, i. 9.
 Guzman, Juan de, i. 351 ; at Lepanto, 406.
 HAARLEM, siege and sack of, ii. 170.
 Habaqui, i. 152, 180, 191, 242 ; makes
 overtures for peace, 245, 251 ; submits
 to Don John, 265 ; undertakes to com-
 pel Aben Aboo to observe the Treaty,
 271 ; is arrested and carried before
 Aben Aboo, who puts him to death, 272.
 Habaqui, Hernando el, i. 263.
 Hædo, ii. 87.
 Haidar Pasha, ii. 15, 77.
 Hamet Bey, i. 397, 398, 497.
 Hamilton of Bothwellhaugh, ii. 208.
 Hanse towns, ii. 130.
 Hareus, F. [Verhaer].
 Haro, Juan de, i. 205.
 Hassan Pasha, i. 397, 398.
 Haultain, Admiral, scatters the Spanish
 soldiery at Antwerp, ii. 252.
 Havrech, Marchioness of, ii. 269, *note*.
 Havrech, Marquess of, ii. 181, 218, 245,
 268, 278, 291.
 Hemling, ii. 131.

- Henry II., King of France, i. 298; ii. 134; unwittingly betrays to William of Orange the secret treaty between Philip II. and himself for the extirpation of heresy, 142; death of, 143, 176, 297.
- Henry III., King of France, i. 348; ii. 281, 315.
- Henry III. of France, ii. 43.
- Henry III. of Navarre, IV. of France, ii. 237, *note* 3.
- Henry of Nassau, ii. 144; killed at Mookerheyde, 172.
- Heredia, Bernardino de, at Lepanto, i. 418.
- Hernandez, Francisco, ii. 204.
- Herradura, i. 85.
- Herrera, A., historian, ii. 476.
- Herrera, Fernando de, i. 454, 455; ii. 478.
- Herrera, Miguel de, i. 277.
- Hesse, William of, i. 60.
- Hessels, a member of Alba's Blood Council, ii. 273, 274.
- Hierges, Baron of, ii. 223, 288, 295.
- Hinojosa, Agustin de, i. 429, *note*.
- Hita, Gines Perez de, ii. 476.
- Hohenlohe, Count of, ii. 288.
- Holland, Abraham, i. 456.
- Holland and Zeland, the Provinces of, declare their independence of the King of Spain, ii. 175.
- Hooft, P. C., historian, ii. 503.
- Hoogstraaten, ii. 160, 161, 163.
- Honorato, Juan, tutor of Don Carlos, i. 39; Bishop of Osma, 41.
- Horn, Count, ii. 144; arrested, 164; executed, 165.
- Horrox, Alcayde of Biserta, ii. 18, 19.
- Horsey, De, Governor of the Isle of Wight, ii. 207.
- Hoseyn, i. 180, 194.
- Hoseyn, El, i. 177, 193, 255.
- Hoseyni, Pedro de Mendoza el, i. 263.
- Hoyos, Juan Lopez de, ii. 478.
- Huguenots, i. 328; ii. 91, 162, 168, 169, 200, 234, 247.
- Humanes [Mayenne].
- Hungary, Mary, Queen of, i. 8, 16.
- IBRAHIM BEY, i. 338.
- Idiaquez, Juan, ii. 40; sides with the Portico of St. Luke, or New Nobles of Genoa, 40; 44, 49, 255.
- Illescas [Yllescas].
- Imbize, ii. 273.
- Infantado, Duke of, i. 346, 352; ii. 463.
- Inquisition, in Spain, i. 24, 119; in the Netherlands, 51; ii. 133, 136; resisted by the people, 140; protest of the Provinces against, 146; abolished by the Accord, 156; but the Accord remains a dead letter, 159; the Inquisition formally re-established, 159, 162; condemns all the inhabitants of the Netherlands to death, 164; abolished by the Pacification of Ghent, 183.
- Insausti, ii. 310.
- Interim of Charles V., ii. 327.
- Intolerance, in Church and State, i. 114, 258, 286; ii. 68; 133, 139, 146, 176, 200, 232, 276, 303.
- Inverardo, Zan Battista, ii. 401.
- Isabella Clara Eugenia, daughter of Philip II. and Isabella of the Peace, i. 49, 450; ii. 22.
- Isabella of the Peace, i. 25, 59; death of, 110.
- Isabella the Catholic, i. 5, 113, 116, 152.
- Isabella, wife of Charles V., i. 2.
- Isidore, St., i. 384.
- Istan, exploit of the curate's niece at, i. 134.
- Ivan the Terrible, i. 470.
- JACQUELINE of Holland, ii. 130.
- James VI. of Scotland, i. 456; ii. 22.
- Janissaries, discipline of the, i. 290.
- Jayar, Mendoza, el, Secretary to El Habiqui, i. 273.
- Jemmingem, battle of, ii. 165.
- Jode, Peter de, ii. 350.
- Johanna, Archduchess, i. 357.
- Johannists, or party of Don John, in the Netherlands, ii. 226; expelled from their posts by the State Council, ii. 278.
- John, Don, of Austria [Don John of Austria].
- John of Nassau, ii. 144.
- Juan, Honorato [Honorato Juan].
- Juana, daughter of Don John, ii. 340.
- Juana, Infanta, Princess - Dowager of Brazil, i. 11, 14, 21; sees Don John at the *auto-da-fé* of 1559, 26; resigns her regency to Philip II., 31; 48, 66; at Aranjuez, 153; death of, ii. 19.
- Juana, Queen, i. 118.
- Jubilee of Pius V., i. 68.
- Jubiles, castle of, i. 140; massacre at, 140.
- KARA, Ali, i. 412.
- Karacosh, i. 399, 408, 409, 416.
- Kegel, Jerome Pyramus, husband of Barbara Blomberg, i. 4.
- Kegel, Pyramus, son of Barbara Blomberg, ii. 122, 341.
- Knife of Conca, ridge of rock at Frigiliana, i. 163.
- Knollys, secretary, ii. 322.
- LA FUENTE, historian, i. 76, *note* 2.
- Lalaing, Count, Governor of Hainault, ii.

- 217, 227, 235, 237, 246, 289; receives the Duke of Anjou at Mons, 316.
- Lala Mustafa Pasha, i. 304.
- La Mota, Marquess of, i. 233.
- Landi, Count Claudio, ii. 57.
- Lando, Marc. Ant., i. 430, *note* 1; ii. 403.
- Landriano, Count, i. 353; ii. 13.
- Languet, Hubert, ii. 356; his opinion of Don John, 357, 494.
- Lanjaron, castle of, i. 117, 198.
- Lannoy, Charles de, i. 1, 30.
- Laredo, i. 14, 31.
- Las Navas, Marquess of, ii. 364.
- Latino, Juan, i. 454.
- Lautrec, French general, i. 1.
- Lazarte, Captain, exploit of, at Galera, i. 227.
- League of 1538, i. 294, 392, *note* 1.
- League, the Holy, proposals for forming, i. 311; conferences at Rome relating to, 331; threatened disruption of, 336; treaty signed at the Vatican, May 25, 1571, 340; terms of the treaty, 340; Spanish and Venetian views of, 342; contingents for, promised by the Italian Dukes, 350; fleet of, 361; dissolution of, 512; bibliography of, ii. 478.
- Leganés, i. 5, 8.
- Lemos, Juan de Cordoba, i. 429, *note*.
- Leni, at Lepanto, i. 416.
- Lenoncourt, Cardinal of, ii. 235, 238, 242.
- Lensæus, Joannes, ii. 492.
- Leon, Francisco de, ii. 377.
- Leon, Juan Ponce de, i. 429, *note*.
- Leoninus, Eibertus, ii. 212, 223.
- Leo X., Pope, i. 326.
- Lepanto, battle of, i. 409, *et seq.*; distribution of booty after, 431, 437; losses in, on both sides, 440; pictures of, 445, 454; ballad on the, 455; fruitlessness of the victory at, 472, *et seq.*; ii. 401.
- Lepanto, Gulf of, i. 403.
- Le Petit, J. F., ii. 495.
- Lerin, Count of, i. 117.
- Lerma, Count of, i. 72.
- Leyden, siege of, ii. 172, 173; foundation of the university of, 174.
- Leyton, English envoy, ii. 280, 303.
- Leyva, Alonso de, i. 280; joins Don John in the Netherlands, ii. 317, 319.
- Leyva, Diego de, i. 278.
- Leyva, Sancho de, i. 147, 255, 270; ravages the Andalusian coast, 278; 354, 355, 392; joins Don John in the Netherlands, ii. 317; 480.
- Liedekerke, Governor of Antwerp, ii. 250, 251.
- Liege, Prince-bishop of, ii. 195, 242.
- Limasol, i. 312.
- Limburg, position of, ii. 312; surrendered to the Prince of Parma, 313.
- Lippomano, Girolamo, ii. 91; his despatch to the Venetian Government, 92; remarks on Don John's suggestions as to the best mode of resisting and foiling the Turks, 96, 294; his opinion of Don John, 342, 359; reports from Naples, 489.
- Lisbon, i. 38.
- Lithgow, William, on Mediterranean piracy, i. 103.
- Llorente, historian, i. 75.
- Loaysa, Bishop of Osma, i. 118.
- Lomellini, Genoese Nobles, i. 87.
- Lomellini, Gianotto, Doge of Genoa, ii. 38.
- Lomellini of Genoa, ii. 39, .
- Longo, Pietro, i. 444.
- Lopez, Francisco, ii. 377.
- Lopez, Gregorio, i. 457.
- Loredano, Giovanni de, at Lepanto, i. 416, 430; ii. 401.
- Loredano, Leonardo, i. 448.
- Loredano, Pietro, Doge of Venice, refuses to yield Cyprus to the Turk, i. 307; death of, 311.
- Loreto, addition made to the Litany of Our Lady of, in memory of the battle of Lepanto, i. 448.
- Lorraine, Claude de, Duke of Aumale, ii. 413.
- Los Velez, Marquess of, Viceroy of Murcia, i. 138; storms Guercija, 139, 177; at Terque, 159; gives orders for the relief of Seron, 169; marches to Uxixar, 177; and occupies it, 178; discontent of, 181; before Galera, 210; meets Don John, 220, 221.
- Louis of Nassau, ii. 144; presents the second Request to the Regent of the Netherlands, 152; defeats a Spanish force under AreMBERG, but is defeated at Jemmingem, 165; takes the fortress of Mons, 168; but is compelled to evacuate it, 169; killed at Mookerheyde, 172.
- Louis, Saint, crusade of, ii. 10.
- Louis XI., King of France, ii. 131.
- Louvain, university of, i. 33; Don John at, ii. 216; surrendered to Don John, 293.
- Lucido, San, Marquess of, i. 455.
- Luna, Antonio de, i. 161, 176, 209, 260, 279.
- Luna, House of, i. 12.
- Luna, Republic of, i. 350.
- Lusignan, Steffano, ii. 484.
- Luxemburg, ii. 188.
- MAALSTEEDE, Baron of, ii. 269.

- Madrid, i. 37.
 Maese de Campo [Maestre de Campo].
 Maestre, or Maese, de Campo, office of, ii. 368.
 Mahamete Ben Daud, i. 193.
 Mahomet Bey, son of Ali Pasha, i. 417, 428, 467; ii. 1.
 Mahomet, cousin of Muley Hamida, of Tunis, ii. 12.
 Mahomet II., Sultan, i. 293.
 Mahomet Pasha, ii. 87.
 Mahomet Sirocco Pasha, i. 397; at Lepanto, 409, 420.
 Mahomet Sokolli [Sokolli].
 Mahomet, tutor of the sons of Ali Pasha, i. 432; set free by Don John, 438.
 Maldonado, i. 142.
 Maldonado, Diego, ii. 82.
 Malek, El, i. 172, 193, 203, 205, 209; fails to surprise Guescar, 210, 245.
 Malipieri, Caterino, at Lepanto, i. 416, 430; ii. 401, 403.
 Mallara, Juan de, i. 385; ii. 479, 480.
 Mal Lara [Mallara].
 Malmocco, port of, i. 91.
 Malta, i. 45; siege of, 304.
 Mann, Dr., envoy from Queen Elizabeth, i. 65.
 Manolesso, E. M., ii. 484.
 Manrique, Garcia de, i. 186, 217, 230, 242.
 Manrique, Geronimo, i. 388, 436; ii. 482.
 Mansfeldt, Charles of, ii. 290.
 Mansfeldt, Peter Ernest, Count, ii. 188, 205, 285, 290; at Don John's funeral, 338.
 Mantua, Duke of, i. 350.
 Manuel, Juan, i. 46.
 Manzino, Gregorio, ii. 411.
 Marbella, i. 135.
 Marché-en-Famine, ii. 193.
 Marck, William de la, ii. 167.
 Margaret, Duchess of Parma, daughter of Charles V., i. 30, 51, 473; Viceroy of the Netherlands, ii. 132, 135; presented with the Request arising out of the Compromise, 148; issues the Moderation, 150; abolishes the Inquisition by the Accord, 156; re-establishes it, 162; recalled, 163. [Parma, Duchess of.]
 Margaret of Valois, i. 348; Queen of Navarre, ii. 188, 237, 242.
 Margariti, surrender of, by the Turks, ii. 482.
 Margliano, Giovanni, ii. 69.
 Maria, Empress, wife of Maximilian II., i. 78; ii. 254.
 Maria la Bailadora, at Lepanto, i. 422.
 Maria, Princess of Portugal, ii. 55.
 Mariotti, Domenico, ii. 482.
 Marlota, Moorish tunic, i. 153.
 Marmol, Lorenzo, i. 248.
 Marmol, Luis de, historian [Carvajal], i. 113, note, 166, 167, 218, 220, 221; on the massacre at Galera, 228, 229; ii. 475.
 Marnix, Philippe de [St. Aldegonde].
 Marolles, Abbé de, ii. 241, 246.
 Marquesillo, El, at Lepanto, i. 422.
 Martinengo, Luigi, i. 366.
 Martinengo, Nestor, i. 370, note 1.
 Martinengo, Sciarra, i. 482; ii. 409.
 Martinez, Diego, ii. 310.
 Martini, ii. 250.
 Martyr, Peter, i. 116.
 Mary of Burgundy, daughter of Charles the Bold, i. 42; ii. 131.
 Mary, Queen of Hungary, i. 8, 13, 16, 31; ii. 132.
 Mary, Queen of Scots, i. 60; ii. 22, 108, 127.
 Mary Tudor, Queen of England, i. 10, 41.
 Mascherati, of Genoa, ii. 29.
 Massacre of St. Bartholomew [Bartholomew, St.]
 Massi, Diego, i. 7.
 Massi, Francisco (or Francisquin), musician, i. 5, 11; ii. 473.
 Massimis, Lelio de, ii. 407.
 Mastrillo, i. 419.
 Matthias, Archduke, chosen governor by the Estates of the Netherlands, ii. 268; accepts the invitation, 269; enters Antwerp, 271; binds himself to the conditions imposed on him, 277; sends envoys to Don John and Philip II., 277; 284; receives tidings of the battle of Gemblours, 294; regarded as a mere mouthpiece of the Prince of Orange, 300.
 Matthias, King of Hungary, i. 290.
 Maximilian, Don, Viceroy of Aragon, and Archbishop of Zaragoza, i. 353.
 Maximilian II., Emperor, i. 45, 78, 302, 310, 349, 471; ii. 167; sends two envoys to Genoa, 37; death of, 200.
 Maximilian, King of the Romans, husband of Mary of Burgundy, ii. 131.
 Mayenne, Marquess of, i. 488, 507; ii. 100, 286, 433, 434.
 Mazalquivir, fortress of, i. 63.
 Mecebe besieges Seron, i. 165, 168; deceives Mirones, 170.
 Mecina de Bombaron, i. 142, 268; butchery at, 277.
 Medicis, Catherine de, i. 46, 59, 79, 298, 349; ii. 316.
 Medicis, Cosmo de [Cosimo I.]
 Medicis, Francisco de, i. 350, 357, 464; ii. 43.
 Medicis, Pietro de, ii. 361, note 1.

- Medicis, Tommaso de, i. 420.
 Medina, Ana de, wife of F. Massi, i. 6, 10.
 Medina-Celi, Duke of, i. 392, *note* 2; appointed Regent of the Netherlands, ii. 169, 171.
 Medina, Diego de, i. 7.
 Meetkercke, Dr., ii. 223, 249, 271.
 Meghem, Baron of, ii. 297.
 Melchi, El, i. 279.
 Mendoza, Bernardino, ii. 292, 322, 495.
 Mendoza, Francisco de, i. 158, 230, 231; ii. 429.
 Mendoza, García de, ii. 70.
 Mendoza, Lope Hurtado de, ii. 75, 78.
 Mendoza, Salazar de, i. 17.
 Mendoza, Ana de, Princess of Eboli, ii. 464.
 Mendoza, Antonio de, i. 353.
 Mendoza, Diego Hurtado de, historian, i. 113, *note*; ii. 475.
 Mendoza el Jayar, i. 273.
 Mendoza, Fernando de, i. 434.
 Mendoza, Juan de, i. 177, 178, 219; ii. 373.
 Mendoza, Maria de, ii. 340.
 Mendoza, Pedro de, i. 347; ii. 330.
 Mendoza, Rodrigo de, i. 34, 72, 358; at Lepanto, 406; letters of Don John to, ii. 437, 462.
 Mendoza, Ruy Diaz, at Lepanto, i. 406.
 Meneses, Carlos de, page of Don John, ii. 338.
 Mesa, Andres de, at Lepanto, i. 406.
 Mesa, Pedro Lopez de, i. 156, 217.
 Messina, i. 374; fleet of the League gathered at, 380; colossal statue of Don John at, 459.
 Meteren, E. de, ii. 500.
 Mexia, Juan de Vargas, ii. 286.
 Mezzo, Giacomo de, i. 430; ii. 403.
 Middelburg, surrendered to the Prince of Orange, ii. 172.
 Miguez [Nassy].
 Miranda, Juan de, i. 429, *note*.
 Mirones, Diego de, i. 168, 170, 179.
 Mocenigo, Luigi, succeeds Loredano as Doge of Venice, i. 316; urges the making of peace with the Sultan, 504. "Moderation," the, ii. 150.
 Modon, port of, i. 489, 497, 498; ii. 427.
 Molina, Argote de, ii. 346.
 Molina, Christoval de, exploit of, at Tablate, i. 137.
 Molina, Francisco de, i. 183, 194, 196, 201; at Galera, 224, 226, 245.
 Molina, Vasquez de, i. 19.
 Monçada, Miguel de, i. 355, 358; at Lepanto, 406; ii. 7, *note*.
 Mondejar, Marquess of, Viceroy of Granada, i. 121, 122, 123; raises the siege of Orgiba, 134; marches to the Alpuarras, 136, 139; massacres the people at Guajar-el-alto, 141, 147, 151; enters Granada, 152; meets Don John at Híznaleus, 153, 180; Viceroy of Naples, 182; ii. 113.
 Mondoucet, French agent, ii. 217, 234.
 Mondragone, Christopher, ii. 290, 314.
 Mondragone, Duke of, i. 372, 434; relieves Tergoes, ii. 170; takes Zierick-Zee, 178; evacuates it, 183, 292.
 Monserrate, Benedictines of, i. 47, 353.
 Monserrate, Lorenzo de, ii. 105.
 Monte, Camillo de, ii. 291.
 Monte, Marquess of, ii. 320.
 Montigny, ii. 290.
 Montigny, Baron of, ii. 145; sent to Spain, 150; judicially murdered, 167.
 Montmorency, constable of, ii. 31.
 Mookerheyde, battle of, ii. 172.
 Moor, Last Sigh of the, i. 113, 127.
 Morales Ambrosio, i. 455.
 Moray (Murray), Regent of Scotland, ii. 208.
 Morcat, Geronimo, i. 393.
 Morea, Stefano, ii. 47.
 Moreno, Antonio, i. 158, 171; ii. 369.
 Morillo, Captain, i. 280.
 Moriscos, make a profession of Christianity, i. 117; repressive laws passed against the, 119; excited by the destruction of their baths, 120; outbreak of, 1568, 121; proposed rising of, on New Year's Day 1569, 122; attacks of, on churches, 129; lose Frigiliana, 164; removal of, from Granada, 166, 187; lose Guejar, 219; Galera, 229; Seron, 242; Tijola, 248; gradual collapse of the rebellion, 256; expatriation of the, 258, 280; results to the landowners of Andalusia, 285; plot with the enemies of Spain, 286; expelled from Spain in 1610, 287; ii. 369, 371; histories of their rebellion, 475.
 Mormori, Manoli, ii. 387.
 Mornay, Duplessis, ii. 494.
 Moro, Antonio, ii. 346.
 Morone, Cardinal, i. 331; ii. 43.
 Moscoso, Violante de, ii. 24.
 Moxcalan, i. 269.
 Mudejares, the, i. 167.
 Muhlberg, battle of, i. 3, 176.
 Muley Abdalla [Aben Abou].
 Muleyhacen, i. 127, 128.
 Muley Hamida, son of Muley Hassan, ii. 12, 17, 20, 24.
 Muley Hassan, Prince of Tunis, ii. 11, 12.
 Muley Mahomet, ii. 17, 77; his forces go over to the Turks, 79.
 Muley Malek, ii. 86.
 Muñatones, Bribeasca de, i. 157, 158, 166, 173.

- Muñoz, Martin, at Lepanto, i. 421.
 "Murderation," the, ii. 150.
 Murray [Moray].
 Mustafa, brother of Selim II., i. 299.
 Mustafa Pasha, i. 45, 312; receives the terms of capitulation proposed by Baglione and Bragadino in Famagosta, 368; entraps them into his tent, and murders Baglione and his officers, inhumanly torturing Bragadino and flaying him alive, 369.
 Mustafa [Zitolomini].
 Mutinies of Spanish soldiery in the Netherlands, ii. 204, 255.
 Mutio, Captain, ii. 397.
- NAMUR, Don John goes to, ii. 233; meeting with Margaret of Navarre at, 238; the citadel seized by Don John, 240; fortified by Don John, 283.
 Nani, Frederigo, at Lepanto, i. 412, 420.
 Naples, Hereditary Grand Constable of, i. 315.
 Nassau [Adolphus, Henry, John, Louis, of.]
 Nassy (or Miguez), Jewish adventurer, receives from Selim II. a promise of the sovereignty of Cyprus, i. 303.
 Navarino, Bay of, i. 490.
 Navarre, Henry, King of, i. 349 [Henry III. of Navarre].
 Navarre, Margaret of Valois, Queen of, ii. 233.
 Naves, lieutenant-governor of Luxemburg, ii. 188.
 Negri, Cesare, i. 356; ii. 54; his masque in honour of Don John, 55, 490.
 Netherlands, excitement in the, in 1557, i. 50; ecclesiastical changes in the, ii. 136; laws against heresy in the, 136; protest against the maintenance of Spanish soldiers in the, 137; character of the nobles of the, 144; the covenant called the Compromise largely signed in the, 148; desecration of churches in the, 153, 155; mutinies of Spanish soldiers in the, 177, 179, 189; the Estates present their demands and offers to Don John, 192; departure of the Spanish troops from the, 206; the Estates request Don John to restore the citadel of Namur to its former Governor, 249; address two despatches to King Philip, 258; propose arrangements with the Prince of Orange, 261; depose Don John, 275; draw up a new Act of Union, 276; the Estates' army defeated at Gemblours, 293; insist on the recall of Don John, 301; welcome the Duke of Anjou, 316; offer terms to him, 324; send Commissioners to treat with Don John at Louvain, 325; histories of the affairs of the, 490, *et seq.*
 Neuhaus, Baron, i. 30.
 Nicosia, taken by the Turks under Mustafa Pasha, i. 312.
 Niño, Gabriel, ii. 304.
 Nivelle, taken by Don John, ii. 296; reconquered by the Estates, 323.
 Noailles, François de [Acqs, Bishop of].
 Noguera, Andres, ii. 482.
 Noircarmes, Count of, besieges and takes Valenciennes, ii. 159, 170.
 Noli, ii. 51.
 Norris, Sir John, ii. 320, 321.
 Northumberland, Countess of, ii. 23, 208.
 Noue, François de la, Huguenot leader, ii. 318.
 Nuñez, Diego, i. 183.
- OBERSTEIN, Count, ii. 181.
 Obsequies of Charles V., controversy respecting, i. 18, *note* 1.
 Occhiali [Aluch Ali].
 Odescalchi, Bishop of Penna, Papal Nuncio, i. 373, 377, 384, 481; ii. 43.
 Ohanez, defeat of Moors at, i. 139.
 O'Hely, Patrick, ii. 106.
 Olivares, Count of, i. 345.
 Olivera, ii. 290.
 Oran, i. 55.
 Orange, William the Silent, Prince of, i. 75, *note* 1; ii. 125, 139; opposes the establishment of the new hierarchy, 140; his character, 141; his tolerance, 142; becomes acquainted with the conspiracy between the Kings of France and Spain for the rooting out of heresy, 143; tries to allay the popular excitement at Duffel, 152; refuses to take the new oath imposed by the Regent, 160; preserves the peace at Antwerp, 161; withdraws to Dillenburg, 161; his knowledge of the secret designs of Philip II., 162; raises troops to act against the Viceroy, 165; marches into Brabant, but is compelled to retreat, 166; takes Middelburg, 172; invested with more ample powers as Stadtholder, 175; summons a Congress to meet at Ghent, 180; power and influence of, 193; his share in bringing about the Treaty of Ghent, 194; his dislike of the Perpetual Edict, 210; refuses to permit its publication in Holland, 211; receives splendid offers from Don John, 213; distrust of Don John, 215; tries to seize on Don John, 217; continues to oppose the Edict, 223, 224; lays before the Estates intercepted letters from Don John and Escovedo to the King and Antonio

- Perez, 247; invited to Bruxelles by the Estates, 261; enters Antwerp and Bruxelles, 262; elected Ruward of Brabant, 271; declines the office of Governor of Flanders, 272; meets the Archduke Matthias at Vilvorde, 278; accepts the office of Governor of Brabant, 278; retires to Antwerp after the battle of Gemblours, 295; negotiates with Duke John Casimir, 302, 324; and with the Duke of Anjou, 324; offers terms to Don John, 325; his opinion of Don John, 356; apology of, 356, 494; his correspondence, 496.
- Orantes, Francisco, ii. 333, 335.
- Orgacio [Orgaz].
- Orgaz, Count of, ii. 439, 443, 447, 464.
- Orgiba, besieged by Aben Aboo, i. 133; siege raised, 138.
- Orgiba, resistance of the Christians to the Moors at, i. 194.
- Orlandini, Baccio, ii. 310, *note*.
- Ormanetti, Nicolas, Bishop of Padua, Papal Nuncio, ii. 21.
- Orsini, Horatio, i. 430, *note* 2.
- Orsini, Latino, ii. 109.
- Orsini, Paolo Giordano, i. 417; ii. 387.
- Orsini, Virgilio, i. 430, *note* 2.
- Ortuño, Pedro Martinez, ii. 70.
- Oruña, Hernando de, i. 158.
- Osma, i. 41.
- Osorio, Antonio, ii. 471.
- Osorio, Diego, i. 251.
- Osorio, Maria Toledo, i. 12.
- Osorno, Count of, i. 28.
- Osuna, Duke of, i. 53.
- Oudewater, capture of, by Requesens, ii. 175.
- PACHECO, Cardinal, Archbishop of Burgos, i. 331, 332, 340; ii. 91.
- Pacheco, Juan de, i. 224, 227, 325.
- Pacification of Ghent, ii. 182, 194, 202.
- Padilla, Garcia de, i. 118.
- Padilla, Martin de, i. 163, 490.
- Padilla, Pedro de, i. 163, 178, 223, 224, 276.
- Padovano, Gaspar, ii. 347.
- Padul attacked by Moriscos, i. 180.
- Pagano, Mucio, ii. 292; killed at Aerschot, 323.
- Pagliano, Duke of [Colonna, Marc Antonio].
- Pallavicini of Genoa, ii. 38.
- Pallavicino, Sforza, i. 312; ii. 412.
- Panis, Peter, ii. 232.
- Pantera on galley management, i. 93, 101.
- Pardo, Mendez, i. 184.
- Pardo, the, ii. 346.
- Parma, Alexander Farnese, Prince of, i. 36, 44; at Lepanto, 416, 474, 487, 490; reaches Luxemburg, ii. 286; wins the battle of Gemblours, 292; obtains possession of Limburg, 313; receives from Don John full powers to act for him, 334 [Farnese, Alexander].
- Parma, Margaret, Duchess of, i. 30, 51, 474; declines to return to the Netherlands, ii. 275 [Margaret, Duchess of Parma].
- Parma, Ottavio, Duke of, ii. 55.
- Paruta, Geronimo, i. 312.
- Paruta, Paolo, ii. 486.
- Pasqualigo, Ant., ii. 403.
- Passau, Peace of, ii. 327.
- Patrona de Espana* (flagship of Ali Pasha), i. 434.
- Paul III., Pope, i. 294.
- Paul IV., Pope, i. 14; ii. 134, 136.
- Pavana*, Spanish dance, ii. 239.
- Pazzameno*, Italian dance, ii. 239.
- Pennoni, Hippolito, ii. 333.
- Peñon de Velez, i. 108.
- Perales, Andres de, ii. 26.
- Perea, Captain, i. 200.
- Perez, Antonio, i. 75; ii. 103; his double-dealing with Don John, 114, 305; treachery of, to Don John and Escovedo, 307; obtains the sanction of Philip for the murder of Escovedo, 309; disgraced and imprisoned, 311; his opinion of Don John, 356.
- Perez, Gonzalo, i. 29.
- Perola, the brothers, i. 453.
- Perotti, ii. 291.
- Perpetual Edict, ii. 200.
- Perrenot, Antoine de [Granvelle, Cardinal].
- Pertau Pasha, i. 397; at Lepanto, 410, 413, 417.
- Pesaro, Andrea de, i. 406.
- Pescara sacks Genoa, ii. 31.
- Petala, Council of War held at, i. 434.
- Peter Martyr, sent as envoy to Constantinople, i. 116.
- Petit, J. F. le, ii. 495.
- Pfalz, the, Duke John Casimir of, ii. 302, 318, 324, 328.
- Philibert Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy, Regent of the Netherlands, ii. 134.
- Philip, Duke of Burgundy, ii. 130.
- Philip I., i. 353.
- Philip II., King of Spain, i. 7; fails to secure the Imperial Crown, 8; summoned to England for his marriage with the Queen, 10; leaves the Netherlands, and lands at Laredo, 31; receives Don John as son of Charles V., 32; marries Elizabeth of Valois, 35; chooses Madrid as the Spanish capital, 38; asks Pius IV. for a Cardinal's hat for Don John, 45; makes false promises to his subjects in the Netherlands, 51; abandons his pretended journey, 52; character of,

- 55; his methods of government, 56; his love of etiquette, 56; his duplicity, treachery, and dilatoriness, 57; his indefatigable powers of business, 58; his dislike for his son Carlos, 59; imprisons Carlos, 71; connives at his suicide, 81; forbids Moriscos to keep negro slaves, 119; resolves on more decisive measures for putting down the Morisco rebellion, 147, 214; receives tidings of Quixada's death, 235; appoints the Duke of Arcos to put down the rebels in Ronda, 279; confers with the Papal Legate Alessandrino, 347; receives tidings of the victory at Lepanto, 448; letter of, to Don John on the victory, 461; views of, in reference to the League, 481; resolves on an expedition against Tunis, ii. 7; orders Don John to visit Genoa, 43; and to aid the Portico of St. Luke, 48, 49; recommends the abandonment of the Goletta and Tunis, 64, *et seq.*; despatch of, to Don John, respecting Tunis, 66; forbids Don John to visit him in Spain, 90, 103; but receives him graciously, 104; appoints him Governor of the Netherlands, 115; approves the scheme for the invasion of England and the marriage of Don John to Mary Queen of Scots, 112, 123; his shortsightedness and ignorance, 125; dismisses Cardinal Granvelle from the Netherlands, 140; receives Berghen and Montigny as envoys from the Netherlanders, 157; murders them, 166, 167; gives instructions to Don John for the government of the Netherlands, 190; sends the Baron de Selles to negotiate with the chief men of the Estates, 299; sends Don John a remittance of more than a million crowns, 304; encourages the treachery of Perez to Don John and Escovedo, 308; determines on the murder of Escovedo, 309; expostulates with Henry III. of France on the designs of Anjou, 315; urges Don John to make peace, if possible, with the Estates, 325; receives Don John's last letter, 332; his treachery to Don John, 360; letters of Don John to, 351, 364, 381; correspondence relating to the Netherlands, 498.
- Philip, Prince of Spain, afterwards Philip II., i. 7, 298; visits Genoa on his way to the Netherlands, ii. 36; hated by the Genoese, 37.
- Philip the Handsome, i. 5; ii. 132.
- Philippeville, ii. 297; surrendered to Don John, 298.
- Piacenza, tournament at, ii. 57.
- Piali Pasha, Turkish Admiral, i. 45, 304; 312, 392, 397, 468; ii. 431.
- Piamontesa*, Savoyard ship, i. 420, 429.
- Pie de Palo [Vilches].
- Piracy in the Mediterranean, i. 104, 108, 118, 287, 291, 355, 397, 471; ii. 7, 31, 91.
- Pisa, Hercules de, ii. 82.
- Pisani, Chico, i. 375.
- Pisani, Pietro, i. 406.
- Pius III., Pope, i. 332.
- Pius IV., Pope, i. 45, 88, 328, 417; ii. 139.
- Pius V., Pope, i. 68, 79, 310; promotes the Holy League, 311; offers to aid Venice against the Turk, 310; early life of, 325; his character and policy, 329; invites the sovereigns of Europe to join the League, 330; draws out the terms of the treaty, 332; renews his efforts on behalf of the League, 334; appoints Don John General of the League, 334; letter to Don John, 352; vision of the victory at Lepanto, 445; addition to the Litany of our Lady of Loreto, 448; illness and death of, 474; character of, 475; ii. 158.
- Polwiller, Colonel, ii. 249, 252, 288.
- Ponce de Leon, House of, i. 279.
- Ponce de Leon, Juan, i. 429, *note*.
- Pont, Dionisio, i. 455.
- Ponte, Nicolas de, i. 513.
- Porcacchi, Thomaso, ii. 353, 485.
- Porras, Pedro de, i. 38.
- Porreno, Balthasar, biographer of Don John, ii. 470.
- Porro, Girolamo, ii. 353, 485.
- Portico of St. Luke, or New Nobles of Genoa, ii. 33, 38.
- Portico of St. Peter, or Old Nobles of Genoa, ii. 33, 38, 41.
- Portocarrero, Pedro, Governor of Goletta, ii. 13, 19; hampers the action of Serbellone, 76; incapacity of, 80; loses the Goletta and is taken prisoner, 81; death of, 87.
- Poyol, Juan, i. 455.
- Prada, Andres de, i. 106; ii. 309.
- Prester John, i. 471.
- Prevesa, i. 87, 294, 318, 376, 392, *note* 1.
- Prevost, Charles, groom of the chamber to Charles V., i. 10.
- Priego, Count of, i. 34, 351, 434; sent by Don John as envoy to the Pope, ii. 53.
- Priests, bravery of, at Lepanto, i. 426.
- Prinsterer, Groen von, ii. 494, 496.
- Privilege, the Great, ii. 131.
- Pubest [Prevost].

- Pucci, on galley slavery, i. 100.
 Purchena, i. 248.
- QUACOS, i. 17.
- Querini, Antonio, i. 369, 381.
- Quesada, Diego de, i. 135, 216, 219.
- Quevedo, ii. 469.
- Quintin, St., battle of, i. 449; ii. 144, 289.
- Quirini, Marco, i. 314, 361, 366; at Lepanto, 405, 420; attacks Margariti, 482, 484; ii. 393.
- Quirini, Vincenzo, i. 430, *note* 1; ii. 403.
- Quiroga, Juan de, i. 34, 106, 111, 181.
- Quixada, Gutierrez, i. 5.
- Quixada, Luis Mendez, i. 5; marries Magdalena de Ulloa, 5; at Yuste, 15; at Madrid, 38; president of the Council of the Indies, 39; present at the arrest of Don Carlos, 71, 147; marches with Don John against Guejar, 217; wounded before Seron, 231; death of, 233.
- RABEL, Jean, his bust of Don John, ii. 348.
- Radaman Pasha, ii. 15, 77.
- Ragazzoni, Jacopo, i. 338, 339; ii. 486.
- Ragazzoni, Placido, ii. 486.
- Ramirez, Diego, commander of Salobreña, i. 269.
- Ramirez, Dr., ii. 336.
- Ramirez, Geronimo, at Lepanto, i. 418.
- Rampini of Genoa, ii. 29.
- Raschid of Tunis, ii. 11.
- Rassenghien, Baron of, ii. 190, 246.
- Ratcliffe undertakes to murder Don John, ii. 322; beheaded, 323.
- Ratisbon, Charles V. at, i. 2.
- Rattaña, Archbishop of Messina, i. 457.
- Reformation, circumstances favouring the, i. 326.
- "Reformers" of Genoa, ii. 32.
- Regla, Juan de, confessor to Charles V., i. 17.
- Rendati, Morisco leader, i. 176.
- Requesens, Bellinger de, i. 392, *note*.
- Requesens, Luis de, appointed vice-admiral of the fleet, i. 82, 147, 158; at Velez, 159; attacks Frigiliana, 162; storms it, 163; returns to Malaga, 164; at Granada, 275; devastates the Alpuxarras, 277, 354; at Lepanto, 405, 413, 416; appointed Viceroy of Milan, 453; his jealousy of Colonna, 465; is unable to send reinforcements for the League, 479; succeeds Medina-Celi as Viceroy of the Netherlands, ii. 171; defeated at Middelburg and Leyden, 172; publishes an amnesty, 174; takes Oudewater and slaughters the inhabitants, 175; dies of fever, 115, 176.
- Request, the, of the Netherlanders, ii. 148, 149, 151.
- Reulx, Count of, ii. 338.
- Reynoso, Francisco, ii. 487.
- Rhodes, Turkish acquisition of, i. 308.
- Ribera, Juan de, Patriarch of Antioch and Archbishop of Valencia, i. 286, 287.
- Ribera, Pedro Afan de, i. 340, *note*.
- Ridolfi conspiracy, i. 330.
- Rijnemants, battle of, ii. 320.
- Riosco, Duke of Medina del, i. 53, 67, 352.
- Robles, Caspar de, ii. 348, 457.
- Robles, Leon de, i. 222.
- Robusti, Jacopo [Tintoretto].
- Roda, Jerome de, ii. 124, 179, 181.
- Rogers, Mr., English envoy in the Netherlands, ii. 200.
- Romero, Julian, ii. 124, 205; death of, 285.
- Roncon, Colonel, ii. 409.
- Ronda, military importance of, i. 259; suppression of the rebellion in, 279.
- Rondacchi, the brothers, i. 366.
- Rota, Martin de, ii. 349.
- Rottolo, of Genoa, ii. 39.
- Rotulo, Leonardo, i. 284.
- Roxalana, mother of Selim II., i. 301.
- Roxas, Francisco, i. 160.
- Rudolph, Archduke, i. 45, 346, 353; Emperor, i. 297, 343; ii. 200.
- Rufo, Juan, i. 454; ii. 473.
- Rustan Pasha, i. 290.
- Rusticucci, Cardinal, i. 331.
- Ruward, office of, in Brabant, ii. 271.
- Ryhove forms a plot to seize Aerschot, ii. 273; hangs Hessels, 274.
- SAAVEDRA [Cervantes].
- Said Bey, son of Ali Pasha, i. 417; ii. 1; set free without ransom, 4.
- Salamanca, university of, i. 39.
- Salazar, Alcaide of Guescar, i. 221.
- Salazar, Andres de, at Lepanto, i. 406; ii. 13, 75, 78, 84, 85.
- Salma, a weight, i. 91.
- Salobreña, i. 126.
- Sambucus, Joannes, ii. 483.
- Sampiero, Corsican chief, ii. 37.
- Sande, Alvaro de, i. 392, *note* 2.
- Sanders, Nicholas, ii. 23, 111.
- San Geronimo, Juan de, ii. 498.
- San Giovanni, Papal ship, i. 420.
- San Lucido, Marquess of, 388.
- San Secondo, Count of, ii. 53.
- Sansovino, i. 445.
- Santacroce, Cardinal, i. 331.
- Santa Cruz, Alvaro Baçan, Marquess of, i. 106; urges the need of relieving Cyprus, 319, 351, 354; at Lepanto, 409, 453,

- 473; captures the galley of Hamet Bey, 497; at Tunis, ii. 19, 26.
 Santa Cruz, Melchior de, ii. 354.
 Santa Fiore, Count of, i. 379.
 Santa Maura, i. 435.
 Sarabia, Gaspar de, i. 133, 138.
 Saraceni, G. C., ii. 485.
 Sarmiento, Guerra, i. 204, 206; attacks Cantoria, 206; his victory, 208.
 Sarmiento, Juan Mendoza, i. 151.
 Sarmiento, Matias de Guerta, i. 184.
 Sarno, Count of, i. 482; ii. 13.
 Sarriera, Antic, i. 177, 178.
 "Satisfaction" of Amsterdam, ii. 299.
 Sauli, of Genoa, ii. 38.
 Savorgnano, i. 356.
 Savoy, Duke of, i. 87, 310, 329, 350; ii. 135.
 Schetz, Caspar, ii. 223 [Grobbendonck].
 Schwartzenburg, Count, ii. 493, 494.
 Scotch prisoners taken at Gemblours, treatment of, ii. 294.
 Scotti, Count Alberto, ii. 55.
 Scotto, Onorio, i. 366.
 Sebastian, King of Portugal, i. 55, 77, 310, 345, 348; ii. 113, 357, *note* 2.
 Sedeño, Antonio, i. 243.
 Segá, Filippo, ii. 227.
 Segovia, i. 46.
 Segovia, wood of, i. 48; ii. 158.
 Segura, i. 39.
 Selim I., i. 308; ii. 9.
 Selim II., Sultan, i. 151, 288, 298; his character, 299; his designs on Cyprus, 301, 303; cheats the Morisco envoys, 306; removes Piali Pasha from his command, 343, 365; orders his fleet to fight at Lepanto, 399; receives tidings of his defeat, 467; death of, ii. 113.
 Selimye mosque at Adrianople, i. 301, 467.
 Selles, Baron de, ii. 277, 301.
 Senarego, Matteo, ii. 38.
 Senix, El, murders Aben Aboo, i. 283; takes the body to Granada, 284; impaled, 285.
 Senoguera, Juan de, ii. 79, 83, 84, 88, 89.
 Sens, peace of, ii. 234.
 Sepulveda, i. 47.
 Serbellone, Gabriel, engineer, i. 435; appointed Governor of Tunis, ii. 17; engaged in building a fortress to command Tunis, 64; besieged and distressed, 74; abandons the city and retires within his fortress, 80; his obstinate resistance, 82; taken prisoner, 83; exchanged, 87; rejoins Don John, 316; fortifies the camp at Bouges, 329; struck down by fever, but recovers, 330.
 Serdonati, Francesco, ii. 353.
 Sereno, Bartolomeo, ii. 487.
 Seron, siege of, by the Moriscos, i. 165; surrendered to them, 170.
 Serbia, Miguel, ii. 481.
 Sesa, Duke of, i. 53, 67, 156, 466; Viceroy of Milan, 156; marches to the relief of Orgiba, 198; makes his way into Guejar, 218, 249; endangers the negotiations for peace, 264, 451, 486; succeeds Requesens as Grand Commander, 466; at Tunis, ii. 115.
 Seville, i. 38.
 Sforza, Count of S^a Fiore, i. 379.
 Sforza, Ludovico el Moro, ii. 28.
 Shaw, James, ii. 281.
 Ships of the sixteenth century, i. 90.
 Siche, C. van, ii. 349.
 Sidney, Sir Philip, i. 290; ii. 228.
 Sierra Nevada, i. 126.
 Sigismund, King of Poland, i. 310, 343, 471.
 Siguença, historian, i. 17, *note* 3.
 Siliceo, Cardinal, i. 39.
 Silva, Diego Guzman de, i. 342, 443, 448, 472.
 Silva, Ruy Gomez de, Prince of Eboli, i. 58, 72, 235, 238, 346; ii. 6, 309; letters of Don John to, 376.
 Sinan, architect of the Selimye dome at Adrianople, i. 467.
 Sinan Pasha, ii. 77; besieges Goletta, 80; insults Serbellone, 85; breaks his compact with the Spanish garrison, 86.
 Sixtus V., Pope, i. 476, 477.
 Slavery, galley, i. 92.
 Sociedi, Lazaro, i. 297.
 Sokolli, Mahomet, i. 301; opposes the Sultan's designs on Cyprus, 304; 337; 467; policy of, after Lepanto, 467, 468; negotiations with Bishop of Acqs, 506, 508.
 Solis, Francisco de, i. 217.
 Solyman the Magnificent, Sultan, i. 15, 45; his fleet, 105, 288; league against, 294, 308, 349, 392, *note* 1, 396.
 Sopoto, i. 361, 508.
 Soranzo, Benetto, i. 430, *note* 1; ii. 403.
 Soranzo, Giovanni, i. 331, 340.
 Soranzo, Jacopo, i. 480, 502.
 Soria, Lopez de, ii. 31.
 Soto, Juan de, i. 181, 241, 264, 265, 351, 354; at Lepanto, 406, 432, 481; his marriage, 483; appointed Commissary-General of the fleet, ii. 6; at Tunis, 13; reports to the King on the affairs of Tunis, 67, 114, *note* 2.
 Sotomayor, Alonso de, ii. 186, 286, 401.
 Spain, choice of a capital for, i. 37.
 Spain, Inquisition in, i. 24.
 Spain, navy of, i. 85.
 Spain, Reformation in, i. 24.

- Spanish Fury at Antwerp, ii. 182.
 Sphagia, Sphacteria, i. 490.
 Spinola, Ettore, i. 405; killed at Lepanto, 416; ii. 401.
 Spinola, Lorenzo, ii. 120.
 Spinolas of Genoa, ii. 29.
 St. Aldegonde, Baron of, Philippe de Marnix, ii. 145, 172, 223, 228, 232, 273; attends the Imperial Diet at Worms, 302.
 "Stable of Don John of Austria," ii. 355.
 Stadtholder, office of, ii. 142, 175.
 Stanton, English exile, ii. 208.
 Stella, Z. F., ii. 409.
 Stopner, Adrian, ii. 502.
 Strada, F., historian, i. 2, 74; ii. 501.
 Stradanus [Straet].
 Straet, John Van der, ii. 354.
 Straten, Cornelius, ii. 219.
 Struys, John, a galley-slave, i. 103.
 Stuart, Robert, ii. 320, 321.
 Stukeley, Thomas, ii. 110, 112, 113, 210.
 Sultan, Turkish, revenue of the, i. 290; armies of the, 290; fleet of the, 291; secret of his power, 292; relations with the Republic of Venice, 292; with the Emperors, 296; with the French King, 298.
 Suriano, Michele, i. 331, 332, 340.
 Szigeth, i. 349.
 TABLATE, struggle at the ravine of, i. 137; 145.
 Talavera, Hernando de, Archbishop of Granada, i. 114; his influence as a peacemaker, 115, 116.
 Tassis, Juan Battista, ii. 218; his opinion of Don John, 342, 358, 500.
 Tavera, Juan de, Cardinal, i. 56.
 Teheran, Venetian Embassy to, i. 309.
 Tello, Hernando, i. 241.
 Tendilla, Count of, i. 117, 122, 136, 143, 153.
 Tergoes, relieved by the Spaniards, ii. 169.
 Terranova, Duke of, ii. 26, 71.
 Terzi, Francesco, ii. 347.
 Thou, De, on the death of Don Carlos, i. 74; on the character of Don John, ii. 358, 477.
 Thuanus [Thou, de].
 Tiepolo, Antonio, i. 65, 357, 481; ii. 486.
 Tiepolo, Paolo, Venetian ambassador, i. 511.
 Tijola, siege of, i. 243; fall of, 248.
 Tintoretto, i. 444; ii. 345, *note* 2.
 Tintoretto, Domenico, 445.
 Tisnacq, i. 300; ii. 180.
 Titian, i. 444, 453.
 Todesco, Cesare, ii. 59.
 Toledo, Antonio de, Prior of Atocha, i. 69.
 Toledo, cathedral of, i. 36.
 Toledo, Eleanora de, ii. 361, *note* 1.
 Toledo, Fernando de, ii. 292, 320.
 Toledo, Garcia de, i. 41, 45, 61, 81, 358, 375, 381, 466; ii. 73.
 Toledo, Hernando de, i. 354; ii. 120.
 Toledo, Hernan Suarez de, i. 44, 63, 64.
 Toledo, Juan de, architect of the Escorial, i. 153.
 Toledo, Pedro de, ii. 171, *note* 2, 338.
 Toraldo, Gaspar, i. 371, 430, *note* 1; ii. 389.
 Torremaggiore, Marquess of, i. 323.
 Torres, Geronimo de, i. 454.
 Torres, Luis de, i. 337.
 Torte, Benvenuto, ii. 480.
 Tortona, Mucio, i. 394.
Toscana, Papal galley, i. 417.
 Tournament at Piacenza in honour of Don John, ii. 57.
 Treslong, Baron of, ii. 245, 249.
 Treviso, Marquess of, i. 466.
 Trevisano, Domenico, i. 293, *note*.
 Trezzo, Giacomo, engraver, i. 54, 63.
 Trigoso, a Jesuit, ii. 198.
 Trojano, Massimo, ii. 61.
 Trono, Pietro, i. 314.
 "Troubles, Council of," called also "Council of Blood," ii. 164, 190.
 Tunis, ii. 10; occupied by Don John, 15, and pillaged, 16; report on, presented to the King by Soto, 67, 68; besieged by the Turkish fleet, 70; taken, 85.
 Turkish allies of the Moriscos leave Spain, i. 270.
 Turkish corruption, i. 294.
 Turkish dominion under Solymán the Magnificent, i. 288.
 Turks, fleets of the, i. 86, 101, 291, 396; causes of the defeat of, at Lepanto, i. 423, 425.
 Tuscany, Cosimo I., Grand Duke of, i. 464.
 Tuscany, Francis II., Grand Duke of, ii. 51.
 ULLOA, Juan de, Alcayde of Toro, i. 12.
 Ulloa, Juan de, brother of Magdalena, wife of Quixada, i. 28.
 Ulloa, Magdalena de, wife of Luis Quixada, i. 5, 11; at the *auto-da-fé* of 1559, 26; 111, 233, 461; ii. 105; last interview with Don John, 123; takes charge of Don John's daughter Anna, 340; letter of Don John to, ii. 373.
 Ulloa, Mariana de, i. 26.
 Ulloa, Osorio, de, ii. 175.
 Umanes [Mayenne].
 Umene [Mayenne].

- Union, Act of, ii. 276.
 Union of Bruxelles, ii. 212.
 Urban VII., Pope, i. 48.
 Urbino, Duke of, i. 30, 310, 350, 416.
 Uxixar, Morisco rising at, i. 131.
- VAGA, Pierino del, i. 356.
 Valdes, Archbishop of Seville, Inquisitor-General, i. 26, 27, 36.
 Valdes, Francisco de, ii. 125, 173, 205.
 Valenciennes, taken by the Count of Noircarmes, ii. 159.
 Valcresso, Valerio, ii. 407.
 Valette, John de, Grand-master of Knights of St. John, i. 45, 304, 358.
 Valladolid, i. 10, 11, 37.
 Valle de Palacios, Hernan, i. 263, 264, 266; sent to Aben Aboo, 272, 273.
 Valois, Isabella (Elizabeth) of, third wife of Philip II., i. 35; death of, 110.
 Valois, Margaret of, i. 349; ii. 233, 499.
 Valor, Antonio de, i. 148, 173.
 Valor, defeat of Aben Umeya by Los Velez at, i. 178.
 Valor, Francisco de, i. 148.
 Valor, Hernando de, called Aben Jouhar el Zaguer, Morisco leader, i. 121.
 Valor, Hernando de Cordoba y de, i. 125; joins rebels in Alpuxarras, 125; is elected their king, and reigns as Muley Mahomet, Aben Umeya, 126 [Aben Umeya].
 Valsain, i. 46, *note* 2, 48.
 Van der Does, John, ii. 173.
 Vanderhammen, Lorenzo, ii. 187, 469.
 Van Ende, ii. 250, 253.
 Van Eycks, painters, ii. 131.
 Vargas, Alonso de, ii. 126, 205, 207.
 Vasari, painter, ii. 354, 355.
 Vassilacchi, Antonio, i. 444.
 Vasto, Marquess of, i. 327; ii. 31.
 Vaucelles, peace of, ii. 134.
 Vazquez, J. B., i. 385, *note* 2; ii. 480.
 Vega, Lope de, i. 287.
Veintiquatros, municipal magistrates of Granada, i. 153.
 Vela, Bautista, curate of Leganes, charged with the care of Don John, i. 5, 9.
 Velasco, Bernardino de, ii. 20, 75.
 Velasco, Inigo Fernandez de, constable of Castille, i. 76.
 Velasco, the Morisco, i. 267.
 Velazquez, i. 287.
 Veleta, Pic de, i. 127.
 Velez [Los Velez].
 Vendega, Baron of [Gognies].
 Vendome, Duke of, ii. 237.
 Venegas, Alonso de Granada, i. 166, 262; sent to Aben Aboo, 267; receives the submission of rebels, 269.
 Venetian mission to Teheran, i. 309.
 Venice, as a naval power, i. 85; relations with the East, 290; with the Sultan, 292; gains and losses of, in the East, 293, 308; unpopularity of, in Europe, 295, 308; promulgation of the Holy League at, 342; prepares vigorously for war, 360; negotiates with the Sultan for peace after the battle of Lepanto, 501, 504; concludes the peace, 508; character of the policy of, 510.
 Veniero, Hieronimo, ii. 401.
 Veniero, Sebastian (Doge of Venice), Governor of Candia, i. 361; sails into the harbour of Messina, 364; enlists troops, 371; replies to Don John, 373; hangs a Spanish captain, 394; at Lepanto, 405, 407, 416; dislike of Spaniards for, 472; made admiral of the Gulf of Venice, 472; retires from St^a Maura, 482; resigns his command and returns to Venice, 502; report to the Doge and Senate on his return from service, 385; life of, 410; death of, 413.
 Venusta, Federico, at Lepanto, i. 422.
 Verdugo, ii. 285, 318.
 Verhaer, F., historian, ii. 500.
 Veronese, Paolo, i. 444.
 Vezzuola, Guaspari, ii. 59.
 Vicentino, Andrea, i. 444.
 Vigevano, ii. 26, 28.
 Viglius, i. 30; ii. 124, 220.
 Vilches, Pedro de, i. 186, 199, 200.
 Villafañe, Juan de, i. 12, *note* 2.
 Villafranca [Toledo, Pedro de].
 Villafuerte, Corregidor of Granada, i. 217.
 Villagarcia, i. 5, 11.
 Villalpando, i. 39.
 Villalta, Bernardino de, i. 144, 145.
 Villalva, i. 19.
 Villamont, Seigneur de, i. 94.
 Villa Prcellin, Francisco de, i. 204, 205.
 Villareal, Garcia de, i. 139, 174, 269, 278.
 Villareal, Juan de, i. 141.
 Villena, Marquess of, i. 168.
 Villi [Robles, Caspar de].
 Villiers, P. Loyseleur de, ii. 494.
 Virues, Cristoval de, i. 455.
 Visdomini, Hippolyto, ii. 60.
 Vitturi, Z., ii. 403.
- WALSINGHAM, Sir Francis, ii. 271, 323, 325, 327, 328.
 Wenceslaus, Archduke, i. 346.
 Westminster, Confession of, ii. 139.
 Wiecek, massacre at, ii. 180.
 Wiercx, Jerome, ii. 355.
 Wilkes, English envoy, ii. 303.
 Willerval, Baron of, ii. 223, 262, 265.
 William of Hesse, i. 60.

- William the Silent [Orange],
 Wooden Leg [Vilches].
- Wylson, Dr., English envoy at Bruxelles,
 ii. 198, *note*, 207; despatch to Lord
 Burghley, 209; interview with Don
 John, 218; despatch to Sir Francis
 Walsingham, 220; to Burghley, 229;
 letter to Davison on Don John's death,
 337.
- XABA, El, i. 136.
- Xarandilla, castle of, i. 14.
- Xergal, massacre of Christians at, i.
 130.
- Ximenes de Cisneros, Cardinal, i. 39, 115;
 ii. 7.
- Xoabyi, Alcayde of Guejar, i. 173, 193,
 200, 217, 250, 267.
- YLLESCAS, Gonçalo, de, i. 281; ii. 479.
- Ypres, desecration of churches at, ii. 155.
- Yuste, Jeromite convent of, Charles V. at,
 i. 13.
- ZAGUER, Aben Jouhar el [Valor], i. 121,
 142, 178.
- Zamar, El, i. 141.
- Zanne, Girolamo, i. 314; procrastination
 of, 315; opposed by Doria, 318; refuses
 to attempt the recovery of Nicosia, 322;
 recalled, 324.
- Zapata, Pedro, i. 225; at Lepanto, 406,
 434, 445; ii. 9.
- Zatahari, El, i. 282.
- Zerbi, i. 392; ii. 138.
- Zitolomini, Giacomo, ii. 76; becomes a
 renegade under the name Mustafa, 77;
 makes Aluch Ali acquainted with all
 details of the fortifications of Tunis, 77;
 directs the operations of the siege, 81;
 is killed, 85.
- Zitolomini, Papal envoy, ii. 287.
- Zuazo, Arevalo de, i. 161, 162, 164, 212,
 260, 273, 280.
- Zuñiga, Bernardino de, ii. 330.
- Zuñiga, Diego, ii. 186.
- Zuñiga, Gabriel Niño de, ii. 339.
- Zuñiga, Juan de, i. 79, 331, 340, 353,
 472, 477, 511, 513; ii. 26, 109, 124.
- Zuñiga, Luis de Requesens [Requesens].
- Zutphen, ii. 274.
- Zuyder Zee, ii. 170.









GETTY CENTER LIBRARY



3 3125 00073 4612

